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Since at least the summer of 2015, refugee migration to Europe has been a topical 
issue in academic, political and public debates. While European meta-discourses 
often link to security issues, border security and problems with “burden sharing”, 
which are reflected at the state level and expanded by questions of social policies 
and so forth, the local level is largely neglected.
Yet, it is at the local level where policies are implemented, often with varying 
practices which are intertwined with local specifics regarding political culture and 
the state of civil society. Taking on a cross-national comparative perspective, 
research on the local level can reveal influences of national framings on the develop-
ment of reception processes, policy and discourses.
This volume aims to show the development of “the refugee crisis” and reception 
processes, and the repercussions of this “crisis” for policy development and public 
discourses at the level of European localities. It brings together a selection of fresh 
empirical research on reception processes and the development of structures, prac-
tices and discourses at the local level throughout Europe. The contributions are 
based on desktop research and document analysis as well as on a large variety of 
empirical fieldwork including media analysis, expert interviews, focus group dis-
cussions and ethnographic research. This fieldwork integrates perspectives from 
political and administration stakeholders, civil society and its institutions, grass-
roots organizations and asylum-seeking migrants throughout European countries 
which were touched by the “refugee crisis” in very diverse ways (Austria, Belgium, 
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Denmark, Germany, Hungary, Italy, and the Netherlands). Hence, the volume shows 
the varieties of refugee reception and integration strategies and practices, taking into 
account the geographical, historical and political contexts of the specific case study 
regions (see for example Chaps. 2, 3, 6, 9 and 10). By also including perceptions of 
the local public and how these translate into policy development, it contributes to 
the nexus between migration/integration of refugees on the one hand and societal 
development and political culture on the other (see for example Chaps. 6, 8 and 11). 
Through highlighting examples of experimental governance and multi-sectoral 
approaches, we point to the role of localities in shaping innovative policies (see for 
example Chaps. 7 and 12), but we also highlight the effects of tightening national 
(or supra-national) policies on specific places and localities, and on the inhabitants 
of those places (see for example Chaps. 2, 3, 4 and 5).
This introductory chapter will first highlight approaches that were central for 
creating this volume and which appear as cross-cutting themes throughout the sin-
gle contributions. Notably, these are the topics of local governance and the constitu-
tion of spaces and places of reception (Sect. 1.1.1), and the crisis narrative, its 
foundations and practical consequences (Sect. 1.1.2). In the last section (Sect. 1.2), 
we introduce the single contributions of this volume.
1.1  Rationale and Conceptual Framework
1.1.1  Local Governance and the Constitution of Spaces 
and Places of Reception
The admission and reception of asylum seekers is obviously a matter for multiple 
governance levels. While EU laws lay the ground for entry into the EU space, defin-
ing member states’ responsibilities for the handling of asylum applications and giv-
ing guidelines for the asylum procedures, it is the local level where asylum seekers 
are allocated, and where practical questions regarding accommodation, health 
issues, education or social integration have to be tackled. Given the fact that asylum 
policies are shaped at the national and supra-national governance levels, there is an 
obvious mismatch between the role of localities as being the major places of recep-
tion and integration of asylum seekers on the one hand, and their limited role in the 
decision-making process around whether to take in asylum seekers or not, and how 
(and at which point of the asylum procedure) they can shape asylum seekers’ paths 
to long-term integration. However, against the backdrop of the formal structure of 
governance, localities can carry out further functions beyond those set out by law, 
and can even undermine the reception system as designed by national or EU norms. 
The (counter-)active role of the local level is particularly evident in the case of net-
works of cities claiming a greater role in the asylum decision-making processes at 
the EU level by becoming ‘cities of refuge’ (Eurocities 2015; Doomernik and 
Ardon 2018).
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In migration research, the new focus on the local was fuelled by the ‘spatial turn’ 
in social sciences, which called for a reintroduction of space as an analytical cate-
gory for the research of social phenomena (see e.g. Bachmann-Medik 2016: 211 ff.; 
Warf and Arias 2009). The ‘local turn’ as part of the ‘spatial turn’ led to a more 
detailed conceptualization of the ‘local’ as a spatio-temporal setting which deter-
mines a specific opportunity structure in which migrants’ integration trajectories 
can unfold (Glick-Schiller and Cağlar 2011: 63). For migration policy research, the 
‘local turn’ implies a reconceptualisation of the local as a level of policymaking 
rather than merely focusing on national policies (Caponio et al. 2018; Stephenson 
2013; Zapata-Barrero et al. 2017). Zapata-Barrero et al. (2017: 2) stress that within 
a multilevel governance research framework, the local perspective can “contribute 
to a more in-depth understanding of why and how cities and regions respond differ-
ently to similar challenges, and of why and how these different answers can affect 
state-based models of immigration management”.
The new sensitivity towards the scale of observation is also appreciated in the 
context of growing critique against the essentialisation of the nation state in migra-
tion research, labelled as “methodological nationalism” (Wimmer and Glick- 
Schiller 2002). This also entails a closer look at local actor constellations, problem 
perceptions and civic cultures which determine how the task of migrant integration 
is approached within a specific municipality. Among the most convincing approaches 
for analyzing those local negotiation processes as crucial aspects of policy develop-
ment, the migration regime approach has become quite prominent in recent years, 
even though it lacks a clear-cut explanatory structure due to the multitude of defini-
tions and applications in research (for a review see: Bernt 2019). However, as Bernt 
(2019: 11) points out, the approach has its merits if used as “a perspective that tries 
to break free of state-centrism, to urge researchers to think about a multitude of 
actors and relationships, emphasizing relationality and openness in the field of 
migrations [sic] studies.” And that’s exactly what the contributions to this volume 
are doing.
A number of contributions also take a decidedly critical geographical perspective 
and apply concepts focusing on the spatiality of reception processes, resulting from 
a translation of hegemonic ideas and discourses into practices and material configu-
rations of places of reception. The contributions of Göler (Chap. 4) and Kreichauf 
(Chap. 3), for example, present analyses of local geographies of asylum, applying 
Marc Augé’s (2009) concept of non-places and Michel Foucault’s ideas on hetero-
topias (Foucault 1984). Focusing on the micro-level of asylum seekers’ accommo-
dation facilities, both authors explore how spatial, material and institutional 
differences affect everyday relations between asylum seekers and local residents 
and can even affect asylum seekers’ chances of being granted asylum. With a con-
ceptualization along the dialectics of openness/closure, or inclusion/exclusion, 
Göler and Kreichauf both demonstrate how spatial and social categories are linked 
in terms of producing spaces of inclusion or exclusion, and thus non-places or het-
erotopias. Also the contribution of Semprebon and Pelacani (Chap. 2) relates to 
critical concepts of space by depicting new “spaces of transit” or “internal hotspots” 
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along the Italian Brenner route, which are not only defined by the geographical 
layout of the space but by social borders of inclusion.
1.1.2  The Notion of Crisis
As the initial idea for this volume developed in the context of increasing arrivals 
(and shipwrecking incidents) of asylum seekers at the European shores, which was 
visible at the local level at least since 2013 and later labelled under various ‘crisis’ 
narratives (among others: ‘migration crisis’, ‘refugee crisis’, ‘reception crisis’, 
‘governance crisis’, and ‘state crisis’), we deem it necessary to reflect on the notion 
of crisis and its meaning in the context of asylum in Europe. As Scholten and Van 
Ninsen (2015: 3) point out in their introduction to a special issue on the role of 
policy analysis in ‘crisis’ situations, “crisis is often defined in a broad sense, involv-
ing concerns about levels and types of immigration as well as concerns about the 
integration of migrant groups and categories.” However, there is no clear definition 
of what the constituents of the crisis are, and who is deemed responsible for react-
ing to it.
In applied research in the context of migration and disaster management, the 
concept of crisis usually relates to humanitarian crises such as natural catastrophes 
or armed conflicts, combined with the inability of affected individuals, communities 
and states to cope with the outcomes of the critical event (Hendow et al. 2018: 13). 
In a historical perspective, the crisis definition gradually changed from a more 
“technical” understanding of crisis as a natural hazard to a more sociological defini-
tion of crisis as “a process of interaction between external forces, such as a natural 
hazard or armed conflict, and the socio-economic and political conditions in a soci-
ety” (Hendow et al. 2018: 14).
In this relational understanding, the concept of “vulnerability” also appeared, 
taking into account varying abilities to cope with the impact of a hazard, due to 
personal or group characteristics (Wisner et al. 1994). The focus on human agency 
and coping strategies led to the adoption of resilience as a key concept of disaster 
management (Hendow et  al. 2018: 17), which is commonly understood as “the 
shared social capacity to anticipate, resist, absorb and recover from an adverse or 
disturbing event or process through adaptive and innovative processes of change, 
entrepreneurship, learning and increased competence” (Frerks et al. 2011). We can 
conclude that the definition of a situation as a crisis is based on subjective percep-
tions and is in a relational sense, rather than on the basis of objectively measurable 
indicators (Lindley 2014).
Furthermore, as Hendow et al. (2018: 14) point out, the perception of a situation 
as critical is related to certain thresholds or tipping points, which highlight the pro-
cessual character (rather than static situation) of a crisis and also stress “the rele-
vance of rising tensions and the multiplicity of factors that shape a crisis as outcome” 
(ibid.). In the case of migration to and asylum in Europe, we can certainly see sev-
eral thresholds, constituted by strongly increasing numbers of migrant arrivals in 
B. Glorius and J. Doomernik
5
particular spots (first of all along the Italian and Greek shores, mostly observable on 
the Greek island of Lesbos and the Italian island of Lampedusa), which were not 
adequately equipped for the reception. Later, these thresholds also emerged in coun-
tries of second reception, such as in Austria, Germany, or the Netherlands, where 
additional reception centres were provisionally erected in camp-like structures. In 
the course of the “migration crisis”, so-called internal hotspots developed at places 
where migrants got stuck on their way through Europe, or after having been deported 
due to the Dublin Regulation. For a number of years, one of the most well-known 
places was the so-called “jungle” of Calais, a series of makeshift camps for migrants 
desperately trying to reach the UK via the Channel Tunnel or under the chassis of a 
lorry going on a cross-Channel ferry. But also the Italian border towns of Ventimiglia 
or Como, or certain cities along the Brenner route – as is shown by Semprebon and 
Pelacani in this volume – developed into internal hotspots.
Those localities serve as a showcase for the inadequacy of European asylum 
governance, highlighting the inability of political actors and regulating bodies to 
integrate those autonomously acting migrants into the logics of a Common European 
Asylum System (CEAS), with its fixed regulations regarding national responsibili-
ties for the processing of the asylum claim, and strict regulations regarding the sup-
port provided to migrants and the eligibility for this support. Consequently, in this 
volume, for example Müller and Rosenberger (Chap. 5) speak of a “migrant recep-
tion crisis” rather than a ‘migration’ or ‘refugee crisis’, stressing the structural mal- 
equipment and practical policy failures in the challenge to adequately respond to the 
needs of asylum seekers (see also Chaps. 2 and 6 in this volume).
However, moving through the contributions of this volume, we can also observe 
that the ‘crisis’ – of whatever it may exactly consist – plays out in different ways: in 
many of our case studies, it results in a backlash regarding integration and diversity, 
constituted by processes of socio-spatial exclusion of asylum seekers (campization, 
in Kreichauf’s words) as a measure to cope with increasing numbers of arrivals 
(such as in the cases of Denmark, Austria and Germany). In other cases, ‘crisis gov-
ernance’ resulted in local innovations and experimental governance (such as in the 
case of Plan Einstein laid out in Chap. 12), or increasing engagement of non-state 
actors and civil society, who gradually turned from people “who just wanted to 
help” into individual stakeholders who learned to express political claims (see 
Chap. 11). In some cases, the sudden surplus of clients constituted by the refugees 
(for example in the area of social housing or education) highlighted the shortcom-
ings of existing state structures, where neoliberal policies had already led to a seri-
ous reduction in quantity and quality before the ‘refugee crisis’. Thus, the arrival of 
refugees could serve as a catalyst for processes of change.
Throughout Europe, the perceived ‘refugee crisis’ went in line with politiciza-
tion processes, leading to the rise of Eurosceptic, nationalist and xenophobic parties 
and governance approaches, which is most notably seen in the case of Hungary (see 
Chap. 8). But also in other countries, and observable at the local level and in local 
discourses, public debates started on the legitimacy of asylum seekers’ presence in 
European localities. On the one hand, those debates argued about the legal legiti-
macy of asylum seekers, identifying so-called “poverty migrants” as persons not 
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deserving asylum in Europe, and not deserving direct support in the localities, 
which might be given to the detriment of economically poor local inhabitants. On 
the other hand, debates on the presence of asylum seekers were structured around 
attributes such as culture, gender, religion or ethnicity, identifying especially young, 
male, single Muslim asylum seekers as a threat to the cultural hegemony of white, 
Christian, democratic Europe. Those “othering” processes have led to strong xeno-
phobic and nationalistic movements and the concomitant evolution of nationalist 
right-wing parties throughout Europe, which are a major challenge for the European 
integration process.
1.2  Structure of This Volume
This volume is based on the assumption that regulatory structures and the develop-
ment of policies in the field of asylum reception are reconfigured at the local level, 
depending on the discursive framing of the topic in general and in relation to other 
topical issues in the relevant local and national frames.
The volume contains three – argumentatively connected – parts: the first address-
ing the governance of asylum and the structures of reception systems and spaces 
and places of reception; the second analyzing perceptions and discourses on asylum 
and refugees, their evolution and the consequences for policy development; and the 
third examining practical challenges and local responses in the field of refugee 
reception and integration.
The first part of this volume explores the spatial and temporal dimension of refu-
gee reception processes and its governance at the local level, presenting case studies 
from Italy (Chap. 2, Semprebon and Pelacani), Denmark (Chap. 3, Kreichauf), 
Germany (Chap. 4, Göler) and Austria (Chap. 5, Müller and Rosenberger). By tak-
ing a comparative perspective on the development of national and local reception 
structures and reception cultures, the contributions show the significance of local 
configurations for the development of spaces and places of asylum in Europe. A 
specific focus of all contributions in this part is the issue of how the governance of 
asylum has been adapted due to the stress situation since 2015.
Chapter 2 (Semprebon and Pelacani) looks at Italy, highlighting reception struc-
tures along the border between Austria and Italy, specifically in the cities of Bolzano, 
Verona and Trento. The region serves as a transit space for onward-moving migrants, 
but due to the border enforcements in Germany and Austria, many of them get stuck 
in the region and have to rely on the local welfare infrastructure to survive. Also 
migrants who were returned from Austria and Germany to Italy on the basis of the 
Dublin Regulation frequently stay in the region. However, the reception infrastruc-
ture is primarily designed for initial asylum applicants, excluding those mobile 
migrants1 who decided to travel onwards. Thus, the access to social services based 
1 In view of the fact that it is not always clear whether individuals who more or less spontaneously 
cross into Europe are intent on applying for asylum or would be granted protection if they did so, 
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on categorization processes of migrants effectively serves as a social boundary, 
which turns transit migrants into “second-class citizens”. The case study shows that 
it is not only first reception policies that have undergone a rescaling process from 
the EU level via the national level to the local level, but also policies of deterring 
individual mobility, which transforms the three case study sites into “internal EU 
hotspots”.
Chapter 3 (Kreichauf) discusses adaptations of the Danish reception infrastruc-
ture as a reaction to the increase of arrivals. Kreichauf examines how the state’s 
further tightening of restrictive reception and accommodation policies significantly 
impacts the socio-spatial configurations of accommodation facilities, and refugees’ 
access to housing and their well-being. He discusses the links between the tighten-
ing of laws, the deterioration of living conditions and the (re-)constitution of large 
accommodation facilities as means of socio-spatial exclusion. Introducing the con-
cept of “campization”, Kreichauf stresses the fact that the geographical location and 
the material configuration of asylum accommodation are crucial elements of 
Denmark’s policy of deterrence and exclusion of refugees.
Chapter 4 (Göler) also takes a deep look into a camp-like reception infrastruc-
ture, this time in the German state of Bavaria. The initial reception centre at Bamberg 
is a model facility that manages all the steps of the asylum decision (until possible 
rejection, followed by deportation) on site. The reception centre is located in a for-
mer military compound and thus is exclusionary in terms of the location and mate-
rial configuration. Drawing on Marc Augé’s concept of ‘non-spaces’ as well as on 
findings from camp research, Göler introduces the notion of “geographicities” as a 
relational approach towards spatial and social order and relevant political, economic 
or historical framings. Implementing a variety of empirical methods, among others 
a mapping exercise with inhabitants of the reception centre, his research reveals an 
alienation of refugees in the local and urban contexts, in which (politically deliber-
ate) approaches to integration are largely missing.
In Chap. 5, Müller and Rosenberger provide an overview of Austrian reception 
policies “before and after the reception crisis of 2015”. They show how localities 
respond to the allocation of asylum seekers, differentiating between two groups of 
relevant actors: administrative authorities on the one hand, and civil society actors 
on the other. Their analysis of the developments since 2015 reveals ambivalent 
results concerning the local turn in migration governance. In terms of legal powers 
on admission, they find municipalities losing importance, while in terms of support 
and inclusion municipalities gain in importance, not least because of the exclusion-
ary stance of the national government on asylum and reduced public funding for 
integration facilitators.
The second part of this volume focuses on public discourses on immigration and 
refugee reception in Europe and explores how they translate into reception practices 
and policy-making, and vice versa. Following the main rationale of this volume, the 
we use the term “migrant” to cover all those instances and reserve “asylum seeker” and “refugee” 
for where these are more appropriate.
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three chapters in this part highlight discourses and their outcomes for the local level, 
using case studies from Italy (Chap. 6), Belgium (Chap. 7) and Hungary (Chap. 8).
Chapter 6 (Pogliano and Ponzo) studies the development of two urban crises in 
Italy evolving in the context of refugee movements since 2013: the rapid increase of 
transit refugees at the Central Station of Milan, and refugees’ illegal occupation of 
four buildings in Turin’s former Olympic village. The chapter explores the framing 
of those events in the local media and policy discourse, identifying two specific and 
competing frames that evolve during the period of observation: the victim frame and 
the humanitarian frame. The authors highlight how policy networks and the local 
media were mutually involved in the process of narrative-making and how the cohe-
sion of the policy networks strengthened their ability to affect the local media 
frames. They thus connect to social movement studies, which just recently have 
begun to consider the role of media and communication in the organisation of “con-
tentious collective action” (McAdam et al. 2001), by raising the visibility of their 
political claims.
Chapter 7 (Ravn et al.), which is a case study of a European-funded local support 
programme for unaccompanied minor refugees in Antwerp, Belgium, explores the 
notion of deservingness which underpins this programme. Ravn et  al. argue that 
deservingness is a central notion in European discourses on refugee reception (e.g. 
Holmes and Castañeda 2016), pointing not only to the legal and economic dimen-
sions, but also to the moral dimension. They analyse how deservingness is repro-
duced by local actors of refugee assistance. One major finding is that stakeholders’ 
different ideas on deservingness reflect their different aspirations about the kind of 
citizens young refugees should become. This chapter thus illustrates how refugee 
reception programmes may trigger reflections on the shape of society and the crite-
ria for becoming a member of it.
Chapter 8 (Simonovits) focuses on yet another discursive line that developed in 
the context of refugee movements in Europe since 2015. Taking the example of 
Hungary, Simonovits explores the notions of fear and xenophobia in the context of 
refugee reception and specific local civil society responses which result from these 
perceptions. To provide a deeper understanding of those reciprocities, it is necessary 
to explore the connection between fear, risk perception, and the development of 
public opinion and public vote. Simonovits uses the Integrated Threat Theory (orig-
inally developed by Stephan and Stephan 1993), which incorporates several theo-
retical perspectives on stereotypes and prejudices, and thus arrives at a differentiated 
typology of real and perceived threats, their development with respect to individual 
and group characteristics, and their effects in terms of anti-immigrant attitudes and 
practices. The findings show how efficiently the anti-immigrant government narra-
tives shaped public attitudes on immigration and integration.
The third part of the volume explores how discourses translate into practices. 
Following Bourdieu’s “Theory of Practice” (1977), we assume that the development 
of practices and policies in the area of local asylum management is not only based 
on laws and regulations, but that it develops following implicit rules. The local level 
and specific features in it can thus be perceived as a field (in Bourdieu’s words), 
where actors compete for power and influence, and develop specific strategies that 
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guide actions and actors. By analysing a field, we better understand manifold influ-
ences such as the configuration of actors, their room for manoeuvre, formations of 
knowledge, normative discourses and power resources. The four contributions in 
this section (three case studies on Germany, one on the Netherlands) shed light on 
local governance in the field of housing and education (Chaps. 9, 10 and 12) and on 
the motivations and interactions of private and public actors (Chaps. 11 and 12). The 
questions addressed in this section are: How are policies influenced by public per-
ceptions and discourses, and vice versa? How do local policy responses in the con-
text of asylum migration and political/managerial practices vary, and how can 
variations be explained? Which interactions between policy fields and between dif-
ferent policy levels have occurred, and what are the long-term consequences of 
these interactions?
Chapter 9 (Glorius and Schondelmayer) presents a regional case study from East 
Germany and examines how the integration process of adolescent refugees in the 
educational system was managed during the years of large-scale arrivals in 
2015–2016. Glorius and Schondelmayer not only highlight the contextual specifics 
of the case study and thus point to the significance of the local level in understand-
ing processes and outcomes of reception policies, but also address the notion of 
integration from various actors’ perspectives. This helps to expand the view on the 
topic, which usually focuses solely on the “official” level of reception and integra-
tion governance.
Chapter 10 (Adam et al.), again a regional case study in Germany, addresses the 
field of refugee housing. Adam et al. conceptualize individual housing as a crucial 
step in integration and highlight the interconnections of governance sectors—refu-
gee reception and social housing—in the field of housing. Affordable housing, in 
many of Germany’s densely populated urban areas, is increasingly contested and 
politicized, and thus the competition for affordable housing could (further) evoke 
social tension in these regions. The authors explore different housing strategies for 
refugees in a large city and smaller towns, illustrating the variety of approaches and 
difficulties with their implementation.
In Chap. 11, the volume’s final regional example from Germany, Hoppe-Seyler 
highlights the role of local voluntary organisations as important actors in the local 
governance of refugee reception, taking over basic tasks from municipalities such 
as language teaching and providing refugees with information and practical help. 
She specifically addresses the motivation for voluntary work, highlighting how the 
emotional and spatial dimensions are meaningful to the analysis of volunteer prac-
tices as well as their conflicts and ruptures. Furthermore, she shows the politiciza-
tion of volunteers and the potential for conflicts resulting from politicization, not 
only for individual volunteers and refugee relief organisations, but also for local 
policy-making.
Chapter 12 (Geuijen, Oliver and Dekker) again turns to the housing sector and 
presents a local housing project in the Netherlands, which combines refugee recep-
tion policies with other sectors of policy-making (social work, neighbourhood 
development, social work with youth). In particular, Geuijen, Oliver and Dekker 
show how, through the development of multi-sector and multi-level alliances, the 
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project was made appealing to different constituents for different reasons. The chap-
ter also illustrates how the experiment resulted in the initiators manoeuvring within 
different political contexts and constraints locally and nationally. In this way, it did 
not challenge the existing structures outright, through decoupling from the national 
level, but negotiated within these, to bring the concept into being. The chapter thus 
presents a refreshing example of how the so-called ‘refugee crisis’ could provide an 
opportunity for experimentation at the local level in European cities.
The concluding Chap. 13 (Doomernik and Glorius) wraps up the major findings 
of this volume. It highlights the conceptual challenges and knowledge gaps that 
were brought to the fore by the single contributions, and identifies interesting 
research questions for further research in this rapidly changing policy field.
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Dispersal and Reception in Northern Italy: 




In the last decades, the European Union’s migration policy has been increasingly 
criticized for its imbalance towards border control and the fight against what policy- 
makers define as “illegal migration” rather than the reception and the protection of 
seekers and holders of international protection. An increasing number of policy 
restrictions and practices have curtailed the rights of both groups of migrants 
(Morris 2002; Tyler 2010), thus impacting on their lives as well as on the territories 
they transit through.
Dispersal schemes are an element of this policy scenario. They feature in various 
EU member states, including Italy (Boswell 2001; Robinson et al. 2003), as part of 
an articulated multi-level policy framework. Within this framework, local authori-
ties and the third sector play a crucial role in dealing with the arrival and reception 
of seekers and holders of international protection and with the difficulties due to 
inadequate EU and national reception systems.
In 2011, with the outbreak of the Arab Spring and the reprise of considerable 
migration flows towards EU member states, the political discourse on asylum and 
migration policy came to be dominated by an “emergency” frame again (Campesi 
2011; Marchetti 2012; Dal Zotto 2014), often invoked to legitimise the unprepared-
ness of national governments to cope with migration. In 2013 and 2014, as the 
Syrian civil war escalated, a growing diversification and fragmentation of migration 
trajectories added to this (perceived) emergency due to the increasing numbers of 
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Syrians and Eritreans arriving on southern Italian shores in order to reach Northern 
Europe, particularly Germany and Sweden.
In this context, temporary controls were re-introduced several times at Brenner, 
one of the Italian points of access to Austria, pursuant to Article 25 et seq. of the 
Schengen Borders Code, providing EU member states with the possibility of intro-
ducing temporal controls at internal borders in the event of serious threats to inter-
nal security. Regular random police inspections have been operated since by 
German, Austrian and Italian police forces on trains and in train stations along the 
Brenner route, from Verona to Brenner, and further north, in Rosenheim and Munich 
(Antenne Migranti and ASGI 2017).
In addition, several agreements have been signed between Italy and Austria in 
this regard.1 Border enforcement was particularly strengthened in 2015 (for a good 
explanation on this, see Fontanari and Borri 2017); and, in the same year, Austria 
declared its intention to tighten controls on its border with Italy (European 
Commission 2015). It was a time when the cross-border mobility of seekers and 
holders of international protection was hardly evident to the wider public opinion. 
On their side, national institutions had been tolerating what were understood as 
marginal “secondary movements” (Scalettaris 2007). These resulted from a national 
strategy of “laissez-passer” (Ciabarri 2015), implemented, similarly to Greece, to 
cope with growing arrivals.2
Holders of humanitarian protection3 were increasingly pushed to the margins of 
society. Some of them tried to travel to Northern Europe to look for better settle-
ment opportunities, thus making the inadequacy of the Dublin system more evident 
(Morano-Foadi 2017). Other migrants included people performing autonomous 
journeys (Kasparek 2016) along the Balkan route, which was closed in summer 
2015, and from Southern Italy, in the period that preceded the full operation of the 
1 For further details see Antenne Migranti and ASGI (2017). In 2014, an agreement regulated con-
trols on passenger trains, and in 2017 on freight trains. The former agreement was ratified by both 
the Italian government (Legge del 03/11/2016 nr. 209, G.U. 21/11/2016) and Austrian government 
(Bundesgesetzblatt Nr. BGBl. III Nr. 47/2017). For further details see Antenne Migranti and ASGI 
(2017) and Monika Weissensteiner “Da Lampedusa al Brennero”, Una città. http://www.unacitta.
it/flip/lampedusa-brennero/files/assets/basic-html/page39.html. Accessed 5 July 2018. As regards 
the latter agreement see Ansa “Austria, Controlli treni merci al Brennero”, http://www.ansa.it/
trentino/notizie/2017/11/15/austria-controlli-trilaterali-brennero_5266a464-914d-4930-a7cf-
8bc5e7004224.html. Accesses 1 July 2018.
2 Cf. Infringement procedure opened against Italy for the incorrect implementation of the Eurodac 
Regulation (n. 20152203) notified on 10/12/2015. European Commission – Press release, 10th 
Dec. 2015. http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-6276_EN.htm. Accessed 20 June 2018.
3 The humanitarian protection is a national status granted by the Italian government to asylum seek-
ers in situations not typified by LD. 286/1998 (arts. 5.6, 19.1), that is to say whenever there are 
serious reasons, of humanitarian nature, or resulting from constitutional or international obliga-
tions. It applies to applicants whose refugee status or right to subsidiary protection cannot be rec-
ognized, but who can also not be expelled in accordance with the principle of non-refoulement. 
However, the LD. 113/2018 (in force since October 2018, and converted into Law 132/2018) has 
partially modified the grounds on which humanitarian protection is given, by limiting the ground 
on which this status can be granted and adding three other “special” permits, two based on humani-
tarian grounds (medical reasons and natural disasters) and another for special civil merits.
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hotspot system (Sciurba 2017), aimed at boosting compliance with the Eurodac (n. 
603/2013) and the Dublin III Regulations (Casolari 2016). Many became stuck at 
Ventimiglia, a border crossing point with France, or Como-Chiasso, at the border 
with Switzerland, and were repeatedly transferred back to the hotspot areas (Tazzioli 
2017). The same happened at Brenner, the main point of access to Austria.
This is how these locations transformed into internal hotspots (see also Denaro 
2016 on Milan) characterised by more and more systematic border enforcement 
practices.4 They have also become “spaces of transit” (Tazzioli 2017). Therefore, 
several local actors have been “forced” to activate accordingly, in order to deal with 
migrants being “stuck” while trying to transit through these spaces towards Northern 
Europe. In particular, we are referring to migrants arriving by land through the 
Balkan route, holders of humanitarian protection wanting to leave Italy, migrants 
re-admitted to Italy in application of the Dublin Regulation or entering Italy to re- 
apply for international protection, and asylum seekers leaving a reception centre in 
Italy (due to unsustainable living conditions) despite a pending asylum application 
in the country.
The fact that none of these migrants can easily access (or benefit from) the recep-
tion system points to some critical issues. Firstly, transit across Europe has affected 
the rights and conditions of seekers and holders of international protection. Secondly, 
it has put reception actors in some border locations under more strain. Growing 
interest has been paid to the crucial role of civil society in dealing with them, as well 
as with undocumented migrants (e.g. Ambrosini 2018). Less attention has been 
given to how and the extent to which the public sector has been activated to deal 
with their presence on their territory, for a more or less limited time. This is the 
focus of this chapter.
By drawing from the work of Caponio and Borkert (2010) on the multilevel gov-
ernance of migration, and the work of Mezzadra and Neilson (2016) on the prolif-
eration of heterogeneous forms of borders, we discuss the specific scenario along 
the Brenner route, and how and to what extent the respective local systems of recep-
tion have catered (or not) for migrants that policy-makers often define “in transit” 
and who (at a certain stage) have fallen out of the ordinary system of dispersal.
The chapter is structured as follows: first, an overview will be given of the cur-
rent system of reception in Italy and of the critical issues that have emerged over the 
most recent years. Second, we will set our contribution into the context of the wider 
academic debate on reception systems and how and whether these have responded 
to migrants. Then, we will focus on three cities along the Brenner route—Verona, 
4 Papers on these localities have been presented in the panels “Ethnographies of asylum seekers 
reception” coordinated by Semprebon and Marzorati http://www.etnografiaricercaqualitativa.it/
GeneralProgramme at the Ethnography and Qualitative Research Conference in Bergamo 6th–9th 
Jun. 2018 and by Fontanari, Gennari, Caprioglio, Ferri http://users2.unimi.it/escapes/
escapes2018/escapes2018-programma/#28p at the Escapes Conference in Milan 28th–29th Jun. 
2018.
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Trento and Bolzano—and will look at the similarities and differences characterising 
their respective reception systems. To conclude, we will make some final remarks 
and provide recommendations for policy-making.
2.2  The Current System of Reception in Italy
Italy is characterised by a double-track reception system: an ordinary and an extraor-
dinary one. The origins of the ordinary system can be traced back to the “Piano 
Nazionale di Asilo” (National Asylum Plan) (1999–2001) when a first attempt was 
made to create a reception network with the involvement of local communities 
(Hein 2010).
In 2001, the Ministry of Interior, ANCI (the Associazione Nazionale Comuni 
Italiani – National Association of Italian Municipalities) and the UNHCR signed a 
memorandum of understanding establishing the first public reception network in 
Italy, which was institutionalized by Law 89/2002 under the name of “SPRAR” 
(Sistema di protezione per richiedenti asilo e rifugiati – Protection system for asy-
lum seekers and refugees).
In 2011, a parallel emergency system of reception was set up in order to cope 
with the increasing number of arrivals by sea that followed the outbreak of the Arab 
Spring and a chaotic situation in Libya. In April 2011, the Italian Ministry of Interior 
launched the Emergency North Africa Program, which ended in December 2012. 
Extraordinary reception centres were opened to provide a temporary solution, aimed 
to complement the limited capacity of the ordinary system.
Over time, due to the persistent inability of the ordinary system to cope with 
arrivals, the extraordinary system was consolidated and was finally institutionalized 
in 2014, on the basis of an understanding among the State, the Regions and local 
entities.5 This was meant to favour the coordination of all government levels 
involved in reception and to lead to the absorption of the extraordinary system into 
the ordinary one, by promoting a two-level system.
The current system is structured as follows: upon migrants’ arrival, medical 
assistance is provided and identification procedures are carried out in hotspots or at 
the ports of arrival, although they partly still take place in the CPSAs (Centri di 
Primo Soccorso e Accoglienza – Centres of first medical aid and reception). Next, 
migrants who express the intention to apply for international protection are taken to 
collective governmental reception centres (CPAs, Centri di Prima Accoglienza – 
Centres of first reception). When places are insufficient, migrants are distributed 
across temporary centres, the so-called CASs (Centri di Accoglienza Straordinaria – 
Centres of Extraordinary Reception), located throughout the country. The distribu-
5 Conferenza Unificata Stato-Regioni, Intesa tra il Governo, le Regioni e gli Enti locali sul piano 
nazionale per fronteggiare il flusso straordinario di cittadini extracomunitari, adulti, famiglie e 
minori stranieri non accompagnati, 10.07.2014. http://www.statoregioni.it/Documenti/
DOC_044430_77%20CU%20PUNTO%202%20ODG.pdf. Accessed 20 June 2018.
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tion takes place according to a system of progressive quotas, taking into consideration 
regions’ number of asylum seekers with respect to the total number of inhabitants 
and the percentage of access to funding from national funds for social policy.6 
Finally, asylum seekers are transferred to a SPRAR structure, if places are 
available.7
According to the most recent data available, on 31st December 2016, 73% of 
migrants were hosted in CAS structures, 7.8% in other structures of first reception 
(CPAS, CDA, CARA), 0.4% in hotspots and 18.7% in SPRAR structures. This 
makes it evident that although the SPRAR system is supposed to be the main ele-
ment of the reception system, it is still far from being so, mainly due to insufficient 
places being available (SPRAR report 2017).
2.2.1  The SPRAR Network and the CAS
The SPRAR network consists of a network of reception projects, funded through 
resources made available by the National Fund for Asylum Policies and Services 
(funded in turn by the EU Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund). Local entities 
join the network on a voluntary basis, by applying for funding. Each reception proj-
ect must be approved by the Central Service (Servizio Centrale), which is the 
SPRAR’s coordinating body. Requirements include first and foremost the accep-
tance of a public authority to take responsibility as the main signatory. Projects last 
3 years, are renewable, and the National Fund covers 95% of the total costs.8
The network operates on a multi-level logic, through the decentralisation of proj-
ect management: the implementation of activities is delegated to private actors, 
encouraging the activation of synergies between the public and third sectors.
In 2016, 652 SPRAR projects were funded: 508 targeting ordinary beneficiaries, 
99 unaccompanied minors and 45 migrants with physical and/or mental vulnerabil-
ity or disability. Since its creation, the network has grown considerably from 1365 
available places in 2003 to more than 26,000 in 2016.
As indicated in the 2017 SPRAR report, in 2016, the ordinary system started 
giving priority of access to migrants who had already obtained a form of interna-
tional protection, in line with the idea that the SPRAR should become the primary 
infrastructure to facilitate the integration of migrants. The Law 132/2018 (in force 
since October 2018) established that only holders of refugee status or subsidiary 
protection, unaccompanied minors, holders of permits granted for medical reasons, 
victims of natural disasters, those with civil merits and other limited special cases 
can access a SPRAR project. The SPRAR was renamed SIPROIMI, (Protection 
System for holders of international protection and unaccompanied minors - Sistema 
6 Supra note 6.
7 For more details on reception structures see Accorinti (2015).
8 See the SPRAR dedicated website. www.sprar.it. Accessed 5 January 2017.
2 Dispersal and Reception in Northern Italy: Comparing Systems Along the Brenner…
20
di Protezione per titolari di protezione internazionale e per minori stranieri non 
accompagnati).
SPRAR and (and similarly for SIPROIMI - but implementation guidelines have 
not been published yet) initiatives offer “integrated” reception services, with the 
main goal of supporting beneficiaries on their path towards autonomy. Apart from 
room and board, services should include health assistance, language and cultural 
mediation, social assistance, multicultural activities, support for job orientation and 
job seeking, and legal assistance. The actual standard of these services across the 
country is inconsistent. Standards of CAS services are not defined in the relevant 
normative framework (Lgs.D. 142/2015), but can be defined in the conventions 
signed between a CAS and a local prefecture9 or the prefecture and the local author-
ity competent for the territory where the CAS is located.10
Reception facilities are of three types: 2873 small flats (83.3% of structures in 
2016), 357 collective centres (10.3% in 2016) and 227 “comunità alloggio”, which 
are community reception centres (6.6% in 2016). Some structures are targeted to 
specific types of beneficiaries, such as unaccompanied minors, single women with 
children, and families.
The length of beneficiaries’ stay in the centres varies depending on their status 
and personal situation, but also across projects, in relation to discretionary decisions 
on the side of operators. As far as seekers of international protection are concerned, 
reception is granted until a decision on the application is made. In case of rejection, 
their stay can be prolonged until the term to appeal the decision expires and, in case 
of appeal, as long as they are authorized to remain in the national territory (art. 14, 
Legislative Decree - from now onwards LD. - 142/2015).
As a result of an effort to simplify and accelerate the legal procedure after a nega-
tive decision by the Territorial Commission, the possibility to appeal the decision to 
a second instance was eliminated (LD. 13/2017). Rejected applicants can now only 
appeal directly to the Court of Cassation within 30 days (art. 6, co. 1, lett. g, LD. 
13/2017, 35 bis, co, 13). In practice, their length of stay depends on the time it takes 
for the competent Territorial Commission to decide on the application: currently 
more than 300 days on average (AA.VV. 2017). For applicants that have obtained a 
form of international protection, their stay in reception centres should not exceed 
6 months, but it can be extended on an individual basis – for example, if applicants 
do not have their own means of subsistence or are particularly vulnerable.
9 The Prefecture is the headquarters of the Prefetto (Prefect) who represents the Ministry of Interior 
in each province.
10 e.g. Prefecture of Rome http://www.prefettura.it/roma/allegati/Download:Cas_capitolato_tec-
nico_cig_695518503c-5854145.htm; Prefecture of Florence http://www.prefettura.it/FILES/alleg-
atinews/1183/ALL_1_Convenzione_.pdf; Prefecture of Milan http://www.prefettura.it/milano/
allegati/Download:Allegato_b_schema_di_convenzione-5732499.htm. Accessed 20 August 2018.
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2.2.2  Critical Issues Relating to the Reception System 
in the CAS and SPRAR Network
Scholars have highlighted a range of critical issues connected to the reception sys-
tems in various EU countries. Some of these issues are (partly) relevant for the 
Italian system too.11
First, there has been a growing process of privatization of reception (Darling 
2016), alongside limited accountability of the managing institutions. This concerns 
Italy too, particularly with reference to the CASs managed by private cooperatives.
Second, responsibility for reception has been increasingly delegated from the 
national to the local government, with scarce monitoring (Robinson et al. 2003). 
Similarly, repeated evidence by lasciateCIEntrare12 suggests that the Italian Ministry 
of Interior does not regularly undertake monitoring visits to the CASs, thus leaving 
them to the discretion of prefectures. On its side, SPRAR’s Central Services has 
been undertaking a regular monitoring of projects’ financial reports but also visits.
Third, minimum standards of services are not always guaranteed (Robinson et al. 
2003). In the case of Italy the lack of homogeneity is evident in particular when 
comparing SPRAR and CAS structures (Marchetti 2016). SPRAR identified precise 
standards for the provision of services, financial reporting and monitoring, contrary 
to CAS structures, where the vast majority of beneficiaries of reception are hosted. 
At the same time, critical issues relating to standards also apply to some SPRAR 
structures, due to the consistent growth of the network and the fact that some opera-
tors are not yet sufficiently trained (Ambrosini and Marchetti 2008; Semprebon 
2017). From this point of view, a reflection is needed on the effectiveness of LD. 
142/2015 in terms of granting minimum standards of reception to all seekers and 
holders of international protection (Marchetti 2016), considering the lack of homo-
geneous approaches to management and the provision of services.
Fourth, as anticipated, the approval of a SPRAR project is dependent on the vol-
untary decision of a public entity to take responsibility for the project. However, this 
does not always happen, as migration is a highly politicized issue and reception is 
often met by resistance from local residents (Marzorati and Semprebon 2018), also 
as a result of a diffused discriminatory discourse on immigration (Carta di Roma 
2017). To date, the total number of public entities that have signed for a project 
amounts to 555, including 491 municipalities (out of a total of 8000 in Italy) – while 
1000 authorities are involved in projects to a limited extent (SPRAR 2017). In this 
sense, the voluntary nature characterizing the activation of SPRAR projects has 
been strongly criticised (Penasa 2017).
Fifth, reception often seems to be geared towards the control of beneficiaries 
rather than their empowerment and integration, particularly in CAS structures 
(Griffiths et al. 2005). In Italy this has translated into rigid internal CAS regulations 
limiting individuals’ personal autonomy, although they should be allowed to go out 
11 e.g. Ambrosini and Marchetti (2008); Scannavini (2010); Marchetti (2016)
12 See http://www.lasciatecientrare.it/. Accessed 8 February 2018.
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during the day, as established for ordinary centres (art. 10.2, LD. 142/2015; Accardo 
and Guido 2016).
Sixth, and at a more macro level, critical issues of reception relate to the actual 
system of dispersal and the impact of beneficiaries’ arrival in different contexts of 
reception. An overarching logic of “burden sharing” (Boswell 2001) still prevails 
and coexists with an approach that is still largely based on emergency management, 
despite the efforts to develop a system based on a constant and ex ante annual evalu-
ation of reception needs. In fact, as expressly stipulated by LD. 142/2015 (art. 8), 
the national coordinating body is expected to adopt an annual reception plan based 
on a prediction of arrivals, which should define the number of places needed for 
reception. No other criteria are applied in the dispersal system. For example, no 
consideration is made to distribute beneficiaries where larger communities of co- 
nationals reside, in view of facilitating access to co-ethnic networks, contrary to 
what is suggested by evidence (for the UK: Bloch 2008).
Seventh, if we look at post-reception experiences, various reports by SPRAR 
highlight that only a few beneficiaries find employment and decent accommodation 
at the end of their stay in a reception project. Moreover, to date, even when benefi-
ciaries are granted protection, they cannot benefit from any national integration pro-
gramme; if they are rejected, they may return to (if ever having left) a state of 
marginality (Médecins Sans Frontières 2018; IntegrA/Azione 2012). Many of them 
may experience a sense of “institutional abandonment” (Agier 2005).
Finally, a more general critical aspect of the reception system in Italy relates to 
access. Some categories of migrants are de facto excluded or run a high risk of being 
excluded from it. These include migrants who are in transit, and who arrive by land and 
are not “dispersed” through the quotas defined by the Ministry of Interior (for migrants 
arriving by sea). The most recent amendment to the national legislation of international 
protection and reception (Cf. Law 132/2018) confirms this exclusionary trend.
2.3  Reception in Transit Places: The Academic Literature
As noted above, little attention has been paid to the public sector, and to how and to 
what extent it is activated to deal with migrants transiting through Europe. 
Particularly in the past decade, Italy has been understood and has considered itself 
as a gateway to Northern Europe. In this sense, it could seem paradoxical that the 
country has scarcely improved its capacity to deal with migrants that transit through 
border areas. However, as spelt out in LD. 142/2015, the right to reception is granted 
only to migrants who do not have any means of subsistence when they apply for 
international protection in Italy and for whom Italy is responsible according to the 
Dublin III Regulation.
What should be stressed is that access to reception, and connected rights, can be 
hindered even when these conditions are met: this is the case for migrants that arrive 
by land, typically through the Balkan route or who travel southwards through the 
Brenner Pass, following a rejected application for asylum in another EU member 
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state. While migrants arriving on southern Italian shores enter the reception system 
through the system of dispersal (unless they refuse to do so or flee), migrants arriv-
ing by land can face considerable obstacles in accessing any form of protection. 
Even if they manifest their willingness to apply for asylum, the formalization of the 
application can take 1 month or more (AAVV 2017) and the entry into the reception 
system can take much longer (e.g. NAGA 2018) or be denied altogether.
Migrants who are re-admitted to Italy following a take-back procedure (arts. 18, 
23–25, Dublin III Regulation) face similar difficulties. In this context, Italy has 
recorded an increasing trend of incoming Dublin procedures, with a three-fold 
increase in 2016 with respect to 2015 (Eurostat 2018–13).13 The evaluation is par-
ticularly lengthy, with the resulting protraction of migrants’ precariousness (AAVV 
2017). Adding to this, the time limits for the evaluation, as per art. 21.1 of the 
Dublin Regulation, often expire, with the result that migrants cannot be subject to a 
Dublin Procedure any longer. Attempts to overcome the deficiencies and imbal-
ances of the Dublin Regulation have been made with the introduction of specific 
tools. The most well-known of these is perhaps the mechanism of relocation, which 
nevertheless has proved ineffective because EU member states have largely acted 
according to their “own interests” (see Stege 2018).
There are also migrants that are granted reception but that choose to flee. Where 
a voluntary and formally unjustified abandonment of reception applies, migrants are 
excluded from reception measures (cf. arts. 13 and 23 LD. 142/2015). This high-
lights the tension between the current logic underlying reception and asylum, that 
is, to stay in a country, and the actual condition and choice of many migrants to 
move across Europe.
A recent report by Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF 2018) has addressed the con-
ditions of migrants experiencing one (or more) of the situations described above. It 
has underlined the “invisibility” of migrants that are barely protected by institutions 
and at a high risk of being forced into informal settlements in public spaces (parks, 
squares, railway station platforms, etc.) or squatting in abandoned buildings (com-
pare Pogliano and Ponzo, Chap. 6 in this volume). Many of the informal settlements 
are found in border cities close to the Balkan route, including North-western Italian 
cities such as Trieste, Gorizia, Udine, but also Trento and Bolzano, further up north, 
as well as in Foggia and Crotone, in Southern Italy, where centres of first reception 
are located. Squatting is mostly evident in larger metropolitan areas. Evidence of 
similar circumstances, most often in the absence of institutional interventions, has 
been found in border locations of other EU countries, such as Calais (Rigby and 
Schlembach 2013; King 2016).
Various scholars have provided informed accounts of civil society actors assisting 
destitute migrants (on Italy: Campomori 2008; Marzorati et al. 2017; on the US: De 
Graauw 2015) and undocumented migrants (Ambrosini 2018) who face  precarious 
and vulnerable conditions, and likewise migrants transiting through border areas.
13 Data is available at: http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=migr_
dubri&lang=en. Accessed 27 August 2018.
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Scholars have identified the role of civil society actors as crucial in the wider 
framework of the European border regime. A general attitude has been observed 
among government agencies of “turning a blind eye” to the presence of migrants, 
while delegating responsibility to the third sector (Ambrosini and Van der Leun 
2015; Bonizzoni 2017; Ambrosini 2018) as, in compliance with national (exclud-
ing) norms, the state does not have to meet their needs. Some scholars criticize simi-
lar forms of delegation (Ambrosini and Van der Leun 2015; Balbo 2015; Marzorati 
et al. 2017; Mayblin and James 2018) by suggesting their substitute function con-
tributes to the disengagement of the public sector (Castañeda 2007).
Generally speaking, the growing assumption that (some) migrants are “in tran-
sit” has often overshadowed the relevance of evolving migration patterns, even in 
urban contexts located at the crossroads of internal and international borders. What 
can be defined as “transit migration framework” has not only contributed to the 
neglect of some migrants’ experiences, but has somehow legitimised non- 
intervention by local governments with respect to wider integration issues (Marconi 
2018). This is in line with a more general tendency to consider forced migrants as a 
temporary population with the resulting adoption of temporary policy solutions 
(Fabos and Kibreab 2007). Davies et al. (2017) argue that this form of institutional 
abandonment can be interpreted as a means of control perpetrated through inaction. 
However, with the rapid diffusion of the (often blurred) “transit terminology” (e.g. 
transit migration, transit countries, transit migrants) in the public and political dis-
course, transit countries and areas have been increasingly accused of being respon-
sible for transit migration itself. At the same time, they have been asked and induced 
to cooperate in filtering unwanted “inflows” of people (Düvell 2012; Düvell et al. 
2014).
While this can be described as an evident manifestation of a wider migration 
regime, it cannot be interpreted as a set of fixed dynamics, but needs to be looked at 
in relation to contextual specificities, including growing concerns and emotions 
associated with xenophobia and racism. This is particularly true for the field of 
migration that has been described as very contentious (Della Porta 2018).
Additionally, as many authors have stressed, migration policies can translate into 
practices that, even in contradictory ways, are “less efficient” and more tolerant. 
Policies can be more or less coherent with respect to national legislations, and more 
or less inclusive with respect to migrants. Some local authorities have refused to 
adhere to national (exclusionary) approaches, by choosing to support irregular 
migrants (Varsanyi 2006; Davies et al. 2017; Ambrosini 2018); while others have 
shown varying degrees of willingness to grant, and difficulty in dealing with, recep-
tion for (otherwise stranded) asylum seekers (e.g. Davis et  al. 2016); others still 
have designed interventions that reinforce the exclusionary nature of national poli-
cies (Gilbert 2009; Chand and Schreckhise 2015; Gargiulo 2017).
National governments bear the primary responsibility for immigration policy 
(concerning the entry of migrants and citizenship regulation), while local govern-
ments are responsible for the provision of services. Research has shown that local 
authorities have been prone to adopt pragmatic approaches to migrants’ incorpora-
tion (Caponio and Borkert 2010; Jørgensen 2012; Marzorati et al. 2017), as they are 
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faced with their needs most directly (Borkert and Bosswick 2007; Vermeulen and 
Stotijn 2010) and somehow are “forced” to address them in some ways (Ambrosini 
and Boccagni 2015). In Italy, this has been happening in a context characterised by 
weak regulation at the national level and strong fragmentation of institutional 
responsibilities (Caponio and Pavolini 2007; Balbo 2015) that has resulted in con-
siderable local variations in the provision of services (Caponio and Campomori 
2014). Furthermore, it has been adding to a welfare system that determines the eli-
gibility of social rights depending on legal status (Sainsbury 2012), meaning access 
to it is most restricted to undocumented and forced migrants.
In this direction, we will look at dispersal and reception policies in Italy, and how 
and to what extent they have been implemented at a local level and in border locali-
ties that have been faced with the presence of migrants transiting through them. The 
focus will be specifically on three cities along the Brenner route: Verona, Trento and 
Bolzano.
2.4  The Methodological Approach
Our approach involves a triangulation of research techniques: legal analysis of pol-
icy documents, content analysis of nine interviews carried out with institutional and 
civil society actors in Verona and Trento between September 2017 and April 2018,14 
and a non-systematic content analysis of newspaper articles – particularly articles 
referred to by interviewees, and secondary research material. This research has also 
benefited from discussions with volunteers of the project “Antenne Migranti”,15 
with whom one of the authors has been volunteering since May 2016. Discussions 
centred on policies implemented by institutional agents in Verona, Trento and 
Bolzano, as well as practices identified by volunteers by speaking to migrants and 
by accompanying them to helpdesks and public offices. Note that no interviews 
were carried out in Bolzano due to resource constraints.
14 CIR employee, 9/3/2018; Operator of dorms, 4/12/2017; Don Calabria supervisor, 8/3/2018; 
Executive Officer Polfer 17/12/2017; Reception Office Coordinator of the Social Service 
Department of the Municipality of Verona, 23/3/2018; Islamic centre Board Member, 19/12/2017; 
Director of Cinformi, 7/3/2018; Helpdesk Operator, 18/4/2018; Soup kitchen operator, 4/5/2018.
15 Antenne Migranti is a project coordinated by the Alexander Langer Stiftung Foundation, in 
Bolzano, with partial funding from the Open Society Foundation to support a coordinator. The 
project is run by volunteers and has these objectives: to detect and prevent the violation of migrants’ 
rights along the Brenner route; to support migrants by directing them to local services and helping 
them with asylum procedures; to assess migrants’ needs and stimulate institutions to respond to 
them; to promote an informed debate on reception and free movement; and to promote the devel-
opment of effective trans-local networks on reception and transit.
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2.5  The Case Studies
2.5.1  Verona
The reception system in Verona comprises a SPRAR and a CAS system. The former 
comprises 97 places for beneficiaries in five projects—two for ordinary beneficia-
ries and three for unaccompanied minors—under the responsibility of the 
Municipality of Verona;16 the latter accommodates 2705 beneficiaries under the 
responsibility of the prefecture17 that has delegated implementation to 30 social 
cooperatives. Out of 98 municipalities in the wider provincial territory, only three, 
including the Municipality of Verona itself, have activated a SPRAR project so far.
Resistance to reception has been strong and it can be associated with political 
factors. The current governing coalition in Verona is led by the right-wing party 
Lega Nord, known in Italy for its xenophobic positions against migrants and its firm 
opposition to reception. Shortly after the beginning of his mandate, in May 2017, 
the current mayor forcefully declared his opposition to reception for migrants “who 
do not have the right to stay”,18 but he has been silent since. The previous mayor had 
developed a more open attitude towards migrants, after departing from an overtly 
racist attitude (Semprebon 2010). At the same time, his approach was in line with 
his successor in that he stressed the distinction between economic migrants and 
“deserving” asylum seekers.19 He also called for police forces not to prevent 
migrants from getting on trains heading to Brenner, and for European member states 
to agree on the delivery of a European humanitarian permit, so that Italy was not left 
to deal with the phenomenon alone.20 On their side, in the most recent years, some 
mayors in provincial localities have openly supported the extreme-right movement 
“Verona ai Veronesi” (Verona to the Veronese) and its protests against reception.21
16 Data (March 2018). http://www.sprar.it/progetti-territoriali?_sft_provincia=verona. Accessed 26 
June 2018.
17 Prefecture of Verona data, 30 November 2017.
18 Verona Sera, 29 June 2017 “Profughi. Sboarina vuole cambiamenti. Ferrari: Aderisca allo Sprar”. 
http://www.veronasera.it/cronaca/sboarina-profughi-ferrari-sprar-29-giugno-2017.html; L’Arena 
27 June 2017, “Sboarina e i profughi ‘Sì a chi ha diritto, no ai clandestini’”. http://www.larena.it/
territori/citt%C3%A0/sboarina-e-i-profughi-s%C3%AC-a-chi-ha-diritto-no-ai-clandes-
tini-1.5797961. Accessed 20 June 2018.
19 L’Arena, 2 February 2017 “Centro profughi Tosi perplesso: ‘Meglio altrove’”, http://www.lar-
ena.it/territori/citt%C3%A0/centro-profughi-tosi-perplesso-meglio-altrove-1.5463105; Verona 
Sera, 3 January 2017. Protesta dei profughi a Veronetta, Tosi: “Inaccettabile. Che siano allon-
tanati”. http://www.veronasera.it/cronaca/tosi-protesta-profughi-veronetta-3-gennaio-2017.html. 
Accessed 20 June 2018.
20 Verona In, 29 September 2015 “Tosi alla Polfer: lasciate salire i profughi sui treni”. http://www.
verona-in.it/2015/09/29/tosi-alla-polfer-di-verona-lasciate-salire-i-profughi-sui-treni/. Accessed 
20 June 2018.
21 Verona Sera, 4 July 2017 “Anche a Roncolevà, Verona ai Veronesi contro il ‘business 
dell’accoglienza’”. http://www.veronasera.it/cronaca/verona-ai-veronesi-trevenzuolo-4-lug-
lio-2017.html; Verona Sera, 24 June 2017 “Presidio a Buttapietra di “Verona ai Veronesi” contro il 
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Verona is located in the north-eastern Italian region of Veneto and is not a town 
of first arrival. Migrants mostly arrive here through the dispersal system operating 
in Italy, while some of them arrive autonomously, while transiting through the coun-
try. In fact, Verona is located at the intersection of several important transport routes: 
the main train station functions as an interchange for railway traffic from Bologna 
to Brenner, from Venice to Milan and west to Ventimiglia. It is also connected to 
Quadrante Europa, one of the largest freight terminals in Italy (in terms of 
volume).
According to the CIR employee interviewed, following the increasing enforce-
ment of border controls at Brenner and the closure of the Balkan route towards the 
north, a growing number of migrants have been transiting through from the Balkans 
towards Italy since mid-2015. In September 2017, the local branch of CIR (Consiglio 
Italiano Rifugiati – Italian Council for Refugees, a national NGO specialised on 
asylum) estimated that a total of 50 migrants were on the waiting list to access 
reception (narrative evidence by a CIR employee).
CIR has been operating a legal support desk for reception beneficiaries, as a 
partner of the local SPRAR project. In recent years, the same desk has also been 
providing support to migrants that arrive autonomously in Verona. Because of 
increasing arrivals, funding was sought to provide them with temporary accommo-
dation. In particular, a specific CAS was opened for this purpose, managed in col-
laboration with Caritas, although with a limited capacity of around 25 places – plus 
a few extra places in the ordinary SPRAR project, if needed (interview with CIR 
employee, 9 March 2018). In practice this CAS offers pre-reception accommoda-
tion for asylum seekers that arrive by land while they wait to access the reception 
system.
CIR is also the lead partner of a project, funded by the Ministry of Interior, for 
holders of subsidiary protection or refugees who are homeless and jobless. All these 
individuals may be potential candidates for secondary movements towards Northern 
Europe or France, although their legal status does not allow them to work in 
European countries other than that from which they have obtained international 
protection. Initially the helpdesk was open to holders of humanitarian protection too 
but it was later decided to target only migrants with a higher form of protection (no 
explanation for this was provided during the interview). The project involves sup-
port in the search for housing and employment (ibd.), which are often hard for 
reception beneficiaries to find once they have completed their reception project (see 
for example MSF 2017). For these migrants, if they are clearly vulnerable, some 
temporary accommodation (15 days) is provided by a helpdesk that manages access 
to the local dorms. Normally, access (or a short renewal) is requested by CIR after 
the migrants access their helpdesk (interview with operator of dorms, 4 December 
2017). This also applies to migrants arriving autonomously on the territory, upon 
formalisation of their asylum application, and to migrants whose asylum  application 
possibile arrivo di 40 profughi”. http://www.veronasera.it/cronaca/presidio-corteo-magnano-
profughi-verona-ai-veronesi-24-giugno-2017-.html. Accessed 10 July 2018.
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has been rejected and who are still homeless 1 year after completion of their recep-
tion project.
A third (already finished) project managed by CIR was specifically targeted to 
unaccompanied minors and was funded by the AMIF (Asylum and Migration and 
Integration Fund). In this project, CIR was co-partner, together with NGOs based in 
Gorizia, Udine, Trieste, Roma and Puglia, with the main aim of providing legal 
assistance to unaccompanied minors and monitoring their transit from Southern to 
Northern Italy, northward through borders with Austria and westward through bor-
ders with Slovenia. According to a CIR employee (9 March 2018), 30% of the 
minors they assisted at their legal desk were seekers of international protection who 
intended to reach a relative residing in another EU country with whom they were in 
contact.
Verona was a transit town for most of them, which in the opinion of the CIR 
employee was largely due to their scarce (if any) awareness of the Dublin Regulation 
and their family reunion rights. This made it crucial to provide them with legal 
information (Koser 2010; Bloch et al. 2011), also in view of preventing potentially 
dangerous onward movements, for example on freight trains. Yet, lengthy proce-
dures often meant that minors would be unwilling to wait and would decide to 
continue their travel on their own.
CIR has also been working in synergy with Don Calabria, a religious body that 
runs projects targeting vulnerable groups and individuals, including the manage-
ment of a community centre for unaccompanied minors. This centre currently hosts 
around 30 beneficiaries, as part of one of the municipality’s SPRAR projects (inter-
view with Don Calabria Supervisor, 8 March 2018). Don Calabria has ten extra 
places of “pronta accoglienza” available: these are “last minute” accommodation 
places usually occupied by minors who are stopped by the police at the train station 
(or elsewhere in town) while trying to transit through the city.
Since 2014, minors have continued arriving, although an Executive Officer of 
Polfer, the railway police,22 stated that the transit of migrants reached a peak in 
201623 to then decrease to a few dozen after summer 2017—in line with the drop in 
arrivals on southern Italian shores (interview, 17 December 2017)—and that these 
movements have rarely involved unaccompanied minors. Possibly they have rather 
been less visible in Verona. We will come back to this later.
There is also an issue of misrepresentations by the media, as police forces them-
selves testified24: the news repeatedly referred to migrants transiting through sta-
tions on the Brenner route, but in fact such movements often involve migrants 
permanently settled in Italy who regularly commute to nearby cities for work or to 
22 The Polfer in Verona is responsible for inspections along the Brenner railway line from Verona 
to Brenner.
23 Around 100–150 migrants, mainly Eritreans and Syrians, between July and August.
24 Corriere di Verona, 26th Jun. 2016 “Senza biglietto sul treno locale. Ma non sono profughi”. 
https://www.pressreader.com/italy/corriere-di-verona/20160623/281711203946664. Accessed 20 
June 2018.
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beg – as well as seekers of international protection hosted in local reception centres 
that go to train stations to benefit from free Wi-Fi.
Ten places for “pronta accoglienza” for unaccompanied minors have proved to 
be insufficient, with the result that minors have been often accommodated in centres 
outside Verona or even outside the region. Additionally, movements have become 
more complex. In the first months of 2018, reception operators started experiencing 
two new specific typologies: on the one side, northward arrivals from Southern 
Italy, following minors’ flight from a reception centre – often described as being of 
very poor standard – with the intention of reaching a family member in Northern 
Europe; on the other side, southward arrivals from Germany and Sweden, following 
the rejection of an asylum application or the non-recognition of minors’ age and the 
pending possibility of being deported back to their country of origin (ibd.).
In relation to the latter, the Reception Office Coordinator of the Social Service 
Department of the Municipality of Verona (interview, 23 March 2018), that holds 
the main (institutional) responsibility for unaccompanied minors, reported consid-
erable frustration: in the face of consistent investments in time and resources 
(including not only accommodation but also individualised educational and employ-
ment programmes), many minors choose to leave the territory, even before complet-
ing their project. Frequently this is the consequence of a long and tiresome waiting 
period for the reunification procedure to be implemented.
Apart from institutional actions, some support to migrants in transit has been 
provided by Antenne Migranti volunteers, volunteers of the “Ronda della Carità”, a 
mobile food service targeting homeless people that has long been active, as well as 
various volunteers and activists of local associations working in the field of migra-
tion and/or discrimination on an individual basis.
The local Islamic centre has been active too. As reported by a representative 
(interview Board Member, 19 December 2017), through word of mouth they were 
visited by a growing number of migrants in transit in 2015 and 2016. In particular, 
there were Syrians and Afghans who asked for food and money to buy a train ticket 
to reach Northern Europe, while more recently, the number of visitors has decreased 
and shifted to Senegalese and Moroccan nationals. Some migrants have asked for 
accommodation too, but the board decided not to provide it due to the pressure they 
have experienced since 2015: following the terrorist attacks in Paris, the prayer hall 
and the adjoined cultural centre have been under regular surveillance by police 
forces, with the declared purpose of protecting the Islamic community.
2.5.2  Trento and Bolzano
The autonomous provinces of Trento and Bolzano/Bozen (henceforth APT and 
APB respectively) are both situated in the autonomous region of Trentino-Alto 
Adige. Although the main responsibility for migration policy in Italy (i.e. control of 
entries, stays and returns) is in the hands of the national government, the APT and 
APB enjoy considerable discretionary powers in the field of migration, compared to 
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ordinary provinces such as Verona, and ordinary regions such as Veneto. As a result, 
both autonomous provinces have adopted their own specific provincial law on 
migration, leading to disparities in the respective reception systems.
As early as 1990, the APT adopted provincial Law 13/1990, “Interventi nel set-
tore dell’immigrazione straniera extracomunitaria” (Interventions in the field of 
non-EU migration), stating that asylum seekers and refugees are granted access to 
public services in the provincial territory on an equal basis with non-EU migrants. 
In 2002, the provincial authority adopted guidelines regulating the material condi-
tions of reception. In the following years, subsequent protocols spelt out further 
specific guidelines on seekers of international protection (2003), victims of human 
trafficking (2003) and unaccompanied minors (2011) (interview with Director of 
Cinformi, 7 March 2018).
Within the same framework, the provincial authority delegated to Cinformi 
(Centro Informativo per l’Immigrazione – Information Centre for Immigration), an 
operative unit of the Dipartimento Salute e Solidarietà Sociale (Department of 
Health and Social Solidarity), the following activities: monitoring the presence of 
asylum seekers within the provincial territory; coordinating the activities of local 
authorities and associations in relation to immigration; providing economic assis-
tance to asylum seekers; drafting and signing conventions with private actors pro-
viding accommodation facilities; and providing information to migrants on asylum 
procedures and on provincial services.25
Two decades after the approval of APT Law 13/1990, Provincial Law 12/2011 
was similarly approved by the APB to regulate the integration of migrants, and seek-
ers and holders of international protection. Additionally, as indicated by the Director 
of Cinformi (7 March 2018), both provinces signed a protocol26 with their respec-
tive commissaries,27 which increased their margin of manoeuvre over the manage-
ment of reception policies: differently from ordinary provinces, both the APT and 
the APB can decide where reception centres should be located and how to distribute 
reception applicants accordingly.
The reception system in Trento comprises a SPRAR and a CAS system, both 
coordinated by the Provincial Authority. The former comprises 149 places in two 
projects (June 2018), one for ordinary beneficiaries and one for unaccompanied 
minors, under the responsibility of the Provincial Authority of Trento;28 the latter 
accommodates 1494 beneficiaries (August 2018), mostly of Nigerian, Pakistani, 
Malian, Gambian and Senegalese nationality, in 229 structures in 70 out of 72 
municipalities of the provincial territory (Cinformi, May 2018).29
25 For further details see http://www.cinformi.it/
26 The protocol of the APT is available at: http://www.prefettura.it/FILES/AllegatiPag/1229/1_
Protocollo_d-intesa_2_aprile_2014.pdf Last accessed: 27th Jul. 2018; the protocol of the APB 
could not be retrieved.
27 These have an equivalent function to the prefectures in ordinary provinces.
28 Data (March 2018). http://www.sprar.it/progetti-territoriali?_sft_provincia=trento. Accessed 26 
June 2018.
29 Data (March 2018). http://www.cinformi.it/index.php/it/news_ed_eventi/archivio_news/
anno_2017/cruscotto_statistico_accoglienza/(offset)/0/(limit)/4/(sb)/312. Accessed 27 July 2018.
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In the APB, discussions on joining the SPRAR have been ongoing since 2017, 
but municipalities have only recently started activating the first projects. At the 
moment, beneficiaries are accommodated in six ordinary SPRAR projects, with a 
total of 223 places, all located outside Bolzano,30 and in various CAS structures 
with a total of 636 places. Narratives by Antenne Migranti volunteers reported on 
declarations by the mayor of Bolzano, stating he refused to join the network unless 
the number of asylum seekers in Bolzano diminished and reached the quota set by 
the Ministry of Interior (fieldwork note, 30 November 2017).
An increasing number of municipalities in the provincial territory have been pro-
viding places. This is unsurprising as, according to the 2018 Agreement on local 
finance,31 the Provincial Authority will not consider any request for public funds for 
municipalities that fail to accomplish their reception obligations set by the Provincial 
Authority itself.32
Similarly to Verona, considerable resistance to reception has grown in Trento and 
Bolzano. Various protests have been repeatedly organised by extreme-right move-
ments and violent attacks have also taken place (although not always claimed by a 
specific movement).33 In the wider political context, the increasing success of the 
Lega Nord (now Lega), for example in municipal elections in Trento and Bolzano, 
must also be acknowledged. According to some political commentators, drawing 
from the trend in  local elections, this is a sign that the autonomous Region of 
Trentino Alto-Adige is experiencing political dynamics that are closer and closer to 
those of the rest of the country and most specifically to those of the neighbouring 
Veneto and Lombardia regions, in spite of a decade of centre-left government.34
The APT can be described as a transit area, since it is located along the Brenner 
route, although its relevance in this sense seems to be less evident than for Bolzano, 
as we shall explain. According to estimates, approximately 20 to 30 migrants arrive 
autonomously in the territory every month (interview with Director of Cinformi, 7 
March 2018).
A helpdesk is operated by the non-profit association Centro Astalli, which has 
been delegated by Cinformi to manage SPRAR projects. The helpdesk provides all 
asylum seekers with basic information on the asylum procedure and reception, thus 
30 Data (March 2018). http://www.sprar.it/progetti-territoriali?_sft_provincia=bolzano. Accessed 
26 June 2018.
31 Cf. Accordo sulla finanza locale per l’anno 2018, 22.12.2017. http://www.provincia.bz.it/enti-
locali/download/2018_Accordo_finanza_locale.pdf. Accessed 4 July 2018.
32 Both provinces should accommodate no more than 0.9% of asylum seekers (in relation to the 
total resident population).
33 Il Dolomiti, 10 April 2018 “Attentato incendiario contro il B&B che ospiterà i profughi” 
Available at: http://www.ildolomiti.it/cronaca/2018/attentato-incendiario-contro-il-bb-che-ospi-
tero-i-profughi-i-sindacati-accogliere-chi; Il Giornale dell’Alto Adige, 13 July 2017 “Centinaia di 
nuovi profughi in Trentino Alto Adige: CasaPound protesta con 50 striscioni sull’A22”. http://
www.ilgiornoaltoadige.it/?p=76264. Accessed 7 July 2018.
34 Trentino, 7th Mar. 2018 “Il voto dice che l’anomalia trentina è finita. E l’Alto Adige si allontana” 
Available at: http://www.giornaletrentino.it/blog/il-voto-dice-che-l-anomalia-trentina-%C3%A8-
finita-e-l-alto-adige-si-allontana-1.1536736 Last accessed: 8th Jul. 2018
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also assisting migrants arriving autonomously. In 2017, approximately 400 migrants 
approached the desk autonomously to apply for asylum and to enter reception 
(interview with helpdesk operator, 18 April 2018). It was also stated that the 
Provincial Authority intended to improve the support, in terms of providing infor-
mation and assistance, to migrants arriving autonomously, thanks to a specific eco-
nomic contribution delivered by the national government to the Municipality of 
Trento and other municipalities in the provincial territory.35 A first contribution was 
given in 2017. In this second round, the Provincial Authority has expressed willing-
ness to sign a protocol with all the municipalities that have received this contribu-
tion, in order to define a strategic plan for the most effective use of resources36 
(ibd.).
Out of 400 applicants indicated above, approximately 150 eventually entered a 
reception project in 2017–18, after a waiting period of 2 or 3 months. According to 
an estimate by volunteers of Antenne Migranti, who collaborate with local volun-
teers engaged in a support service for homeless people, approximately 50 migrants 
are currently stranded on the streets (fieldwork note, 7 May 2018). While data has 
not been collected systematically, it can be hypothesized that half of the applicants 
actually leave the territory, while the other half decide to remain, possibly because 
of a higher scarcity of resources.
Since the increase of police controls at the Brenner border in 2016 (following 
declarations by the Austrian Ministry of Interior on a “clampdown” on migration), 
the operators of Cinformi have repeatedly collected narratives by applicants describ-
ing Milan as the actual transit spot where, in agreement with compatriots (probably 
acting as passeurs), migrants can be driven out of Italy across the border with 
Austria. Trento, as a transit spot, did not emerge clearly in this picture.
At the same time, the operator interviewed reported a peculiarity of the Brenner 
border. Since 2015, some “fluidity” has become evident: migrants are not always 
subject to police controls on the Austrian side of the border and are often left free to 
cross southward to reach Italy, while controls in the opposite direction have been 
much more systematic and have mostly resulted in migrants being stopped and 
asked to take the train back southward. A similar attitude was reported by police 
forces in Bolzano with the hypothetical result that migrants eventually arrive in 
Trento, the first large town south of Bolzano, but according to volunteers of Antenne 
Migranti this has not been happening since November 2017 (fieldwork note, 20 
August 2018).
The typologies of migrants’ journeys have considerably evolved over time to 
become more and more complex. At present, the majority of migrants who arrive 
autonomously in Trento had their application previously rejected in one or two 
35 This contribution corresponds to 500 euros for each reception beneficiary and is given to munici-
palities in Italy to compensate for the burden of reception, whenever they host a given percentage 
of asylum seekers.
36 Giornale Trentino, 25 January 2018 “Arriva il bonus ai comuni: per ogni profugo 500 euro”. 
http://www.giornaletrentino.it/cronaca/trento/arriva-il-bonus-ai-comuni-per-ogni-profugo-500-
euro-1.1502151. Accessed 4 July 2018.
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European Union countries—mainly Germany, Austria or France (interview with 
helpdesk operator, 18 April 2018)—and then applied for protection in Italy. Although 
in these cases a take-back request should be lodged as per art. 18.1(d) of the Dublin 
Regulation, Italy has often ended up becoming the Member State responsible, due 
to lengthy bureaucratic procedures.37 Furthermore, other categories of migrants 
approach the helpdesk,38 although not all are granted access to reception, based on 
rules defined in LD. 142/2015 but also by the Commissary.
Helpdesk operators help to fill in applications for reception and for asylum appli-
cation appointments at the Commissary (interview with helpdesk operator, 18 April 
2018). However, as Antenne Migranti volunteers have testified (fieldwork note, 6 
July 2018), there are no clear, transparent rules on who is admitted to reception. The 
decision is up to the Commissary, with a level of discretion that seems to go beyond 
interpretation of the asylum norm. An example of non-transparent and unclear rules, 
as reported by volunteers themselves, are those that apply to migrants who have 
already applied for asylum in another Italian city. In this case the underlying 
assumption is that each locality has the capacity to host applicants, hence they all 
have a chance to enter the system. This is actually consistent with LD. 142/2015. 
However, consistency is less obvious in the case of vulnerable applicants, and yet 
this decree still does not ensure their access to reception. Antenne Migranti volun-
teers reported that access had been recently denied to migrants re-admitted to Italy 
regardless of obligations set by the Dublin Regulation (art. 18), or of any form of 
vulnerability suffered by the applicants (fieldwork note, 4 May 2018).
It is questionable whether this recent filter has been applied to address the local 
administrators’ fear of a “pull effect”, possibly associated with a word-of-mouth 
narrative among migrants suggesting that Trento is more welcoming than nearby 
cities, in particular Bolzano, which has severely restricted access to the reception 
system with the introduction of the Circolare Critelli (circular letter) as will be 
explained below. It is legitimate to wonder whether the Provincial Authority in 
Trento may have somehow “emulated” the approach adopted in Bolzano to avoid an 
extra “burden” of reception resulting from the restrictions introduced by the 
Circolare.
Concern about an extra “burden” has also been stated explicitly, in a recent press 
release,39 whereby the President of the Provincial Authority of Trento (together with 
that of the Provincial Authority of Bolzano) has taken a strong stance with the 
Ministry of Interior, calling for indications on how to include migrants that arrive 
autonomously in the national system of dispersal, and on whether resources for 
37 Cf. art. 23.3 and 29.2, Regulation 604/2013
38 These include: migrants arriving from southern Italy who have abandoned or have been expelled 
from a reception centre in another Italian city, where they have a pending appeal; holders of inter-
national protection that are stranded without a house and job; migrants who upon arrival on south-
ern Italian shores get into contact with smugglers to be driven up north; but also migrants from 
Colombia and Ukraine who arrive on a tourist visa and then apply for asylum.
39 Press Release 1546, Autonomous Province of Trento, 21 June 2018 “Richiedenti asilo, dalla 
Conferenza Regioni ok alla proposta del Trentino e dell’Alto Adige.”
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homeless people should also be used for them (and for migrants that terminate their 
reception project or for whom reception measures are withdrawn, thus making them 
homeless).
Resources for homeless people are a thorny issue. Access to food distribution is 
open to everyone but operators insist on the need to improve collaboration with 
social services and operators dealing with reception. They have lamented the fact 
that they have had to use homelessness resources for asylum seekers, while they 
should be dealt with by Cinformi, Astalli and municipal social services, not least 
given their specific skills in addressing the needs and vulnerabilities of asylum seek-
ers (Soup kitchen operator, 4 May 2018).
Access to dorms is regulated thorough a helpdesk operated by five local associa-
tions. While they used to be fully accessible to everyone, increasingly restrictive 
rules have been introduced, emulating the approach of Verona, and then revised 
again. Currently, people that have a residency status in Trento can stay in the dorms 
for 30 plus 30 days, while those with no residency status can only stay for 30 days 
(both with a possible renewal of 30 days).40 The most crucial issue around perma-
nence has concerned the limited time allowed, with the result that many people, 
including asylum seekers that arrive autonomously, fall into homelessness for up to 
four or 5 months even after they have formalized their application for asylum – 
which is why temporary accommodation solutions were found in winter 2017. It 
also concerns the fact that, similar to Verona (fieldwork note, 9 March 2018), it 
often takes more than a month for asylum seekers to formalize their asylum applica-
tion and that formalization requires, among other things, a letter stating their domi-
cile. This can only be provided by dorms during the time they host people. In turn, 
this has contributed to creating a “black market” for asylum seekers that need to buy 
a letter from friends or compatriots (Soup kitchen operator, 4 May 2018; and for 
Verona fieldwork note, 9 March 2018).
As explained by the helpdesk operator interviewed, whenever a homeless vulner-
able migrant approaches the helpdesk (or a migrant completes his/her reception 
project and becomes homeless), an application for reception is forwarded to the 
SPRAR. As set out by LD. 142/2015, the specific situation and needs of vulnerable 
persons must be taken into account (including minors, disabled people, elderly peo-
ple, pregnant women, single parents with children who are minors, victims of 
human trafficking, people with serious illnesses, people with mental disorders and 
people who have been subjected to torture, rape or serious forms of psychological, 
physical or sexual violence). Yet, available places in SPRAR are very limited and 
most often it is local associations that provide for them, with temporary accommo-
dation paid by the Provincial Authority.
Similarly to the APT, in the APB the Provincial government coordinates the 
reception system and since mid-2017 has delegated implementation to the  following 
40 Regolamento e criteri di gestione dello sportello unico per l’accoglienza delle persone senza fissa 
dimora (Rules and criteria for the management of the helpdesk for the reception of homeless 
people), provided by soup kitchen operator (updated 4 December 2017).
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actors: the NGO Associazione Volontarius Onlus, together with the social coopera-
tive River Equipe, Caritas, the Red Cross, and SPES srl Social Enterprise.
Considering its geographical and strategic position – it is along the Brenner railway 
route and de facto the last large city before the Brenner Pass – Bolzano (and its pro-
vincial area) can also be considered a transit area for migrants. It has become a transit 
zone, a sort of internal hotspot, following the increasing controls carried out at Brenner 
and in Bolzano, as a result of the agreements cited in the introduction (see notes 2, 3, 
4) that have de facto forced migrants stopped at Brenner to return to Bolzano.
As in Trento and Verona, some migrants arrive autonomously in the town, par-
ticularly from Nigeria, Ghana, Gambia, Mali, Senegal, Iraq, Pakistan and 
Afghanistan. At the end of June 2017, a total of 146 male migrants were recorded as 
being present (Antenne Migranti and ASGI 2017).
For such migrants, access to reception has been limited since the approval of the 
aforementioned Circolare Critelli from the Provincial Authority, dated 27 September 
2016, although even earlier it was very much restricted. This circular spells out the 
categories of migrants who cannot access reception, in particular: migrants who 
have right to relocation, male parents of minors of less than 14 years old (at the 
beginning of October 2016 the age was raised to 18), and migrants who have stayed 
in a European or non-European country or in an Italian region (and did not just 
transit through). What is more is that as far as vulnerable individuals are concerned, 
there is no specific provision for access even if they fall under any of these catego-
ries. Their needs are taken into consideration only in exceptional circumstances 
(e.g. certified severe health problems) and if they are clearly in transit (i.e. if they are 
stopped by the police at the border). In any of these cases, access is only considered 
for a maximum of 3 days. Contrary to what happens in Trento, no application is 
made for entrance into SPRAR projects, as these individuals are de facto considered 
as “fuori quota” (that is to say, arriving asylum seekers who take the numbers above 
the quota assigned to the Province of Bolzano by the Ministry of Interior). As a 
result of this, at the end of June 2018, around 260 people were homeless on the 
streets (160 in families and 100 single people), according to estimates collected by 
Antenne Migranti volunteers through Caritas (fieldwork note, 27 June 2018).
Migrants that cannot enter the reception system are basically left homeless and 
they only have access to two free meals per day—following insistence on the side 
of Antenne Migranti for a minimum of two meals to be given to them in the local 
soup kitchen operated by Caritas for homeless people—and one free shower per 
week. This scenario hit the headlines in 2017, when the news reported about Adan, 
a 13 year old who in spite of having muscular dystrophy was still left out on the 
streets with his family and eventually died a few days later.41
It should be noted that in order to meet migrants’ basic needs during their stay in 
Bolzano, or at the actual Brenner border, two support centres were opened in 2015 
at the respective train stations, which are operated by local humanitarian volunteers. 
41 Alto Adige, 12th October 2017 “Circolare Critelli, raccolta firme per abolirla”. http://www.alto-
adige.it/cronaca/bolzano/circolare-critelli-raccolta-firme-per-abolirla-1.1343670. Accessed 3 May 
2018.
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The local association Volontarius Onlus operates two support centres—one at the 
train station in Bolzano (since April 2015) and one at Brenner (since December 
2014)—to provide basic information, food and clothing, using volunteers from a 
range of local third sector organisations (including local cooperatives, Caritas, the 
Italian Red Cross and the Alexander Langer Foundation).42 At Brenner they also 
coordinate an accommodation structure. Furthermore, some local parishes give shel-
ter—although they have limited capacity and resources—and Antenne Migranti vol-
unteers provide basic information on local services and on the asylum procedure43.
2.6  Discussion and Final Remarks
What actors provide what services for migrants transiting along the Brenner route? 
In each of the cities analysed services are limited and access restricted. Migrants 
that transit through cities and border areas are treated as “second-class citizens”, 
compared to migrants arriving by sea on southern Italian shores and dispersed 
through the quota system. Yet, the number of autonomous arrivals has been quite 
stable in recent years, and it has been most problematic in Bolzano where the recep-
tion system is still under construction.
Against this scenario, our contribution has looked at the Brenner route area in 
order to dig out any specific elements, in terms of governance approach and con-
figurations, that could be associated with the cities selected for the analysis and their 
(geographical) closeness to the border. Indeed, some common elements, as well as 
differences, have emerged.
First, in all three cities there are hardly any dedicated services for migrants tran-
siting through cities and border areas. The few services available to them are rela-
tively recent and (tend to) overlap with services for homeless people. Accordingly, 
criticism has been voiced by various actors about an improper use of (targeted) 
resources and a lack of specific professional skills to deal with this complex cate-
gory of users.
Additionally, no form of collaboration exists across the three cities in dealing 
with migrants transiting through cities and border areas, but examples of “policy 
emulation” are manifest in Trento, with respect to Bolzano, and also to Verona, 
although only in the replication of exclusionary rather than inclusionary solutions. 
This could sound surprising when recalling that Trento has for a long time been 
considered as a “positive example” of reception, first and foremost given the promi-
nent coordinating role of the Provincial Authority.
Second, services in Bolzano are provided mostly by third sector organisations, 
thus confirming their substitution function with respect to the public sector. In 
42 See https://www.volontarius.it/assistenza-umanitaria-alla-stazione-di-bolzano/. Accessed 20 
June 2018.
43 See supra note 17.
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Trento and Verona institutional arrangements have also emerged, in more recent 
times, in line with the pragmatic stance, according to which local institutions cannot 
avoid dealing with, or at least addressing, migrants’ presence. Nevertheless, particu-
larly in Verona, services are strongly connected to actors’ fundraising skills. These 
have taken the shape of inclusionary but also exclusionary initiatives, with an 
opaque tendency towards a “laissez-passer” approach. Paradoxically, in contexts 
such as Bolzano, it is precisely this tendency that result in forms of containment for 
migrants getting stuck in the city when sent back from Brenner.
Third, this chapter shows that restricted access to reception is not always justified 
on the basis of the asylum policy. Restriction criteria are spelt out by policy-makers 
in Bolzano and in the Circolare Critelli, in line with what has been happening else-
where in Italy, where the majority of migration policy acts have taken the form of 
administrative acts; while in Trento and Verona, volunteers have reported cases of 
exclusion that are harder to compare with elsewhere, because they are the result of 
non-written decisions.
In terms of governance, this points to the fact the traditional distinction between 
migration policy (focused on entry and citizenship) and immigrant (integration) 
policy (focused on local inclusion) is somehow becoming inadequate (see Barberis 
and Violante 2013, and for examples in this sense, particularly with reference to 
residency status: Gilbert 2009; Lebuhn 2013; Gargiulo 2017). This suggests the 
necessity of exploring the dynamics associated with the rescaling of responsibilities 
across government levels in more detail (Brenner 2004), as responsibility for recep-
tion seems to be more and more rescaled down to local authorities. In turn, this will 
inform scholars about the evolution of the European border regime.
Fourth, restrictions for access to reception are even more problematic for 
migrants that are especially vulnerable, although the national and European norma-
tive frameworks stress their specific needs should be addressed. Actions and pro-
tests have been organised by activists in all three cities, and migrants themselves, to 
put forward their claim for protection.
The overall aim behind policies and practices addressing migrants in transit in 
the three cities is clearly to limit access as much as possible to “repel any extra bur-
den” while preventing any potential “pull effect”, linked to restrictive policies of 
neighbouring cities.
That being said, what are the factors that explain the specificities of the reception 
systems of Verona, Trento and Bolzano, as illustrated above?
The geographical positioning is partly predictive of the categories of migrants 
that can arrive on the territory. All three cities are quite far from Brenner and yet 
they are situated in the wider railway route area and have been affected by increas-
ing internal border controls, which have transformed them into internal hotspots, as 
mostly evident in Bolzano. Hence, these localities have had to respond somehow to 
the presence of migrants that are transiting through cities and border areas.
Another factor is political in nature. Municipal and provincial authorities have 
been under pressure not to welcome migrants arriving outside of the ordinary 
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 dispersal system. In this regard, European asylum policies certainly play a crucial 
role, particularly in terms of the following issues: the increasing closure of some 
internal borders; the more and more evident inadequacy of the Dublin Regulation; 
the flights of unaccompanied minors from centres in Verona; and the (still) timid 
cooperation on relocation among EU member states, as recently emerged at the EU 
summit on migration44, which is one of the main causes of the failure of the reloca-
tion mechanism.
Reflections on migrants that are transiting through cities and border areas and 
more generally on effective access to reception and protection for forced migrants 
are particularly crucial, with reform of the whole EU common asylum system still 
under discussion. The call for a solid European policy is manifest in the positions 
expressed by various institutional actors on a number of occasions. Nevertheless, 
their positions appear to be rather instrumental to prove to their voters the supposed 
unwillingness and inability of the EU to manage migration. In fact, this desired 
reform has periodically hit the headlines but, de facto, has remained no more than 
talk for a long time. Irrespective of the outcome(s) of the reform process, any change 
promoting the inclusion and protection of migrants that transit through cities and 
border areas remains unlikely. This is all the more evident for Italy, following the 
recent coming into force of what is known as the Salvini Decree in December 2018.
While this Law is coherent with a more general long-term policy approach based 
on emergency and the marginalisation of forced migrants (see Marchetti 2012), it 
has introduced elements that are likely to contribute to an increase of their marginal-
ity. The humanitarian protection status has been almost abolished, being partly 
“substituted” by the so-called permits for “special cases”. Limits have been intro-
duced for access to residency status (the permit to stay for asylum application is no 
longer considered as a valid document for residency application) that de facto legiti-
mize on-going practices of exclusion on the side of local authorities.45 SPRAR is 
only accessible to refugees and holders of subsidiary protection, which again legiti-
mizes an ongoing practice.46
Another important consideration must be made in terms of policy and gover-
nance more generally. It is evident that the category “migrants in transit” includes 
migrants with different legal statuses, migration journeys and projects. It is equally 
evident that it is a category that has been constructed through policies and the devel-
44 Espresso, 29 June 2018 “Vertice UE sui migranti, ecco il testo dell’accordo: parola chiave è 
“base volontaria”. http://espresso.repubblica.it/palazzo/2018/06/29/news/ue-e-migranti-ecco-il-
testo-dell-accordo-la-parola-chiave-e-base-volontaria-1.324457 . Accessed 29 June 2018.
45 Consoli D. and Zorzella N. “L’iscrizione anagrafica e l’accesso ai servizi territoriali dei richie-
denti asilo ai tempi del salvinismo”, 8 January 2019. https://www.asgi.it/asilo-e-protezione-inter-
nazionale/liscrizione-anagrafica-e-laccesso-ai-servizi-territoriali-dei-richiedenti-asilo-ai- 
tempi-del-salvinismo/ Accessed 3 March 2019.
46 Pepino L. “Le nuove norme su immigrazione e sicurezza: punire i poveri”, 20 December 2018. 
https://www.asgi.it/asilo-e-protezione-internazionale/le-nuove-norme-su-immigrazione-e-
sicurezza-punire-i-poveri/ Accessed 3 March 2019.
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opment of a specific and yet blurred terminology of “transit migration”. Focusing 
the analysis further on the actual experience of this category of migrants carries the 
risk of re-instating it, while also moving attention away from the fact that such cat-
egorization has been produced with the aim of “fixing” positions and entitlements 
(Zetter 2007).
Dispersal locations, in particular those in border areas, have become veritable 
internal borders (Fontanari and Borri 2017) where local processes of bordering take 
place (Lebuhn 2013). Such processes have de facto reinforced entry regulations 
associated with immigration policy, resulting in new borders at the local level. 
Interestingly, many forced migrants are not calling for the right to enter and stay but 
rather for the “right to come and go” (Fernandez and Olson 2011: 415). This calls 
for more attention not only to issues of presence, but also of mobility, as underlined 
by critical migration and border scholars (see for example Mezzadra and Neilson 
2016).
Such an approach promises to inform the wider literature on migration and 
forced migration governance and to put under discussion systems based on the prin-
ciple of universal residence-based welfare, a principle that is more and more evi-
dently excluding (Könönen 2018). It promises to provide insights into the 
re-elaboration of a welfare model capable of addressing the right to mobility for all 
and the need to overcome the tendency to implement “sedentary” policy solutions 
to address policy fields, such as that of migration, that are by definition fluid.
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Chapter 3
Legal Paradigm Shifts and Their Impacts 




The case of Denmark illustrates a changing story of a country that once was the first 
nation to ratify the 1951 Refugee Convention to a country where its Prime Minister 
called for an end to the convention in 2016 (Kingsley 2016). Especially during and 
in the aftermath of the so-called “European Refugee Crisis”, Denmark’s “harsh new 
immigration law” (Boserup 2016), its “inhumane family reunification” regulations 
(Dearden 2016) and “deterrence tactics” (Simpson 2016) have caused international 
attention. This shift did not take place over night. Since the early 1990s, Danish 
asylum legislations have been revised and toughened several times, often because 
of increasing arrivals as well as rising neo-nationalism and anti-immigrant 
sentiments.
Denmark’s relation with the EU in the fields of immigration and asylum reflects 
this development. It holds opt outs on EU Justice and Home Affairs and stands out-
side of the Common European Asylum System (CEAS). Its asylum and immigra-
tion legislations thus differ from the rest of the EU, which makes Denmark a special 
and, as I will discuss in this chapter, an extreme case regarding the arrival and inte-
gration of asylum seekers and refugees.
There is a broad scholarship on the development of immigration and asylum 
legislations in Denmark and the transformation of its asylum system from humani-
tarianism to nationalism (see i.e. Jaffe-Walter 2016; Hedetoft 2006). However, 
scholars have paid little attention to the impacts of asylum and immigration laws on 
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reception practices, the development of Denmark’s centre system as well as to the 
living conditions of forced migrants.
In this chapter, I analyse the development of the Danish asylum legislations and 
their influence on the country’s reception practices and on the well-being of forced 
migrants. I argue that their reception and initial settlement in Denmark is, first, the 
domain of the state, whereas municipalities have little power to decide. Second, I 
contend that accommodation has increasingly been transformed into large, camp- 
like structures with lowered living standards and a closed character because of the 
tightening of asylum laws. I finally argue that Denmark’s centre system reflects the 
materialisation and socio-spatial consequences of changes in legislations. I reveal 
how the state’s restrictive laws are put into practice and are translated into space 
reinforcing Denmark’s policy on the strategic isolation of forced migrants.
To understand the development of the Danish asylum legislations and their influ-
ence on the country’s reception and settlement practices as well as on the well-being 
of forced migrants, I contextualise the Danish case in the literature and present my 
theoretical and methodological approaches (Sect. 3.2). I continue with explaining 
Denmark’s traditions in handling asylum seekers and refugees since WWII with a 
focus on current developments (Sect. 3.3). This is followed by a precise outline of 
refugee laws, Denmark’s special position in the European asylum regime as well as 
explanations of current political and legal practices (Sect. 3.4). Then I present and 
discuss empirical findings on the socio-spatial exclusion of forced migrants through 
accommodation and placing in remote camps in Denmark’s Hovedstaden Region 
(Sect. 3.5). Within this part, I elucidate the structures, objectives and spatial con-
figurations of the Danish camp system. In my conclusion (Sect. 3.6), I discuss the 
translation of policies into spatial dimensions and highlight avenues for further 
research.
3.2  Studying Refugee Reception and Accommodation 
Practices in Denmark
In most European countries, refugees are usually allocated to states and municipali-
ties according to allocation quotas, which are often calculated based on economic 
activity and the number of inhabitants in a region. The political motivation often lies 
in spatially constructing and arresting refugees “through bureaucratic labelling and 
assignment to heterotopias”  – processes, which “freeze the forced migrant in a 
place” (Witteborn 2011: 1142). Dispersal, first reception and resettlement are policy 
areas and processes that are linked with each other in the trajectories of arriving 
forced migrants. They make up a large part of research on refugees in the global 
north. Even though, dispersal and resettlement policies are not per se local policies, 
they result in the arrival of refugees in and close to cities and municipalities, which – 
depending on national asylum laws – are responsible for accommodation and sup-
port. Dispersal and reception practices are governmental processes, which localize 
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and transfer issues of maintenance, welfare support and the management of forced 
migrants to the level of cities and municipalities (Darling 2016). Because of 
 dispersal policies some regions and municipalities become destinations for migrants 
in the first place. This “forced arrival” (Kreichauf 2018) confronts some cities to 
react and develop reception approaches and accommodation schemes, which other-
wise would have barely experienced immigration.
In the European context, studies on dispersal and reception focus on the role of 
municipalities and communities in organizing and accommodating arrivals, institu-
tional challenges, civil society engagements, and shifts in local policies (Aumüller 
et al. 2015; Ikizoglu Erensu and Kasli 2016; Lidén and Nyhlén 2016; Steen 2016). 
Breckner (2015: 1) finds a “new sensibility” regarding the “localization of provi-
sionary housing, institutional practices and in the acceptance of civil engagement” 
studying the local living conditions of forced migrants in Hamburg. Studies on 
reception experiences often investigate the first phase of arrival and the reactions of 
administrative bodies dealing with the management of forced migrants. They 
include health care, material and welfare provisions as well as the implementation 
of the EU reception directive (see for example Rosenberger and König 2011). 
Particularly UK geographers such as Phillimore and Goodson (2006), Spicer (2008), 
O’Mahony and Sweeny (2010), but also Kreichauf (2019) illustrate the local distri-
bution of refugees within a city, mostly in disadvantaged neighbourhoods or socio- 
spatially excluded in refugee camps outside of settlements.
Referring to the Danish case, Wren (2003) shows that, in contradiction to the 
state’s objective to prevent the concentration of migrants, dispersal policies have 
resulted in processes of socio-spatial ethnic segregation in deprived areas reinforc-
ing exclusion and anti-refugee hostility. Larsen’s (2011) ethnographic field research 
expounds that dispersal policies and the placing of migrants hinder the establish-
ment of relationships to co-ethnics and relatives and ultimately the incorporation in 
the Danish welfare society.
A strong body of research studies the reception and accommodation of refugees 
in European states, which is usually managed by the development of mass accom-
modation, asylum centres and refugee camps (EMN 2014). Many theoretical con-
cepts have been developed based on camps in African countries and the Middle 
East, most prominently by Ramadan (2013), Sanyal (2014), and Malkki (1995). In 
the camp literature, the camp is conceptualised as a space of exception and biopoli-
tics (Diken and Laustsen 2005; Edkins 2000; Hyndman 2000) or as sites in which 
new identities, acts of agency, political life, and resistance are formed and practiced 
(Ramadan 2013; Salih 2017; Redclift 2013). In the North, studies analyse the ‘asy-
lum centre’ and the living conditions of forced migrants in those accommodations. 
The research stress the genesis of mass accommodation systems in EU member 
states and the exclusion of asylum seekers through these large accommodations (see 
for example Darling 2009; Dwyer and Brown 2008; Hirschler 2013; Kublitz 2016; 
Szczepanikova 2013; Witteborn 2011). Most of the studies describe them as places 
of states of exceptions and as border areas, where the state has unlimited power to 
decide on the inclusion or exclusion of immigrants.
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Regarding the Danish case, Syppli Kohl (2016) explains the development and 
shifts of the centre system, its main characteristics and trends of socio-spatial exclu-
sion and exploitation due to labour programs in the camps. Kublitz (2016)  illustrates 
the living conditions of Palestinian refugees in Danish centres. She argues that 
accommodations are “characterized by minor mundane catastrophes, infinite un- 
becomings that slowly erode the lives” (Kublitz 2016: 246). Research on the arrival 
accommodation in Denmark lacks analyses on the specific socio-political and 
socio-spatial functions of centres as well as on their socio-spatial settings. For that 
reason, this chapter links the tensioning of laws with the emergence and changes of 
the Danish centre system. I expound how restrictive laws not only impact the socio- 
spatial configurations and characteristics of refugee shelters, but how they reinforce 
and legitimize Denmark’s harsh dealings.
I conceptualise the camp as a site of bordering (Darling 2016) that denies refu-
gees’ movement and mobility and that is a part of a camp-border urban development 
(Diken and Laustsen 2005). In another work (Kreichauf 2018), I have established 
the concept of “campization” to describe the development of camp-like accommo-
dations in Europe and to capture that changes in asylum laws have stimulated a 
transformation of refugee accommodations. Campization is a process that explains 
two tendencies of accommodating refugees in the context of increasing numbers 
arriving in EU member states and the tightening of laws on asylum, and explicitly 
on reception:
First, the legal stabilization of permanent, enlarged, remotely located, and spatially isolated 
camps with lowered living standards, increased capacities, and a closed character; and sec-
ond, the changing notions and forms of containment, exclusion, and temporality of these 
infrastructures. These tendencies are reflected architectonically, functionally, and socio- 
spatially. (Kreichauf 2018, 4).
I apply this concept in this chapter to explain the emergence and deepening of 
camp-like characteristics of Danish refugee accommodation and to reveal reception 
and accommodation practices as Denmark’s central instruments to strategically iso-
late and deter forced migrants.
The following empirical findings are based on qualitative research conducted 
from 2013 to 2016. It contains multi-level policy analyses of major law and policy 
changes as well as of the development of political and societal discourses on (forced) 
migration in Denmark. I also included socio-spatial analyses of following asylum 
centres in or close to Hovedstaden: Centre Sandholm, Centre Kongelunden and 
Centre Avnstrup. Thirteen semi-structured interviews on the accommodation, living 
conditions of forced migrants and the impact of law changes on local receptions 
were conducted on following levels between 2013 and 2016: 1) decision makers and 
administrative bodies (2), 2) civil society actors, local refugee organisations and 
initiatives (6) and 3) asylum seekers and refugees (5). The aim of the three-level- 
division was to develop a broad context of findings on perception of social struc-
tures, power relations and effects in and of accommodations from various actors. 
Many more informal interviews with forced migrants have been carried out. Those 
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were used as observations written down in a research diary as part of the “Go along” 
method (Kusenbach 2003).
Within this chapter, I cite interviews I conducted with the Danish Immigration 
Service and the Danish Red Cross as the major administrative and operative bodies 
regarding accommodation, Asylret, Danish Refugee Council, Refugees Welcome 
and the Trampoline House as the leading refugee organizations as well as interviews 
with forced migrants in the Hovedstaden Region.
3.3  Post-WWII and Recent Refugee Reception Experiences 
in Denmark
Denmark was one of the first countries to become a party of the 1951 Refugee 
Convention and the first state to ratify the treaty in 1952 entering force in 1954. It 
acceded to the 1967 Protocol in 1968 and it further ratified the 1954 Convention 
relating to the status of Stateless Persons in 1956 and the 1961 Convention on the 
Reduction of Statelessness in 1977. Denmark’s international performance as an 
active supporter of the development of an international protection regime character-
ised its welcoming attitude towards refugees in the first decades after WWII (Jønson 
and Peterson 2012).
In 1983, the Aliens Act was implemented. It was described as “one of the world’s 
most humane” ones (Brochmann and Hagelund 2012, 113) with rather liberal 
admission criteria for refugees and accesses to permanent residency and citizenship. 
At the same time, forced migrants began to arrive in larger numbers, 30,000 in the 
1980s. A discussion on the structure of the Danish welfare system and the number 
of arriving refugees and immigrants emerged. This debate resulted in a political 
attitude that argued so-called “refugees of convenience” would abuse the welfare 
system (Hedetoft 2006; Brochmann and Hagelund 2012). As a result, the Aliens Act 
was tightened in 1986 particularly regarding family reunification and benefits aim-
ing to make it less ‘attractive’ to apply for and obtain asylum or citizenship.
The End of the Cold War as well as conflicts and wars in the Middle East led to 
the increasing arrival of several new groups throughout the 1990s. Particularly refu-
gees from the former Soviet Union, Bosnians, Iranians, Iraqis, Lebanese and state-
less Palestinians characterised arrivals between 1990 and 1999. In 1992, the law 
regulating family reunification was further tightened, completely removing the 
automatic right to reunification. The controversial public debates on refugees as 
“welfare scroungers”, who would unfairly take advantage of the Danish welfare 
system, have been further intensified and heavily politicized throughout the 1990s 
(Brochmann and Hagelund 2012). The establishment of the Danish People’s Party 
(DPP) in 1995 and its success is a result of immigrant issues dominating the elec-
toral campaigns since then and an atmosphere of deterrence and minimizing ‘pull- 
factors’ for immigration (Hedetoft 2006). Denmark’s further developments 
regarding its asylum regime, such as the implementation of the Integration Act of 
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1999, which guaranteed some integration means but which also reduced welfare 
benefits, are outcomes of these debates (Brochmann and Hagelund 2012).
Understanding the composition of the data on refugee arrivals since 1990 appears 
to be complex at first glance (see Fig. 3.1). Danish statistics divide the numbers into 
following variables: application lodged in Denmark by spontaneous refugees1, asy-
lum applications that have been lodged abroad and the gross number of applica-
tions.2 This division is a result of changes in the Danish asylum law throughout the 
1990s and 2000s. Until June 2002, the Danish legislation (§ 7(4) Alien Act) enabled 
asylum seekers to apply for asylum abroad, where Denmark’s diplomatic represen-
tations had operated a protected entry procedure (Al-Shahi and Lawless 2005). As 
seen in figure one, applications lodged abroad had a huge impact in the 1990s. 
Especially in 1990 (72%), 1991 (64%) and 1995 (50%), more asylum applications 
have been submitted abroad then on Danish soil.
When only focusing on applications lodged in Denmark, the numbers show that 
around 8000 applications have been submitted each year with climaxes in 1993 
(14,347) and 2000 (10,347). From 2008 on, asylum applications were slowly 
increasing until 2012, but since 2012 they have been growing heavily mainly due to 
on-going tense situations in Iran, Afghanistan and the war in Syria. Consequently, 
the numbers tripled from 3336 in 2012 to 10,192 in 2014 (see Fig. 3.1). Figure one 
further shows occurrence of gross application numbers since 2000. This is because 
this value covers all people who have applied for asylum in Denmark, including 
1 Danish authorities call persons that apply asylum on the soil of Denmark and that have been 
travelling independently (without institutional help) spontaneous asylum seekers. Compared to 
quota refugees, who have been settled to Denmark through the UNHCR’s resettlement program, 
they claim asylum when they arrive at the border of the Danish territory.
2 Danish official statistics do not include quota refugees of which around 500 arrive every year.
Fig. 3.1 Asylum seekers by type of asylum between 1990 and 2017 (total numbers)
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people, who were returned to a safe third country, transferred or re-transferred to 
another EU Member State under the Dublin Regulation as well as disappearances 
and withdrawals etc. during the asylum procedure.
As seen in figure one, there is an increasing discrepancy between gross application 
figures and figures for applications that are being proceeded in Denmark. This is an 
indication for Denmark’s strict accomplishments of the Dublin- and Safe- Third- County-
Regulations throughout the 2015 “refugee crisis”, which resulted in lower numbers of 
registrations and asylum cases that have been processed in Denmark. Compared to 
other EU member states, particularly Germany and Sweden, asylum applications lodged 
in Denmark stared dropping by the beginning of 2015 and they remained relatively 
steady throughout that year. In total, 21,315 applications have been filed in 2015, an 
increase of 43% compared to 2014. The number of cases that are being effectively pro-
cessed in Denmark remains almost the same though (10,921 in 2014; 10,472 in 2015) 
and clearly lower than in 1992 and 1993. Since 2016, arrivals started falling signifi-
cantly. In 2017, around 2500 forced migrants applied for asylum, the lowest number in 
Denmark for 8 years. Twenty six per cent of asylum applications were successful in 
2017, whereas the rate was around 85% in 2015 and 2016. The main refugee groups 
since 2014 are Syrians, Iranians, Afghans, Eritreans, Stateless people and Iraqis.
3.4  The Development of Denmark’s Asylum Legislations
One major characteristic defines the Danish asylum system compared to other EU 
member states: Denmark abstains from membership in CEAS. It can withdraw EU 
decisions made about foreigners in Denmark. The following sections analyse the 
genesis and changes of the legislations in detail. They focus particularly on 
Denmark’s exceptional approaches and on recent law changes.
3.4.1  Abstaining CEAS and Implemented EU Regulations
Denmark holds opt-outs from EU policies in the fields of security and defence, citi-
zenship, police and justice, home affairs and the adoption of the Euro. They are set 
down in the Edinburgh Agreement. The core directives of CEAS, which character-
ise the EU asylum policy and include Council Directive 2003/9/EC on the reception 
of asylum seekers, the Council Directive 2004/84/EC on the qualification and status 
of asylum seekers and the Council Directive 2005/85/EC on the asylum procedure, 
are not implemented. Triggered by EU’s moves in the field of asylum, Denmark, 
however, has introduced similar laws to its domestic legislations by practicing its 
right as an international sovereign to enter parallel agreements with other entities 
(Adler-Nissen 2013, 68). Major agreements are the application of the Schengen 
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acquis, the Dublin Regulation and the EURODAC. They allow Denmark to partici-
pate in certain means to the EU asylum framework (Tonsberg 2011). In following 
areas, Denmark has applied different policies:
First, Danish law does not adopt Article 15 of the EU Qualification directive, 
which enables subsidiary protection in case of a person’s fear of death penalty or 
execution, torture and threat to a civilian’s life “by reason of indiscriminate violence 
in situations of international or internal armed conflict”. As a result, many asylum 
seekers, for example from Afghanistan, Iraq and Somalia, which get often granted 
subsidiary protection in other EU states, are rejected in Denmark. Compared to the 
EU directive, Danish asylum law does also not recognise sexual orientation as a 
social group eligible for refugee status. Second, the Danish asylum policy is charac-
terised by a special definition of refugees: A person must be individually persecuted 
and prove s/he is personally in a specific danger (Article 19(1)(i)). The Refugee 
Convention, however, finds it sufficient to belong to a persecuted group or come 
from a very insecure area. Third, the application for family reunification for refu-
gees with temporary protection is highly restricted: Spouses must be above the age 
of 24; the spouse in Denmark must finance the move to Denmark, give a financial 
guarantee of around 7000 Euro and s/he should have not received state benefits for 
the past 3 years. The waiting period before a refugee can apply for reunification is 
3 years. Fourth, regarding the reception, there is an increasing use of detention. This 
will be outlined in the following sections more specifically.
Denmark’s special role is strongly rooted in the fear of losing its national identity 
in a unified Europe and that the EU would undermine its social-welfare system and 
standard of living (Brochmann and Hagelund 2012). Because Denmark signed the 
1951 Refugee Convention and the European Convention on Human Rights, the sig-
nificance of Denmark abstaining CEAS is reduced. Nevertheless, Denmark’s deal-
ing with family reunification, cuts of benefits and detention practices have caused 
tensions with the EU and the UN (Dearden 2016).
3.4.2  Denmark’s Reception and Integration Conditions
There are two core acts that define Denmark’s reception and integration conditions: 
The Aliens Act, initially introduced in 1983, and the Integration Act, established in 
1999. Both acts have been repeatedly revised; the Aliens Act alone experienced 
more than 100 amendments. The revisions have been focussing on reforming the 
asylum policy and institutional responsibilities, but they also show a clear pattern of 
restrictive measures, particularly since the early 1990s (Jensen 2012).
The changes to the Aliens Act in the 2000s have been quite fundamental. The 
right-wing alliance of the Liberal Party Venstre and the Conservative People’s Party 
with support of the right-wing populist DDP created the Ministry for Refugees, 
Immigrants and Integration of Denmark in 2001. Its objective was to prevent 
Denmark from becoming a multicultural country, to limit the number of arrivals and 
the number of people being granted asylum as well as to promote a cultural assimi-
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lation of admitted immigrants (Hedetoft 2006). Assimilation in the Danish context 
means that the existence of cultures other than the Danish understanding of culture 
is restricted and seen as problematic (Wren 2001). In 2002, amendments to the 
Aliens Act involved, among other things, the abolishment of the de facto refugee 
concept and the possibility to apply for asylum at a Danish mission abroad. Stricter 
conditions for family reunifications were introduced (L 152). These changes resulted 
in a significant drop of asylum applications between 2001 and 2008 (see Fig. 3.1).
In 2011, a new government coalition between the Social Democrats, the Danish 
Social Liberty Party and the Socialist People’s Party removed the Immigration 
Ministry, with a redistribution of duties under the Justice and Social Affairs depart-
ments. The Danish Ministry of Justice and its subordinated authority of the Danish 
Immigration Service are administrable in charge for the reception and integration of 
forced migrants. Despite promises to improve the conditions for forced immigrants 
(Asylret 2014), amendments to the Aliens Act included the further expansion of a 
parallel welfare system, providing significantly lower state support for forced 
migrants applying for asylum.
The amendments include possibilities to work (Article 14a(1)(ii)) and to live 
outside of asylum centres (Article 42k. (1)(i)) after staying 6 months in Denmark 
and living in an asylum accommodation. These require a cooperation contract 
between the Immigration Office and the asylum seeker, which declares that “the 
alien cooperates in obtaining information for the assessment of his application for a 
residence permit (…) and, upon refusal or waiver of the application for a residence 
permit, cooperates in his departure without undue delay (…)” (42k.(vi)(5)). Signing 
the contract can engender an immediate departure after the first rejection of the case 
and thus circumvent the possibility to appeal the decision in front of the Refugee 
Board. Thus, most asylum seekers decide not to sign the contract.
Upon arrival, asylum seekers are taken to registration at the Sandholm Centre, 
Denmark’s official reception centre, where they are accommodated up to 6 months. 
Denmark’s centre system is characterised by three different types. Sandholm, which 
houses approximately 600 asylum seekers, a detention centre close to Sandholm run 
by Danish Prison and Probation Service, and 32 accommodation centres in 2016. 
The Danish Red Cross operates most accommodations. It manages all humanitarian 
aspects of the accommodation including Sandholm (Article 42(5) Alien Act). The 
Danish Ministry of Justice and the Danish Immigration Service decide on the legal 
regulations, locations of centres and living standards.
The reception as laid down in the Aliens Act serves to exclude asylum seekers 
from relevant social institutions and integration means (housing, labour market, 
education, welfare) until the “applicant” proves to be eligible for state protection. 
Once forced migrants are granted asylum, they are confronted with several assimi-
lationist responsibilities to acquire access to the Danish society. These rights and 
obligations were established in the Act on Integration in 1999. The Danish Refugee 
Council (2015) summarizes this logic in an interview as follows:
As long as you are an asylum seeker, we will try to keep you out as hard as we can, you will 
be placed as far away as we can and you will not learn Danish, you will not be able to get a 
job. By the minute you get your residence permit, you are forced to integrate as fast as you 
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can. […] You must become a part of the society, which you have been kept away from it for 
often some years.
The Danish Integration Act was one of the first of its kind in Europe, developed 
to regulate and control integration. It includes requirements for accessing perma-
nent residency and citizenship. The Integration Act contains a 3-year introduction 
and integration program, courses on culture and society as well as job related activi-
ties during which refugees over age 18 are expected to learn Danish (based on pro-
vided courses) (§21(1)) and to familiarize themselves with Danish history. All 
refugees and reunified family-members are obliged to follow the programs to be 
able to access social benefits called “start allowance”, which, however, are substan-
tially lower than corresponding benefits.
Fundamental parts of the Integration Act are a compulsory Contract of Integration 
and a Declaration on Integration and Active Citizenship, which refugees must sign. 
In these documents, refugees must ensure their loyalty to ‘Danish values’ (Hedetoft 
2006). Refugees and reunified families “are further asked to confirm their willing-
ness to obey Danish law, to respect democratic principles, to learn the Danish lan-
guage, to acknowledge principles of gender equality, to respect liberty of conscience 
and freedom of speech, to refrain from carrying out terrorism etc.” (Mouritsen and 
Hovmark Jensen 2014, 11). It describes also “occupational or educational goals and 
determine the contents of the activities necessary to ensure fulfilment of the goals 
set out in the contract” (§19). The contract specifies the sanctions applicable accord-
ing to legislation to the refugee if s/he fails to appear at or rejects one or more of the 
activities agreed in the individual contract.
The Integration Act changed the distribution and integration conditions and tra-
jectories of refugees. On the one hand, it assigns the main responsibility for integra-
tion of refugees to the municipality once a residence status is granted (§16). The 
municipalities are in charge to ensure that refugees meet the requirements of the act 
and the contracts. On the other hand, the state “has absolute control over refugee 
settlement policies” and their housing patterns (Myrberg 2017, 329). The 
Immigration Service decides where in Denmark the refugee must live without her/
him participating in the decision-making process. This is realized by quota systems, 
which I explain in the analyses of the Hovedstaden region more precisely.
3.4.3  The “Refugee Crisis” and Its Consequences
In 2016, the Ministry for Migration and Integration was re-established under the 
new right-wing government. It is responsible for all issues related to asylum. In 
2015 and 2016, the Danish Parliament adopted several changes, such as L 87 and L 
62, to the Aliens legislation, which aim at conveying a message to make it “less 
attractive” to seek asylum in Denmark and to protect Denmark’s social cohesion 
and identity (Udlændinge-, Integrations- og Boligministeriet 2016). The amend-
ments have raised “serious concerns of conformity with human rights standards” by 
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refugee organisations, the EU and the United Nations (Council of Europe 2016), 
because they reduce welfare support, enhance detention practices and complicate 
means such as family reunification and residence permits tremendously. The law 
includes major shifts in following fields:
 1. Qualification and status conditions: The new law reduces the period of asylum 
as follows; convention status holders: two years (instead of five); individual pro-
tection status holders: one year (instead of two); subsidiary protection status 
holders: one year (instead of five) and temporary subsidiary protection holders: 
one year (instead of two).3 The right to family reunification for refugees with 
temporary protection (subsidiary forms of protection under Article 7 (3) of the 
Aliens Act) changes from one to three years. The possibility to obtain legal resi-
dence changes from five to six years. Applicants must pass a test for Danish level 
two (instead of one) and they must provide full-time employment for two and a 
half years out of the last three years at the time of application compared to three 
out of five years.
 2. Detention: L 62 concerns immigration-related detention introducing circum-
stances such as massive arrivals for detaining asylum seekers (Aliens Act, article 
36, L 62). Article 36 further states that police are entitled to detain an asylum 
seeker in the context of her/his arrival to Denmark, for the purpose of verifying 
her/his identity, conduct registration and establish the basis for her/his applica-
tion. Article 59(1) provides the possibility of imprisonment for up to six months 
for non-citizens who enter or leave Denmark at a non-designated passport check- 
point or stay in Denmark without the requisite permit. The new laws are related 
to the introduction of new detention facilities such the Vridsløselille Prison, a 
former prison now used exclusively for immigration related reasons. Rejected 
asylum seekers can be detained for up to 18 months without committing crime.
 3. Reception conditions and extension of asylum austerity: Various measures that 
reduce benefits to asylum seekers and at the same time include asylum seekers 
and refugees in covering the costs related their reception characterise the new 
Aliens Act. “User charges” have been introduced, which include to pay fees to 
access application to: family reunification (for subsidiary protection holders, 
≈940 Euro), extension of residence permit (≈242 Euro), appeal of rejection of 
applications (≈108 Euro) (Article 5.7.2). The new law (Article 40 (9)) further 
allows police to seize asylum seekers’ assets to cover the costs of institutional 
assistance (accommodation, food and health service). It enables officials to force 
asylum seekers to cede resources such as cash, valuables, including gold and 
jewellery, exceeding 1340 Euro upon their arrival in Denmark. If the asylum 
seeker is in possession of adequate funds, the Danish Immigration Service will 
not provide subsistence allowances and/or state-financed accommodation. 
Ironically, the amendments abolished the possibility to live outside of centres 
after six months upon; living in a centre is obligatory. Asylum seekers are thus 
3 For a detailed overview on the changes of periods (and possibilities of extension) of different 
forms of asylum see UNHCR Regional Representation for Northern Europe (2016).
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forced to pay for their place in a state-financed centre. The changes further focus 
on increasing the capacity for accommodation and the role of municipalities and 
private companies in operating centres to reduce costs for accommodation due to 
competition of a diverse set of operators. Social benefits for arrivals after 2015 
are cut down by around 50%. A single asylum seeker in the phase of the asylum 
procedure, who is served with canteen services, receives approx. 1.10 Euro per 
day and approx. 33.20 Euro per month. Asylum seekers with access to self- 
catering receive 8.20 Euro per day and approx. 243 Euro per month in total cash 
allowance (section 7). Section 6.2.2 even lists that, “it is reasonable to foreigners 
to pay for their stay in detention centres as long as they have the means to do so” 
(translated into English).
Despite recent changes and falling numbers, Denmark discusses further steps to 
ultimately stop arrivals. Since 2015, Denmark has published ads in newspapers in 
countries of the Middle East to promote its strict laws and demotivate migrants. In 
December 2017, the Danish parliament decided to opt out of the UN refugee reset-
tlement programme, through which Denmark accepted around 500 refugees each 
year since 1989. In February 2018, the Social Democrats, the Danish parliament’s 
biggest opposition party, pushed forward a discussion on the establishment of 
Danish-run reception centres in North African countries, which would determine 
decisions on asylum and protection statuses. This approach includes the abolish-
ment to claim asylum on Danish soil (The Local DK 2018) and ultimately the right 
to asylum.
3.5  The Socio-Spatial Exclusion of Forced Migrants 
in the Hovedstaden Region
Denmark’s Hovedstaden Region covers a great part of northeast Zealand including 
the greater Copenhagen area and Bornholm island. It is the most densely populated 
region in Denmark comprising around 1,753,000 inhabitants on 2546.3 sq. km. 
Copenhagen is the largest city of Hovedstaden; its administrative seat is in Hellerød, 
a middle-sized town 30  km north of Copenhagen. Compared to other Danish 
regions, Hovedstaden has a long tradition in accommodating asylum seekers.
In this section, I explain how Denmark’s legislations and policies affect the liv-
ing conditions and processes of socio-spatial exclusion of forced migrants. First, I 
elaborate Denmark’s agenda to concentrate asylum seekers in remote centres and to 
prevent newcomers from living in areas with higher percentages of immigrants. 




3.5.1  The Danish Policy of Siting Centres 
and the Territorialisation of Refugees
Denmark’s Integration Act (§8) follows the logic to place asylum seekers in remote 
areas outside of urban settlements and to disperse accepted refugees to municipali-
ties with low immigrant populations to guarantee a “better integration”. The instru-
ments for this policy are quota systems of the Immigration Service that regulate the 
allocation of accepted refugees to regions (Regionskvoter) and municipalities 
within the regions (Kommunekvoter). The quota is calculated based on the number 
of residents of a municipality in relation to Denmark’s total population, the number 
of immigrants in a municipality as well as the number of family reunifications in 
municipalities. Municipalities that already have a high percentage of individuals 
with foreign origin, with Copenhagen, Arhus and Aalborg leading the way, are so- 
called “0-Municipalities” meaning that no refugee can move or be distributed to 
these cities. The explicit intention is to “share the burden of immigration” and create 
an equal distribution across all municipalities, so that integration can be improved 
(Danish Immigration Service 2017).
This distribution system has significant effects on the integration trajectories of 
asylum seekers: first, gives absolute control to the state regarding refugee settle-
ment. Second, it has a long-term effect on the mobility of refugees, who must live 
for 3 years in the assigned municipality. Third, the municipality is responsible to 
ensure that refugees participate in the 3-year integration program as well as to sanc-
tion refugees if they do not follow the requirements. And fourth, the policy is assim-
ilationist and anti-urban. It argues that the concentration of immigrants in larger 
cities would circumvent integration. It does not consider the role of ethnic commu-
nities and urban ethnic infrastructures as part of integration processes. Instead, it 
follows the logic to integrate the individual into the Danish society detached from 
ethnic communities and cultural practices.
This quota also impacts the distribution of asylum centres to less populated areas 
with low shares of immigrants. It is applied to justify the remote location of centres: 
Since accepted refugees do not have access to bigger cities, it would not be feasible 
to open centres in 0-municipalities. In Hovedstaden, all 0-municipalities 
(Albertslund, Brøndby, Høje-Taastrup, Ishøj and Copenhagen) are in Greater 
Copenhagen. As a result, there is no asylum centre in or in the neighbouring munici-
palities and suburbs of Denmark’s capital city. The closest centres to Copenhagen 
are Centre Kongelunden (10 km to the city centre) and Centre Sandholm (30 km to 
the city centre) (see Fig. 3.2). Neither asylum seekers nor refugees have the legal 
opportunity to live in bigger cities. In Hovedstaden, centres are predominantly 
located in former military bases and hospitals in forests 10–50 km away from larger 
urban settlements. Particularly the location of centres in Bornholm is striking: Three 
shelters are located on the remote and sparsely populated isle of 39,756 inhabitants. 
One ferry connects Bornholm with the Danish mainland taking approx. 5 h.4
4 The centres and living conditions of asylum seekers on Bornholm have not been further investi-
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There are five accommodations in Hovedstaden’s mainland and Centre Avnstrup, 
which situated close to the region. Sandholm is a central landmark in the Danish 
system and in Hovedstaden. The old, yellow military barracks were built in 1909 
and opened in 1986 as an accommodation site. The centre is located some 30 km 
north of Copenhagen. It houses the immigration section of the Danish National 
Police, the Immigration Service, and Ellebækhus, Denmark’s institution for detained 
asylum seekers operated by the Danish Prison and Probation Service. Sandholm 
gated within the presented research material.
Fig. 3.2 Schematic map of accommodation forms and their distribution in Hovedstaden (without 
Bornholm) in 2016. (Map modified by including data and information on accommodation, which 
are based on conducted interviews, own mappings and socio-spatial analyses, as well as on data 
provided by Røde Kors (2016). Røde Kors Asylcentre. https://www.rodekors.dk/det-goer-vi/




accommodates up to 600 individuals, who are either newly registered, awaiting a 
decision on their application, or have had their application rejected and are awaiting 
departure from Denmark.
The Centres Kongelunden, Auderød, Gribskov and Esbonderup are run by the 
Danish Red Cross. They house 200 to 500 asylum seekers. The Danish Immigration 
Service (2014) argues in an interview that “smaller units are not very well and 
expensive to have.” 5 The location in rural areas as well as processes of dispersion 
and concentration characterise the accommodation of forced migrants in Denmark.
3.5.2  Campization and Asylum Austerity
In Denmark, the establishment of mass accommodation is strongly connected to the 
discourse on the abuse of asylum, the ‘protection’ of the Danish society as well as 
the introduction of restrictive policies. These conditions unfold in the spatial form 
of the centre aiming to discourage refugees to migrate to Denmark by strategically 
reducing the living conditions and accesses to the Danish society. A representative 
of the Danish Refugee Council (2015) argues that this strategy is the inherent logic 
of Denmark’s reception system:
They do not want to make them feel too comfortable, because they are afraid that more refu-
gees would come. This is very persistent in the society of Denmark. It is a very nationalistic 
discussion on how to protect the Danish society.
Recent changes in asylum laws and accommodation practices have introduced or 
enlarged centres, higher capacities and a longer detention time with the purpose of 
securing the containment and territorialisation of refugees.
Regarding accommodations in the Hovedstaden region, this process of campiza-
tion is revealed by five major characteristics. First, the isolating location and the 
socio-spatial structures of the accommodation are defined by the establishment of 
consolidated and secluded spaces separated from urban settlements. Those camp 
spaces illustrate a parcel-like organisation of land and buildings, means of centrality 
within these camp-like settlements, border and surveillance infrastructures, a con-
centration of the functions reception, accommodation and deportation at one place 
and own infrastructures within the camps (schools, clinics, canteens, job centres, 
washhouses). Further, there is a social differentiation and segregation of the resi-
dents depending on their status, the legal characteristics as well as characteristics 
regarding race/ethnicity, gender, age and family status.
Second, control is a central element. There are direct and indirect means of control 
in centres in Hovedstaden. For example, identity and entry controls of residents and 
visitors and physical boundaries like fences and walls guarantee direct control. 
5 A place for one asylum seeker in a centre costs around 750 Euro at average. To accommodate a 
family of four family members thus costs around 3.000 Euro every month. These high expenses for 
centre housing circumvent the Immigration Service’s statement (Refugees Welcome 2015).
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Intrusions in the privacy, the control by the staff of the centres on the actions  conducted 
in the centre and outside of it, the control by other asylum seekers and the develop-
ment of a specific form of self-control characterise indirect forms. These mechanisms 
are highly interlinked with the asylum process. They have been established not only 
to organise and manage asylum seekers, but also to sanction them if necessary.
Third, the accommodation system, but also the asylum regime as such, is estab-
lished around a state of heteronomy. By heteronomy I mean the condition in which 
state agencies and officials rule to a large extent forced migrants and their lives. It 
begins with the distribution after arrival. After initial reception at Sandholm, asylum 
seekers have no influence on their further distribution to accommodation centres or, 
once asylum is granted, to municipalities. All interviewed asylum seekers in 
Hovedstaden had to move multiple times without receiving an explanation. This 
practice results in feelings of fear, the destruction of social relations among resi-
dents and the lack of belonging, as a former resident of Sandholm argues:
They can send you all over the country, if they want to. I lived in many centres here in 
Denmark. And every time, when you have to leave one, you think that they will deport you. 
You cannot understand the decision of them sending you to a new place.
The heteronomy opens a set of rules, restrictions and dependencies. It detains 
asylum seekers from having an autonomous life and being perceived as incapable of 
conducting their own lives. The principle of allowance, the activation program and 
the organisation of the centre life has huge impacts on the life and the privacy of 
asylum seekers.
Fourth, stigmatization and racial markings are a crucial and intentional element 
of campization in Hovedstaden. The accommodation centre plays a crucial role in 
the formation of resentments towards ‘strangers’, because of its architecture and 
structural organisation, its location as well as its symbolism. Because of the alloca-
tion of refugees to a negatively connoted space, they are excluded, but noticed and 
they become visible – this is the starting point for processes of racialisation and 
“territorial stigmatisation” (Wacquant 2007). Housing in an accommodation pro-
duces attention due to the material and inner structures of the camp space (low 
standards, concentration of people on a very limited space, intrusion into privacy, 
dependency on social workers, ban from work). To the outside, the centre conveys 
an image of its residents who are not in accordance with societal norms. These con-
ditions are highlighted in following excerpt of an interview with a representative of 
Refugees Welcome (2015):
Especially because often asylum centres are old military barracks, you easily get the 
impression of centres being concentration camps for people that do not belong and are 
unwanted in the society. The whole constitution of the centre space like barriers, the 
entrance control, the fact that people live jammed together on a very small space helps to 
downgrade asylum seekers in the perception of society and thus they are stigmatised as 
sub- human beings. […] The location of the asylum centre helps to establish an image on 




Sandholm is the most obvious socio-spatial expression of the centre representing 
a place of stigmatization and intimidation. Not only that it is a former military basis 
with a history still present in the architecture and in the arrangement of buildings, 
but also a shooting range of the Danish military surrounds the centre. Gunnery exer-
cise starts every day at 6 a.m. Major sport facilities (the biggest playground, soccer 
field etc.) are located towards the borders of the centre to the neighbouring detention 
section. A refugee and member of Asylret remembers: “In Sandholm, in the kinder-
garden, you can look to the prison for the people that have to leave the country” 
(Asylret 2014). These conditions further add to the traumatization of asylum 
seekers.
Finally, Denmark’s emerging asylum austerity politics and the mantras of cuts of 
social benefits and the refugees’ contribution to financing the reception system 
cement campization processes and the position of refugees in society. Since 2003, 
the government introduced an activation program in the centres overseen and con-
ducted by the Danish Red Cross. The program is mandatory and asylum seekers 
above the age of 18 must participate otherwise their financial means are cut. It con-
tains daily activities at the centre such as cleaning shared facilities, doing laundry, 
recycling and bicycle repair (Hobers 2006). These activities are negotiated and dis-
tributed by a Job Centre located in the camp. To finance the activation programme, 
the cash allowances for asylum seekers were lowered, but they regain it by partici-
pating at the program (Syppli Kohl 2016). A former employee of the Danish Red 
Cross (2015) describes the programme in an interview as follows:
There is a thing called “Cleaning”. Used to control the behaviour, I would say. Because you 
have to do it, and if you are not doing it, your money will be cut […]. And then you have 
activation within the centre, which […] could be opening and closing the room of the wash-
ing machines – completely silly, you don’t learn anything. The whole idea is that people 
[…] get “qualifications” that enables them either to have a good time here or to return. This 
is the formula in the Red Cross. People are prepared to leave Denmark.
The program is related to means and functions of (non-punitive) prison labour 
consequently aiming to discipline, control and exploit asylum seekers with little 
paid and manual labour activities. It aims to economise the asylum seekers’ mainte-
nance, to save expenses on the reception and it introduces ways to penalise those 
who do not participate (Syppli Kohl 2016). Consequently, it follows the neoliberal 
logic of promoting and demanding with asylum seekers being exploited and forced 
to participate in the preservation of this system.
Denmark has carried asylum austerity measures to extremes. Indeed, cuts in 
social benefits, integration programs, administrative staff and generally the objec-
tive to minimize the expenses for the maintenance of asylum seekers and refugees 
have some tradition in Danish legislations and political discourses. But Denmark’s 
new approach of appropriation of property and financial means as well as the con-
tribution of asylum seekers’ finances and labour power to cover expenses related to 
their stay is another step towards the disfranchisement and degradation of persons 
seeking protection.
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The poor financial situation and the spatial isolation in the centres result in asy-
lum seekers trying to find other ways to become a part of the society and to liberate 
themselves from the exclusionary mechanisms. Due to the cuts of benefits, the long 
periods asylum seekers are forced to live in the centres, and due to the constitution 
and location of the centres they find informal ways to conduct their lives (small 
offences, black market, illegal work with no employment rights, riding trains with-
out tickets etc.). In the end, this situation reinforces the development of the men-
tioned stigmas on this group.
3.6  The Role of the Local in Denmark’s War on Asylum
Forced migrants are excluded in extraterritorial and exceptional places, but included 
in the structures of government, power and national laws and objectives. The accom-
modation marks the refugees and portrays their position in society. It is an “Urban 
Non-Class” (Kreichauf 2016, 194), which cannot be described by typical definitions 
and structures of classes, but which exists parallel to existing social structures of 
society. There are laws, institutions and spaces exclusively designed for refugees, 
which structurally, economically, socially and spatially exclude them from estab-
lished institutions for citizens of a nation state.
What is most apparent when empirically investigating the quintessence of 
Denmark’s reception practices and accommodation structures is their translation 
into spatial dimensions. During the application process, the asylum system is 
designed to give control to the state to isolate forced migrants in camp-like accom-
modation, to provide as little means as possible, and to ultimately deter forced 
migrants. The state applies the accommodation to separate the ‘own’ and the ‘(eth-
nic) other’, citizens and non-citizens (Turner 2016). It represents the material reali-
sations of asylum laws and it is the physical space of administrative and political 
acts of power. Law changes during and since the “refugee crisis” have intensified 
these objectives, even though the case of Denmark illustrates a clear path depen-
dency in the establishment of exclusionary reception practices since the 1990s.
Regarding this book’s topic and its focus on the local level and local integration 
conditions, Denmark’s reception and settlement approaches are significant and 
require further studies for the following reasons. First, municipalities have practi-
cally no saying regarding the location and development of accommodations and the 
distribution of accepted refugees. After receiving asylum, the state decides the loca-
tion and settlement of refugees based on the Regionekvoter and the Kommunekvoter.
Second, only after the dispersal and settlement in a municipality, local policies 
become relevant, but they are still embedded in powerful state regulations and the 
assimilationist 3-year-long integration program. Research on the trajectories of 
accepted refugees during and after this 3-year residential obligation are necessary to 
give insights into local integration processes, the role of the municipality and their 
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impact on the living conditions of refugees. This will also show if refugees in the 
end stay in allocated regions or if they finally migrate to urban areas.
Third, the hardening of integration policies, the introduction of the quota system 
and residential obligations for accepted refugees were influenced by Social 
Democratic majors of Copenhagen and Aarhus in the 1990s (Myrberg 2017). They 
saw an unfair distribution of costs and problematic concentrations of immigrants, 
since refugees would migrate to larger cities and settle in ethnic neighbourhoods. 
The Danish case refutes  – or at least diversifies  – the assumption in urban and 
migration studies that big cities would be a hotbed for progressive and pro- 
immigration policies.
Fourth, Denmark’s ‘geographies of asylum’ are consequently rather rural because 
of the anti-urban and anti-multicultural integration policies. Accommodation cen-
tres for asylum seekers and accepted refugees are distributed to rural areas and 
small towns with low immigrant populations. However, major refugee organiza-
tions, initiatives and places of protest are in Copenhagen. The Trampoline House, 
for example, is a cultural and social project, which aims to “deisolate asylum seek-
ers and include them in the urban society” (Trampoline House 2015). Further analy-
ses should investigate to what extent refugees develop tactics and strategies to 
participate in urban life and ethnic cultural activities in urban localities.
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Chapter 4
Places and Spaces of the Others. A German 
Reception Centre in Public Discourse 
and Individual Perception
Daniel Göler
4.1  An Outline of the Problem and Its Theoretical 
Embeddedness
The refugee migration to Europe in 2015 and the political management of the so- 
called “refugee crisis”, which is more and more perceived as a “European refugee 
reception crisis” (Knipper 2016: 993), have dominated daily public discourse since 
then. From a scholarly point of view, refugee mobility has produced both spatially 
and personally alienated human beings, as discussed by Rosa (2014: 122ff). Among 
the manifest outcomes are refugee camps as places without any history and identity, 
thus “non-places” (Augé 1992). According to anthropologist Marc Augé, non- 
places are one of the characteristics of “super-modernity” (1995: 30): “Something 
we perceive, but only in a partial and incoherent manner”. These basic assumptions 
are fundamental to the subsequent analysis of refuge and asylum procedures at the 
local level in a receiving country. Therefore, a German reception and accommoda-
tion centre serves as an example. The main concern of analysis is exploring the 
geographical logic of social practices there (Werlen 2013: 84). Hence, this study 
focuses on the phenomenon’s “geographicities” (Göler and Krišjāne 2017) and 
thereby on the wide range of the refugees’ migration spatialities. The concept takes 
into account in particular that the (spatial) order of individuals, social groups, econ-
omies, relevant institutions and their interrelation is highly influenced by specific 
framing, settings and developments. This means that the notion of place and space 
is interpreted as a relational one. Against this background it is obvious that this 
study has to use a broad empirical approach in order to cover two relevant research 
interests. One is the spatial context of and the local discourse on such a reception 
centre, and the question of how these are produced in an arena of tensions between 
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policies at the European, national and local levels. The other is the manner in which 
these processes of permanent negotiations constitute the camp’s logic as a non- 
place and what variations it is subject to.
The rationale of the analysis concentrates in particular on the spatial perception 
of migrants and asylum seekers. From this perspective, refugee camps and reception 
centres are transitory places where the residents as individuals are temporarily 
reduced to the functionality of the institution. Thus, such centres correspond 
strongly with Foucault’s figure of heterotopia (1967): They are the spatial product 
of political will and governance, reflecting the constituting society and yet function-
ing according to their own rules. In this respect, a refugee reception centre (and 
every other kind of camp) represents an impersonal, ahistoric and identity-poor 
transit area in its given local context. Elements of “Liquid Surveillance” as described 
by Bauman and Lyon (2013) such as restricted access and entrance rituals underline 
the scrappy, fragmentary and incoherent perception of such a place in a local neigh-
bourhood. Generally, little information about the site and the residents leaks to the 
outside. In this chapter, fresh material from three empirical studies on media dis-
course, individual perceptions and corresponding reflections will be presented.1
After a description of the methodology, concept and research questions and a 
concise discussion on refugee migration, asylum and encampment, interest will be 
turned to the “Reception and Accommodation Centre of Upper Franconia” in 
Bamberg, a medium-sized town in Northern Bavaria, Germany. In what follows, 
this institution is considered as a non-place and thus serves as a distinct example for 
the topic of places and spaces of the other. The main goal of the chapter is a further 
reflection on the “geographicities” of refuge in a local context.
4.2  Methodology and Concept
Unravelling such a complex institution like a refugee reception centre and related 
aspects requires a multidimensional approach. Consequently, the social-geographic 
study on the institution and its residents is based on a methodological triangulation. 
The main findings on the centre’s geographicities are gathered from discrete empiri-
cal studies. Each one covered specific research questions and used separate survey 
methods adapted to the individual set of research problems.
The analysis of the media discourse related to the reception centre (Sect. 4.5) is 
a longitudinal approach from the very beginning to the stage of consolidation. It 
provides insights into public attitudes as well as local policies towards the reception 
1 The study is based on results of ongoing research on (refugee) migration, reception and return, 
conducted by the working group on Geographic Migration and Transition Studies (Prof. Dr. Daniel 
Göler) in cooperation with the european forum for migration studies (efms), Institute at the 
University of Bamberg. Bettina Fritzler, Jan Thelen and Mehdi Sejdiu contributed substantially to 
the empirical part on refugees and locality. Thanks are also due to the operator of the reception 
centre (Government of Upper Franconia), who agreed to fieldwork on site.
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centre. Related research questions focus mainly on relevant changes over time: are 
there any decisive incidents to identify what information is reported on the location 
and the residents, and how this communication is done? How is the functionality of 
the centre assessed? Therefore, media coverage was scrutinized in detail for the 
period 2015–2016. The source of information was the online archive “inFranken“, 
where articles from leading Northern Bavarian newspapers published by the Media 
Group Upper Franconia (especially “Fränkischer Tag”) are available. Text analysis 
concentrated on 312 articles, of which 189 were directly related to the camp.
As Sect. 4.5 represents the perspective from outside, these findings are contrasted 
in Sect. 4.6 by the views of the centre’s residents. Insights were gathered through a 
total of 20 qualitative biographical interviews with occasionally, but not systemati-
cally selected residents (“snowball sample”). At the time of the survey in mid-2016, 
the vast majority of the residents (and hence the interviewees) were from Western 
Balkan countries, mostly Albania and Kosovo. The interviewees were between 17 
and 56 years old. Interviews lasted up to an hour and were conducted on site in their 
native language. The main research questions and guidelines for the interviews and 
the talks about individual migration biographies were the motivations and circum-
stances of the migration “into asylum”, the current personal situation in the centre 
and their perspectives if and when they were returned to their own countries. 
Guiding questions were: Did the migrants have any opportunity to gain resources in 
Germany for restarting their lives after deportation? What are their individual expe-
riences of failed immigration to Germany or the Schengen area, respectively?
Then, attention is drawn to refugees’ perception of the locality and surroundings 
(Sect. 4.7). The spatial representations of selected residents were surveyed by using 
the method of mental maps, because “human spatial behaviour is dependent on the 
individual’s cognitive map of the spatial environment” (Downs and Stea 1973: 9). 
During narrative interviews, residents were asked to make a drawing of the spatial 
environment where people live and stay (“sketch map”)2. In the second half of 2017, 
a total of 15 tested persons documented their spatial perception, which is deter-
mined by spaces and places relevant to them. The interest was in how the residents 
at their stage of transit deal with this status from a spatial perspective. How do they 
cope with their specific situation and which spatial patterns exist, or do they tend to 
be randomized?
As the empirical findings give broad information on the geographicities of refu-
gee mobility, detailed synthesis and generalization is necessary. Thus, the discus-
sion at the end concentrates on dichotomies, variabilities and limitations inside and 
outside the examined non-place.
2 The method, its application in geography, and relevant studies go back to the 1960s and 1970s. In 
the context of a cognitive turn in geography, individual behaviour and spatial perception became 
the focus of interest (see Lynch 1960; Horton and Reynolds 1971; Downs and Stea 1973).
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4.3  A New Analytical Perspective
The “refugee crisis” of 2015 soon found its expression in academic literature. 
Analysis of the challenge that Europe faced in those days focused on the admission 
of some hundreds of thousands of asylum seekers. Another issue was the valuation 
of cultures of welcome and assistance; an example is Schiffauer et  al. (2017), 
including a contribution on Bamberg (Rauber 2017: 232). Sometimes fundamental-
ist and ideology-driven political criticism, partially charged by emotions (see con-
tributions in Hess et al. 2017), draws attention away from the scarce analysis of 
spatialities of refugee migration, asylum and reception (such as Ramadan 2012). 
Literature beyond a couple of studies on the Western European receiving countries 
in general and Germany in particular often deals with specifics such as the airport 
asylum procedure (Nieswand 2018) or the role of borders or boundary drawings 
(“b/ordering”; Hartmann 2017: 239). Only a few emphasize refugees’ everyday life 
and the local practice of housing (e.g. Kublitz 2016).
This may distract scholars from the fact that immigration, refuge and asylum are 
not new, but periodically recurring topics. Without going too far back into German 
history, there are parallels to the situation in the 1990s with regard to asylum migra-
tion at that time and to the admission of refugees from Yugoslav secession wars. As 
a result, the entire complex of asylum procedures or paradigms of integration have 
been thoroughly questioned (cf. Isaakyan 2016: 169ff).
This leads directly to the challenge of securitization of refugees and the fields of 
encampment and self-settlement. Self-settlement means that “the refugees make 
their own choice about where they reside and the state’s role can vary enormously“, 
whereas encampment “refers to a policy which requires refugees to live in a desig-
nated area set aside for the exclusive use of refugees “(Bakewell 2014: 129). The 
first variant is seen as being more efficient, but in a humanitarian sense hardly justi-
fiable if we take into account the critical situation of an increasing number of 
migrants in the Global South. It is the large number of refugees that legitimizes the 
variant of organized encampment in the regions of origin or neighbouring countries 
there.
Encampment is still mostly thought of from the perspective of the Global South. 
Collyer (2014: 118ff), for example, implicitly locates the “Geographies of Forced 
Migration” there. Indeed, the vast majority of studies on refugee camps analyze the 
situation in and around contexts of refuge and scrutinize the situation in camps in 
Jordan, Lebanon or Darfur (see for example: Ramadan 2012; Minca 2015; Oesch 
2017). Thus, scholars have recently expressed regret that “the focus of research is 
geographically divided between South and North” (Rechitsky 2016: 172). However, 
an explicit transfer of analysis on encampment or camp settings to the Global North 
is rather an exception.
That is somewhat surprising given that refugee reception is anything but new in 
Germany, for example going back to the post-Second World War period when so 
called “border crossing camps” were established (Oltmer 2016: 50). Until today, 
institutions like that exist in quite similar forms, though renamed as a “collective 
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camp for foreigners” (“Sammellager für Ausländer“) and, more recently, as a 
“reception centre for asylum seekers” (“Zentrale Aufnahmeeinrichtung für 
Asylbewerber“). The concept of centralized accommodation of asylum seekers is, 
as part of the ongoing political debate on asylum, recently celebrating a re-birth 
(more on which later on). This seems to be tricky because in a historically sensitized 
country such as Germany, encampment is highly contentious politically, socially, 
morally and academically (Pieper 2010). Nevertheless, “hotspots” and “transfer 
zones” for asylum seekers who are trying to reach Fortress Europe are again part of 
serious considerations; that is, extra-territorialization of the problem in the form of 
“offshore processing” (Papagianni 2016: 326) accompanied by accelerated discus-
sions on efficient and, at the same time, humanitarian practice according to interna-
tional law.
A central part of these discussions was the implementation of arrival and depor-
tation facilities as they were being set up in Bavaria in 2015, at least as another “way 
of grounding geopolitics in the everyday” (Ramadan 2012: 65). On the top of the 
“refugee crisis”, this raised the question of the adequate form of accommodation for 
asylum seekers in Germany. To sum up, all these focal points are further indicators 
for broadening the perspective and “to look at the relationship of migration [from] 
within the Global South to power dynamics within the Global North” (Rechitsky 
2016: 173).
However, the centralization of reception procedures and decision-making are 
becoming the general rule of admission practice in Germany, since so-called 
“AnKER-Zentren” were an integral part of the national government’s Coalition 
Agreement in February 2018.3 Since then, eight such centres have been established 
nationwide. The blueprint for this form of onshore processing has existed in 
Germany for 3  years: the reception and accommodation centre AEO 
(Aufnahmeeinrichtung Oberfranken) that opened in Bamberg in 2015 (known as 
ANKER-Einrichtung Oberfranken since August 2018). A consideration of the local 
effects, hence geographicities, of migration, refuge and asylum is worthwhile in this 
example, since the Bamberg institution represents the future standard of admission 
and asylum practice in Germany and possibly throughout Europe.
4.4  Non-place AEO?
4.4.1  Facts About the Centre
According to the above – the (academic) interpretation of reception and accommo-
dation centres as non-places and future (political) models for asylum processing – 
Bamberg’s AEO may even be considered as a laboratory for finding efficient ways 
3 “Arrival, decision, and resettlement or deportation should take place in AnKER centres” 
(Koalitionsvertrag 2018, 107). The acronym AnKER – which is reminiscent of “anchor” – comes 
from the German spelling: Ankunft, Entscheidung, kommunale Verteilung bzw. Rückführung.
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to implement asylum legislation. The facility opened on 14 September 2015 as one 
of two “admission and deportation centres” (ARE) in the Federal State of Bavaria.4 
There was a very short lead time as former military sites were available. In Bamberg, 
this was a 190-hectare housing area inside the former US barracks (Fig. 4.1). After 
the final withdrawal of the US forces in 2014, a long-term urban conversion process 
should have started. Given the dramatic situation in mid-2015 and the urgent ques-
tion of housing for a large number of migrants, the transformation into accommoda-
tion for asylum seekers was obvious. As the premises were owned by the Federal 
Republic of Germany and not the municipality of Bamberg, national authorities 
could easily leave this area in a top-down decision by contract to the Federal State 
4 “Ankunfts- und Rückführungseinrichtung”, abbreviated to ARE II. The other one, ARE I, is in 
Manching/Upper Bavaria.
Fig. 4.1 Plan overview of AEO and its location in Bamberg
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of Bavaria to install a reception centre there, essentially without the consent of the 
Bamberg municipality.
ARE II opened exclusively as a special reception centre for asylum seekers from 
safe countries of origin such as the Western Balkan countries. Since July 2016 a 
regular reception centre for asylum seekers has been integrated into the complex, 
and a third pillar came in September 2017 in the form of an arrival centre. Since 
then the camp has been renamed AEO. All relevant authorities such as the federal 
agency for migration and refugees (BAMF), state immigration authority, youth wel-
fare office and an application office of the administrative court are present on site. 
This guarantees that the procedure for granting the right of asylum according to the 
law is conducted accurately, but in an accelerated manner. Asylum seekers should 
receive information on whether they are allowed to stay in Germany or whether they 
must return to their country of origin as soon as possible. The average length of stay 
is 2 months, according to the Government of Upper Franconia who operates the 
centre.5
The initial capacity of 1500 residents steadily expanded. In July 2017, the (cur-
rent) final expansion to 3400 beds was reached. It has been reported that there is 
now capacity for 4500 residents, but such a level of occupancy has never been 
reached. Usually, the number of residents varies between 1200 and 1600. In early 
March 2018, for example, almost 1300 people were living there, including 223 in 
the special reception centre and 1073 in the regular reception centre. At the begin-
ning (2015–2016), most of the centre’s residents came from Western Balkan coun-
tries. Hence, the centre is popularly known as the “Balkan Centre” (“Balkanzentrum”), 
although nowadays the origins of the residents is much more diverse and includes 
migrants from north Africa, Syria or former Soviet republics such as Russia, Ukraine 
and Georgia.
The life span of the reception centre is a crucial question. According to contracts 
between the Bamberg municipality and Bavaria, it is limited to 10 years. However, 
after the recent developments in refugee politics in Germany, this seems to be wish-
ful thinking in Bamberg: Why should a well-functioning and highly efficient proto-
type, built up with enormous efforts, be shut down and then be substituted by 
capacity constructed elsewhere? Therefore, at the latest in 2025, Bamberg will 
prove the litmus test regarding political commitments by the federal and state gov-
ernments towards local politics.
5 As of 2 March 2018. Information about the centre and details concerning current occupancy can 
be found on the government’s website: https://www.regierung.oberfranken.bayern.de/buerger_
und_staat/migranten/ae_oberfranken/index.php
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4.4.2  Asylum Policy and the Camp’s Political Framing
After the reform of the German asylum legislation in the 1990s, asylum seekers 
were usually accommodated decentrally. Housing was provided in apartments or 
small collective units on the social or private housing market. This was common 
practice in Bavaria and thus in Bamberg. Three factors determined the need for a 
reaction and policy response in 2014–2015: the increase in refugee immigration, a 
massive shortage on the housing market, and the need to enhance efficiency in oper-
ating asylum procedures. As a consequence, gradual adjustments to immigration 
laws and the extensive constriction of asylum regulations and their application have 
been implemented on the basis of two acts: The Asylum Packages I and II (Asylpaket 
I und II) of October 2015 and February 2016, respectively. Among the concrete 
measures therein are the special reception and accommodation centres. Beside the 
more or less informal suspension of Dublin regulations, the identification of “safe 
countries of origin” is a focal point regarding the new regulation. The latter include 
(in addition to the member states of the EU) the Western Balkan countries (since 
2014–2015) and Senegal and Ghana (since 1993). The extension of the policy to the 
Maghreb countries is planned. Asylum seekers from these countries are directed to 
reception centres immediately after arrival and application, similar to the proce-
dures in Bamberg. Thus, a group of migrants with a low probability of gaining 
asylum is constructed ex ante; in the case of asylum seekers from Albania and 
Kosovo for example, the quota for successful application in 2015 was 0.2% and 
0.4%, respectively (BAMF 2016, p. 50). Applicants are then obliged to live in the 
reception centres, which provide accommodation and further subsistence until the 
federal office’s decision is made. During this period of time, they are not allowed to 
work or to leave the county where they have been allocated to. If their application 
for asylum is rejected as “manifestly unfounded” or even “inadmissible”, these 
regulations apply until they leave Germany.
Another basic element of the new regulations on asylum is the changeover from 
the monetary to the in-kind principle, which means that beside accommodation, 
food and all other basic needs are provided by the state. Monetary benefits are thus 
reduced to a minimum and even drop completely if the application is rejected. 
So-called “misguided incentives” should be avoided. This seems to be the case – or 
at least is implied  – for a certain number of migrants from Southeast and East 
European countries, who generate, by immigration into the German asylum system, 
an income above the average in their home countries.
The accelerated asylum procedures apply analogously to migrants from coun-
tries with a “high probability of approval”. These are countries with a protection 
rate of at least 50% (currently Eritrea, Iraq, Iran, Syria and Somalia). In fact, the 
reforms outlined were crucial for administrative coping with the rapid rise in the 
number of asylum seekers, including registration, application and processing in 
such a short period of time. Thus, the intended increase in efficiency in operational 
terms is achieved, as long as the rejected asylum seekers do not make appeals. The 
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same applies to the goal of clarifying the residence status as a prerequisite for sub-
sequent integration measures or access to the labour market.
Regarding that interrelation, Etzold (2017: 82) argues “that the two fields – the 
‘field of asylum’ and the ‘field of labour’  – were purposely kept separate from 
another. This interrelation was recently reconfigured in complex ways and is still 
dominated by restrictive regulations concerning the asylum procedures”. Vice versa, 
with this approach any kind of integration during the asylum procedure should be 
kept to a minimum, not least in order to simplify measures of deportation if the 
application is rejected.
4.4.3  Criticisms of the AEO
The Bamberg reception and accommodation centre earned much recognition, espe-
cially from conservative government policy in Bavaria and beyond. But there was 
and still is a lot of criticism concerning the reception procedures in detail or making 
asylum regulations stricter in general. The latter concerns in particular the weaken-
ing of the fundamental right of asylum by constructing groups of refugees with a 
low vs. high probability of remaining and the related categorization in advance, 
solely on the basis of origin. However, this point is not specific to AEOs and does 
not need to be further elaborated upon in this chapter.
Directly related to the location is criticism of its martial form. Not at least with 
the massive fencing dating from the days of the US Army, the physiognomy of the 
site actually conveys the impression of imprisoning and thus interning refugees. In 
fact, residents are allowed to leave and enter the area at any time; the operator points 
out safety reasons for the residents regarding fencing. However, unauthorized 
access, i.e. non-residents without a permit, is denied. Corresponding entrance con-
trols and checkpoints underline permanent surveillance and the character of a non- 
place (Fig. 4.2). Although it is in the direct vicinity of bourgeois residential areas, it 
is, due to limited accessibility, at the same time far away. It comes as an anachro-
nism that the situation today evokes the era of the US barracks.
Other criticism is directed to questions of individual housing, integration of resi-
dents and schooling of children. All these points are subject to individual as well as 
ideological evaluations, as will be elaborated upon in the analysis of public media 
discourse.
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4.5  The AEO in Public Media Discourse
4.5.1  The Location
In 2015 and 2016, the media coverage of Bamberg’s AEO focused on three topics: 
the location and its relation to the housing market, the residents of the centre, and 
the functionality of the (non-)place.
The decision of the former military area as a suitable location was initially judged 
as an advantage. At the time, there was even talk of a “tailwind for conversion” 
(Thelen 2017: 42ff.). However, no one is talking about this any more, especially 
since a Federal Police training centre was also opened on the conversion area in 
2016, and only a small crumb remains of the original idea of urban development. 
Moreover, in the meantime the process of urban conversion has started in the smaller 
area of the historic Lagarde barracks (see Fig. 4.1), not least because of compensa-
tions from the Federal State of Bavaria. The release of the area occupied by the AEO 
in 2025 is, as already indicated, at least questionable.
Another persistent strand of discourse is around the demand for affordable hous-
ing. This is the main concern of a citizens’ initiative called “Army site in citizen 
hands”, established in 2014. They want to provide moderate-priced housing in the 
Fig. 4.2 Checkpoint and entrance control at Bamberg’s AEO; in the background one of the resi-
dential buildings. (Photo by author, 21 Oct. 2018)
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former garrison.6 In fact, the situation on the regional housing market has worsened 
considerably with the opening of the AEO and the police camp. Thereby, the real 
estate market has received much less space through the conversion process than 
expected. At the same time demand has increased considerably, not least due to 
several 100 employees in both institutions. The price level for housing in Bamberg—a 
medium-sized town in a rural area—is already comparable with metropolitan areas. 
But it is not only the competing institutional use that makes the demand for a rapid 
conversion of the residential buildings in the former barracks irrelevant. The “uni-
form functional buildings” with attributes like “compact and heated” (Thelen 2017: 
44) may be appropriate for short-term use and temporary accommodation, but with-
out extensive and lengthy renovation and modernization they would have little 
attraction for the real estate market. Incidentally, critics overlook the question of 
ownership in this regard: The acquisition of the site from the federal state at regular 
market conditions and the subsequent project development of the whole area would 
hardly be affordable for the municipality of Bamberg in the foreseeable future any-
way. In this respect, the topic of location implicitly leads back to the focal question 
of ownership of the former military area and the resulting discourse about the 
acceptable capacity of the camp.
4.5.2  The Residents
The discourse concerning the residents was initially indeed determined by questions 
of scale. In particular after the incidents on New Year’s Eve 2015 in Cologne, when 
hundreds of women were sexually assaulted by (mostly) male, young North African 
and Arab migrants and numerous thefts were recorded, a critical atmosphere devel-
oped with regard to origin, “otherness” and masculinities of migration. At the end 
of 2015, it seemed that the ARE and its residents – a limited (and declining) number 
of migrants from Western Balkan countries – were more or less accepted among 
Bamberg’s citizens, but then came media reports of a conversion to a regular recep-
tion centre, where migrants from (North) African sending countries would be 
accommodated. After initial problems the “Balkanzentrum” seemed to be broadly 
accepted, not least because it was occupied by “white Europeans”. But now, the 
centre would turn into a facility with people from culturally much more distant 
origins. This strongly evoked the arguments of the thesis of hierarchical otherness 
of immigrants, which would – with the UK as an example – ultimately lead to the 
suppression of the autochthonous (or as such perceived) majority population of 
“white Britains” (Coleman 2006). The claim that the character of the centre as a 
“place of lack of perspective” (Thelen 2017: 48) would pass, since asylum seekers 
with better perspectives would live there, remained largely unheard. Rumours and 
reports of rising crime in the form of shoplifting, car break-ins, damage of property 
6 Details on the initiative can be found on their Facebook account [www.facebook.com/
BIArmyGelaende/, last visit 13 March 2018].
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and bodily injury in and around the reception centre did not make things better. 
Again and again, media reported on certain groups of nationalities for different 
reasons and far too often these were criminal acts. However, it becomes evident that 
the image of the centre’s residents, produced by the media, is exposed to constant 
change (Thelen 2017: 59).
4.5.3  The Functionality
The functionality of the (non-)place is defined by the concentrated presence of the 
relevant authorities, the proximity to the applicants and the aim of accelerating the 
procedures, including redistribution or repatriation, depending on the decision. This 
was pointed out in surprising openness with the initial naming as ARE (an abbrevia-
tion for arrival and deportation). AEO, in contrast, sounds at least more open- 
ended, even though the dominance of the function as a “special reception centre” 
indicates deportation as the most likely outcome. Moreover, new terms such as 
“turbo deportation centre”, “deportation camp”, “Bamberg deportation facility” or 
“deportation camp without integration” mushroomed in the course of 2016 (Thelen 
2017: 61ff.).
The organization and execution of deportations, which usually take place in the 
early morning and apparently give residents not much more than 10 min to prepare, 
is highly controversial. Even the role of the non-lockable doors to and inside the 
apartments is discussed distinctively in this regard. On the one hand, they facilitate 
a deportation if residents oppose. On the other hand, the government points out 
safety reasons for the residents in case of fire or any other incident and their respon-
sibility as operator. Other controversies are about the medical service, schooling or 
a bus shuttle set up in March 2016. The latter connects the AEO with the main rail-
way station, the central bus station and the hospital. On the one hand, the incremen-
tal improvements regarding the functionality of the institution are appreciated. On 
the other, a discussion simultaneously emerged in the public discourse, because all 
of these improvements for refugees are always evaluated in competition with public 
services offered to Bamberg’s citizens. Thus, the shuttle bus was immediately clas-
sified as a luxury for free, although the regional government of Upper Franconia had 
already withheld a small part of the residents’ “pocket money” in advance.
Concerning the functionality of the whole facility, the discourse always spins 
around two opposing perspectives: One emphasizes the efficiency of the centre, 
mainly with regard to the previously constructed group of asylum applicants with a 
“low probability” of their claim being accepted. The other declares the institution as 
completely inhuman, despising basic human rights and subordinated to the political 
desire to temporarily isolate the residents.
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4.6  The Reception Centre as a Place of Transit? 
The Residents’ Perspective
The ever-changing occupancy, and hence the character of the AEO as a place of 
transit, makes it difficult to generate coherent findings on the perspective of the resi-
dents. In fact, given the heterogeneity of individual cases and the biographies of 
asylum seekers, there can be no such coherence. At the time of our survey (July–
August 2016), the sample implicitly focused on a slightly more homogenous group, 
as during the centre’s first year, the residents were predominantly migrants from 
Western Balkan countries. The majority of the interviewees had already lived in 
(decentralized) accommodation all over Northern Bavaria, sometimes for a longer 
period of time. They saw themselves on a good path of integration through school 
attendance and regular work. Then they had to move to the ARE in Bamberg, in 
order to accelerate further processing. Almost all of them had had a negative deci-
sion on their application before, but had not yet been deported due to various issues 
such as missing documents or ongoing medical problems. This explains in a certain 
number of cases the disproportionately long stay in the reception centre. Those 
asylum seekers whose applications had been unproblematic in the bureaucratic 
sense, or those who recognized the futility of an asylum application in their case and 
stopped the procedure on their own, had already left the ARE by the time of the 
survey. As a consequence the sample predominantly represented a group of people 
whose asylum procedures had been problematic (in terms of asylum procedures). 
This also explains that all of our interviewees stayed much longer in the camp than 
the average duration of 2 months mentioned above.
For these migrants, the stay in Bamberg was often just another stage in a multi-
faceted migration trajectory. They are bound in an “elusive migration system” 
(Göler and Krisjane 2016: 2017), like those migrants from Kosovo and Albania, 
who act in a highly flexible, spontaneous and unpredictable way. Two biographies 
underline this. Firstly there was a 38-year-old Albanian citizen (I12)7, born in 
Tepelena, who had lived and worked in Greece for 11 years. Due to the economic 
crisis there he returned to Albania in 2011. In 2015, he decided to leave to Germany 
“into asylum” with his family (a wife and three children). Secondly there was a 
31-year-old Kosovan from Prishtina (I6) who came to Germany in 2011 and expe-
rienced slightly different conditions with liberal regulations at that time. He worked 
in a restaurant, then in horticulture and attended a language course. His work permit 
was no longer renewed from the end of 2015, and so since April 2016 he had been 
living in Bamberg’s reception centre after living in three intermediate decentralized 
accommodation facilities in Northern Bavaria.
In other cases, too, the impression emerges that for migrants from Western 
Balkan countries who came to Germany before 2015, the prospects of staying were 
not bad at first (at least in the form of an exceptional leave to remain, i.e. the imposi-
tion of a ban on deportation according to §60 of the Residence Act). I hypothesize 
7 The interviews are rendered using anonymized codes based on the survey order (I1–I20).
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that those migrants were indirectly affected by the “refugee crisis”. This seemed to 
be the case for a 28-year-old Kosovan from Gjakova (I19), who – after having spent 
parts of his childhood in Saarbrücken – had lived with his family in several small 
towns in Upper Franconia since 2014. He had worked in a fast-food restaurant for 
9 months, where he was recently offered vocational training. The notice of rejection 
had been received 3 months previously. He had had to stop working and to cancel 
his apprenticeship. Since his family is obliged to leave the country, but cannot cover 
the travel expenses to do so, they will be deported. That will mean a ban on entry 
and residence in the Schengen area for the next years.
For all of our interviewees, return is not a realistic option to solve individual 
problems and will not be a permanent solution (see also Göler and Doka 2015; 
Göler 2015). All statements given by the interviewees on their plans after return 
point to repeated emigration – to other countries or even back to Germany, but then 
not in the migration channel of asylum. The tragic misunderstanding of that time, 
i.e. the rumours that political asylum also applied to migrants from Western Balkan 
countries, seems to be dispelled. Most migrants admit in a remarkably open way 
that wrong information, given by family members, a far too blue-eyed migration 
decision, or, especially in the case of Kosovans, false promises from human smug-
glers led to a misguided migration project.
Some of the statements indicate that there are still deficits of information. The 
view that “if you work here, if you are informed and integrated, then you have the 
right to live here” (I6) may be understandable from an individual perspective, but it 
does not lead to a residence permit being granted. I5 constructs a completely bizarre 
definition of political asylum: “I applied for political asylum because I am disap-
pointed with the politics in Kosovo.” Similarly, the expectation “I was sure that I 
would get asylum, because France is now dominated by the non-white race and I 
read that Germany wants to avoid that through the immigration of white, Albanian 
migrants” (I18) is wholly misguided. This indicates again that evidently wrong 
expectations have arisen and that erroneous knowledge or crude interpretations are 
still circulating.
Coming back to the situation of residents in the AEO, their separation from the 
surrounding environment, the lack of any kind of social embeddedness and restricted 
access to the labour market are manifest problems. Conscious of the limitations to 
their stay, migrants seek to aggregate resources and capital for the period after their 
expected deportation, but have only very few opportunities to do so. When trans-
ferred to Bamberg, some migrants were deprived of the networks needed for such 
(possibly informal) employment. This, in turn, limits the scope for action in the case 
of return, due to a lack of social and financial resources. A few admit that they 
earned some money from illegal employment which is reported to be worth 50 EUR 
a day (I1). In addition, at best, it is possible to earn something through (approved) 
ancillary activities in the camp. Due to changes in social assistance provision – from 
direct allowances to benefits in kind – generating savings in that way is very diffi-
cult. Only I18, who lived outside his home country for the first time 20 years ago 
and looked back on a remarkable migration biography, stated that he had saved 
enough from emigration to live in Kosovo in the future, if necessary.
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A study on ensuring children’s rights in reception and accommodation centres 
(Alexandropoulou et al. 2016) assesses the situation of the residents and in particu-
lar the Roma population as critical. First, the authors refer to deficits in schooling 
(ibd.: 19ff.)8. A place in the regular schools in Bamberg is indeed not provided, but 
rather a substitute in the form of a special educational institution is offered on site. 
School attendance is barely controlled and absence is not sanctioned. Second, with 
regard to fears of already traumatized children, having non-lockable doors in apart-
ments is considered highly problematic. Third, discrimination and antiziganism, 
which is common all over the Balkans, is prevalent in the AEO as well. All in all, 
respondents to the study’s survey consider the living conditions of families there to 
be “consistently negative” (ibd.: 27).
Conversely, in our survey on accommodation in the centre, beside a couple of 
unsurprising negative facts, some positive ones were mentioned as well. These 
include the good healthcare system in Germany in general, notably the medical care 
offered on site, and the respectful handling by the authorities. Residents seem not to 
be used to this when it comes to authorities in their country of origin: “I have more 
rights here than in Kosovo, even though I am an asylum seeker” (I1). Nevertheless, 
the situation of Roma, an ethnic group that is undoubtedly threatened all over 
Southeastern Europe and whose situation is precarious in the AEO, too, seems dra-
matic. On the one hand, deportation is not an option due to a bundle of uncertainties 
“at home”. As a consequence, Roma families try to resist their return by all means. 
However, as they are obliged to leave, they have no access to bare subsistence. 
Beyond mere accommodation, they have no means of livelihood even in the recep-
tion centre. For this reason, I2 openly states that he is more or less forced to steal 
goods for his family’s survival.
Beyond all assessments of the situation in the centre – which, as shown, strongly 
depends on the perspective – living there is a life in permanent limbo with manifold 
uncertainties, no matter if somebody has a high or low probability of staying. 
Regardless of the length of the asylum procedure and the related stay in the centre, 
or even the perspective of staying or leaving the country, the AEO is – in the words 
of Augé (1992) – a footloose, anonymous (non-)place of transit. In this respect, the 
following sequence analyzes to what extent daily life in such a parallel world – a 
heterotopia – is reflected in the perception and use of space by the residents.
8 This study was funded by the Hildegard Lagrenne Foundation and focuses exclusively, in accor-
dance with the foundation’s mission, on the education, inclusion and participation of Sinti and 
Roma.
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4.7  Coping with Locality: The Resident’s Spatial Perception 
of the Local Area
Spatial perception, knowledge and behaviour of the centre’s residents are deter-
mined by the marginality and isolation of the location on the one hand and by 
individual, biographically conditioned capabilities on the other. The correspond-
ing survey by means of “mental maps” was calculated with the heterogeneity of 
the sample in advance. The 15 participants in the experiment had mixed nationali-
ties (Syria, Eritrea, Iran and Morocco)9, and they differed in gender (ten males and 
five females), length of stay (2  weeks to 8  months) and level of education. 
Concerning academic and school education a distinction was made between 
“high” (five people with university degrees, mainly from Syria and Iran), 
“medium” (qualifying school leaving certificates, four people) and “low” access 
to education (six Eritreans; Fritzler 2018). As expected, the depth of the spatial 
knowledge correlated strongly with the level of education, and a higher age led to 
more extended spatial knowledge. In contrast, factors such as duration of stay or 
language skills had hardly any differentiating influence. The 15 sketch maps dif-
fered considerably: the number of spatial elements included in the drawings, for 
example, varied between six and more than 120. Generally, sketches are analyzed 
by number, type, naming, location and, if applicable, description of spatial 
elements.
In detail, six of the maps made by the Eritrean migrants mentioned above repre-
sent the image of local- or neighbourhood-focused individuals showing a very lim-
ited range of action (Fig.  4.3). Their drawings contain a manageable number of 
elements (between 6 and 16) that are predominantly in the immediate vicinity of the 
reception centre. A prominent strategic point is a busy intersection on a ring road 
not far from the AEO. There is a Wi-Fi hotspot with free access, which is the only 
urban quality in that location. The main hub in the closer town centre is an internet 
cafe, which provides high-speed internet access and offers pre-paid cards at reason-
able prices. The shop is operated by a Nigerian migrant (“the najeryamen”, Fig. 4.3), 
which makes it worth a visit as well. Besides that, further spatial knowledge of these 
residents is rather poor. For three of them, an A4 sheet was more than sufficient for 
the whole drawing.
Four other participants in the survey, coming from Syria, Iran and Morocco and 
with a moderate level of education, have more extended spatial knowledge, albeit 
mainly centred on the AEO and its neighbourhood. They included significantly 
more spatial elements in their maps and show higher variance (17 up to 70 ele-
ments). These elements, their location and the topographic and physiognomic rela-
tions are often incorrectly reproduced. Individual perception is usually influenced 
by individual interests or needs. For example, in the case of a Christian Iranian 
9 It is the survey period, a year later, which explains the different structure of the samples, most 




woman, churches play an important role (Fig. 4.4). In addition, shopping sites in 
Bamberg’s central pedestrian zone are mentioned. What is on offer there is per-
ceived, but cannot be benefited from due to individual, mostly financial, restrictions. 
A 35-year-old male Syrian drew a wide range of actions and numerous facilities, 
whose name and function he hardly knew. It revealed that he rides his bicycle 
through Bamberg and collects returnable bottles in order to earn a little bit of money. 
This also explains why he is quite familiar with Bamberg’s vibrant bar area, even 
though he never visits any of the pubs – be it because he doesn’t want to or because 
he cannot afford to. He serves as another example of obviously widespread capabil-
ity constraints among asylum seekers.
Five other, highly educated refugees from Syria and Iran have very detailed 
knowledge of space – one of the sketch maps includes more than 120 elements. 
They show a clear orientation of the town centre. There is broad information on 
places of various functions, such as social services like Caritas, a dentist, a phar-
macy, a lawyer, the town hall, shops, etc. Furthermore, several institutions for lei-
sure and culture such as a cinema or a temporary art installation in public space are 
included, as well as symbolic places, such as the so-called “Gabelmann”, which is 
a well-known meeting place in the main pedestrian zone. In two of these maps, the 
AEO and its surrounding neighbourhood are not included. Interestingly, the shuttle 
bus, which has connected the AEO with the railway station and the hospital since 
Fig. 4.3 Sketch map by a young migrant from Eritrea with limited spatial information. (Fritzler 
2018, 77)
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March 2017, plays an important role in the orientation and spatial behaviour of the 
residents (Fig. 4.5): In one case, the entire drawing was calibrated along the bus 
route, which was reproduced in great detail. Another respondent reported to have 
previously done the paths on foot and was thus limited when buying daily goods. 
So, infrastructure like a bus connection could be a means of planning, regulation 
and control of the residents’ spatial pattern at the same time.
All in all, the residents’ spatial field of action is a result of necessities of every-
day life and individual interest outside the camp, sometimes combined with spe-
cific personal needs. The educational level plays a determining role, capability 
constraints a limiting one and provisions that are free of charge – like mobility via 
a shuttle bus – may have a liberating but also controlling effect. As a summary of 
the sketch maps of the AEO residents, a spatial pattern in the form of an east-west 
axis appears. This is of course due to the location of the AEO on the eastern out-
skirts of the town and the important function and orientation points located to the 
Fig. 4.4 Sketch map by a Protestant Iranian woman with accurate spatial information of the town 
centre. (Fritzler 2018, 71)
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west of it towards the inner urban area. Places north or south of this axis, with the 
exception of the mentioned intersection, remain excluded. Incidentally, the find-
ings from the analysis of mental maps presented here are essentially identical with 
those of perception geographies and research on action space in general (Downs 
and Stea 1973).
Fig. 4.5 Section of the sketch map by a woman from Iran with detailed information along the bus 
route and on the town centre. (Fritzler 2018, 65)
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4.8  Discussion and Results
The geographicity of the reception centre is, as has become clear, characterized by 
manifold dichotomies, variabilities and limitations. This affects both the location, 
including the camp’s spatial embeddedness, and the residents. This specific constel-
lation of multiple ambiguities seems to be inherent to such places (see Oesch 2017). 
Following Martin (2015), although in a completely different context, this phenom-
enon may be interpreted as a “CampScape”, with the suffix -scape representing the 
camp’s generally fluid character and referring in particular to the special setting of 
the place (Martin 2015: 14).
The interplay of space, place and individuals defines the very special assemblage 
of Bamberg’s CampScape, which includes certain dichotomies. This includes in 
temporary terms the fact that the duration of stay in the centre is unpredictable, but 
generally limited. Asylum seekers’ transitory episodes end in compliance with the 
politically formulated function of the centre, i.e. the result of staying (and further 
integrating) or leaving the country. In this regard, the question of origin is more than 
significant. It defines, via the political construct of safe (and unsafe) countries of 
origin, the likelihood of staying and thus legitimizes almost ex ante the subsequent 
decision for approval of a residence status or upcoming deportation as a further 
dichotomy. The problem is defined by requirements of high efficiency of govern-
ment institutions on the one hand, and preservation of humanity, human rights and 
international agreements on refugee treatment on the other. This question is of 
course irrelevant for the centre as a non-place, because this kind of dichotomy is 
reduced to an average as described by Augé (1995). Regardless of the motivation of 
migration, all residents have the same de jure status during their stay in the camp 
until the final decision on the asylum procedure has been made.
In fact, the occupancy was not homogenous either structurally or over time, but 
characterized by manifold variabilities of the CampScape. Time, for example, was 
a decisive factor in my field studies. It has been shown that the resident structure 
could change fundamentally just within half a year in terms of origin, ethnic group 
and/or citizenship due to the fluid character of the camp. In the Bamberg centre, for 
example, migrants from safe countries of origin in the Western Balkans were 
replaced by refugees from countries affected by civil war and other crises. This 
intensive fluctuation of 300–500 entrances and exits per month is the trigger for the 
structural variability regarding the composition of the residents. It was also part of 
the massive initial—and ongoing—discussion on the maximum capacity of the 
institution and related scepticism of many of Bamberg’s citizens: On the one hand 
there is an informal consensus on a tolerable number of 1500 residents, and on the 
other hand capacity is officially still stated as 3400. There is no doubt that in case of 
a renewed increase in refugee immigration this capacity will be reached soon. Even 
an increase to the gloomy 4500 is relatively easy to implement if necessary.
The residents are subject to various limitations. For the duration of the asylum 
procedure, living in the camp is compulsory and residence obligations prevail. Self- 
settlement of refugees was and is not an option in Germany. Even local freedom of 
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movement is limited by the fencing off of the area. However, this is an essential part 
of the safety guarantee for the camp, thus making it acceptable to most local resi-
dents. Even the residents and their habitus are characterized by limitations and con-
straints. This was demonstrated, for example, in terms of spatial orientation and 
interest in the local area, including the individual’s abilities. This is offset by certain 
disillusions, possibly resulting in immobility for some residents. But for most of 
them, even simple needs like a shuttle bus or the random availability of Wi-Fi access 
may change spatial patterns, which indicates that the CampScape and its people are 
organized elusively. These are the hallmarks of a certain alienation of refugees in 
the local and urban context, in which (politically deliberate) approaches to integra-
tion are largely missing. In addition, limitations also come into play when multiple 
capability constraints become relevant and they certainly do not end when it simply 
comes to shopping or going to a pub.
4.9  Conclusion and Outlook
Housing in the “Laboratory AEO” and the CampScape in Bamberg (as an intrater-
ritorial solution to refugee immigration) or, for example, a refugee camp in Jordan 
(as an extraterritorial solution from a European point of view), are modest responses 
to the global challenge of migration. Each answer brings with it its own specific 
differentiation, dichotomy and limitation, which may serve as a superordinate find-
ing of the study of refuge in the local context. With regard to the realities of refugee 
migration, any kind of average might not exist anyway. But the non-place can be 
produced whenever and wherever, if necessary – Bamberg’s AEO serves to prove 
that argument.
Encampment, most recently in the form of AnKER centres, is a way towards 
efficient asylum processing in Germany. The figure of heterotopia, super-modernity 
and the vision of non-places each provide adequate access for an analysis of places 
and spaces like that. The concept of non-places (Augé 1995) is without any doubt 
the most suitable framework for a study of encampment in a narrow sense. As the 
(non-)place is just one part of the bigger picture, the suggestion is to widen the con-
ceptual and theoretical lens. As underlined by the broad empirical approach applied, 
a more holistic assessment involves an analysis of the whole range of relevant phe-
nomena in and around non-places like a reception centre, including their manifold 
interrelations. The relational perspective in terms of geographicities offers the 
chance to analyse spatialities, people and institutions on different scales and with 
multidimensional methodologies. There are lots of elements that produce the logic 
of the place, thus the heterotopia of the AEO, such as personal attitudes, percep-
tions, individual perspectives and origins, legal issues, politics, public discourse 
and, not least, time. The logic of the place is the product of both the organizational 
framing and the institutional setting.
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In 2015 Austria was among the European countries with the largest asylum arrivals per 
capita. Pictures of refugees crossing the borders from Hungary and Slovenia dominated 
the media and influenced how the issue has been framed, politicized and perceived by 
political elites, journalists and citizens. Although the massive refugee movement did not 
come as a surprise, the humanitarian challenge was enormous and the reception frame-
work went through a major crisis. When state institutions partly failed to serve the high 
numbers of refugees with accommodation and basic services, volunteers from all walks 
of life and human rights organizations reacted and did their best to provide help and sup-
port. During this refugee policy crisis1 local communities became key actors and sites in 
the admission of asylum seekers. However, this included both acts of support for indi-
viduals and protest against the creation of new facilities. Open and closed doors existed 
simultaneously. In addition, the reception policy crisis in 2015 was intensified by long-
standing conflicts between the various political tiers over responsibilities for the territo-
rial distribution and reception of asylum seekers2 (Gruber 2017; Haselbacher and 
Rosenberger 2018; Knapp 2015; Müller and Rosenberger 2017; Rutz 2018; Sauer 2017).
1 The term goes back to legal scholar Manfred Nowak, citied in Der Standard, 7 December 2015. 
Below we use this notion to refer to what is often called refugee crisis.
2 Asylum seekers are defined as international protection seeking persons whose applications are 
being processed. Refugees are defined as persons who have been granted asylum based on the 
criteria laid down in the Geneva Refugee Convention of 1951.
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Considering this phenomenon of large refugee arrivals, on the one side, and lack-
ing cooperation within the tiers of asylum governance, on the other, this chapter 
focuses on the local responses to the asylum events of 2015 and considers both 
administrative activities by authorities and social practices by civil society and vol-
unteers. Inspired by literature on multi-level governance in migration (Benz 2009; 
Scholten 2013; Scholten 2014; Tränhardt and Weiss 2016) and local immigrant inte-
gration issues (Aumüller 2017; Glorius and Doomernik 2016; Simsa et al. 2016; 
Walker 2014), we will combine a macro-level perspective on institutional arrange-
ments and multi-level governance structures with a micro-level one to highlight not 
only vertical but also horizontal cooperation and conflicts between actors perform-
ing various types of formal and informal activities. Against this theoretical and ana-
lytical background, we explore in detail, first, conflicts and cooperation between the 
national, provincial and local levels over policy making and policy implementation 
in the fields of admission and integration. Second, we elaborate on how local com-
munities responded to implementation needs and everyday life challenges during 
and after the reception crisis. Third, we analyse in which policy fields and forms of 
activities municipalities have gained or lost power, influence and responsibility dur-
ing and after this event?
Austria is a case well suited to investigate local responses to the refugee policy 
crisis insofar as it applies a multi-level reception system that includes administrative 
tasks for the local level only at the policy implementation stage. As the local tier 
does not have any legal powers, a significant gap exists between those actors who 
are in charge of policy decisions and those who have to implement them (Götzelmann 
2010; Gruber 2017; Merhaut and Stern 2018; Steininger 2006). At the same time, 
local communities pursue a wide range of social activities that clearly go beyond 
what is regulated in institutional arrangements on basic care. They help to enhance 
everyday wellbeing and inclusion into certain societal relations and institutions (De 
Jong and Ataç 2017; Simsa 2017). Finally, worth to be mentioned, the events of 
2015 had a major impact on politics in Austria. The attitudes towards refugees 
changed profoundly during and after 2015 from welcoming to openly rejecting. 
Eventually, the asylum issue dominated the ensuing elections (Plasser and Sommer 
2017), which led to a change in the coalition government from centre-left to centre- 
far right in 2017. As will be shown, this political shift to the right has severely 
affected the priorities in territorial dispersal and refugee integration.
This paper demonstrates that the assumption of a local turn in migration gover-
nance is shaped by very different designs and sequences. Austria does not follow a 
linear local turn-track in reception and integration governance as found in several 
country case studies (Hinger et al. 2016; Kos et al. 2015). As our case study high-
lights, the local turn rather depends on policy fields involved and the type of tasks 
considered. Most of all, in Austria the national government pursues a rather ambiva-
lent strategy – to strengthen the central powers on admission policies and to take 
back responsibility and funding for policies to facilitate integration. Hence, the ver-
tical governance structure clearly differentiates, first, between admission and 
 integration issues and, second between decision making, implementation of policies 
and social assistance provided at a voluntary basis.
S. Rosenberger and S. Müller
95
The findings presented in this chapter are derived from a qualitative analysis of 
the following sources: empirical studies on protest and volunteering in connection 
with asylum, human rights reports, legal texts, government documents, newsletters 
of the Municipalities Association, as well as media articles (from 2014 till 2018). 
Moreover, the analysis of local responses is based on a report on best practices com-
piled by an informal network of mayors (Forum Alpbach 2016). This range of mate-
rial allows us a detailed mapping of policy developments and practical responses 
during and after the events of 2015.
In the next sections, we locate our analysis within multi-level governance litera-
ture and then we move on to a brief overview of current political developments.
5.2  Multilevel Governance in Asylum and Reception
The issues of migration and asylum have a strong national and European orienta-
tion. Literature discusses municipalities and local arenas primarily as sites where 
European and national regulation is implemented (Bendel 2015; Trauner 2016). 
However, as Walker (2014) underlines, national policies are not only being repro-
duced locally, but local sites also reinterpret national policies and may change the 
original intention by their own activities. By adopting a local perspective, scholars 
address the (discretionary) power of municipalities in the making and implementa-
tion of admission and inclusion policies (Garcés-Mascareñas and Penninx 2016; 
Langthaler and Trauner 2009).
Based on the fact that municipalities exert major tasks in accommodation and 
integration processes, scholars analyse the relations between national and local lev-
els (Kronenberg 2018). In general, it is noted that the power relations within a multi- 
level system are subject to challenges by actors at all levels through negotiations, 
disobedience or redistribution of responsibilities and resources. Multi-level dynam-
ics are mostly expressed as cooperation and/or conflict. As Hinger et al. (2016: 445) 
demonstrate, the local administrations can “negotiate, enhance or question legal 
norms and regulations according to specific problem definitions not anticipated by 
or included in state regulations.” Also, Alexander (2003: 412) points out that munic-
ipalities can either “complement, contradict or preempt” national policies.
In the event of conflicts, Garcés-Mascareñas and Penninx (2016: 4) note that 
opposed policy rationales exist at national and local level. While the national gov-
ernment aims for control and sovereignty, local authorities tend to focus on social 
cohesion and well-being instead. Breeman et al. (2015) add that if there is a topic of 
major concern for the municipality, it will tend to handle it with a view to the best 
outcome for the local level rather than sticking to the national agenda. In the case of 
the Netherlands, among others, Kos et al. (2015) identify a situation of competition 
between national and local levels. The authors demonstrate that local authorities try 
to balance restrictive national regulations, which would lead to homelessness and 
destitution of unregulated/unregistered migrants, consequences which local com-
munities want to avoid in the interest of coexistence, social order and security.
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For Germany, studies which investigated the involvement of municipalities in the 
federal refugee regime stress a different aspect. They report that municipalities 
faced huge challenges and met them with rather pragmatic approaches. Civil society 
engaged in smoothing everyday life problems for both hosting society and newcom-
ers. Finally, several studies notice that the local level gained in influence within the 
federal structure as a result of providing social practices (Aumüller 2017; Bogumil 
et al. 2017; Schammann and Kühn 2016; Tränhardt and Weiss 2016). In contrast, 
Emilsson (2015) stresses that in Sweden and Denmark the national government has 
increased its power and restricted the local governments’ scope of actions (for more 
about Denmark see Chap. 3).
These insights from different countries reveal that the path is not linear, but that 
contradictory developments are ongoing; in some cases, the local level gains, in 
other cases it loses in importance.
The analysis of administrative functions of municipalities refers to federalism 
studies (Joppke and Seidle 2012) and to the multi-level governance framework. 
These studies include insights on modes of sharing and separating powers, activities 
and tasks between national, provincial and local levels. According to Benz (2009), 
the term multi-level governance describes political structures and processes at dif-
ferent political levels; multi-level governance may also refer to horizontal and verti-
cal forms of coordination between state authorities as well as between state 
authorities and non-state actors. The specific constellations of the relationships 
within and between the levels also affect the policy outcomes. If politicians cannot 
fulfil the tasks and responsibilities assigned to them, these can be downloaded to the 
lower level.
Peter Scholten (2013) presents four approaches to describe and identify the rela-
tionship between the national and the local level and/or the role of the local level 
within a multi-level setting: (1) centralist; (2) multi-level; (3) localist and (4) decou-
pling. The centralist approach describes a top-down relationship between the 
national and local authorities. In this model, the national government is responsible 
for the formulation of policies, while local authorities are supposed to administer 
and implement them. The multi-level approach is characterized by cooperation, 
negotiation and strategic interactions between the tiers. In contrast, the localist 
approach entails a bottom-up procedure in which policies are not simply imple-
mented but formulated as well. Finally, a decoupled approach refers to tensions 
between the national and local levels that arise from contradictory policies and 
interests between the levels.
As already emphasized, the different modes entail different manifestations of 
horizontal and vertical governance structures, conflicts and cooperation. Whereas a 
vertical structure describes how powers and responsibilities are divided or shared 
between national, provincial and local levels, a horizontal governance perspective 
indicates if and how administrative authorities cooperate with civil society actors, 
NGOs, political associations and organizations (Scholten 2013).
This chapter is informed by this briefly sketched scholarship and investigates 
local responses to the events of 2015. It discusses administrative activities and goes 
a step further by including also everyday practices and collective actions of resi-
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dents – both in support of and in resistance to the admission of asylum seekers. We 
thus combine an institutional approach that refers to institutional arrangements and 
legal frameworks with a social perspective that covers acts performed by individuals 
and civil society.
At this point we want to clarify the key notions used in this paper and explicate 
our conceptual framework. The overall term local response is operationalized by 
two dimensions of activities and respective actors – administrative activities and 
social practices. Administrative activities pertain to officials and cover mainly 
implementation policies in the field of admission and basic care provision. By con-
trast, social practices are performed by individuals, initiatives and organizations 
who act for or against the admission of asylum seekers and their inclusion in local 
communities. Expanding work by Scholten (2013) in order to capture conflicts and 
cooperation between the tiers and actors we refer to multi-level governance frame-
work which differentiates between vertical and horizontal structures. The vertical 
approach looks at the dynamics of legal responsibilities between the administrative 
levels (national, provincial, local). The horizontal approach sheds light on interac-
tions, cooperation and conflicts among local actors, mostly mayors and refugee ini-
tiatives (see Table 5.1).
5.3  Contextual Information: Application Numbers 
and Asylum Politics
The reception policy crisis in 2015 was very serious, but it did not come as a sur-
prise. Already in 2014, the two initial reception centres, designated to accommodate 
asylum seekers during the phase of bringing in their asylum claim, were over-
crowded and overstrained. In late spring 2015, the large-scale facility in Traiskirchen, 
which is equipped to hold 1750 individuals, had to handle 2500–3000 people 
(Knapp 2015). At this time, the mayor of the city, alongside human rights activists 
and refugees from the camp, protested outside the Ministry of the Interior in Vienna 
Table 5.1 Framework of governance structure and forms of activities
Forms of Activities/
Vertical governance 
structure Administrative activities Social practices
National level Decision making on admission and 
integration
−




Local level Implementation of reception 
policies (basic care services)
Horizontal governance: 
Authorities and volunteers to 
welcome and integrate
Source: own illustration
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and demanded better reception conditions and a faster distribution of refugees to 
other provinces. However, this protest met without any response or success.
With 90,000 asylum applications in 2015, almost four times the number of 2014, 
the demand for reception facilities and basic care increased massively. Within 
1 year, the demand for accommodation places had risen from 30,000 to 78,884 by 
December 2015 (Mouzourakis and Taylor 2016). Between June and November 
2015, the number of municipalities hosting asylum seekers, most of them located in 
rural areas, rose from 683 to 1138 (out of 2100 municipalities nationwide; European 
Union Agency for Fundamental Rights 2015). This rise in the total number of 
municipalities indicates that small municipalities also came to host asylum seekers. 
Not only were asylum seekers distributed to small rural areas, within a few months 
the facilities had to be expanded from small and medium-sized facilities to some 
large-scale and camp-like settings (Knapp 2015).
The large influx lasted for a brief period of time. As a consequence of national 
and European measures, in particular the EU-Turkey refugee deal in March 2016 
and the following closure of the Balkan route, the number of asylum applications 
dropped significantly.3
Interestingly, the number of asylum applications has continued to fall, but the 
issue of asylum has remained a highly negative politicized issue since then. As will 
be shown below, the situation was not only characterized by intense struggles 
between the national and municipal levels over the need to accommodate asylum 
seekers, it was also followed by major political changes. In 2016, the Chancellor 
Werner Faymann (SPÖ) came under pressure by his conservative coalition partner 
and the far-right opposition party to resign. Doubtless there were several reasons 
behind this resignation, but they included his role in the summer of 2015 when the 
government decided to take in refugees as well as letting them move through the 
country, largely without any registration at the borders. This loss of control over 
borders was a decisive factor in public perception. Within a very short time, atti-
tudes towards asylum seekers and refugees changed from welcome to refusal, from 
an emphasis on humanitarian aspects to the threats and burdens that come with 
admitting refugees. Eventually, the provincial and the national election campaigns 
in 2017 became dominated by the asylum theme. The political promise of measures 
to stop future asylum seeker movements were supported by a majority of voters and 
led to a change in the government composition. The coalition government of the 
Social Democratic Party of Austria (SPÖ) and the Conservative Austrian People’s 
Party (ÖVP) was removed from office, to be replaced by a coalition government 
formed by the ÖVP and the far-right Freedom Party Austria (FPÖ).
Before we shall elaborate on the consequences of this change in government, we 
shall now turn to conflicts and lack of cooperation within the vertical governance 
structure and show how this impacted on the management of the reception crisis.
3 In 2017, it had dropped by 42% compared with 2016 (Federal Ministry of Interior 2017).
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5.4  Lack of Cooperation: The Local Within the Legal 
Framework
Drawing on the four-dimensional typology of multi-level governance proposed by 
Scholten (2013) and speaking strictly in legal terms, we can identify two phases in 
the Austrian case: a centralist governance phase from 1991 to 2004, and a multi- 
level governance phase after 2004, characterized by divisions of powers between 
the national and the provincial level, but with the municipalities left out in this 
framework.
Below, we briefly sketch the Austrian reception regime and then go on to show 
how the local level responded to the demand for huge numbers of accommodation 
places in 2015. We argue that the federalist framework, which largely ignored and 
ignores the role of municipalities, has to be seen as a cause for the conflicts with and 
resistance from municipalities and communities.
5.4.1  A Multi-level Framework without Municipalities
In 1990, for the first time in history, nationwide basic reception conditions were 
adopted and the responsibility for material support assigned to the national level. 
One year later, the Asylum Act introduced accelerated asylum procedures in an 
effort to reduce the number of asylum applications. The aim of sharing responsibili-
ties for basic care and accommodation between the federal state and the provinces 
could not be reached. Eventually, the legal responsibility for the reception remained 
with the national government till 2004, when a multi-level framework was intro-
duced in the course of the transposition of Council Directive 2003/9/EC 2003.
The current legal basis for reception conditions and responsibilities for asylum 
seekers is the Basic Welfare Support Agreement (Grundversorgungsvereinbarung, 
GVV) of 2004. This framework was negotiated between the federal government and 
the governors of the nine provinces in the interest of achieving two goals: First, to 
comply with Council Directive 2003/9/EC 2003, which stipulates minimum stan-
dards for the reception of asylum seekers, and second, to implement a power- and 
cost-sharing model between the federal government and the provinces. In this 
regard, the agreement also includes the compulsory distribution of asylum seekers 
across the territory and requires the provinces to offer places in proportion to the 
size of their population. However, the agreement envisages no sanctions if prov-
inces do not comply with the quota system. As a result, the law failed to ensure even 
distribution of asylum seekers across the country or to sufficient shelters. On the 
contrary, conflicts between the provinces and the national government over the dis-
tribution of asylum seekers continued (Rosenberger and König 2011). To illustrate 
the situation: In 2015 Vienna was the only province fulfilling the quota requirement 
and taking in a proportionate share of asylum seekers.
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The GVV sets out a multi-level structure of responsibilities. The administrative 
responsibility for accommodating asylum seekers rests with the nine provinces, not 
the federal state. The latter is responsible for running initial reception centres, decid-
ing upon procedural regulation and border policies. That makes the provinces more 
powerful on the issue of reception than in other policy areas, where the main deci-
sion power remains with national authorities. Vice versa, national authorities enjoy 
a limited capacity for setting up new facilities. In this regard, the mutual cooperation 
of national, provincial and local authorities is needed (Götzelmann 2010).
As mentioned, the GVV leaves out municipalities as decision makers of asylum 
and reception. Local authorities are supposed to implement federal propositions and 
provide accommodation sites and fulfil various incorporation tasks. Municipalities 
have a say on only very few administrative aspects (for example, on building regula-
tions). In 2015 and after, this two-tier structure was far from working properly and 
opened up for mutual finger-pointing and severe conflicts, causing what is called a 
reception policy crisis.
5.4.2  Conflicts, Resistance, and the Search for Cooperation
As early as 2014, but even more so in 2015, tensions between the three political tiers 
increased on the issue of taking in and sheltering asylum seekers. The federal gov-
ernment, formally co-responsible for accommodation and support for asylum seek-
ers, faced resistance from provinces as well as municipalities when they were 
looking for new accommodation facilities.
In addition to the increased numbers of asylum applicants, two other develop-
ments contributed decisively to the reception policy crisis: First, the national distri-
bution system laid down in the Basic Welfare Support Agreement did not work 
properly, most of the provinces refused to meet the quota requirements. Second, 
some municipalities, residents and politicians alike, protested against the federal 
and provincial demands to set up accommodation facilities for new arrivals.4
Although municipalities have almost no formal powers on asylum and therefore 
no legal instrument to stop the creation of an accommodation facility, they hold 
informal powers to do so. Protests organized by municipalities contradicted, ques-
tioned and partially also pre-empted national and provincial legislation. One policy 
instrument which successfully prevented the set-up of new accommodation facili-
ties was withholding the classification approval for a building conversion 
(Gemeindebund 2016a; GfK Austria 2016).
During the time of many arrivals, the Ministry of Interior decided to run large 
accommodation facilities, predominantly for financial and logistic reasons. 
However, these facilities, mainly emergency shelters, often met with local protest. 
4 Haselbacher and Rosenberger (2018) collected data on all protest activities reported in the (local) 
media in the province of Upper Austria between 2014 and 2016. The findings below are based on 
this empirical study.
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Sometimes the protests stemmed from worse reception conditions, sometimes from 
resentments towards the inclusion of migrants and foreigners (Meinhart 2015).
The resistance against facilities for asylum seekers was more pronounced in 
small, rural municipalities than in cities. According to the survey carried out by GfK 
Austria (2016), bigger municipalities (>5000 inhabitants) had already sheltered 
asylum-seekers before 2015, while smaller ones (<5000 inhabitants) often provided 
accommodation for asylum seekers for the first time. Personal contacts with ethnic, 
cultural and religious diverse people had an impact on instances of resistance from 
the local population, authorities and politicians. As the study by Haselbacher and 
Rosenberger (2018) reveal, especially people and political authorities in rural areas, 
where the idealized norm of cultural homogeneity continued, took to the streets and 
started petitions to mobilize against the admission of asylum seekers. Moreover, 
this study emphasizes that
[…] mayors play an especially important role in organizing collective action against accom-
modation centres. As they feel left out, local politicians have a strong incentive to speak up 
against actors on the national level, claiming their involvement in consideration of local 
interests and sentiments. (Haselbacher and Rosenberger 2018: 263)
The national government in turn criticized the local protest activities and held 
municipalities responsible for the reception crisis. However, the task of sheltering 
refugees was poorly coordinated between the authorities. This lack of coordination 
increased the tensions on the side of municipalities as well as on that of the federal 
institutions.
In response to local protests, the national government took several measures, soft 
and not so soft ones. In September 2016, it installed a refugee coordinator with the 
task to facilitate a better distribution of asylum seekers across the territory through 
dialogue. The refugee coordinator stayed in office for 1 year and then left somewhat 
disappointed about a lack of governmental support for and interest in integrating 
asylum seekers.
In January 2016, the government adopted some restrictive measures concerning 
the admission of asylum seekers. The Asylum Summit organized by the federal gov-
ernment with the participation of representatives of the provinces, cities and munic-
ipalities agreed to limit new arrivals per year to a maximum of 1.5% of the 
population. This condition was supposed to result in 37,500 applications in 2016 
and to decrease in the following 3 years to 25,000 applications in 2019 (Federal 
Chancellery 2016).
In addition, the national parliament amended the legal framework and entitled 
the national government to open up shelters without the consent of the given munic-
ipality. The Accommodation and Distribution of Aliens in Need of Aid and Protection 
Act (2015) guarantees the federal state the right to operate accommodation centres 
directly. The bill is meant to enforce distribution of asylum seekers by the federal 
state, without consent of provinces (and municipalities). In particular, it allows the 
Ministry of the Interior to establish new reception facilities in those municipalities 
that have not met the reception quota of 1.5% of the resident population. In 2015, in 
a similar way, the provinces Salzburg, Vorarlberg, Lower and Upper Austria adopted 
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state laws on accommodation and distribution of asylum seekers in order to bypass 
local resistance against the admission of asylum seekers. Carinthia even introduced 
a quota system for municipalities and changed the building regulations to lower 
administrative barriers for running accommodation facilities (Gemeindebund 
2016b; Müller 2017).
These legal provisions envisage even greater powers for the national and provin-
cial level at the expense of municipalities. Therefore, following Filomeno (2017), 
we state that the local power in migration policy is rather limited, but local activities 
can be seen as the result of broader multi-level governance constellations and 
conflicts.
Summarizing these lines of conflicts, we identify three major configurations: 
conflicts between federal and provincial authorities over admission and costs, con-
flicts between federal and municipal authorities over admission and reception stan-
dards, and conflicts between provincial and municipal authorities over providing 
accommodation places and sharing the burden. These conflicts are not novel to the 
asylum regime, but they were intensified during and after the crisis (Rutz 2018).
5.5  Social Practices to Welcome and Integrate
From the very beginning of 2015, tensions and polarization as well as support and 
engagement ran through municipalities. On the one side, refusal of and protest 
against new asylum facilities, on the other, instances of welcoming and voluntary 
initiatives, which helped in providing shelter and basic care. Local authorities and 
individual volunteers became key actors in the reception and integration of asylum 
seekers (De Jong and Ataç 2017; Gemeindebund 2016a; Simsa 2017).
Municipalities are the sites were asylum seekers live and receive material sup-
port according to European standards (Rosenberger and König 2011). In the course 
of 2015, municipalities developed a variety of measures to deal with asylum seekers 
and demonstrated that their responsibility goes beyond the simple implementation 
of regulations from higher levels. Citizens, associations and local authorities alike 
gave a hand to asylum seekers to cope with daily struggles, guided them to partici-
pate in community activities and found ways for them to access education and the 
labour market (Mouzourakis and Sheridan 2015).
In view of the admission situation in Germany, Bogumil et al. (2017) differenti-
ate two temporalities, which require different types of support. In the first phase, 
institutions and people offer services to welcome and provide accommodation and 
basic care. In the second phase, when structural integration becomes the priority, 
local communities facilitate access to housing, education and job opportunities. 
Language acquisition and social contacts, often provided by local initiatives, are 
viewed as important facilitators for successful structural integration.
In the following, we differentiate between two groups of actors who respond in 
a supportive way to the needs of asylum seekers: administrative authorities on the 
one side, and civil society actors on the other.
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5.5.1  Administrative Authorities
In Austria, mayors occupy an influential position in municipalities and enjoy a high 
degree of trust among inhabitants. The introduction of direct elections in many 
provinces has even strengthened their role within the municipalities. This is particu-
larly true of their role in communication and information sharing within the com-
munity (Steininger 2006).
Mayors have been at the forefront of the challenge to act and find humanitarian 
and voters-oriented solutions. Some mayors leaned towards protest and rejection of 
asylum seekers (see above), others found pragmatic solutions for the admission and 
inclusion of asylum seekers.
In September 2015, a nation-wide horizontal coordination initiative started to 
provide mayors with best practice knowledge. It was initiated as a non-partisan 
network by the European Forum Alpbach, the Municipalities Association and the 
refugee coordinator. The network meetings brought together mayors who already 
hosted asylum seekers and those who were planning to do so. In five network meet-
ings, more than 350 mayors gathered and exchanged best practices in the reception 
of asylum seekers and in further integration measures. One result was the compila-
tion of a Handbook for Municipalities (Offenes Handbuch für Gemeinden; Forum 
Alpbach 2016) which lists and discusses reception and integration measures devel-
oped and realized in different municipalities and cities.
The handbook shows how mayors responded in various ways to the admission 
policy crisis: First, mayors became temporary policymakers, creating individual 
policies in their communities and enhancing the structural integration of newcom-
ers. Administrative units and mayors were particularly active in the field of accom-
modation, education and opportunities for community, and unskilled work. They 
supported families in sending their children into kindergarten and schools, some-
times even paying for additional tuition for them. They also tried to include asy-
lum seekers and refugees through offering small jobs for the community, like 
mowing lawns, clearing snow or cleaning windows. Some municipalities provided 
support beyond these petty jobs and help with everyday life and included activities 
like opening bank accounts to collect donations which were then used to help 
asylum seekers with public transport costs. Here and there, cultural events and 
leisure activities have been organized to build interaction between different sec-
tors of society.
Second, mayors created horizontal coordination and cooperation structures, 
some nationwide, some limited to a region. For instance, twin cities or neighbour-
hood cities embarked on coordination and exchange of best practices. Regional net-
works have formed not only between municipalities but also including regional 
municipal associations, NGOs or churches. Then mayors initiated cooperation with 
civil society actors. For instance, some created volunteer platforms to enable the 
involvement of and exchange with local citizens. Other offered space for volunteers 
to hold German classes or provided room where locals and asylum seekers could 
meet regularly (Forum Alpbach 2016).
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5.5.2  Civil Society Actors
Langthaler and Trauner (2009) argue that NGOs and civil society play especially in 
reception and integration demands a crucial role, be it due to personal solidarity or 
professional interests. In 2015, the visible suffering of asylum seekers, including 
families and small children, triggered a broad coalition of supporters to improve 
poor living conditions. Individuals and civil society organizations provided assis-
tance, such as emergency shelters, on a nightly basis. Across the country, voluntary 
associations emerged which helped ad-hoc with goods and guidance, but also 
offered services and assistance for empowerment and structural integration. This 
has been visible in Austria but as well in many other European countries (Feischmidt 
et al. 2019; Mouzourakis and Sheridan 2015; Pries 2019; Simsa 2017). For more 
information on the practices in other European countries see for e.g. Chaps. 6 and 7 
in this volume.
Some civil society actors became involved only locally within a given municipal-
ity, others exchanged experiences with initiatives active in other municipalities, 
with NGOs or local authorities. They created horizontal as well as vertical coopera-
tion and coordination structures. De Jong and Ataç (2017) noticed that established 
NGOs in the field of asylum did not necessarily cooperate with newly established 
initiatives, because of different views on professional or not so professional work 
with social care and legal aid.
Civil society actors are mainly committed to offer cultural services, such as lan-
guage courses. They are the ones who often established the first social contacts with 
asylum seekers and encourage further relations between residents and asylum seek-
ers. A relevant source for building close relations are common leisure activities, 
running errands or meetings within communities (Forum Alpbach 2016).
In general, local initiatives did not receive any financial or other forms of support 
from the national government. Often local initiatives relied on fundraising or dona-
tions to help asylum seekers. Cooperation at horizontal level with local authorities, 
and especially with mayors, facilitated to secure funds for integrative measures and 
care (Forum Alpbach 2016; Simsa et  al. 2016). Sometimes civic initiatives have 
enjoyed the material or ideational support of individual politicians. For instance, 
Secretary for Integration in Upper Austria, Rudolf Anschober, launched a platform 
“Helping Out in Upper Austria”5 to spread knowledge and experience over activities 
and to facilitate partnerships between asylum seekers and citizens, NGOs and local 
organizations. The main aim was to coordinate groups and their engagement in the 
region, for instance, through regional conferences for volunteers. The Green Party 
published a list of local initiatives in Austria on their web page,6 to enable network-
ing and to share good experiences.
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Civil society and NGOs often filled the gap where provisions were missing or 
had never been envisaged by the national government in the first place. One exam-
ple were the calls by local initiatives for donations of money and goods to ensure 
asylum seekers had access to clothing and basic products. With regard to language 
acquisition, civil society not only makes up for the lack of German classes offered, 
but sometimes are the only option for asylum seekers to study German, as national 
programmes are restricted to those who have been granted asylum (De Jong and 
Ataç 2017; Simsa et al. 2016).
Unfortunately, this kind of positive take on asylum seekers and the supportive 
mood decreased over time. With increasing critical voices and negative politiciza-
tion of the issue, an anti-refugee climate emerged, also reflecting a growing dissat-
isfaction with the positioning of the government as such (Der Standard 2015).
5.5.3  After 2017: Ambivalent Tendencies
With the far-right government in office (since December 2017), the policy making 
in the field of admission and reception of asylum seekers on the one hand, and the 
provision of integration measures for refugees reached a turning point.
The national level has reclaimed a dominant role, not only in border control, 
return and asylum procedure policies, but also in policies on the territorial distribu-
tion and the provision of welfare services for asylum seekers. The working pro-
gramme of the government (Regierungsprogramm 2017) entails a set of measures 
to separate and isolate asylum seekers and to reduce the scope and quality of inte-
gration measures. In office FPÖ ministers raised demands to restructure the accom-
modation system. In particular, asylum seekers should no longer be put up in small 
units and private facilities, but allocated to big facilities, camps and barracks with a 
curfew on the outskirts of cities.
The overall aim of campization7 is to send tough signals to future asylum seekers 
and the voting population alike complemented by the related strategy of strengthen-
ing the federal powers at the expense of provinces and municipalities. Moreover, an 
indirect effect of the campization strategy will be to make it unfeasible for members 
of the host society to establish social contacts and relations with asylum seekers. 
Campization works against any form of belonging, it prevents civil society and NGOs 
from providing assistance to realize basic rights of asylum seekers. A phenomenon 
that is also visible in other EU countries (see Chaps. 3 and 4, in this volume).
With regard to admission and basic welfare support, municipalities, in particular 
in rural areas, will lose their role. This is different for integration activities aimed at 
those already living in the country. Here, municipalities and local initiatives are 
needed more than ever.
7 Kreichauf (2018: 1) uses this term to describe „a process in which the recent tightening of asylum 
laws and reception regulations have resulted in the emergence and deepening of camp-like charac-
teristics of refugee accommodation in European city regions.”
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Although the number and costs of asylum applications are decreasing, more and 
more facilities remain empty and more and more refugee aid workers have had their 
contracts terminated, the national government has decided to withdraw funding for 
integration measures. In particular, funds for German classes as well as the financial 
resources to facilitate access to the labour market have been drastically reduced 
(Brickner 2017; UNHCR 2018).
The policy proposals have caused an outcry in civil society, nowhere more so 
than in Vienna, where roughly half of all asylum seekers live. Critics accuse the 
federal government of jeopardizing highly necessary integration activities and 
achievements (Meinhart 2018). These policy responses will affect the scope and 
quality of services as well as the leeway of local communities on the integration of 
asylum seekers and refugees. It is to be expected that integration processes and 
achievements – in the domains of housing, educational institutions and labour mar-
ket – will depend even more on the good will of municipalities and social relations 
with volunteers. This voluntary approach to the hotly debated integration issue 
implies arbitrary results. Integration may become a lottery, depending on where 
asylum seekers live and whether they are lucky to have access to volunteers.
5.6  Conclusions
This chapter dealt with the multi-level governance of admission and integration of 
asylum seekers with a focus on the role of the local level. Conceptually, the chapter 
uses the term local responses to cover both formal decisions and implementation of 
basic care as well as measures that go beyond this to include social integration 
activities. Moreover, the chapter included not only pro-migrant tasks regarding 
admission and integration, but also collective actions which were openly directed 
against the admission of asylum seekers.
In retrospect, cooperation and conflict between the political tiers dominated the 
responses to the asylum challenges of the year 2015 and beyond. Within this frame-
work, localities certainly have been and still are the places and spaces where recep-
tion, accommodation and integration happens, where barriers occur and facilitators 
are in place. The role of municipalities in migration and asylum governance changed 
in the course of 2015 and after, but has been and still is characterized by ambiguities 
and opposing trends.
The local level has shown a high degree of autonomy in implementing or contra-
dicting national and federal legislation and, in turn, has also triggered national and 
provincial responses. Nevertheless, in some cases the local authorities and initia-
tives made up for what the national and provincial level could not provide. To do so, 
municipalities explored support networking strategies through sharing best practice 
experiences. For some time, the national government had a huge interest in getting 
as many municipalities involved and to benefit from an extensive voluntary recep-
tion and network. This can be understood as turning to a more pronounced localist 
approach, where not only the national government decides and the local government 
implements, but both levels work together.
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In the meantime, however, on the admission policy side municipalities have lost 
in decision making power. As said above, the national authorities were stonewalled 
in the multi-level reception framework, when they searched unsuccessfully for 
places of accommodation. As a response to the resistance against the set-up of 
accommodation facilities, in 2016, the national government adopted a bill, which 
point to a strengthening of the central state in the admission domain. However, this 
reactive answer is followed by pro-active proposals. The centralisation of decision 
making at the national level has been intensified when the national government has 
turned to deterrence policies to keep away asylum seekers from entering the coun-
try, for instance, by proposing camp-like housing run by the federal state. Eventually, 
the short-term localist approach shifted back towards a centralist procedure on 
admission and territorial distribution. Hence, on admission, the local arena has lost 
leeway as the federal government has strengthened its legal powers.
On the integration policy side, the past and future tendencies are different from 
the admission rational. Here, the local arena has gained in importance when the 
nation state was overstrained by large asylum arrivals, and it will maintain this role 
not at least because the national government has largely withdrawn from the inte-
grating tasks and more than ever before it remains with civil society to help with 
daily life challenges and integration requirements.
We conclude that the large refugee inflows of 2015 challenged municipalities 
and impacted on the handling of ethnic and religious diversity. However, the change 
in government, followed by a change in asylum and integration policies, will again 
largely affect the municipal activities. For the time being, it is local citizens, asso-
ciations and authorities who have a decisive share in the success or failure of inte-
grating asylum seekers and refugees. All this happens in an informal way and 
without changing the vertical governance structures, involved are social practices 
rather than administrative activities.
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Mediatised local events are the gateway for national media narratives, and tradi-
tional local media play an essential role of gatekeeping. In this chapter we maintain 
that local journalism is highly influenced by local news sources, namely the local 
institutions and all other actors engaged in the issues at stake which are conceptual-
ised here in terms of policy networks (Rhodes 1988; Marsh and Rhodes 1992).
Our previous investigations (Pastore and Ponzo 2016; Pogliano 2016) have sug-
gested that the “narrative autonomy” of local policy networks is greater where they 
are more cohesive, i.e. when their representations of the issues at stake are consistent 
and when their actions are coordinated. More cohesive local policy networks appear 
to be better able to develop their own narratives on migration and self- representations 
of the local community, and more capable of influencing the media narratives. To a 
certain degree this study builds upon this hypothesis and further develops this previ-
ous work. Specifically, we confronted this approach by elaborating on two particu-
larly significant case studies which are emblematic of the barriers and concentrations 
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of refugees and migrants who are physically and symbolically reshaping Europe: the 
Central Station of Milan, where starting in 2013 the number of migrants engaged in 
trying to reach other European countries multiplied in spite of the rules imposed by 
the Dublin Convention; and the utilisation in the same year of the abandoned build-
ings of the MOI area (former Mercati Ortofrutticoli all’Ingrosso, i.e., Fruit and 
Vegetable Wholesale Market) in Turin by persons granted humanitarian and interna-
tional protection who, due to restrictions in terms of circulation associated with 
these statuses, remained trapped in Italy at the end of a reception process that had 
proven incapable of guaranteeing adequate housing and work integration.
The joint analysis of media and policy dynamics is, in our opinion, the most inno-
vative aspect of this contribution, since the media and policy literature remain substan-
tially separate and unable to dialogue, despite the fact that the strength of the seminal 
work for media studies, Policing the Crisis, authored by Hall and colleagues in 
Birmingham 40 years ago, was significantly based on this connection (Hall et al. 1978).1
Years after Policing the Crisis, whose idea of the social processes drew from 
Gramscian concepts of hegemony, hegemonic bloc and strategic alliances, this way 
of researching communication and society barely survives in studies about moral 
panics and the media. The legacy of Policing the Crisis has arguably been taken up 
by social movement studies at least since the work of Touraine (1981), with his con-
ception of society as something produced and reproduced in collective action, and 
his focus on the issue of who is able to intervene in social processes and how such 
interventions shape the direction of social process (Eder 2015). However, social 
movement scholars have often overlooked media and communication processes.
Only in recent years has the study of communication and media processes 
entered into the research agenda of social movement studies, with several attempts 
to formalise the role of media and communication (see Teune 2011; Mattoni 2013; 
Bennett and Segerberg 2015) in the organisation of “contentious collective action” 
(McAdam et al. 2001). In these studies a key question is about how communication 
serves social movements in their formation and by raising the visibility of their 
political claims. To use the words of Bennett and Segerberg (2015), the point is to 
understand when communication is an expression of existing organisations and 
when, instead, an organisation is the creation of communication.
Our work is an attempt to move forward by widening the scope of research from 
social movements to larger policy networks and analysing the logic of the actions 
and strategies of those networks and the media on an equal footing, avoiding  viewing 
one of the two as instrumental for the other.2 In fact, whereas the literature on social 
1 In this regard, see the criticism by Curran (2002) of what he calls neoliberal revisionism and its 
consequences on media research after Policing the Crisis. It should also be noted that, even in the 
somewhat meagre production of research in the wake of Policing the Crisis, the role of the media 
is often underrepresented, and when it is central, the themes of migration and asylum are not (see 
Critcher 2006).
2 The concept of mediatisation of society and politics (Couldry 2012; Thompson 1995) is a further 
incentive for reasoning and producing research embedded in a model of society in which collective 
and political actions operate in constant tension and mutual conditioning with the narratives, cat-
egories and logic of the media.
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movements is focused mainly on organisations, our analysis is about policy net-
works which encompass several types of organisations, including social move-
ments, and concerns the pattern of relations between them. Following the distinction 
proposed by Rhodes (1988) between the national government environment (macro), 
policy networks (meso) and organisations (micro), we could say that our focus is on 
the meso rather than on the micro level.
Furthermore, we consider the policy networks and the local media to be mutually 
involved in the process of narrative-making. Our work concerns the dialectic 
between policy networks and local media on the issue. How do these dialectical 
mechanisms produce and reproduce the media frames on migrants and refugees?
This research is based on a mixed qualitative methodology. To study the local 
policy networks, we analysed the available official documents and carried out 18 
semi-structured interviews with local administrations, third sector organisations and 
social movements.
For the media analysis, we collected news items related to transit refugees in Milan 
and to the MOI occupation in Turin, by using keywords in the online archives of 
newspapers. We collected all the news items for the period from the beginning of the 
media coverage of the two cases – April 2013 for Turin and October 2013 for Milan – 
to the end of June 2016, when the local elections were held in the two cities (in Milan 
the centre-left coalition kept governing the city while in Turin the centre- left majority 
led by the Democratic Party was replaced by a Five Star Movement–led majority). 
The news titles analysed are from the two main national broadsheets with a local 
newsroom in the cities– La Stampa and Repubblica in Turin, Corriere della Sera and 
Repubblica in Milan. Specifically, we analysed frequencies and frames of the news 
items through a qualitative news framing analysis (D’Angelo and Kuypers 2010).
In total, we collected 301 news items for Milan and 162 news items for Turin. 
Finally, the mechanisms of local journalism in the two cities were investigated 
through eight semi-structured interviews (four in Milan and four in Turin) with the 
journalists who ended up being the most involved in covering the stories.
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 6.2 provides a brief overview of the 
main events in the two cities. Section 6.3 illustrates the local media coverage and 
framing of the two cases. The results of Sect. 6.3 will be explained through analysis 
of the organisation and functioning of local journalism (Sect. 6.4) and local policy 
networks (Sect. 6.5) and their interactions (Sect. 6.6). In the last Sect. 6.7, we will 
discuss the main findings.
6.2  Main Events and Turning Points in the Case Studies 
of Milan and Turin
6.2.1  The Transit Refugees in Milan
According to the Dublin Regulation, refugees have to claim asylum in the first EU 
country they enter. However, when refugee flows started increasing after the Arab 
Spring, neither Italy nor Greece identified every refugee and many of them crossed 
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borders to reach other European countries. Against this backdrop, Milan was a 
major passageway to northern Europe since it is close to the border. The phenome-
non became significant in 2013 when many Syrian families started spending a few 
days in the Central Station before resuming travel. Since 2015, sub-Saharan 
Africans, especially Eritreans, began to arrive as well and after a while they exceeded 
the number of Syrians who soon moved away from this route. Overall, from October 
2013 to April 2016 the number of transit refugees registered by the municipality 
was 88,067, peaking at 52,600 in 2014, and finally dropping to 4700 in the first half 
of 2016.
With the arrival of Syrian refugees, various NGOs (Save the Children, the 
Eritrean association Cambio Passo, etc.) as well as the City of Milan started offering 
support at the Central Station, establishing a so-called “hub”.
In October 2013, thanks to economic resources provided by the Ministry of the 
Interior through the local prefecture, accommodation centres run by non-profit 
organisations (Arca Foundation, Farsi Prossimo, City Angels) were opened.3 
However, the length of the agreements between the City and the local prefecture 
was generally a few months. While waiting for the renewal of these agreements, the 
City repeatedly appealed to non-profit organisations and charities to deliver free 
accommodation. In fact, some parishes and Catholic NGOs (Casa di Carità, Fratelli 
di San Francesco, Sant’Egidio), and initially even some mosques, provided beds on 
a voluntary basis. Support for transit refugees became increasingly structured over 
time and the activities of screening and relocation to accommodation centres moved 
several times, eventually settling in April 2016  in the centre in via Sammartini, 
located along the railway line but further from the station.
Private citizens also rallied to provide help by triggering one of the greatest soli-
darity mobilisations ever seen in Milan. The summer of 2014 saw the start of what 
was called the SOS Syria Emergency volunteer group. Initially supported by a few 
people from the local branch of the Democratic Party, it soon became the largest 
grassroots volunteer group active at the Central Station. In contrast, right-wing par-
ties and movements staged several anti-refugee demonstrations over the years in 
question, in both the city centre and the Central Station. However, citizens’ partici-
pation in those demonstrations was never significant and was largely outnumbered 
by pro-refugee demos and mobilisations.
The mobilisation of civil society and the institutions has to be framed within the 
context of the Expo (Universal Exposition) held in Milan in 2015. This had two 
main relevant consequences. First, the Central Station became a sort of “entryway” 
into the city, especially from May to October 2015, when the Expo was open to the 
public. Second, the Expo emphasised the cosmopolitan identity of Milan, which 
3 The legal basis for the intervention was the so-called Apulia Law (Law Decree 451/1995 con-
verted into the National Law 563/1995) passed two decades earlier in order to manage flows from 
the Balkans to southern Italy. The law allows the establishment of emergency centres to accom-
modate irregular migrants waiting to be identified. Yet, public institutions did not identify refugees 
staying in Milan’s centres, arguing that the Immigration Consolidated Law stipulates that foreign-
ers must submit requests for residence permits to the public authorities within 8  days of their 
arrival in the country, and none of them stayed that long.
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had impacted its approach towards migrant communities since the mid-2000s when 
preparations for the Expo first started, as immigrant associations and cultural groups 
were regarded as resources for the city’s international outlook (Caponio 2014). This 
orientation and, more generally, the cosmopolitan atmosphere emphasised by the 
Expo contributed to limiting xenophobic attitudes among politicians as well as 
citizens.
The management of the refugee flows, however, was not conflict-free. The 
clashes were particularly strong between the City, with a centre-left majority, and 
the Lombardy Region, led by the Northern League, especially when it came to the 
management of health issues, which in Italy falls under the remit of the Regions. In 
the autumn of 2014 the Regional Council formally rejected the proposal, repeatedly 
pushed by the centre-left minority in the region, as well as the City, to set up a fixed 
medical unit at the Central Station. In order to make up for the lack of health assis-
tance, doctors offered their help on a voluntary basis. Only in June 2015, when 
several cases of scabies surfaced, did the Lombardy Region finally establish a fixed 
medical unit at the Central Station to cope with the challenging health situation.
With the closing of borders in 2016, transit became almost impossible. Time 
spent in the accommodation centres increased and reached an average stay of 
100 days in June 2016. Therefore, the large majority of would-be transit refugees 
ended up requesting asylum in Milan.
6.2.2  The Occupation of MOI Buildings in Turin
The occupation that occurred in Turin is intertwined with that of the so-called North 
Africa Emergency Programme, which started in 2011, triggered by the arrivals fol-
lowing the Arab Spring and the fall of Gaddafi in Libya. The Programme mainly 
concerned people from central Africa living in Libya who were hosted, upon arrival 
in Italy, in accommodation centres managed by the Department of Civil Protection 
and the Ministry of the Interior. When the North Africa Emergency Programme 
ended, in February 2013, a large majority of the people expelled from the accom-
modation structures were homeless and unemployed. Between March and April 
2013, around 400 of them, most of whom held humanitarian permits,4 occupied 
three buildings of what is known as the MOI (former  Mercati Ortofrutticoli 
all’Ingrosso, i.e., Fruit and Vegetable Wholesale Market) area, located on the east-
ern edge of the Lingotto neighbourhood, just along the railway line (Fig. 6.1).
The occupied buildings belong to the Olympic Village and are composed of 30 
structures that accommodated the athletes during the Winter Games held in Turin in 
2006. After the Games, 19 buildings were sold by the City of Turin to the Turin City 
Fund, a real estate fund whose investors are the City of Turin itself (35%), Equiter 
(29%) and Prelios (36%). The latter is also the asset management company which 
4 The permit of stay for humanitarian reasons lasts 2 years and can be converted into a permit of 
stay for work. It does not allow holders to freely circulate in Europe.
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manages the Fund, is responsible for the reconversion and commercialisation of the 
buildings and thus acts as owner. Despite the efforts made, four buildings remained 
unsold and thus empty until the time they were occupied by refugees.
The occupation was supported by the extreme-left organisations Gabrio and 
Askatasuna, inspired respectively by communist and anarchist ideologies, and by 
the Migrant and Refugee Movement linked to the radical trade union USB. In the 
days following the occupation, a Solidarity Committee supported by those organisa-
tions was set up with around 15 Italian volunteers and some refugees from the occu-
pation. Neighbourhood residents provided basic goods, no protests were registered, 
and neither the police nor the Municipality intervened. The occupation soon gained 
the solidarity of the Archbishop of Turin who visited the occupied buildings in July 
2013 and was supported by the Pastoral Office for Migrants (Ufficio Pastorale 
Migranti, UPM), which is the branch of the diocesane curia responsible for migra-
tion issues.
In August 2013, a fourth building, the only empty one left, was autonomously 
occupied by Somali refugees, the majority of whom came from the previous occu-
pation of Clinica San Paolo which occurred in 2008, and who had never been prop-
erly accommodated by the local institutions. Overall, the number of occupants rose 
to around 600.
During the investigated time period, the main negotiation between the organisa-
tions supporting the occupation and the City occurred in the autumn of 2013 and 
Fig. 6.1 The location of the MOI area in the city of Turin. (Source: Authors’ own design)
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concerned the possibility of enrolling the refugees living there on the civil registers 
in order for them to gain access to local services, sign work contracts and renew 
their residence permits.5 After several public demonstrations and meetings, the City 
decided to provide homeless refugees6 living in the city, including those squatting in 
the MOI buildings, with an artificial residence7 which differs from full residence 
because it does not allow access to social benefits and, being granted only to home-
less people, is regarded as stigmatising. This event marked the breakup of the alli-
ance between the extra-left movements and the Migrant and Refugee Movement 
since the first were less keen to accept the compromise on artificial residence than 
the second, and more oriented towards highly participatory approaches and refu-
gees’ direct engagement in the negotiation with the City.
Although the public demonstrations played a relevant role, the decision on artifi-
cial residence also suited the City’s plans. In fact, the City expected the enrolment 
on civil registers to provide a sort of census of the refugees living in the MOI build-
ings which should have been the starting point for planning their relocation across 
the Region through tailored interventions of integration, financially supported by 
the Ministry of the Interior. In fact, only a portion of people living in the MOI build-
ings enrolled on the civic registers. The main obstacle to the above relocation plan, 
however, was the lack of support from the Ministry of the Interior, which did not 
meet the City’s requests to establish national common rules for enrolling homeless 
refugees on civil registers and to provide economic resources in order to cope with 
the MOI occupation. This lack of support from the central government was one of 
the main differences between Turin and Milan and, as we will see in Sect. 6.5, con-
tributed to the opposite outcomes observed in the two cities.
Against this backdrop, the right-wing political opposition in the Municipal 
Council continuously called for the occupied buildings to be evicted. This request 
became more pressing in the winter of 2014 when the councillors of the right-wing 
parties repeatedly tried to enter the occupied buildings to check on the situation 
inside but were stopped by members of the extreme-left organisations Askatasuna 
and Gabrio. A municipal councillor from the Northern League claimed to be looking 
for cocaine and marijuana near the occupied buildings and filmed the scene in order 
to denounce the drug-selling that he alleged was occurring in the area. In response, 
the Solidarity Committee organised a 24/7 task force together with the refugees and 
some neighbourhood residents to oversee the area and push out drug dealers.
5 In fact, resident permit renewal is not dependent on enrollment on the civil register, as specified 
in a communiqué issued by the Ministry of the Interior on 18 May 2015. However, before that 
communiqué it seems that the Prefecture of Turin acted differently.
6 Namely people seeking asylum, granted international protection or holding a residence permit for 
humanitarian reasons.
7 The artificial residence is an imaginary address which allows homeless people to enrol on the civil 
registers, thus obtaining city residency and access to services. Two other artificial addresses 
already existed at that time, via Casa Comunale 1 and via Casa Comunale 2, for Italian and foreign 
homeless people, respectively. A new artificial address, via Casa Comunale 3, was created for 
homeless refugees.
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The square in front of the MOI occupation also became the stage for public demon-
strations by the Northern League national leader in December 2014 and 2015, and by 
far right movements. However, as in Milan, citizens’ participation was never massive.
Finally, it is worth reporting an episode which gained relevant public attention, 
namely the alleged rape of a young woman with severe learning disabilities in the 
occupied buildings in June 2015. The men accused of that crime were caught with 
the help of the people living in the occupied buildings.8 Public demonstrations fol-
lowed, organised by right-wing parties, and a police garrison began to oversee the 
area 24/7. At the same time, the Mayor announced a census of the people living in 
the occupied buildings, though it never happened. In June 2016, the number of 
people living in the MOI occupied buildings was estimated to be around 1000.
6.3  Local Media Coverage and Media Framing
In this section we report on our analysis of the coverage in the local pages of the 
examined newspapers and of the frames that informed this journalistic coverage at 
the narrative level. For the framing analysis we referred to Benson’s (2013) distinc-
tion between victim frames and threat frames. Through a literature review of both 
European and the US materials, Benson arrived at a list of 10 broad immigration 
frames: three victim frames, four threat frames and three hero frames. Victim frames 
are “the global economy frame”, “the humanitarian frame” and “the racism/xeno-
phobia frame”. Threat frames are “the jobs frame”, “the public order frame”, “the 
fiscal frame”, and “the national cohesion frame”.9 The hero frames were irrelevant 
in our dataset.
8 The final judgement concluded that the young woman spent time with the men, one of whom was 
her boyfriend, on a voluntary basis but the men were nevertheless sentenced for having taking 
advantage of a person with severe learning disabilities.
9 Not all news items express a clear frame. In those cases the news items are irrelevant for the frame 
analysis. In other cases, more than one frame can be found in the same item: in accordance with 
most research on media frames, including Benson’s, we included in the data set all the frames that 
appeared in the news items analysed. The more frequent occurrences were clearly those of the 
humanitarian frame and of the public order frame. The former is defined by Benson thus: 
“Immigrants are victims of unjust government policies (violations of human rights, fair legal pro-
cess) or business practices; they suffer from poverty, lack of access to health care, dangers related 
to border crossing, etc.; or they have difficulties in adapting to their host society”. The latter: 
“Illegal immigrants break the law in coming into this country; once here, immigrants – legal or 
illegal – are more likely than others to commit crimes, use drugs, and carry diseases; immigrants 
are coming in such numbers that they threaten overcrowding and environmental degradation”. 
Frames are sometimes directly supported by journalists or they can be found in claim-making from 
politicians or from members of institutions or civil society, reported in the news. Because our 
research was conducted on the local sections of national newspapers we considered the page and 
the position of the articles to be irrelevant.
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6.3.1  Milan: Intense Coverage and the Dominance 
of the Humanitarian Frame
On transit refugees in Milan, Repubblica produced 171 articles in the 32.5 months 
from the middle of October 2013 to June 2016, which means an average of 5.26 
article per month, while Corriere della Sera produced a total of 130 articles (an 
average of four each month). Considering only the hot seasons (from May to 
October), when the numbers of refugees arriving in Milan were higher, we get an 
average of more than one article every 3 days (12 per month in Repubblica, 11 per 
month in Corriere) (Fig. 6.2). These numbers of news items allow us to speak of 
intense coverage.
As indicated, in spite of slightly different absolute numbers, the trend in the cov-
erage over time for the two titles is virtually identical. This is so rare in the analysis 
of the contents of the media over such a long period of time that the most plausible 
explanation is twofold: firstly, constant news management of the large number of 
small news events that occurred during the reference period – confirmed by a com-
parison with the press releases issued by the City of Milan; and secondly close 
cooperation, of a community type, between journalists of the two newspapers, simi-





























































































REPUBBLICA CORRIERE DELLA SERA
CITY PRESS RELEASES
Fig. 6.2 The coverage of 
Milan transit refugee news 
by Repubblica and 
Corriere della Sera – 
compared with the 
distribution of city press 
releases (October 2013–
June 2016). (Source: 
Authors’ own design)
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In general terms, the peaks are easy to explain because of the intensification of 
refugees crossing the Mediterranean Sea and then transiting to Milan during the hot 
seasons. The highest peak, that of May–June 2015, which is a media hype (more 
than a quarter of the entire coverage of 32.5 months is concentrated in this 2-month 
period), is a consequence of the sum of various factors: (a) the beginning of the hot 
season with an intensification in the number of refugees, (b) the opening of the Expo 
in Milan with the resultant increase of attention around the city and its security 
system, (c) the medical alarm about scabies, (d) right-wing politicians’ public state-
ments and demonstrations aimed at creating a public health moral panic, and (e) the 
local government’s communication action efforts in order to counteract the panic.
The victim frames (the humanitarian frame) led the coverage (Fig. 6.3), and even 
when the threat frames (the public order or the fiscal frame) promoted by right-wing 
politicians or civic society’s protest groups were the real first material for producing 
news, both newspapers very often embedded the threat frames within news items 
which started with quotations from the victim frames’ supporters. This way of rep-
resenting the threat frames has been favoured by the strong news management of the 
Councillor for Social Policies Pierfrancesco Majorino, which aimed to present the 
local administration as a pragmatic and anti-ideological actor engaged in a sort of 
resistance against adverse fate (“the State and the Region have left us alone”), and 
to demonstrate how the local administration was driven by both humanitarian and 
public order concerns. This kind of constant and coherent communicative action led 
to a rejection of the racist/xenophobia frame (the accusation of racism in coping 
with the threat frames) in favour of a distinction between “people who do things” 










Threat Frames Victim Frames
Fig. 6.3 The distribution of frames in Milan transit refugee news (Repubblica  +  Corriere). 
(Source: own design)
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Journalists appear to find that this narrative adheres to the climate of citizen soli-
darity observed every day in the Central Station by reporters. It is perhaps above all 
this non-contradiction between narratives that created a “natural” climate for the 
affirmation of the humanitarian frame in Repubblica and Corriere, which also have 
few differences in this aspect.
6.3.2  Turin: Light Coverage and the Dominance of the Public 
Order Frame
The coverage of an event such as the MOI occupation would be expected to produce 
high numbers of articles from local journalism, for various reasons, including the 
important news value of “quantity” (the number of people involved in the occupa-
tion). However, Repubblica produced only 70 articles on it in the 38 months from 
April 2013 to June 2016, which means an average of 1.84 articles every month, 
while La Stampa produced a bit more with 92 articles in total (2.4 per month).
The first peak occurs in the beginning of the occupation, the second is registered 
more than a year later, in November–December 2014, and a third peak occurs in the 
summer of 2015. These are small peaks, around 10 articles in 2 months, which can 
be regarded as coverage intensification rather than as media hype. The highest peak 






























Fig. 6.4 Coverage of the ex-MOI occupation in Turin in the local pages of Repubblica and La 
Stampa (April 2013 – June 2016). (Source: Authors’ own design)
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Both the second- and the third-most significant attention spans are due to crime 
and to statements and protests arising out of these events (drug dealing in the first 
case, alleged sexual violence in the latter).
Frame analysis (Fig. 6.5) shows a situation in which the victim frames are preva-
lent in the very first phase of coverage of the occupation, while the threat frames are 
generally more frequent in the following months. In particular, with respect to the 
two attention peaks indicated, the public order frame guides the coverage. A detailed 
analysis of the production of frames in the articles of the two publications reveals a 
sort of overturning of the narrative structure that dominated the representation in the 
Milanese case. While in Milan threat frames were evoked in order to contrast the 
humanitarian frame that structured the story, in the case of the occupation of the 
MOI – except for the very first phase – the victim frames (in particular the humani-
tarian frame and the racism/xenophobia frame) encouraged a story built mainly 
around the frame of public order. The most frequent narration followed this script: 
it starts with interviews with members of the neighbourhood committees or local 
and national politicians from right-wing parties who use the public order frame, 
continues by talking to supporters of the victim frame, and then closes by placing an 
emphasis on the public order frame.
An aspect of great interest for this work is the following: the victim frames only 
rarely appear on the pages through the words of political subjects, whether or not 
they are members of the local administration in charge. The voices that support 
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Fig. 6.5 Trend of the victim and threat frames in all the collected articles (Repubblica  +  La 
Stampa) for the case of the ex-MOI occupation in Turin (April 2013  – June 2016). (Source: 
Authors’ own design)
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6.4  The Organisation and Functioning of Local Journalism
In this section we use interviews with local journalists in Milan and Turin from the 
above mentioned national newspapers to offer a first explanation of how events 
were told, which circumstances led to certain narrative productions and the develop-
ment of frames that prevailed in the journalistic stories of the two cases, as well as 
relationships with some members of the local policy networks. Three topics are 
investigated: (a) the professional experience of journalists with respect to migration 
(6.4.1), (b) the editorial offices of local journalism; and (c) an analysis of the setting, 
or the work dynamics linked to physical places (6.4.2).
6.4.1  How Journalists’ Specialisation Impacts Local 
Narratives
In Italy, despite migration being a central theme for political and media communica-
tion, among journalists in the newsrooms of the main daily newspapers, few have 
specific skills on the topic. This is especially true for local journalists. The trend is 
made worse by the fact that in Italy local journalism on migration largely relies on 
the desk production of news based on official sources rather than on first-hand mate-
rials, and civic society is often under-represented.
Despite this general framework, some exceptions are present, especially for 
Milan and Rome. In fact, entities such as Redattore Sociale, Radio Popolare and 
Avvenire in recent years have formed a group of editors who interpret their work as 
mostly concerned with the production of a form of news (Barnhurst and Nerone 
2001) that Benson (2013) has described as “dramatic personalized narratives” 
which is closely linked with the humanitarian frame, having its origins in advocacy- 
oriented and social journalism (Schudson 1978).
Some of these journalists were hired by the local editorial offices of national 
newspapers, especially, if not almost exclusively, in Milan and Rome. In the case of 
migrants in transit in Milan, this meant the presence of a small group of reporters 
who are used to dealing with different communities of migrants in their work and 
are able to frame the local events in a broader context. This situation is quite rare in 
the city sections of national newspapers that we have analysed, and in the local 
journalism more broadly. The Turin case exemplifies what turns out to be the norm. 
Despite the length of the occupation and its direct connection to an important story 
(the North Africa Emergency and its political management), the journalists engaged 
in the local narrative were not able to deal with the problem by connecting it in a 
relevant way to migration issues and to policies concerning migrants and refugees. 
One of the main reasons is due to the lack of specific skills on the issues being dis-
cussed. Local journalists moved from one local event to another, but did not focus 
on a central theme. When they were engaged in telling the MOI story they were out 
of their comfort zone.
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6.4.2  Newsroom Framing and the Reporting Setting
In part as a consequence of what has been written above, and in part as a result of 
the choices of the respective newspaper editors, the two cases were in fact framed in 
the newsrooms we have studied in distinct terms. In Milan, the city sections of the 
national newspapers analysed favoured an intensive approach, involving a few jour-
nalists with specific skills on the issue of migration and asking them to go deep into 
the story and follow it over time, while in the case of Turin the story was not 
entrusted to any one journalist, but combined the distinction of privileged tasks and 
contacts with typical sources of ordinary and routine work. These profound differ-
ences led in the Milanese case to the production over time of a clear and coherent 
editorial frame, while in the Turin case the definition of the situation first shifted 
from the migratory question to the occupation of buildings and from there took 
more subtle directions depending on the specific skills of reporters (e.g. the relation-
ship between antagonistic groups and the city administration, neighbourhood 
dynamics, etc.).
All this was amplified by the extreme diversity of the settings. The Turin case 
was characterised by the difficulty of journalistic access to the stories of the occu-
pants. In fact, the journalists interviewed complained about the difficulty of entering 
the MOI, the long waiting times for the decisions of the Solidarity Committee, 
which were badly adapted to the timetables of the daily news, and a series of preju-
dices and misunderstandings that sometimes made for strained relations.
The extreme-left movements supporting the occupation failed in their attempt to 
build strong networks with supportive journalists. Adopting Rucht’s (2004) “Four 
A’s” model of social movement media strategy, we noticed that “abstention” was 
predominant, while “adaptation” was explicitly refused  – partly as an opposing 
reaction to the way journalists reported from the MOI and partly because of the 
absence of communication staff – while “attack” and “alternative” were limited in 
their scope, directed to a small radical audience through a couple of “alternative 
media” forums (Downing 2000). However, instead of the well-documented ten-
dency of the media to report negatively on movements (Gamson 2004), what we 
noticed in this case had more to do with journalists’ lack of trust in the Solidarity 
Committee as both a source of information and a gateway for accessing the refu-
gees’ stories, the latter being related to the fact that the Solidarity Committee was 
clearly intended to be an intermediary.
With respect to the question of exchanges between journalists, these were lack-
ing because of the absence of a common place in which the reporters of various 
newspapers could work, or because of the declared absence of meetings inside the 
editorial offices to discuss the issue of the MOI.
The Milanese situation appears to be the complete opposite. The presence of a 
public access setting with relatively small dimensions like the Central Station pro-
duced a sense of community among the journalists involved, which on some occasions 
also became a solidarity commitment linked to emergency management. The mix 
between the role of reporter and that of an active and supportive citizen finds journal-
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istic form in the appeals to collect food and clothing for migrants in transit published 
on an online platform by journalists of Repubblica reporting from the Central Station, 
thus building an echo chamber between the City and organised citizens.
6.5  The Local Policy Networks
In this section, we will analyse the local policy networks, paying special attention to 
those elements which can explain the differences in  local media narratives high-
lighted in Sect. 6.3.
Policy networks may indeed differ along several dimensions such as the fre-
quency and continuity of participants’ interaction, the variety of interests they 
express, the distribution of resources and the possibility of finding solutions with 
advantages for all members through positive-sum games, and the degree of consen-
sus on basic values and paradigms or, at least, on issue definition (Heclo 1978; 
Marsh and Rhodes 1992). As we will see, the differences between the policy net-
works of Turin and Milan in many of these dimensions contributed to explaining the 
diverse outcomes observed in the two cities.
6.5.1  A Highly Compact and Centralised Policy Network 
in Milan
Although the processes of spontaneous mobilisation and the activation of volunteer-
ing were extremely important in the Milanese case, the network as a whole soon 
assumed a compact and strongly centralised configuration revolving around the figure 
of the Councillor for Social Policies Pierfrancesco Majorino, supported by the Mayor 
Giuliano Pisapia and the Councillor for Security Marco Granelli, which allowed the 
network to take quick and fairly coordinated action. In addition to managing the rela-
tions among other local institutions and the central government, Majorino maintained 
direct contact with the media and with the various entities involved in the policy net-
work, organising periodic meetings and frequently visiting the hub.
Beyond the strong coordination role played by Councillor Majorino, a factor that 
strongly contributed to the compactness of the Milanese policy network was the 
identification of a clear and circumscribed policy issue, which allowed the field of 
action of the network policy to be clearly delineated: it was to manage migrants in 
transit, who were staying in Milan for a few days, with the aim of giving them tem-
porary material support and managing public order and decorum in the station and, 
more generally, in the city. The issue that in the same time period ignited the 
European debate—the violation of the Dublin Regulations—seems to have never 
been a subject of discussion within the local policy network because it was seen as 
a matter for the central government.
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A second element is represented by the economic resources made available by 
the Ministry of the Interior, since without them night-time reception would proba-
bly have been impossible and the phenomenon of migrants in transit would have 
turned into a political and social emergency that was difficult to manage.
Finally, the policy network was able to develop thanks to the convergence of 
interests between the various organisations due to, firstly, the availability of eco-
nomic resources that acted as an incentive, especially towards the organisations 
involved in the management of night centres to which these resources were destined 
and, secondly, by the limited expertise on migratory themes of the people who made 
up the policy network.10 Only Farsi Prossimo (in favour of a more in-depth screen-
ing of individual situations and the introduction of legal and psychological support), 
and Save the Children (particularly attentive to the needs of minors, pregnant 
women and families) had specific skills on migratory issues when the policy net-
work was established, and they had different approaches from those of the adminis-
tration, leading to a progressive modification of the intervention over time. The 
limited number of organisations with complex and specific “visions” on the issue of 
migrants in transit, together with a “definition of the problem” with clear and rather 
narrow borders, reduced the internal conflicts of the network, favouring its durabil-
ity. The main conflict line was between the third sector organisations and spontane-
ous volunteer service, of which the main and most visible exponent was SOS Syria 
Emergency, but it focused more on the practical management of certain issues than 
on the definition of the problem and the solutions for dealing with it. The only major 
conflict was with the Lombardy Region (Sect. 6.2). However, since the Region is a 
higher-level body than the City, this rift ended up making the citizen’s network 
policy more compact.
6.5.2  A Fragmented and Conflictual Policy Network in Turin
The situation in Turin was completely opposite to the one in Milan. The definition 
of the policy problem appeared to be extremely complex. In the first place, it con-
cerned people destined to remain in the area, raising, next to issues of public order 
and the protection of occupants, all the multiple and complex problems that gener-
ally concern integration and, specifically, access to work and housing.
Moreover, the organisations belonging to the policy network saw immigration 
and access to housing as central themes of their mission, with respect to which they 
affirmed their reference values and defended their own interests, thus ending up 
reducing the room for negotiation and creating the conditions for strong antagonism 
between the parties. The Refugee and Migrant Movement, along with the UBS trade 
union, showed a more pragmatic approach and appeared to be keener to compro-
10 The involvement of organisations with little expertise on migration and asylum was possible 
because of the “bed and soup” approach of the Municipality aimed at providing light support to 
transit refugees who spent just a few days in Milan.
A. Pogliano and I. Ponzo
129
mise with the local institutions. In contrast, for the extreme-left movements the 
ideological aspects had a decidedly greater weight: defence of the rights of the 
occupants of the MOI is part of a framework of more general protest of the institu-
tions and is linked to a wider struggle for the right to housing, where resistance to 
evictions and illegal occupations are central instruments. For their part, the dioce-
sane curia and the Pastoral Office for Migrants, far from seeking a clash with the 
institutions, framed support for the occupiers of the MOI within their mission of 
solidarity with the most vulnerable. Finally, the municipal administration, interven-
ing in favour of refugees, feared inciting competition for scarce resources, such as 
housing and work, with citizens who they are required to protect and represent. 
Moreover, it wanted to avoid dialogue with the extreme-left movements, which used 
illegal occupations among their main tools in the housing fight, fearing legitimising 
this strategy of contra legem action at the city level. Overall, since central members 
of the local network saw the issues at stake as crucial to their core mission, and they 
held a certain degree of expertise and rather specific perspectives on those issues, 
room for negotiating shared solutions was lacking.
Relations between local actors were then further complicated by tensions that 
developed in other policy networks. Relations inside a policy network always occur 
within a broader context and set of relationships. Therefore we have to consider 
multiple and overlapping memberships and recognise that action in one network 
may affect a group’s role in other networks (Marsh and Rhodes 1992). The extreme- 
left movements had for years been in dispute with the administrations led by the 
Democratic Party on the construction of the TAV (Treno Alta Velocità, i.e., High 
Speed Train) line. At the same time, the Pastoral Office for Migrants and, even more 
so, the other third-sector entities of the city that had mobilised during previous 
occupations of refugees such as that of the San Paolo Clinic had evaluated attempts 
to collaborate with the municipality as disappointing (Manocchi 2012). They ended 
up not mobilising for the MOI, or else developed an attitude of great distrust towards 
the local institutions, at least with respect to their methods of managing occupa-
tions. The tensions and mutual distrust generated in other networks reverberated in 
the specific policy network that developed around the occupation of the MOI.
To these dynamics are added two other important factors that distinguish the 
Turin case from the Milanese one. The first is the internal division of the local 
administration, well summarised by the words of an interviewee: within the Council 
“each of them tried to pass the hot issue onto someone else’s shoulders”. Whereas 
in Milan the local administration showed itself to be compact and ready to make 
support for migrants in transit its standard, in Turin internal conflict and the lack of 
a shared position probably prohibited the establishment of city platforms involving 
other local actors and working groups aimed at coordinating and acting jointly.
The second factor is traceable to the lack of financial support from the Ministry 
of the Interior, which only arrived into the coffers of the local administration after 
Five Star’s victory in the administrative elections in the summer of 2016. In fact, the 
only relevant agreement among the members of the policy network, which  concerned 
civil registration, occurred in the early stages of the occupation and, from the per-
spective of the administration, served as an initial census in preparation for an evic-
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tion and relocation intervention that should have happened with the financial support 
of the Ministry. Given the paralysis of the central government, the City ended up 
taking a step back and opportunities for joint action within the policy network 
became thin on the ground.
We can therefore conclude that in Turin the fragmentation of the policy network 
depended on several factors: the difficulties in defining the problem and therefore 
the field of action; lack of economic resources; the strong divergence of visions and 
interests between the organisations belonging to the network and sometimes on the 
same side, e.g. between organisations supporting the occupation (Refugee and 
Migrant Movement versus the extreme-left movements), and within the local 
administration. In Milan we observed completely opposite conditions, which 
favoured the development of a cohesive network: a definition of the problem that 
delimited a precise and rather circumscribed field of action; the availability of huge 
funding from central government and the consequent presence of economic incen-
tives; the convergence of the positions of the components of the policy network as a 
result of a lack of “strong visions” on migration issues.
6.6  Interactions Between the Local Policy Networks 
and the Media
The different compactness of the two local networks seems to have had significant 
effects on the quantity and quality of the media narratives through two mechanisms: 
the management of relations with the media and the degree of consistency of the 
narratives developed by the components of the policy networks.
In Milan, the Municipality and especially the Councillor for Social Policies 
Majorino developed close relations with the local media, almost on a daily basis, 
and completely centralised the communication flows within the policy network. 
Members of the issue networks generally did not give interviews without passing 
through his press office, so Majorino was the central “speaker” for the local issue 
network. Furthermore, some newspapers, such as Repubblica, were close to the 
local administration and explicitly supported it both generally and in that specific 
circumstance by amplifying Majorino’s messages or calls for citizens to help pro-
vide first-aid supplies. These elements appeared to contribute to the development of 
a sort of “co-production” of public narratives by the policy network and the 
local media.11
With regard to opposition politicians, journalists in Milan all remarked on the 
low frequency of their communications, explaining it as a reflection of the 
 administration’s (successful) news-management operation, but also as a conse-
quence of a vision stimulated by the Expo of migrants as part of the cosmopolitan 
11 Jasanoff (2004) used the term co-production to describe the joint generation of knowledge by 
science and politics.
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appearance of the city (Caponio 2014), a climate of opinion particularly sensitive to 
the fate of the Syrians and a lack of politicisation of the theme, addressed with a 
pragmatic approach.
If direct and frequent contact with Councillor Majorino was the true strength of 
coverage with regard to hard news, the search for stories also passed through the 
associations present in Central Station, mostly stable and “close at hand” for all the 
reporters. However, those sources did not produce alternative narratives: the com-
pactness of the Milanese policy network and the sharing of a certain “definition of 
the problem” and of the solutions to be pursued by its members produced the con-
vergence of the narratives given to the media.
In contrast, the communication strategy of the City of Turin was explicitly aimed 
at limiting outward communication and relations with local media according to a 
strategy that we can define as “non-communication”. As a result, journalists all 
complained of a lack of information despite attempts to contact the policy represen-
tatives. In this vacuum of political communication on the occupation, the police 
headquarters and especially the Prefecture were the main institutional sources. 
Although it contributed largely to supporting the humanitarian frame from the first 
day of the occupation, acting as a “primary definer” (Hall et al. 1978), it must be 
said that the communication strategy of these institutions seemed to journalists like 
a “firefighter” who runs around extinguishing some fires, while keeping the remain-
ing fires at a minimum level of visibility, communicating as little as possible, even 
on the news stories that had reached the limelight. This dynamic can be explained 
by the fact that in Turin the institutions, i.e. local administration, police headquar-
ters and Prefecture, did not have shared solutions to communicate and indeed were 
careful to avoid statements that could exacerbate conflicts within an already very 
weak and divided policy network. At the same time, as we have said, journalists’ 
access to the MOI occupation was anything but easy, so it was also difficult to col-
lect the voices of the organisations that supported the occupation and the refugees 
themselves. In this situation, journalists looking for information on the occupation 
increasingly gave more space to protest committees and demonstrations of political 
opposition, however limited and unrepresentative they were, opening the door to 
narratives which were often distant from and contradictory to those of local 
authorities.
6.7  Conclusions
The literature on the relations between media and political actors – mainly dealing 
with social movements and agenda-setting – is often unable to account for the com-
plex local mechanisms leading to the production of media frames. By combining 
the two sets of literature on policy networks and on the media, we have tried to 
identify new hypotheses.
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The local institutions are crucial sources of information for the mainstream local 
media (Ekström et al. 2012)—what Hall et al. (1978) called primary definers. When 
they achieve the leadership of a network and keep control over frame production 
through the creation of a coherent and shared narrative, as happened in Milan, media 
production follows and it is unlikely that the political opposition will see its frames 
efficiently represented. However, when local institutions fail either to act as the 
primary definer or support the development of a cohesive policy network and shared 
narratives, things risk falling apart. Under such conditions, the media tend both to 
follow the traditional news values of conflict and sensationalism (Altheide and 
Snow 1979) and to look for information from any available voice, with the risk of 
overweighting and overexposing protest groups and opposition parties, as occurred 
in Turin. We can thus affirm our hypothesis that the cohesion of the local policy 
networks, understood as shared frameworks and operational cooperation, strength-
ens their “narrative autonomy”, namely their ability to produce public narratives 
and impact those of the media.
Alongside the cohesion of the local policy networks, on which our initial hypoth-
esis was focused, the presence of a cohesive local media community, i.e., a group of 
journalists sharing the same definition of the situation and exchanging information 
and contacts, has emerged as key in developing positive and coherent media narra-
tives. More generally, the conditions of journalists’ work in itself, not only in terms 
of news-making routines (Maneri and ter Wal 2005), but also in terms of knowledge 
and orientations, are crucial in shaping reporting on refugees and migrants. In this 
regard our findings highlight the central role played by another factor, namely 
expertise (or lack of expertise) on migration and asylum, which can be defined as 
having reported experiences from the migrant or refugee perspectives (so-called 
advocacy journalism), and commitment to “the cause”. Where such expertise and 
commitment are greater, the local media community tends to be more cohesive and 
the media frames more positive.
Paradoxically, while expertise and commitment have an adhesive function for the 
local media community, they might play a disruptive role within the policy com-
munity since they tend to generate different and not negotiable definitions of the 
situation and desired solutions.
To conclude, we can affirm that the main factor able to explain the different evo-
lution of the media narratives in the two analysed case studies is the cohesion of the 
local policy and media communities. That cohesion seems to be in turn influenced 
by different elements such as the actors’ expertise and commitment, and the role 
played by local institutions which are a sort of primi inter pares and hold a stronger 
position compared to the other actors. Nevertheless, we cannot exclude that other 
members of the policy networks could be key in producing cohesive communities 
and promoting consistent narratives, even if this has not emerged from our analysis. 
In order to assess the possibility of generalising our empirical results and explore 
different configurations, further research is needed.
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Chapter 7
Shaping the “Deserving Refugee”: Insights 
from a Local Reception Programme 
in Belgium
Stiene Ravn, Rilke Mahieu, Milena Belloni, and Christiane Timmerman
7.1  Introduction
In 2015, almost a million refugees arrived in Europe. Although those who made 
it to Europe were only a small number compared to those displaced by the con-
flict, the sudden increase of asylum applications, mostly in Germany, mobilized 
public opinion and the attention of the media for months. While some asked to 
what extent Europe could bear what was described as a “human flood”, others 
lamented that many among the applicants were not real refugees. Images of vul-
nerable refugees needy of assistance were reproduced along with images of 
threatening aliens overflowing European borders.1 Since then, the discourse sur-
rounding the “refugee crisis” has been in a way or another shaped by the idea of 
deservingness. Who deserves to enter into European territory? Who deserves to 
receive state-funded assistance?
In recent years, “deservingness” has increasingly become a focus of attention for 
those studying public discourse on refugees. Most authors investigating these issues 
highlight how these categories shape refugee reception systems, programmes of 
social assistance and the views of those who work in these programmes (Casati 
2017; Hardy and Philipps 1999; Holmes and Castañeda 2016; Sales 2002; Walaardt 
1 See Chap. 6 in this volume by Pogliano & Ponzo on the role of different actors (media, policy 
makers) in the production of public narratives on refugees.
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2013). While analysing Germany’s reception context in the midst of the 2015 refu-
gee crisis, Holmes and Castañeda (2016) argue that the lexicon of terror used to 
frame refugees and the crisis can have fatal consequences. As they write:
The discursive frames used in the media and in political and popular narratives can help us 
learn a great deal about how the responsibility for suffering is shifted; how fears of cultural, 
ethnic, and religious difference are mobilized; and how boundaries of social categories are 
made and unmade, sorting people into undeserving trespassers versus those who deserve 
rights and care from the state. (Holmes and Castañeda 2016: 13).
The point here is to understand how the discourses on deservingness influence 
not only public opinion, but also practical interventions and programmes at a 
national and local level. We aim to understand to what extent and how these general 
discourses on deservingness are interpreted, reproduced and/or contested on a local 
level and how this translates into practice. This article contributes to this trend of 
literature by analysing a local assistance programme implemented in the city of 
Antwerp (Belgium). This programme was funded by the European Union in the 
aftermath of the refugee crisis. Its creation was directly linked to the surge in the 
amount of refugees entering Belgium. The programme aims to assist unaccompa-
nied minors – recognized as refugees or receiving subsidiary protection2 – who are 
about to turn 18 or have recently turned 18. This group represents a particularly 
vulnerable group in the professional caregivers’ perceptions, since the youngsters’ 
newly acquired adulthood leads to a sudden withdrawal of the public support mea-
sures available to unaccompanied minor refugees.
By examining the aims and the rationale of the project, as formulated by project 
team members, we aim to assess how categories characterizing the discourse on 
refugee crisis are reproduced, interpreted and questioned by local actors and stake-
holders. In particular, we observe how the category of deservingness and its differ-
ent dimensions have shaped the perspectives of those involved in this local 
intervention. The article illustrates the theoretical usefulness of distinguishing 
between three main dimensions of this notion: legal, moral and economic deserv-
ingness. In addition, we analyse how varieties in local stakeholders’ perspectives on 
deservingness can be explained. By examining the interaction between locally 
rooted organisational cultures and wider European discourses, we point to the role 
of localities in shaping innovative policies.
We first discuss theoretical debates on the moralities of refugee assistance and 
elaborate on three different dimensions of deservingness: juridical, moral and eco-
nomic deservingness. After briefly describing the context and aims of the local refu-
gee programme, we analyse notions of deservingness in the project stakeholders’ 
perspectives. Finally, we show how different dimensions of deservingness are often 
in tension with each other: while young refugees are expected to be “highly vulner-
able” from a moral point of view, their inclusion in the programme depends on their 
capabilities to be economic deserving actors.
2 The refugee status is granted according to the United Nations Refugee Convention of 1951. As a 
refugee, individuals are initially granted the right to stay in Belgium for 5 years, after which they 
are given permanent stay. Contrarily, subsidiary protection is more temporary and granted to those 
who cannot be defined as a refugee but who would face a real risk of being harmed upon return to 
the country of origin. (CGVS 2015).
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7.2  The Deserving Refugee: Theoretical Debates  
About the Moralities of Refugee Assistance
Although the idea of deservingness has been central in recent academic debates on 
refugee reception and related discourse, it has rarely been examined in its manifold 
aspects. However, when reading the literature, it is evident how the image of the 
deserving refugee is a rather multifaceted one, evolving over time and space (Ludi 
2014).
Some authors have highlighted how the image of deservingness in public dis-
course can change even in relatively short periods and influence asylum-related 
practices or attitudes. Walaardt (2013) has analysed the case of the Christian Turks 
who sought asylum in the Netherlands in the 1970s. He shows how after initial 
rejection by Dutch authorities, Christian Turks managed to successfully present 
themselves as “deserving refugees” by changing the refugee paradigm. At first por-
trayed as Eastern men seeking refuge from communist regimes, they then shifted 
the image of the refugee into a vulnerable, easily assimilable grateful victim. While 
previous assessments on asylum claims in the Netherlands were based more on 
credibility and persecution frames, those lobbying for Christian Turks introduced a 
moral frame justifying protection based on a humanitarian standard.
The image of the deserving refugee is context-dependent; it varies according to 
local institutional and socio-economic conditions. Casati’s (2017) study of a small 
reception programme in a Sicilian town shows how local actors interpret deserving-
ness through locally embedded moral criteria. These reflect the socio-economic 
marginality of the area and the limited institutional support provided to refugees and 
Italians alike. Casati (2017:13) argues that “notions of gratitude, suffering and 
autonomy take on specific connotations in relation to local economic, political and 
historical configurations”. In particular, she illustrates how locals’ evaluation of 
refugees’ deservingness is based on how grateful these are to receive assistance – 
when resources are little for locals too –, how desperate they are (to justify prioriti-
sation of refugees’ needs over locals’ needs), and how hardworking they demonstrate 
to be.
A review of the literature shows that deservingness encompasses several dimen-
sions. The first dimension is grounded in legal definitions derived from the 1951 
Geneva Convention. Deservingness here implies a legal entitlement to seek asylum 
and receive assistance in Europe. A sharp distinction is made here between authen-
tic refugees, fleeing persecution or war, versus bogus refugees, unauthorized or eco-
nomic refugees who are just trying to “jump the queue” for regular visas. While the 
former category is considered “deserving”, the latter would have no legitimate rea-
son to come to Europe. Interestingly, both human rights promoters and those in 
favour of state sovereignty over their territory use these categories of deservingness 
(Hardy and Philipps 1999).
The second dimension of deservingness emerges from a meritocratic, capitalist 
perspective, which identifies the deserving with the active, potentially productive 
refugee/migrant. This dimension of deservingness is built around the idea that 
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 refugees represent a burden on welfare states (Sales 2002). The notion of particular 
groups representing a burden on society is older than contemporary refugee dis-
courses, though. It can be found in discourses on the poor too. Katz (1989) investi-
gated the common perception among Americans that the poor are undeserving of 
help because they brought poverty on themselves. Although this image has shifted 
in context and time, the idea has perpetuated and continues to influence the rationale 
of public social assistance. Deserving refugees are those who are thought to have 
the potential to evolve from their dependent position to an active one from which 
they will be able to contribute to national economy. It is assumed that investing in 
them is worthwhile, because the expected return on investment is significant. On the 
contrary, refugees who remain assistance receivers are framed as “profiteers” bur-
dening host society.
The last dimension is ethical: who deserves hospitality most from a moral point 
of view? Who is most vulnerable? As it is framed in public discourse, the right of 
people to seek asylum and to be assisted is tightly connected to their vulnerability. 
This idea is reproduced by humanitarian discourse of international organisations 
and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) aiming to raise awareness and funds 
on the plight of refugees (Malkki 1996). Images of women and children are system-
atically selected over other representations to elicit compassion. Be it for strategic 
reasons or for sincere belief, refugees are continuously portrayed as traumatized 
people who have lost their home, their families and their possessions. In this stereo-
typed image of the refugee as the ultimate vulnerable victim, there is little space for 
personal agency, entrepreneurship and physical strength, which are indeed charac-
terizing many of those who make it to Europe through extremely challenging 
voyages.
Remarkably, this image of the vulnerable refugee is employed not only by those 
who seek to protect refugees, but also by those who want to keep them outside 
national borders. American president Trump’s statement that the European refugee 
crisis was mostly dominated by “young strong men” was precisely based on this 
assumption of deservingness. His words implicitly meant that those seeking asylum 
in Europe did not “deserve” their status as refugee not only because they were not 
vulnerable enough, but also because they were cowards escaping their responsibili-
ties of defending the country and their families.3
Unaccompanied youngsters, the target group of the programme discussed in this 
article, occupy an ambiguous position within the above debate. On the one hand, 
these youngsters, usually boys, are portrayed as harmless, vulnerable children in 
need for help. On the other hand, they are also described as a group at risk (Bryan 
and Denov 2011), being potentially aggressive and prone to religious radicalisation. 
This is especially true in the Belgian public debate where young Muslim men rep-
resent the group mostly associated with terrorist attacks and religious fundamental-
ism (Fadil 2014).
3 See a media coverage about this at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/
wp/2016/05/16/trumps-claim-that-young-strong-men-dominate-the-european-migrant-
crisis/?utm_term=.ddafc80d9df6
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7.3  Creating Categories, Crafting Policies: Views 
from a Local Programme in Antwerp (Belgium)
In the wake of the 2015 Syrian refugee crisis, a consortium of stakeholders in 
Antwerp applied for, and was granted, a 4.9 million budget by the European 
Regional Development Fund to set up a holistic support programme for “unaccom-
panied young adult refugees”.4 Antwerp is the second largest urban centre in 
Belgium with around 520,000 inhabitants. This city has a diverse population of 
which 48,5% is of foreign ancestry (Buurtmonitor Antwerpen 2015) including a 
considerable share of refugees.
The programme is led by the city authorities and more in particular the local 
Public Centre for Social Welfare,5 the agency responsible for social rights of all 
Antwerp residents. Other executive stakeholders are (1) the city’s municipal agency 
for the integration of newcomers, (2) a hospital-based psychotherapist NGO, spe-
cialised in diagnosis of psychotrauma and therapy for young refugees, (3) a youth 
NGO, with a special focus on neighbourhood-oriented street corner work with 
urban youth, (4) an NGO specialised in empowerment, civic participation and adult 
education. All stakeholders involved have considerable experience with ethnically 
diverse and socially vulnerable clients, patients or participants. Most project team 
members are practitioners, who meet refugees and newcomers on a daily basis, as 
these are a part of the target population of their institution.
In the choice of the programme focus, the increase in the number of unaccompa-
nied minors in Belgium has been significant. In 2015 the number of asylum applica-
tions of unaccompanied minors (3099) was six times higher than the year before 
(486). This growth was seen as an opportunity to develop a targeted assistance pro-
gramme for “unaccompanied young adult refugees”. An additional element of con-
cern for municipal authorities has been the low educational background of a 
considerable share of unaccompanied minors, and their generally weak position in 
education, and later, on the labour market.6
The overall objective of the intervention is to empower “unaccompanied young 
adult refugees”, with a particular focus on their (future) labour market position. The 
intervention is two-fold: on the one hand, it provides inexpensive small-scale com-
munal housing with local residents;7 on the other, it offers individual guidance and 
training trajectories for the refugees involved.
4 For more information about the programme, see Mahieu and Ravn (2017).
5 At the time of the research, this was still a separate institution. In 2019 however, it has been inte-
grated into Social Services.
6 About foreigners’ participation in the Belgian labour market, see Ouali and Rea (1999).
7 For an up-to-date review of how locals and civil society more broadly are engaged in refugee 
integration, see Feischmidt et al. (2019).
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7.3.1  Methodology
This paper focuses on the viewpoints of the stakeholders involved in the interven-
tions’ target group and the relationship between these views and the project design. 
The main source of data used are focus group discussions with the team members 
from the five executive stakeholder organizations involved. For each institution, one 
focus group was held.8 In total, six group interviews were conducted, each with 
between two and four team members of one respective stakeholder organisation 
(N = 17). Interviews were conducted between January and February 2017, a few 
months after the launch of the project, but before the actual implementation started. 
Respondents were asked about their views on the project design, vision and goals; 
their experiences with, and perceptions about, young adult refugees; and their 
expectations about the project. In addition, the researchers observed several project 
team meetings. Interviews were recorded and transcribed, and all data was scruti-
nized with the aim of laying bare the underlying assumptions of project team 
members.
7.3.2  Legal Deservingness: The Legitimate Refugee
As mentioned before, the programme under study targets young refugees who have 
been granted legal protection (asylum status or subsidiary protection) in Belgium. 
The programme is therefore implicitly based on legal deservingness. This decision 
may stem from the strategic need to attract funds, or from a practical consideration 
that this type of integration programme would be less useful for asylum seekers or 
unsuccesful asylum applicants.
However, it should be noted that, while stakeholders may not have the intention 
to purposely exclude asylum seekers or groups without a legal status, the legal 
dimension of deservingness remains unquestioned and is reproduced in this pro-
gramme. Implicitly, the prioritisation of refugees with a legal status indicates how 
investing in the future of asylum seekers or undocumented people is deemed as less 
feasible or efficient. An alternative approach can be found for instance in a Dutch 
cohousing programme where stakeholders decided to include both refugees and 
unsuccessful asylum applicants (see Chap. 12 in this volume, Geuijen, Dekker and 
Oliver). Differently, this programme focuses less on civic and social integration, and 
more on the development of individual entrepreneurial skills on the short-term.
While legal deservingness is an implicit premise of the programme, it is probably 
not the most important dimension to understand how local stakeholders have con-
structed it. The crucial question for professional caregivers providing assistance to 
8 For the leading institution, the Social Centre for Public Welfare, two group interviews were con-
ducted: one with the intervention’s designers, and one with social workers involved in the 
implementation.
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refugees is less “who deserves to enter and to stay in our country” but rather “which 
groups, within the larger population of refugees, deserve/are worthy of special care 
and attention?” Beyond purely legal interpretations of deservingness, moral and 
economic dimensions are crucial to understand local level policy discourses.
7.3.3  Moral Deservingness: The Vulnerable Refugee
The alleged vulnerable condition of the particular group of “unaccompanied young 
adult refugees” lays at the basis for the creation of the project. According to stake-
holders, their vulnerable condition is multi-layered and can be discerned at the 
micro-, meso- and macro- level.
7.3.3.1  Micro-Level Vulnerability
On a micro-level, being “young and separated from parents or primary caregivers” 
is identified as a marker of increased vulnerability of this group compared to the 
larger refugee population. It implies nobody cares for them. This, in turn, increases 
the responsibility of the governmental care system and the receiving society as a 
whole.
It is believed that being separated from one’s parents since an early age, both 
during and after migration, has major psychological consequences. Stakeholders 
argue that many of these youngsters struggle with feelings of loss, trauma, stress or 
other psychological issues, related to the fact of being separated from their families. 
On top of the trauma accumulated during the journeys from their countries to 
Belgium, project stakeholders stress that these youngsters, being adolescent, are 
going through a crucial phase in their development.
These perspectives overlap with the findings of researchers that have investigated 
journeys of unaccompanied minors to Europe. Research has shown that unaccom-
panied minors in Belgium are experiencing higher levels of anxiety and depression 
compared to similar groups of children accompanied by their families, and native 
adolescents (Bean et al. 2007). Unaccompanied minors are generally at high risk of 
developing mental health problems due to (traumatic) experiences before, during 
and after migration (Derluyn and Broekaert 2007). However, studies have also high-
lighted refugees’ resilience. Refugees are not simply passive recipients of care, 
instead, they are pro-active individuals that develop personal help- and support- 
seeking strategies and construct social networks (Williams 2006).
Stakeholders feel that existing public services in Belgium do not sufficiently 
address vulnerability in all its complexity. Therefore, their programme aims to pro-
vide psychological counselling, psychotrauma diagnosis, treatment to refugees and 
specialised training to team members.
While the young refugees’ vulnerable position is emphasized by all stakeholders 
as one of the main reasons for the project, perspectives on their vulnerability differ. 
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One of the psychotherapists states that psychological problems are often underre-
ported. However, this stakeholder also argues that refugees’ psychologic problems 
are often wrongly pathologised:
With regard to [the mental health of] refugees, there are two problems. On the one hand, 
psychiatric problems are underreported. On the other hand, there is a large pathologisation 
of difficulties that are situated in refugees’ context. People underestimate what migration as 
a psychological process entails. It always involves an intensive mourning process. (NGO 
offering mental health care)
This stakeholder emphasizes that migration in general is a demanding psycho-
logical process involving grief for the accumulated losses. In addition, vulnerabili-
ties often arise from harsh material and social circumstances of refugees in the 
receiving societies. In sum, this stakeholder warns against “decontextualisation” 
and a too individualised understanding of refugees’ (mental health) problems.
Differently, team members of the NGO working with youth state that the vulner-
ability of “unaccompanied young adult refugees” is largely similar to that of young-
sters with immigrant or deprived socio-economic backgrounds. Similar to the 
NGO’s wider target group, unaccompanied young refugees are considered to be in 
need of individual and social empowerment. This can be acquired through self- 
development (e.g. the development of skills, reflection and self-knowledge) and 
emancipatory actions (e.g. raising a public voice). Interestingly, social workers 
from this NGO even refuse to label their target group as “vulnerable”:
We consciously do not talk about ‘vulnerable’ youngsters. A part of our target group is 
vulnerable, yes. And we do try to target those that are most vulnerable, but we do not talk 
about them that way, because it emphasizes their vulnerability. We talk about an urban 
crowd and focus on the opportunities within a city that is inhabited by this diverse crowd of 
urban youngsters. (NGO working with youth)
This quote illustrates how the concept of vulnerability itself is contested within 
the project team. In addition, the different views of two stakeholders illustrate how 
understandings of vulnerability are grounded in institutions’ backgrounds.
7.3.3.2  Meso-Level Vulnerability
Beside their identifications of vulnerabilities on the micro-level, stakeholders also 
point at meso-level factors. They all agree that unaccompanied young refugees lack 
social networks. In particular, stakeholders argue that young refugees need to build 
new horizontal relationships with Dutch-speaking locals, as opposed to the more 
hierarchic vertical relationships with professional caregivers. These relationships 
should allow for the formation of bridging capital.9 The main reason as to why refu-
gees need these kinds of horizontal social networks is the presumed positive impact 
9 When constructing social networks during resettlement processes, refugees may build ties with 
individuals from the same ethnic group leading to the development of bonding social capital. 
Bridging social capital, in contrast, involves ties between individuals from a different ethnic group 
(Putnam 2007). For a review of the concept of social capital in migration, studies see Portes (1998).
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on their Dutch language proficiency. Remarkably, this focus overlooks other types 
of social networks or sources of social support young refugees might benefit from. 
The relevance and potential advantages of fostering bonding capital or existing 
social networks are not mentioned by the project team members. Furthermore, it 
should be stressed that social support and social networks can also be found in other 
life spheres. Raghallaigh and Gilligan (2010), for example, found that religion sig-
nificantly facilitated the coping strategies of unaccompanied minors while they 
were adjusting to living in a new country. However, in this project, religion or reli-
gious networks are not considered as relevant.
More specifically, stakeholders feel that young refugees’ opportunities to 
encounter native citizens are limited. This understanding adds to their vulnerability 
because it is assumed that this negatively affects their sense of wellbeing and their 
potential for “successful” integration. Stakeholders observe that the environments 
young refugees navigate or reside in – Dutch language classes, the local reception 
centre, newcomer education and activities – allow them to get in touch with peers 
from foreign background only, with a lack of bridging capital involving the native 
population as a result. Stakeholders also point out the fact that native Belgian 
youngsters lack opportunities to encounter young refugees too. Communal living 
by young natives and refugees is thus seen as an opportunity to engender meaning-
ful durable social interactions between these groups.
Beside their contacts with co-ethnic peers and other newcomers, unaccompanied 
young refugees’ position in the care system implies that caregivers and other profes-
sionals (e.g. teachers) take a central position in these youngsters’ everyday social 
encounters. The programme stakeholders too are professional caregivers and are 
thus part of the institutional ‘carescape’ (De Graeve and Bex 2017) surrounding the 
youngsters. However, they also problematize the implications of these vertical 
social relations:
In a professional care relationship there is always a power imbalance: you have the thera-
pist/caregiver who has a certain expertise, on the one hand, while you have the caretaker 
who needs assistance, on the other. Inevitably, there is a hierarchy. (NGO offering mental 
health care)
This quote shows that stakeholders are aware of the fact that refugees’ vulnerable 
condition may be reinforced by the intrinsically hierarchical nature of the caretaker/
caregiver-relationship. More than other stakeholders, this point was particularly 
stressed by the civic education NGO. Based on their experiences in other refugee- 
oriented projects, this stakeholder feels that positioning refugees as “persons in 
need” who are dependent on professional caregivers strengthens refugees’ sense of 
ignorance and incompetency. The NGO argues that informal contact with ordinary 
citizens has the potential to influence refugees’ self-perception positively, as they 
will learn that it is normal to struggle with everyday life matters, such as bureau-
cratic procedures. Therefore, the NGO for civic education particularly emphasizes 
the importance of the horizontal bridging capital:
[In relationships with professional caregivers] there is no honest reciprocal connection. I 
think that the added value of the buddy [i.e. the native flatmate of the refugee] is that he or 
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she will engage in a real, more authentic relationship with the refugee. (NGO for civic 
education)
This quote shows the importance adhered by this NGO to the development of an 
egalitarian relationship between the refugee and his flatmate, an argument shared by 
all other stakeholders.
In sum, on the meso-level, the project team understands the refugees’ vulnerabil-
ity in terms of a lack of durable social relations with natives, and with non- 
professional “ordinary citizens” in particular.
7.3.3.3  Macro-Level Vulnerability
On a macro-level, stakeholders maintain that the particular age of the refugees (just 
18 or slightly older) puts them in a vulnerable position within structural care poli-
cies in Belgium. This concern overlaps with findings in research on “care leavers”. 
Studies have shown that young people who are forced to leave care due to reaching 
adulthood face an increased risk of social exclusion from various life domains (e.g. 
to have poor educational attainments, become homeless or end up in poor housing, 
have higher levels of unemployment, etc.) (Stein 2006).
In Belgium, most existing support services target either minors or adults, and 
there is no transition zone between these types of services. This problem is salient 
within regular services of some stakeholders involved in the programme. For 
instance, in the municipal agency for integration, actions for minors and adults are 
completely separated. Only recently, attention for people in the transition zone 
emerged. Introducing the new category of “unaccompanied young adult refugees” 
is in fact a way to cater the particular needs of this group. Different stakeholders 
stress that exactly because this group is not recognized as such — even an appropri-
ate term is lacking — they “disappear” into the broader refugee population.
There are enough measures for minors, but from the moment they turn 18, they are consid-
ered as adults. They have to manage everything on their own without support.10 (NGO 
working with youth)
We can notice here how this stakeholder expresses the need to adopt more fine- 
grained policies. By establishing new categories of vulnerable people deserving 
public assistance, the programme attempts to overcome this problem.
While the lack of policies for this group was denounced by all stakeholders, the 
NGO working with youth raised another concern. The NGO argues that these young 
refugees, like many other urban youngsters, face large barriers in their search for 
help and assistance in Belgian society. It is explained that these youngsters often 
feel discouraged and unable to engage with institutions (e.g., schools, health ser-
vices, etc.) independently. According to this stakeholder, difficulties arise when 
10 For a similar discussion of the age transition and its formal consequences regarding access to 
education see Chap. 9 (Glorius and Schondelmayer) in this volume.
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negative encounters with societal institutions accumulate, leading to disengagement 
and distrust:
According to the social-institutional vulnerability theory, youngsters experience a vulnera-
bility towards institutions. We use this term often and we know the theory very well. Once 
you’ve been hurt four or five times, you will probably not go to that institution a sixth time. 
(NGO working with youth)
Subsequently, for this stakeholder it is important not only to strengthen young-
sters on an individual level, but also to empower them on the societal level and to 
foster their engagement with broader society. Additionally, the mental health care 
NGO also notes how public institutions may add to refugees’ vulnerability through 
exerting “institutional violence” on caretakers:
I believe that many professional caregivers […] are totally unaware of the institutional 
violence. For example, if you have to go to court in Brussels, to enter that enormous build-
ing, that11 is also a form of institutional violence. When you enter that building, you imme-
diately get the feeling: ‘I am nothing, in this court’. (Mental health care NGO)
Another major macro-level element adding to the vulnerability of “unaccompa-
nied young adult refugees”, relates to their disadvantaged position in the local hous-
ing market.12 The problem is especially pressing in urban centres, such as Antwerp, 
where most refugees tend to move. Stakeholders all denounce the lack of decent, 
affordable housing for refugees in general. Although other groups of citizens expe-
rience similar problems, refugees are particularly vulnerable to discrimination on 
the private housing market. Their foreign names and appearance, low proficiency in 
Dutch and (usually) dependency on social welfare benefits contribute to natives’ 
distrustful attitude towards them. Moreover, upon receiving a refugee status, refu-
gees have to leave state-funded shelters within 3 months. Young single refugees are 
in a disadvantaged position as they have very limited savings (which is needed to 
cover the warrant) and because single-room accommodation is sparse and relatively 
expensive. The combination of all of these elements turns young refugees into easy 
targets for exploitation by dishonest house-owners:
The fact that [this programme] provides decent, affordable housing also means that these 
young refugees won’t be living in housing where, let’s say, mushrooms are growing on the 
walls. This is a huge problem in Antwerp. In our services, we encounter many young refu-
gees who are living in houses where you wouldn’t even let your dog enter, while paying a 
monthly rent of €500 to €600. (Integration agency)
We conclude that notions of moral deservingness are saliently present in stake-
holders’ perspectives on young refugees. The fact that this project actually creates a 
‘new’ category of refugees, extending the notion of “unaccompanied”, usually con-
nected to the group of unaccompanied minor refugees to adult refugees, shows that 
stakeholders find this target group to be “worthy” or “deserving” of special care. 
They perceive this group as being vulnerable, needy, neglected by current policies 
11 Words in italics are emphasised by the interviewee.
12 For a broader discussion on the housing of refugees after acquirement of a legal status, and on 
how local policies impact upon housing opportunities, see Chap. 10 in this volume (Adam et al.).
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and services and want them to be recognized and cared for. The project’s stakehold-
ers thus seem to feed into the more general stereotyped image of the refugee as the 
ultimate victim. As was mentioned before, the reasons for this type of portrayal can 
be based on both sincere belief and/or strategic reasons. In the context of this proj-
ect, framing the target group as “vulnerable” can, next to other grounds or beliefs, 
also be perceived as a strategic choice. We can assume that the more vulnerable a 
group is perceived, the easier it is to find resources for a project catering to the needs 
of the group. Therefore, creating a perception of vulnerability is important.
Another essential aspect to take into account in how the vulnerability of this 
group is discussed, is the fact that the overwhelming majority of “unaccompanied 
young adult refugees” are boys. As mentioned before, in current public discourses, 
young male, especially Muslim, refugees are often framed as potential threats to the 
nation state. In the official project proposal, one of the main objectives was formu-
lated as follows: “successful young newcomers set an example to their peers and 
personify an opposing force to growing fears about failed integration and radicaliza-
tion in Belgian cities.” Although several stakeholders were sceptical about this proj-
ect objective, the fact that the project coordinator included this as one of the project’s 
main goals shows that it plays a role in the project design and the way in which the 
target group’s identity is constructed. We can assume that the focus on these young-
sters’ vulnerability and deservingness is also a way of opposing racist and gendered 
discourse in which young immigrant Muslim men are framed as dangerous and 
threatening to Western society.
7.3.4  Economic Deservingness: The (Potentially) Productive 
Refugee
However, to be morally deserving is not enough to be part of this programme. The 
ultimate goal of this programme is to empower young adult refugees, understood 
here as enabling them to build an independent future in Belgian society. It is assumed 
that all of the project’s interventions will contribute to this main objective: increas-
ing refugees’ skills through training and learning, building social networks, partici-
pating in leisure activities, etc. Importantly, the focus on young adults reveals the 
preventive nature of the programme. By and large, the goal of the intervention is to 
shield participants from the social problems mentioned above through preventive 
actions. Actions are introduced to stimulate active participation and, as such, to 
avoid the development of a problematic condition of dependency, rather than to help 
(older) unaccompanied adult refugees who already are in this vulnerable situation. 
This explains why the intervention targets the age group of 18–21; there is a strong 
belief that young adults will benefit most from the intervention.
They are going to stay here. They are going to build a life here. We don’t want them to end 
up again in statistics of youth unemployment or early school leaving. So, you have to be 
able to grab them quickly and prevent them from leaving school or being unemployed. 
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Because at that age, there is a real risk that they will disappear ‘under the radar’. (NGO 
working with youth)
The various trainings and activities aiming at increasing refugees’ skills are man-
datory. So only those who are willing to make efforts, “deserve” the support and 
care offered by the project. Especially the social welfare agency stresses that refu-
gees have to be willing to commit themselves to learn Dutch, to attend trainings, etc. 
If they display a lack of motivation for these activities, candidate-participants are 
not allowed to enter the project. This attitude may however reproduce the discourse 
on the “deserving poor”, mentioned above. Those willing to cooperate with social 
interventions, deserve care; while a lack of compliance with the social measures 
designed to take them out of poverty would be interpreted as a sign of laziness. The 
non-compliant would be perceived as guilty of his/her own misfortune and for that, 
“undeserving” (Katz 1989). The programme too is based on the assumption that 
only a group of committed refugees will be able to benefit from the programme.
Compared to other stakeholders, the welfare agency is especially focused on 
activation and on strengthening refugees’ productivity potential rather than on ele-
ments relating to a moral deservingness of care. In order to comprehend this stance, 
it is important to understand the welfare agency’s general mission. For the agency’s 
team members, the implicit comparison group for “unaccompanied young adult 
refugees” is the broader population this institution provides services for: social wel-
fare recipients. The agency’s main goal is to facilitate welfare recipients’ social 
integration and to empower them to become independent from social welfare. The 
obligation for refugees to engage in project activities conforms the broader policies 
of this institution for all of its clients: care is contingent upon individual efforts. In 
return for the financial social welfare benefits and the services that clients receive, 
the welfare agency expects certain efforts from the recipients, that should ideally 
lead to independence from social welfare. The centre can withdraw social benefits 
from welfare recipients that do not commit themselves to obligations.
The choice for the particular target group, the preventive character of the inter-
ventions and its focus on refugees becoming productive citizens reveal the existence 
of an economic rationale in the programme design. This economic rationale is 
strongest in the statements of the welfare agency. Other stakeholders highlight 
active participation in society as well, but from a different point of view. The NGO 
working with youth also concentrates on activating the participating refugees and 
urban youngsters in general, but they distance themselves from the welfare agency’s 
assumption that the provision of care should depend on the client’s individual effort. 
This discussion seems to be intertwined with broader discussions on integration of 
migrant youth. When asked about the recurrent use of the word “integration” in the 
project proposal, one of the youth workers expressed a critical perspective about 
pushing towards assimilation/integration:
It [the welfare agency’s frequent use of the term integration] tells us something about their 
assumption that youngsters should be ‘integrated’. We [the NGO working with youth] feel 
that a bunch of people [refugees or second and third generation youth] simply have the right 
to be who they are and to be here. […] And that is a different viewpoint than the one focus-
sing on all the things youngsters have to do until they ‘belong’: ‘you have to learn Dutch, 
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you have to know the rules, you have to put the trash out, you have to be able to talk to your 
neighbour, because if not…’. (NGO working with youth)
This quote illustrates how this NGO stresses the moral dimension of deserving-
ness more, and rejects the economic rationale. Similarly, for the NGO offering men-
tal health care, active participation as a form of social integration is also important 
not for economic reasons, but because their integration is seen as a leverage for 
psychological wellbeing.
In spite of different point of views, all stakeholders find it important that partici-
pants undertake steps to become active members of society. However, all project 
partners emphasize that active participation in society is a long-term process. Both 
the welfare agency and the integration agency stress that the success rate of the 
project is not dependent on the number of refugees enrolled in education or work at 
the end of the programme. There is no predefined standard outcome to be expected 
for all; rather, the yardstick of success is the difference between a refugee’s position 
at the start and at the end of the programme.
Another essential project objective that draws on economic deservingness is “to 
support refugees in creating a clear and realistic vision and plan for their future life 
in Belgium.” One of the psychotherapists explains why this is important:
Some of these youngsters arrive here with very high expectations regarding their position 
in our society and in particular in the labour market. They expect to find a good job quickly 
and to raise enough money to support their families back home. However, in reality there is 
usually a mismatch between their skills and our labour market. In addition, because many 
are nearly illiterate, their learning progress is very slow. […] Upon arrival in Belgium, they 
are often deeply disappointed […]. Therefore, it is important to help them to turn this sense 
of disillusionment into a positive future ideal. (Mental health care NGO)
From stakeholders’ perspectives, young refugees either lack aspirations, or have 
aspirations unsuitable for their new life in Belgium. With regard to this point, how-
ever, research has shown that refugees’ individual aspirations are not lost in the 
flight; rather, they are crucial to understand their migration trajectories, their deter-
mination to overcome geographical borders as well as their pathways once arrived 
in the new country (Belloni 2016). However, these aspirations, such as the aspira-
tion to support family back home (Nunn et al. 2014) or to become a professional 
football player or a doctor, may not be in line with what social workers, teachers, 
and other professionals dealing with these youngsters expect (Glorius and 
Schondelmayer, Chap. 9 in this volume). On the one hand, these aspirations may be 
considered unsuitable for young men in their late teen years, as being loaded with 
responsibilities toward left-behind kin implies they are unable to focus on personal 
development. On the other hand, these aspirations may not be seen as legitimate, 
because unrealistically high for someone who has limited possibilities to pursue 
higher education. This attitude corresponds with the local support programme’s aim 
to (re)shape refugees’ aspirations in order to increase their participation in the 
Belgian labour market, while taking into account young refugees’ disadvantaged 
position in that market.
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In sum, notions of economic deservingness are present in professional caregiv-
ers’ perspectives about refugees’ active participation. This is most visible in the 
governmental perspectives (the welfare agency and integration agency); however, 
these notions are expressed in a nuanced way. Other stakeholders take into consid-
eration moral dimensions of deservingness (vulnerabilities) more strongly. In the 
next section, we take the analysis one step further by investigating how these two 
types of deservingness in stakeholders’ perspectives interact. As we will argue, 
stakeholders’ attempt to reconcile both perspectives leads to inherent tensions in 
their approach.
7.3.5  Tensions Between Different Dimensions 
of Deservingness
The programme aims at balancing different rationalities, drawing on notions of both 
economic deservingness and moral deservingness, which we discussed earlier. The 
tensions between these dimensions are especially salient as the programme is nego-
tiated between stakeholders with diverse perspectives.
While the moral deservingness of the specific target group is emphasized and 
used as a justification for the creation of the project, it is important to note that the 
most vulnerable among the group of “unaccompanied young adult refugees” cannot 
enter the project. Upon entering the programme, candidate-participants are screened 
during an intake procedure in which a psychotherapist assesses to what extent 
youngsters suffer from trauma, chronic stress, ‘frozen’ grief, etc. Those with very 
severe psychological issues (e.g. depression, paranoia), problematic social behav-
iour (e.g. aggression) or a criminal record are not eligible to enter the project. 
Stakeholders mainly fear that their inclusion would overburden the resilience of the 
refugee’s flatmate, which would eventually make communal living impossible. As 
this would negatively affect the expected impact of the project, it can be considered 
a pragmatic choice to exclude the most vulnerable refugees. If we consider this from 
the framework of economic deservingness (Sales 2002), the decision to exclude the 
most vulnerable refugees also indicates the tensions between different dimensions 
of deservingness. While from a moral point of view (Malkki 1996; Casati 2017), the 
most vulnerable need care more than anyone else; from an economic viewpoint it is 
more rational to invest resources in the group that is most likely to benefit from the 
project.
In addition, those who are most needy in terms of Dutch language acquisition 
are excluded from the project. Upon entering the project, candidate-participants are 
required to have sufficient proficiency in Dutch. If this is not the case, they are 
excluded as stakeholders feel their inclusion would significantly affect various 
intervention actions of the project. It is argued that certain training methods (such 
as participatory ones, where Dutch is the language of instruction) will be difficult 
to apply and will have little effect. With regard to communal living, it is expected 
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that when Dutch language proficiency is low, the quality and quantity of social 
interaction between the flatmate and volunteer will be limited. Once again, this 
implies a trade-off between the logics of moral and economic deservingness, as 
discussed in Sect. 7.2.
The intertwinement of moral and economic dimensions of deservingness are also 
salient in the external communication of the programme. On the one hand, there is 
a focus on the vulnerability of the targeted group: the young refugees are portrayed 
as lacking a supportive social network and being somewhat ‘lost’ in Belgian society. 
Simultaneously, it is stressed how a high ‘return on investment’ of the project is 
expected because of the young age of the participating refugees: it is a group worthy 
to invest public money in today, in order to reduce the burden they would impose on 
the welfare state tomorrow.
7.4  Conclusion
This article explored how the “refugee crisis” and related discourses have become 
the main frame for local level policy interventions and assistance programmes. By 
examining the categories and views employed in the tailoring of a local support 
programme in Antwerp, we have shown how the idea of “deservingness”, as a cen-
tral notion in wider European discourses on reception of refugees, is represented in 
the perspectives of different local stakeholders. Their perspectives, as we high-
lighted, vary according to their different organisational backgrounds. Each organ-
isation perceives deservingness according to their historical mission and the usual 
target population of their services. The collaboration of different welfare and inte-
gration agencies, and health care, youth and civic educational NGOs, produces 
within the frame of one project a plurality of understandings associated to the idea 
of the deserving refugee.
As illustrated throughout the article, the creation of a target group as well as the 
description of young refugees’ special needs is grounded in different dimensions of 
deservingness, which usually remain undistinguished in academic debates. We 
explored deservingness along three main dimensions: the legal, the moral and the 
economic one. While different dimensions of deservingness of care are often evoked 
in an interwoven manner, our empirical analysis of professional practitioners’ 
accounts also reveals the tensions between a moral and economic approach to 
deservingness. On the one hand, the vulnerability of young refugees is used as a 
rationale for the creation of the project. Due to their vulnerable position, “unaccom-
panied young adult refugees” are seen as deserving extra support and care. On the 
other hand, when refugees are perceived as being too vulnerable, because of severe 
psychological issues or weak language proficiency, they are not eligible to enter the 
local support programme. This tension between moral and economic deservingness 
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demonstrates that, in making decisions about what categories of refugees to sup-
port, not only moral rationalities but also economic, efficiency-driven rationalities 
are employed by local stakeholders.
Finally, it should be noticed that discourses on deservingness are linked to stake-
holders’ different aspirations about the kind of citizens young refugees should 
become. Talking about who deserves assistance and protection implies a discourse 
also on what citizenship, integration and participation in the society of arrival 
means. Our point here is that discourses on deservingness do not only function as 
ways of shifting “responsibilities from historical political and economic policies 
supported by powerful actors” to refugees themselves, as claimed by Holmes and 
Castañeda (2016: 13). In discussions concerning what kind of refugees are deserv-
ing assistance and for what reason, different actors within the receiving society 
reproduce, discuss and contest positive and negative models of citizenship. Our case 
study, thus, illustrates how refugee reception programmes may serve as a laboratory 
for reflection on the kind of society – and the kind of membership in this society – 
that local civil and state organisations would like to promote.
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Chapter 8
The Public Perception of the Migration 




Hungary is distinct from most other European countries that have experienced huge 
migration flows in the past years, both in terms of the political context and the radi-
cal change in the volume of migration during 2015. Since the legal and physical 
closure of the borders in autumn 2015,1 significantly fewer asylum seekers have 
entered Hungary. While in 2015, approximately 177,000 people claimed asylum 
and more than half a million migrants and asylum seekers crossed Hungary’s 
borders,2 in 2016 less than 30,000 asylum claims were registered and in 2017 the 
number of claims was approximately 3000 (see Appendix 8.1 for further statistics). 
Furthermore, from a policy perspective, it is important to mention that integration 
policies have been non-existent since the Hungarian state completely withdrew inte-
gration provisions, such as a monthly cash allowance and school-enrolment bene-
fits, on 1 June 2016. Since that date, only NGOs and religious charity organisations 
have been entitled to provide specific help in the refugee integration process (e.g. 
assistance in housing, finding employment, learning the Hungarian language or 
family reunification). Leading human rights organisations warn that this process has 
brought about significant negative changes in the integration possibilities of forced 
migrants, and most importantly serious risks of destitution and homelessness, even 
1 16 October 2015.
2 “After Hungary completed a fence on its border with Serbia in September, the flow of migrants 
shifted to Croatia. In all of 2015, the region recorded 764,000 detections, a 16-fold rise from 2014. 
The top-ranking nationality was Syrian, followed by Iraqis and Afghans.” Source: FRONTEX 
http://frontex.europa.eu/trends-and-routes/western-balkan-route/
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in case of recognised refugees (Hungarian Helsinki Committee 2017; Amnesty 
International 2017). As far as the NGOs are concerned, there are certain influential 
organisations3 dedicated to the integration of third country nationals (hereafter 
TCNs), organising various services for them related to housing, finding employ-
ment and learning Hungarian. These services rely partly on funding programmes 
from the European Union. Furthermore, a significant number of volunteers organ-
ised by grassroots organisations took an important role during the 2015 migration 
crisis, e.g. by providing different forms of help for asylum seekers at various rail-
way stations throughout the country.4
Now I turn to briefly discuss Hungary’s demographic profile. The following two 
main features must be emphasised. Firstly, Hungary is a relatively homogenous 
country both racially and ethnically (the largest ethnic minority is the Roma, who 
make up 5–6% of the total population, according to Kemény and Janky 2006), as 
well as in terms of religion (the overwhelming majority is Christian, mostly 
Catholic). Secondly, the proportion of the migrant population is low; the number of 
immigrants per 1000 inhabitants remains well below that in most Western European 
countries. The crude immigration rate—the number of immigrants related to the 
size of the population in the destination country—has been fluctuating between 1.8 
and 2.6 since 2000, whereas in the majority of Western European countries this rate 
is over 5 or in some cases even over 10 per thousand (Gödri 2015).
In this paper5 I aim to assess different components and levels of mass migration- 
related fear based on the theoretical framework of integrated (later re-labelled inter-
group) threat theory developed by Stephan and Stephan (1993; Stephan et al. 2009). 
My main research question is why symbolic threats from migrants crossing or set-
tling in Hungary are as dominant as realistic threats, based on national (Simonovits 
2016) and international quantitative research results (Messing and Ságvári 2018) 
that rely on Round 7 of the European Social Survey. This chapter is structured in the 
following way: in Sect. 8.2 I briefly discuss the most recent Hungarian political 
developments relevant to our topic. Section 8.3 presents the theoretical framework 
and aims to introduce the concepts of intergroup threat theory, while Sect. 8.4 dis-
cusses the empirical strategy. Section 8.5 is devoted to an overview of the most 
important survey results measuring xenophobic attitudes, while qualitative results 
are presented in Sect. 8.6. Finally, the conclusion (Sect. 8.7) reflects on the most 
3 Most importantly, Menedék Association should be mentioned in this regard: https://menedek.hu/
en
4 The main motivations of the aid work and the composition of the volunteers at both the organiza-
tional and individual level has been analysed by Bernát et al. (2016) and Feischmidt and Zakariás 
(2019).
5 This chapter has been written in the framework of a Postdoctoral Research Grant (No: 121095) 
entitled “A Meta Analysis of Intergroup Contact Theory Based on Surveys, Controlled Experiments 
and Case Studies—With a Special Focus on Immigrants Living in Europe” provided by the 
National Research, Development and Innovation Fund in Hungary. I am also grateful to the 
Artemisszió Foundation for letting me use the data gathered through the comprehensive research 
on migration-related attitudes in Hungary in 2017, as part of the project entitled “ThreeZ: Impact, 
Independence, Integration” (funded by the OSI under the project number OR-2016-29608).
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relevant findings from the quantitative and qualitative data analysis as well as the 
limitations of the research.
8.2  Political Context
As far as the political context is concerned, during the 2015 migration crisis the 
official communication of the Hungarian government purposefully refrained from 
using the words ‘asylum seekers’ and ‘refugees’, and preferred to use the terms 
‘illegal migrants’ and ‘economic migrants’, in order to frame public discourse. In 
opposition to this, certain left-wing political parties, as well as certain research 
institutes (e.g. Publicus Research),6 intentionally used the terms ‘asylum seekers’ 
and ‘refugees’ for this heterogeneous group of people to frame the public discourse 
the other way around. This dichotomy in the perception of the different migrant 
groups was reinforced by the field research, as most participants in the focus group 
discussions emphasised the need to distinguish the two terms: while migrants were 
mostly perceived as illegal, refugees were perceived as a deserving and vulnerable 
group. For the crisis of 2015, we use the term migration crisis, as it can be best 
described as a mixed flow, according to the UNHCR (2015), comprising various 
kinds of migrants who left their countries on a forced or voluntary basis.
Further discussing the political context, it is important to mention that through-
out 2017 the Hungarian government ran a billboard campaign against George Soros’ 
pro-immigration stance, as a follow-up to an anti-immigrant billboard campaign 
introduced in spring 2015. The campaign—featuring Soros’s smiling face with the 
words “Don’t let Soros have the last laugh”—resulted in sporadic incidents of anti- 
Semitic graffiti throughout the country.7 One of the major issues in the campaign for 
Hungary’s 2018 parliamentary election, which was dominated by the governing 
party, was the possible dangers of mass migration affecting Europe. Furthermore, 
Prime Minister Viktor Orbán recently drew a parallel between Hungary’s Roma 
community in the north-eastern city of Miskolc, where the percentage of the Roma 
population has been very high since the 1970s, and the recent migration crisis.
There was a time when people from the outside en masse immigrated into this city. And you 
remember what happened. The people of Miskolc experienced what happened then. … Yet 
those people who moved to Miskolc came from the territory of Hungary. Now you imagine 
what will happen when people who in their culture, customs, and views are completely dif-
ferent from us arrive from outside of the country.8
6 http://www.publicus.hu/en/
7 We used these billboards as supplementary research materials in our focus group sessions. You 
can see examples in the following direct links: https://goo.gl/images/6GVFQb, https://goo.gl/
images/KNBc9B
8 The strategy of hate: Viktor Orbán in Miskolc (4 March 2018): Hungarian Spectrum. http://hun-
garianspectrum.org/2018/03/04/the-strategy-of-hate-viktor-orban-in-miskolc/ Accesses 23 March 
2018.
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It is obvious to anyone with any recollection of recent Hungarian history that the 
prime minister meant the Roma citizens of Hungary in the quotation above.
For a better understanding of the Hungarian context, it is important to note that 
influential scholars (Róna-Tas 2015; Erős 2016) have framed the mass migration- 
related public discourse within the context of a moral panic.9 A moral panic is the 
process of arousing social concern over an issue, usually through the work of “moral 
entrepreneurs” (people initiating the panic who create a clear message and set the 
agenda) and the mass media. This process can be described as intensive fear and a 
high level of anxiety raised by news transmitted by the mass media that is responded 
to by government measures, and thus it has a special relevance to our subject matter. 
Both Erős and Róna-Tas argue that a moral panic was stoked by the Hungarian 
government, relying on strong national feelings, and xenophobic attitudes closely 
related to welfare chauvinism and scapegoating. Furthermore, Barlai and Sik intro-
duce the concept of the Moral Panic Button as a Hungarian Trademark (2017), 
which they define as a complex set of state-propaganda techniques, including vari-
ous forms of manipulation such as ‘national consultation’, the ‘quota referendum’, 
Parliamentary elections and overlapping waves of billboard, TV and radio ad cam-
paigns. The aim of using the moral panic button, in their understanding, is to win 
popularity by framing and manipulating the political discourse in the public sphere.
8.3  Theoretical Framework
The Intergroup Threat Theory (Stephan et al. 2009)10 is a widely used theoretical 
framework to examine anti-immigrant sentiments in European societies (see for 
example Velasco-Gonzalez et  al. 2008) as well as in the USA (see for example 
Croucher et al. 2013). The theory—incorporating several theoretical perspectives 
on stereotypes and prejudices—suggests that four basic types of threat may lead to 
prejudice. First, there are realistic threats at the material, economic and political 
levels, focusing on the competition over material and economic group interests. 
Realistic threats are threats that pose a danger to the in-group’s well-being, includ-
ing threats to physical safety or health, threats to economic and political power, as 
well as threats to the existence of the group. Second are symbolic threats, which in 
contrast to realistic threats are based on perceived group differences in values, 
norms, and beliefs (Stephan and Stephan 1993). The basis of these perceptions is 
that out-groups (in this case immigrants) often have differing world views than 
dominant groups. Third is negative stereotyping, which is expectations of how a 
member of an out-group will behave, often related to feelings of threat or fear. 
Fourth is intergroup anxiety, which is a feeling of being personally threatened dur-
ing interactions with out-group members.
9 The original concept was developed by Cohen in the early 1970s; for the Hungarian application 
and contextual background, see, for example, Kitzinger (2000).
10 Originally labelled as Integrated Threat Theory and developed by Stephan and Stephan in 1993.
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In the analysis below the primary focus is on the distinction between realistic and 
symbolic threats, as this distinction is crucial to understanding anti-immigrant senti-
ments in contemporary Hungary. Analysing the Hungarian case, it is important to 
note that not only symbolic, but also realistic threats may be understood at the level 
of perception; the kernel of truth (in this case the actual “danger” of immigration) is 
not that relevant in our understanding. Following the interpretation of Velasco- 
Gonzalez et al. (2008), the core issue here is the perceived competition over scarce 
resources (e.g. jobs, houses, social welfare), and the perception that these resources 
are threatened by outsiders.
The concept of realistic threat is closely related to the idea of welfare chauvin-
ism, as both concepts assess the perceived competition of scarce resources (such as 
labour market positions and social services), and the majority’s perception is that 
these resources are threatened by outsiders, i.e. immigrants. In Hungary—and also 
in the neighbouring Central-Eastern European countries—welfare chauvinism11 and 
scapegoating have been measured to be central elements of anti-immigrant senti-
ments (see more on the Hungarian context by Enyedi et al. 2004; Simonovits and 
Szeitl 2016). Beyond that, previous research has confirmed both in the European 
context (Bizman and Yinon 2001; Velasco-González et  al. 2008; Stephan and 
Stephan 1993) and the US context (Croucher et al. 2013) that Muslim immigrants 
are perceived both as a realistic and as a symbolic threat to the dominant—mostly 
Christian—Western cultures. Recent empirical research—both in the international 
and in the Hungarian context—has underlined that asylum seekers with a Christian 
background are more welcomed than those with a Muslim background.
Hainmueller and Hopkins (2012) and Bansak et al. (2016) have recently tested 
empirically how economic, humanitarian, and religious concerns affect attitudes 
towards asylum seekers in the US, and in certain European countries. Both studies 
were based on a survey experimental research design and tested for the influence of 
an extended list of randomised immigrant attributes on generating support for 
admitting immigrants. Both the US and the European results underlined that host 
societies prefer immigrants of higher social status, i.e. more highly educated immi-
grants and in jobs with higher status. In contrast, they view asylum seekers unfa-
vourably, seeing them as people who do not plan to work, have entered their country 
without authorization, or do not speak English. Regarding the religion of asylum 
seekers, a high level of anti-Muslim sentiment was measured (in comparison to anti- 
Christian or anti-agnostic sentiment) by Bansak et al. (2016). Boda and Simonovits 
(2016) showed using Hungarian data that respondents at the later phase of the 
migration crisis (in January 2016) tended to accept asylum seekers being persecuted 
due to belonging to a Christian denomination twice as likely as asylum seekers who 
were being persecuted due to belonging to a Muslim denomination (23% vs 9%).
11 Welfare chauvinism refers to the idea that welfare benefits should be restricted to certain groups, 
particularly to the natives of a country, as opposed to immigrants. The term was first used by 
Jørgen Goul Andersen and Tor Bjørklund in Denmark and Norway in 1990.
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8.4  Data and Methods
This study relies on both quantitative and qualitative data. The quantitative data 
analysis is based on TÁRKI’s long-term research on xenophobia and attitudes—
from national representative surveys—while the qualitative part is based on joint 
research of TÁRKI and Artemisszió Foundation12 in the framework of what is called 
the “ThreeZ” project. In 2017, all together 12 focus group discussions were held in 
five different places across Hungary. The analytical framework of these group dis-
cussions was developed by a research team consisting of anthropologists and soci-
ologists.13 Our main aim was to better understand what people think about the 
increasing level of mass migration in Europe, how they feel about migrants with 
different racial and ethnic origins, and most importantly how they conceive the dif-
ferent aspects of threats related to mass migration. By applying qualitative methods, 
we aimed to better understand what was in people’s heads, as this method enables 
researchers to gain first-hand experience with people forming different opinions on 
migration.
The group discussions were organised in two waves, as they slightly differed in 
terms of their research focus. In the first wave of our empirical research (imple-
mented in March 2017) four main interrelated topics were discussed: (i) general 
problems and public issues in Hungary, (ii) solidarity in general and specifically 
towards refugees, (iii) attitudes towards different types of migrants—asking respon-
dents to differentiate between asylum seekers, refugees and labour migrants—and 
(iv) personal experiences with migrants. In the second wave (carried out in June 
2017) we concentrated more on the different types of perceived threats related to 
mass migration into Hungary and Europe; more specifically, we discussed in the 
groups (i) directly perceived threats, (ii) welfare chauvinism and labour-related 
threats, and (iii) national and cultural isolationism. The socio-demographic compo-
sition of the focus groups that participated in the two waves can be found in 
Appendix 8.2.14
During the selection of the target locations, our primary criteria was to find loca-
tions affected by the migration crisis at different levels, as the main goal of these 
group interviews was to explore how citizens—in different geographical loca-
tions—respond to the migration crisis and to xenophobic political discourse spread 
all around the country via the mass media, national consultations, and billboard 
campaigns. We selected three locations (Keszthely, Vecsés and Salgótarján) that had 
not been affected at all by the recent migration flow, alongside Szeged, as an exam-
ple of a town heavily affected by the 2015 migration crisis (as it is situated near the 
Serbian-Hungarian border), and finally Budapest, as the capital of Hungary was part 
12 http://artemisszio.blog.hu/
13 Here I want to thank, for the collaborative work, Teréz Pataki, Diána Szántó (Artemisszió 
Foundation), Bence Ságvári (Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Centre for Social Sciences), Anikó 
Bernát and Blanka Szeitl (TÁRKI, Social Research Institute).
14 Further details on the sampling process, the screening questionnaire and the focus guidelines can 
be sent upon request.
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of the main migration route in 2015, with its three main railway stations operating 
as transit zones that summer. The compositions of the groups were homogenous in 
terms of level of education and mass migration-related attitudes (we differentiated 
between very dismissive and less dismissive respondents, as we could hardly find 
any people with pro-immigration views), but heterogeneous in terms of gender; the 
selection process was based on a screening questionnaire.15
The focus group guidelines were designed in line with the theoretical framework 
described above, asking specific questions on the different types of mass migration- 
related threats beyond the general questions related to the experiences of the recent 
mass migration. I developed the analytical framework of the focus group discus-
sions using the theoretical approach of Stephan and Stephan (1993), distinguishing 
the different levels of anti-immigrant threats.
8.5  Anti-Immigrant Attitudes at the National Level 
(Quantitative Analysis)
Intergroup relations between the majority population and immigrant minorities are 
actually a hot issue in the European context. In international comparison—based on 
European Social Survey Round 7 and Round 8 data, and a Gallup World Poll carried 
out in 2016—Hungary is one of the worst-performing countries in terms of social 
distance and welcoming attitudes towards migrants (Messing and Ságvári 2018; 
Gallup 2017). Generally it can be stated that not only Hungary, but most Eastern 
European countries (e.g. Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Czech Republic, Latvia, 
Slovakia) are among those least accepting of migrants (MEDAM 2018).
Based on a recent survey on xenophobic attitudes in Hungary—carried out by 
TÁRKI in January 2017—the level of xenophobia has reached an all-time high 
(60% of the total population), and xenophilia has practically disappeared (Fig. 8.1).
Analysing results of the European Social Survey—Round 7, the fieldwork for 
which was carried out in 2014 and 2015—on anti-immigrant sentiments, Messing 
and Ságvári (2018) concluded that different components of fear (welfare, labour 
market, crime, cultural and religious) are the most important basis of anti- immigrant 
views. The following five factors correlated most strongly with less negative atti-
tudes towards mass migration in all examined countries at the individual level: high 
levels of interpersonal and institutional trust, tertiary education, contact with differ-
ent racial or ethnic groups, and feeling safe in the dark. Beyond the micro-level 
factors, the authors concluded that the following macro-level factors most explained 
the differences in attitudes towards migration: “people in countries with a large 
migrant population, with a high level of general and institutional trust, low level of 
corruption, a stable, well performing economy and high level of social cohesion and 
15 For the exact location and composition of the groups see Appendix 8.2.
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inclusion (including migrants) fear migration the least according to the data from 
2014–15” (Messing and Ságvári 2018: 28).
To the best of my knowledge, relatively little attention has been paid to examin-
ing attitudes to refugees and asylum seekers in Hungary, but much more to attitudes 
towards migrants (e.g. the 7th Round of the European Social Survey), even though 
these two groups raise different concerns, especially in today’s European context. 
The questions we used in our survey from 201616 addressed both groups, as the 
increased flow included various kinds of migrants, best labelled as a ‘mixed flow’ 
according to the UNHCR (2015).
In line with the theoretical framework presented above, we tried to separate 
between the two types of threats by using a simple set of anxiety-related questions. 
We measured realistic threat with two interrelated questions assessing the majori-
ty’s perceived anxiety related to the volume and ‘irregularity’ (i.e. undocumented 
status) of the current migration flow arriving into Hungary and Europe. To measure 
symbolic threats, we used two questions to assess perceived anxiety related to the 
16 The fieldwork was completed in mid-January 2016, 2 months after the Paris terror attack (13 
November 2015) and right after a series of sexual assaults, allegedly perpetrated by migrants, in 
several German cities on New Year’s Eve. The survey block on migration-related attitudes—a part 
of TÁRKI, Hungarian Social Research Centre’s regular Omnibus survey—was based on a repre-
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Fig. 8.1 The ratio of xenophobes, xenophiles and thinkers (I labelled as “xenophobes” are those 
respondents who would not admit any asylum seekers into Hungary, as “xenophiles” those who 
would admit all asylum seekers into Hungary, and “thinkers” as those who would consider admit-




different cultural and religious backgrounds of migrants arriving into Hungary 
and Europe.
Figure 8.2 illustrates that the level of perceived threat was very high in all aspects 
measured, and that levels of threats are somewhat higher about the irregularity and 
volume of the current migration flow (realistic threat: 92–93%) than the level of fear 
related to the different cultural and religious background of the migrants (level of 
symbolic threat: 89–90%). The results of my principal component analysis (2016) 
underlined that the two types of mass migration-related threats were strongly related 
as well, and the correlation analysis revealed most of the respondents think in a 
similar way concerning the perceived cultural and symbolic threats to Hungary.
In the same survey we also measured how Hungarians felt about asylum seekers 
with different reasons for flight. Figure 8.3 shows changes in attitudes towards asy-
lum seekers’ different reasons for flight, in the order of how welcomed a given 
group was in October 2015 and January 2016. It is clear that respondents made a 
clear distinction between on the one hand those who had left their country due to 
(civil) war, had fled due to hunger or natural catastrophe, or with the aim of family 
reunion, and on the other hand those claiming asylum for other reasons such as 
being part of an oppressed ethnic, national or religious minority; the level of accep-
tance of this second group was significantly lower. In the case of those who had left 
their home country due to lack of work, the percentage of acceptance was very low, 
which means the great majority of the Hungarian adult population is not welcoming 
towards them at all, in line with both the Hungarian government’s and the European 
Union’s current asylum policy. A more elaborated analysis on the social basis of the 
symbolic and realistic threats can be found in Simonovits (2016).
Analysing the trend, it is clear that welcoming attitudes dropped dramatically 
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Seeing the arrival of refugees and migrants to Europe of
cultures and religions that are different from ours makes
me worried.
Seeing the great number of undocumented refugees and
migrants entering Europe without control makes me
worried.
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migrants entering Hungary without control makes me
worried.
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Fig. 8.2 Different components of the perceived threat from the current migration flow into Europe 
and Hungary (in per cent, approx. N = 980). (Source: Boda and Simonovits 2016)
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whether the refugees’ reason for flight was war or religion. While in October 2015 
more than half of the population would have accepted asylum seekers who left their 
country due to war or civil war, in January only one third of the respondents had a 
welcoming attitude towards them. The numbers are similar in the case of hunger 
and natural catastrophes as well (where the level of acceptance dropped from 50% 
to 35%), and family reunion (decreased from 48% to 38%). Moreover, the level of 
acceptance in the case of being persecuted due to one’s ethnic or national origin 
dropped by half, from 33% to 17%, as well as in the case of being persecuted due to 
one’s political activity (from 27% to 13%). The level of acceptance in the case of 
lack of work was almost non-existent in January 2016, while in October 2015 it was 
twice as high: 10%. This is perfectly in line with the Hungarian government’s and 
the European Union’s recent asylum policy. (See more on that in the qualitative 
analysis in Sect. 8.4).
It is worth mentioning that in the second wave (January 2016), religious affilia-
tion was divided into two separate questions (Christians and Muslims) in order to 
see if there is a difference in response to each. While roughly every fourth respon-
dent (23%) would welcome asylum seekers who are being persecuted due to belong-
ing to a Christian denomination, only 9% responded positively in the case of 
Muslims.
Before shifting our attention to the qualitative results, it is worth to take a look at 
the Hungarian respondents’ personal contacts with migrants. Based on our repre-
sentative survey, the proportion of those who personally knew migrants was very 
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Fig. 8.3 Reasons for flight: Acceptance of different reasons for flight, in order of being welcomed 
(‘From among the asylum seekers, should Hungary admit those…?’ – those who answered “yes”, 
in per cent, in October 2015 and January 2016). (Source: Boda and Simonovits 2016)
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of the Hungarians said that they personally knew any kind of migrant, and in January 
2016 this proportion was 4% (Fig. 8.4).
Surprisingly, the proportion of those who had met some kind of migrant in the 
past 12 months was high (24% in October and 27% in January), suggesting that 
people interpreted this question broadly, i.e. presumably even those who only saw 
or passed by migrants in the past year answered “yes” to this question.
8.6  Anti-Immigrant Attitudes at the Local Level (Qualitative 
Analysis)
For the qualitative analysis, it must be noted that the focus groups were organised in 
the political climate described above, during the different waves of billboard cam-
paigns against immigration and George Soros’ pro-immigration stance. For the 
qualitative analysis below, I have organised the results in the following way: based 
on the scripts of the 12 focus groups, I first briefly discuss the respondents’ level of 
knowledge regarding mass migration, and then focus on the different aspects of 
mass migration-related threats (illustrative quotations are summarised in Tables 8.1 












personally knows migrants has met some kind of migrants in the past 12
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January 2016 (N=1001) October 2015 (N=1003)
Fig. 8.4 The proportion of those who personally knew migrants and those who had met some kind 
of migrant in the past 12 months (in October 2015 and January 2016). (Source: Tárki omnibus 
survey October 2015 and January 2016)
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Table 8.1 Types of the perceived threats: realistic and symbolic threats expressed in the focus 
group discussions, by type of location (March and June 2017)





Budapest (its 3 
railway stations and 
their surroundings 
were affected to a 
large extent)
In locations not affected by 





“We were afraid of 
going out on the 
street”
“I did not feel safe at 
the border”
“I was afraid of 
catching diseases 
from them”
“The mass at the 
border was 
frightening”
“It is not the older 
generation, but the 
kids of the Pakistani 
taxi driver that might 
blow us up”
“Within Hungary, only 
Budapest might be a 
potential target for 
terrorists”
“We definitely need the 
border fence, though it is 
not strong enough”
Labour market “They do not want to 
work”
“We do not need 
them as they do not 
have special skills”
“They [the Chinese 
entrepreneurs] do not pay 
taxes”




“The wars and ethnic 
conflicts of the 
Middle East are not 
our problem”
“Mass migration 
means a huge burden 
to Europe”
“We have the Roma, 
we do need other 
burdens, such as 
immigrants”
“Hungary’s welfare system 
is not strong enough to 





minority groups in 
the receiving 
countries
The alleged high 
fertility rate is 
perceived to be a 
problem;
Most respondents 





arrived in Europe and 
also in Hungary”
“They have too many 
kids”
“There are certain districts 
in Budapest, where there are 
a lot of them [migrants]”
“Their fertility rate is much 
higher than ours, and this is 
the problem”
“If family reunification is 
allowed, they would bring 
8–10 (!) wives and their kids 
with them”
Symbolic threats




“Only whites should 
be accepted into 
Hungary”
“They should respect 
our religion and us”
“Islam aims to destroy 
Christianity and 
Western civilization”
“They are Islamists, they 
would behave towards us as 
they are used to; i.e. they 
rape kids and cut the hands 
off of 8-year-old children”




8.6.1  General Knowledge and Attitudes About Migration 
and Integration
Even though the overwhelming majority of the focus group participants had hardly 
any personal experiences with migrants and asylum seekers, they formed quite defi-
nite and categorical views on recent immigrant groups entering Europe as well as on 
those who arrived into Europe in the past decades. They differentiated quite easily 
between forced and labour migrants, and expressed a bit more empathy towards 
forced migrants who had to leave their homes because of political persecution, as 
Table 8.1 (continued)





Budapest (its 3 
railway stations and 
their surroundings 
were affected to a 
large extent)
In locations not affected by 
the 2015 migration crisis
Cultural threats “Their culture and 
their habits are the 
problems”
“Because of their 
culture they would 
never assimilate”
“They do not respect 
our girls and 
women”
“They have their own 
rules. It is impossible 




“They would not learn our 
language”
“If 3 or 4 families live in the 
same street, with their same 
culture and habits, they 
won’t adapt to our 
behavioural patterns”
“They are violent”
Note: the author’s analytical framework is based on the theoretical approach developed by Stephan 
and Stephan originally in 1993
Table 8.2 Perceived positive impacts of mass migration, articulated in the focus group discussions, 





Budapest (with the largest 
immigrant population)
In locations not affected by 
the 2015 migration crisis
Labour 
market
– “The Turks in the kebab shop 
also work hard (from 10 a.m. to 
11 p.m.)”
“Those who work [i.e. 
Arabic doctors, Chinese 
entrepreneurs] can stay”
“The Chinese immigrants 
are hardworking”
Religious Not mentioned Not mentioned Not mentioned
Cultural “Only new tastes 
and music, nothing 
else is needed”
“Let’s have a colourful Europe, 
but not at the cost of me being 
afraid to leave my home after 
dark.”
“Restaurants run by 
migrants are acceptable, but 
nothing more”
“We do not want to change 
our Coat of Arms”
“The Chinese are okay. 
They have the money to 
move here”
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well as towards Christians who had to flee their homes due their religion (in line 
with the quantitative results presented above).
Generally, most of the respondents had an overwhelmingly negative view of both 
the recent migration flow affecting Europe and the integration process. In line with 
the aforementioned quantitative results, focus group participants also thought that 
too many migrants had arrived in Europe and Hungary without a proper screening 
and documentation process. As far as immigrant populations in Western European 
countries are concerned, the participants were able to enumerate some of the coun-
tries that had experienced huge migration flows in the past decades and recently. 
They seemed to be well-informed about the so-called no-go zones in certain 
European cities as obvious signs of failure of integration policies.
It turned out that most respondents had been informed via public media chan-
nels—echoing primarily the official views of the Hungarian government’s anti- 
immigrant rhetoric—as well as via the taxpayer-funded billboard campaign all over 
Hungary.17
Most of the respondents had some basic knowledge of the main migration trends 
into Europe, i.e. they were aware of the fact that certain Western European coun-
tries—most frequently Germany was mentioned—had experienced a huge migra-
tion flow since the 1960s. They were also quite certain that generally it is not the 
first generation of immigrants, but members of the second and third generation who 
might become terrorists. The dominant view was that Hungary is a small country 
compared to most Western European states, and thus unlikely to become a primary 
target of terrorist attacks. “They do not even know where we are [Hungary]; there 
are bigger fish in Europe” (Budapest Group, June 2017). Some of the respondents 
shared the view that “it is not the migrants who are responsible for the terrorist 
events, but bigger forces, like the European and American world powers” (Budapest 
Group, June 2017). In contrast, some of the respondents placed the primary empha-
sis on the individual dispositions (the case of Breivik was mentioned) as well as on 
the effects of socialisation (i.e. if someone is raised in a deprived neighbourhood), 
thus they did not agree with the total exclusion of Muslim migrants. We could iden-
tify a type of reasoning, making use of the social-psychological phenomenon of 
relative deprivation: “in Belgium, for example, second and third generation migrants 
don’t work; they see their neighbours doing better than them… so they go bombing” 
(Vecsés Group, June 2017).
Comparing the Hungarian towns and cities, most of the respondents agreed that 
Budapest has been the most affected by migratory movements in the past decades. 
They claimed that “there are certain districts of Budapest where there are a lot of 
migrants” (Keszthely Group, June 2017). Some of the participants emphasised that 
the growing number of immigrants poses a challenge to public safety, and they also 
find this tendency problematic from a cultural point of view, i.e. they argued that if 
too many migrants live in a locality, their culture will become dominant. Even 
17 See more on the content analysis of the Hungarian media by Bernáth and Messing (2015) as well 
as a comparison between the Austrian and Hungarian media coverage, and an analysis of the news 
coverage of three symbolic events in the migration crisis, by Bernáth and Messing (2016).
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though we did not ask the participants to estimate the actual ratio of migrant popula-
tions in Hungary, they seemed to be overestimating the real numbers. Again, it has 
to be noted here that in Hungary the proportion of migrants is very low; the foreign- 
born population makes up 1–2% of the total population, the overwhelming majority 
of which are ethnic Hungarians who migrated from the neighbouring countries that 
used to be part of Hungary before 1920 (Gödri 2015).
Discussing the different types of migrant groups, most of the interviewees dif-
ferentiated between (i) the old migrants who had lived in Hungary for decades and 
worked mainly as medical doctors or in other professional positions (most of which 
having arrived in Hungary from Northern African or Arab countries in the 1970s as 
students), or run their own local businesses (i.e. Asian immigrants, primarily from 
China or Vietnam), and (ii) the “newcomers” who are mostly perceived to be as 
neither useful for the economy (i.e. they do not have the proper skills) nor truly 
vulnerable people eligible for social welfare. We learnt this primarily in the focus 
groups of lower status respondents according to whose reoccurring reasoning there 
were Hungarians who were more in need than the Syrian refugees “wearing Nike 
shoes and having smartphones” (Salgótarján Group, March 2017). The following 
idea also emerged in several groups: “if someone is a refugee, thus fleeing from a 
war zone, why doesn’t he stay in his home country and fight?” (Salgótarján Group, 
March 2017). They also argued that it is not Europe’s responsibility to let the refu-
gees in, as on their way Turkey was the first peaceful country.
8.6.2  Perceived Migration-Related Threats
Discussing welfare services provided to recognised refugees, the overwhelming 
majority expressed views that can be best labelled as welfare chauvinistic. It again 
has to be noted that the Hungarian government completely withdrew from integra-
tion services provided to beneficiaries of international protection in summer 2016. 
At certain points of the group discussions, participants drew a parallel between the 
Roma and the migrants in terms of both groups being “lazy” and “a threat to public 
safety” as well as tending to conserve their own identities and being unwilling to 
assimilate into Hungarian society. These ideas were primarily articulated in 
Salgótarján, situated in one of the most economically depressed areas of Hungary 
with a significant Roma population. It has to be mentioned here that Prime Minister 
Victor Orbán also pointed to alleged similarities between the Roma and the immi-
grants a number of times during the migration crisis.
As far as labour market threats are concerned, we learnt of two basic ideas. 
Regarding the old migrants, the hardest criticism was articulated about Chinese and 
Vietnamese businessmen who do not pay taxes and sell bad quality goods. However, 
there was not a perfect agreement in this regard: some of the respondents liked 
cheap Asian products. The newcomers, in contrast, were criticised for their “lazi-
ness” and for their lack of language (Hungarian and English) and professional skills.
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As far as symbolic threats are concerned, the Prime Minister warned the 
Hungarian Parliament as well as visiting Polish politicians about Europe’s possible 
dark future if they continued to allow more immigrants into the old continent:
We may lose our European values—our very identity—by degrees, like the live frog allow-
ing itself to be slowly cooked to death in a pan of water. Quite simply there will be more 
and more Muslims, and Europe will be transformed beyond recognition. If we are unable to 
change things now, we can predict with sufficient mathematical accuracy—all one needs 
are some mathematical calculations—what Europe’s cities will look like in two or three 
decades (Viktor Orbán 2016).18
Opinions in the focus groups were formed in line with these ideas, repeating that 
Hungary does not need people with other cultural and religious backgrounds (see 
selected quotations in Table 8.1).
Summing up, the qualitative results underscored the quantitative results, as both 
realistic and symbolic threats by Muslim immigrants are perceived to be high in 
contemporary Hungary, and letting in a great amount of people with unknown iden-
tities is seen as posing a serious risk to the receiving society. Most of the arguments 
given by the focus group participants echoed the concepts of the government, in 
terms of terrorism, contagious diseases, as well as immigrants imposing a huge 
burden on the welfare state. As far as cultural threats are concerned, lack of lan-
guage skills is perceived to be a crucial problem. Focus group participants repeat-
edly emphasised that the basic problem is that migrants tend to arrive in groups and 
live in blocks in European cities, making integration nearly impossible. Some of 
them added that even though they make up only a minority of the population, they 
tend to dominate the majority population.
In contrast, we could hardly find any positive or neutral opinions related to 
migration into Hungary or Europe. In Szeged, the city with direct experience of the 
2015 migration crisis, we did not record a single positive statement related to immi-
gration (see Table 8.2).
To sum up, we could hardly find any positive views with regards to the effects of 
migration. Most interviewees were in favour of the strict immigration policy intro-
duced by the Hungarian government, including the 170  km-long border fence. 
Furthermore, they proposed building a wall similar to the one at the US-Mexico 
border as a more effective tool against irregular migrants.
8.7  Conclusion
To understand the Hungarian case, it is crucial to re-emphasise that a new era in 
asylum policy began in 2015, at the beginning of the recent migration crisis, which 
manifested itself in a different approach to the provision of reception conditions as 





well as a dismantling of integration services.19 As a result, in the last few years, the 
permanent, better-equipped reception facilities have been replaced with temporary 
centres offering less favourable reception conditions. Since 2016, asylum seekers 
have been systematically detained in transit zones, which are in remote locations, 
built into the border fence. Furthermore, the vulnerabilities of asylum seekers have 
been systematically ignored—most importantly, unaccompanied minors over 
14 years of age are also detained in the transit zones. From early 2016 the monthly 
cash allowance that asylum seekers were given to spend how they wished, as well 
as the school-enrolment benefits previously provided to asylum seekers, were 
withdrawn.20
These developments have had an increasingly serious effect on asylum seekers 
trying to find refuge in Hungary. Moreover, the dismantled integration services and 
further negative changes in family unification rules have discouraged recognised 
refugees and beneficiaries of subsidiary protection from staying in Hungary for the 
long term. So I can conclude that the pronounced aim of the Hungarian government 
has been to stop the immigration of irregular TCNs into Hungary. The above- 
mentioned policy changes have been accompanied by an extensive anti-immigrant 
campaign since early 2015, and an elaborated moral panic (related to the threats of 
mass migration) in Hungarian society. In light of these developments, it is not sur-
prising that the empirical research could barely find support for refugee reception 
among the Hungarian population.
The quantitative and qualitative results were mostly in line with each other. The 
overwhelming majority of the Hungarian population is absolutely dismissive 
towards any kind of migrants (either forced or voluntary). According to the latest 
representative survey results, 6 out of 10 Hungarians would not let any asylum seek-
ers into the country, and during the focus group discussions there were rarely narra-
tives in favour of either labour migration or forced migration into the country. Based 
on the complex analysis conducted here, I can conclude that perceived threats—
both realistic and symbolic—have real consequences, regardless of whether or not 
the perceptions of threats are accurate.
Most Hungarians were able to differentiate between different types of migrant 
groups. There seemed to be a contradiction however: on the one hand—based on the 
quantitative results—respondents felt more solidarity towards forced migrants; on 
the other hand—based on the qualitative results—out of the main immigrant groups, 
the Chinese, were always mentioned as most acceptable. One reasoning behind that 
was that Chinese immigrants do not impose a burden on the Hungarian welfare state 
(as they run their own businesses) and they are not perceived to be a threat either in 
a realistic or a cultural way. Asked about forced migrants from war zones or those 
fleeing from natural catastrophes, roughly one third of the respondents expressed 
19 Similar tendencies were also observed in other European countries (see Chaps. 3, 4 and 5 of this 
volume).
20 For more details see the Hungarian Helsinki Committee (2017).
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their theoretical solidarity, but based on the qualitative results the overwhelming 
majority of the Hungarian population did not express welcoming attitudes towards 
these groups either.
All in all, it is obvious that migrants who are Muslims are rejected to a large 
extent, as they are perceived by Hungarians as presenting both a realistic and a 
symbolic threat. The overwhelming majority of the group interviewees shared the 
opinion that Islam is a violent and domineering religion (i.e. aiming at taking con-
trol), and that Muslim migrants are unable to integrate into European societies. Our 
qualitative results showed how the key messages of the official public discourse 
were echoed in the groups, as well as how successfully and efficiently the moral 
panic has reached its target population. However, it has to be mentioned that the 
findings derived from the qualitative research have low external validity, as the 
number of observations was rather low (approx. 100 respondents) and not represen-
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 Composition and Locations of the Focus Groups Held in Hungary in 2017
Wave 1: Composition and locations of the focus groups, in Hungary in March 2017
No. Name of the location
Date of the 





1. Budapest 8 March heterogeneous 60+ middle very dismissive
2. Budapest 8 March heterogeneous 25–60 high rather dismissive
3. Salgótarján 
(north- eastern part of 
Hungary)
14 March heterogeneous 25–35 low very dismissive
4. Salgótarján 
(north- eastern part of 
Hungary)
14 March heterogeneous 35–60 middle rather dismissive
5. Szeged (Serbian 
border zone)
10 March heterogeneous 25–35 middle very dismissive
6. Szeged (Serbian 
border zone)
10 March heterogeneous 35–60 low rather dismissive
aBased on a complex definition of the level of education and the financial status of the respondent. 
Screening questionnaires assessing both social status and attitudes towards immigration can be 
sent upon further request
Wave 2: Composition and locations of the focus groups, in Hungary in July 2017
No. Name of the location








7. Budapest 24 July heterogeneous 60+ middle very dismissive
8. Budapest 24 July heterogeneous 25–60 high rather 
dismissive
9. Vecsés (in the 
agglomeration of 
Budapest)
26 July heterogeneous 25–35 low very dismissive
10. Vecsés (in the 
agglomeration of 
Budapest)
26 July heterogeneous 36–60 middle rather 
dismissive
11. Keszthely (south- 
western region of 
Hungary)
27 July heterogeneous 25–35 middle very dismissive
12. Keszthely (south- 
western region of 
Hungary)
27 July heterogeneous 36–60 low rather 
dismissive
aBased on a complex definition of the level of education and the financial status of the respondent. 
Screening questionnaires assessing both social status and attitudes towards immigration can be 
sent upon further request
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Chapter 9
Diverging Perspectives on “Integration” 
in the Vocational Education System: 
Evidence from an East German Periphery
Birgit Glorius and Anne-Christin Schondelmayer
9.1  Introduction
In 2015, around 890,000 asylum seekers reached Germany, the majority of them 
aged 25 and younger (BMI 2016: 15). Among them, there were a large number of 
children and adolescents under 18 who had the fundamental right to receive (and 
also the duty to attend) school education. Due to years of war in their home coun-
tries or a poor educational system, many of them had received limited years of 
schooling and thus lagged behind their age peers in Germany who had pursued a 
continuous educational biography. This is also true for the large groups of young 
adults under 25, who could not finish their degree programmes in their home coun-
tries and now needed opportunities to catch up. This chapter presents results from 
an empirical case study carried out in 2016 in two vocational schools in a remote, 
rural district of East Germany. During the last decades, the region had experienced 
population losses rather than net migration, and there were few experiences with the 
integration of foreigners. Even though theoretical knowledge and concepts existed, 
they were not embedded in the actual experience of teachers and headteachers.
Our research aimed to evaluate the practical implementation of a programme for 
continuous language education, which had been used for the integration of migrant 
children for a long time. However, its implementation with a group of young refu-
gees who entered the German school system at the ages of 14–17 was rather novel. 
During the year of our research, we accompanied stakeholders who collected and 
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reflected upon first experiences, and observed the development of structures and 
regulations for this educational field and this specific group. In this chapter, we will 
first show how the implementation and outcome of the concept is linked to the inter-
pretation of stakeholders on site, who are not always ready to apply conceptual 
approaches that were developed without consultation with them. Second, we will 
highlight that the definition of integration not only varies on an individual level, but 
that it is entangled with social positions and roles. Third, we will show how the 
specifics of the locality affect integration processes, taking into account regional 
characteristics like the shape of the labour market, population structures, and per-
ceptions of and public discourses on migration and asylum.
To tackle those aspects, we address the following guiding questions:
What idea of “integration” is present in the narration of the main stakeholders?
How is this interpretation framed?
How do varying interpretations of “integration” influence the practices of integration?
In order to address these questions, we will first elaborate upon the notion of 
“integration” from the perspective of various disciplines and their development 
(Sect. 9.2). Section 9.3 will address the policies and regulations for the education of 
migrant children and recent policy changes due to the arrival of refugees. Section 
9.4 discusses the regional settings of our case study, our research methodology and 
implementation, and Sect. 9.5 turns to the results of our case study, which are dis-
cussed and generalized within a wider explanatory frame in the final section (9.6).
9.2  Perspectives on Integration and Its Implications 
for Educational Planning
The notion of “integration” has manifold meanings and interpretations, which vary 
throughout societal groups, professions, and over time. Generally speaking, integra-
tion means the connection of single parts within a system, like for example a social 
system. When all parts are connected with each other, the system can be understood 
as being a whole and can be identified by its clear delimitations with respect to other 
systems (Esser 2000). Following social theory, the differentiation between the sys-
temic level and the actors’ level is of crucial importance for understanding integra-
tion processes. While system integration, according to Lockwood (1964: 245), 
means “the orderly or conflictful relationships between the parts”, social integration 
characterizes “the orderly or conflictful relationships between the actors” of a social 
system. Social psychology uses the term integration for the description of inter- 
group relations (Berry 1984). Pettigrew (1988) defines “integration” as “intergroup 
interaction that involves social processes that facilitate both intragroup integrity and 
intergroup relations” (Pettigrew 1988: 19). Both social theory and social psychol-
ogy stress the importance of social structures and human (individual or group) inter-
actions for the process of integration. More specifically, social theory distinguishes 
three main mechanisms of social integration:
B. Glorius and A.-C. Schondelmayer
181
 1. culturation, which means that the actors need to acquire specific knowledge and 
competences (like language skills) to get into contact with other actors;
 2. placement, which means the assignment of a specific social position; and
 3. interaction, which means the mutual orientation of actors with the help of shared 
knowledge, symbols, daily communication and emotions.
Following the mechanisms of social integration, schools seem to be the ideal 
place for integration processes, as they offer knowledge and skills which are rele-
vant for integration, and provide an overall accepted social identity (as students) to 
their members, as well as opportunities for interaction in a shared environment.
In the context of migration, the term “integration” is frequently equated with 
“assimilation”, especially in political and public discourse (Bowskill et al. 2007, 
Hersi 2014), or when referring to specific aspects like culture and religion (see 
Schneider and Crul 2010:1145). This perspective is criticized from the field of peda-
gogics, because those framings of both assimilation and integration are based on the 
assumption of a deficient “other”, who can only enter a given structure by abandon-
ing his/her own norms, values and habits, and instead adopting the norms and values 
of the host society. It also denies ongoing societal changes, which result in a higher 
social divergence and the creation of new identities. The assimilation approach con-
ceptualizes the host society as a homogeneous entity, which is threatened by the 
addition of other, foreign cultures. Thus, already existing differences in the host 
society are neglected (Nohl 2010: 17ff). In this perspective, integration is a process 
of determining and distinguishing between the inside and the outside, the “we” and 
the “other”, or the “local” and the “stranger” (Riegel 2009: 24), and therefore con-
tributes to a process of exclusive identification and essentialization.
Taking a transatlantic comparative perspective on discourses and processes of 
migration and integration, Schneider and Crul (2010) point to the varying interpre-
tation of the terms “assimilation” and “integration” in the US and Europe. In the 
US, the term assimilation refers to the idea that all groups of immigrants and their 
offspring can become similar (“the mainstream”), which basically means to be 
incorporated into a dynamically developing system (like the immigrant society of 
the nineteenth and early twentieth century). “Studying ‘successful ‘assimilation’ 
thus has mainly meant to measure the degree of incorporation into patterns of eco-
nomic and social ‘success’” (Schneider and Crul 2010: 1144). In the European con-
text, on the other hand, this dynamic and inclusionary perspective of “assimilation”, 
especially in terms of economic performance, is often overlooked. “European ‘inte-
gration’ predominantly carries the implicit ideal of (a minimum degree of) cultural 
homogeneity especially referring to language as a prerequisite for social cohesion” 
(ibd.) Also, Schneider and Crul (2010) highlight the different traditions of social 
politics in the US and Europe. While in the US a neoliberal economy with low regu-
latory influences and a high self-determination of the individual prevails, the 
(Western) European context is especially characterized by a strong welfare state 
with a high number of regulations and specific policies aiming to overcome group 
inequalities and integrate strangers. In this framing, the term “integration” fits 
 better, as it more explicitly includes structural aspects of incorporation into society 
than “assimilation” (ibd.: 1145).
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Since the late twentieth century, the transnational paradigm in migration research 
challenges the traditional approaches of migration and integration. The term “trans-
nationalism” reflects migrants’ lived realities, which are characterized by the expan-
sion of their individual reference frame and social relations beyond borders, thus 
creating a transnational social space (Pries 1996). These processes cannot be ade-
quately addresses by dualistic models of inclusion and exclusion, such as in tradi-
tional assimilationist approaches. Pries (2003: 32) therefore suggests an expanded 
model of social incorporation as an open-ended social process of economic, cul-
tural, political and social interdependence for migrants at the local, regional, 
national and transnational levels. In the context of ongoing globalization and a mul-
titude of migration processes, he argues, nation states cannot uphold models of 
homogenization or dominant integration paradigms any more, but should prepare 
for flexible processes and results of incorporation (ibd.: 33, see also Treibel 1999: 
151). Incorporation in this sense entails the negotiation of self-perceptions and 
external perceptions, which requires a certain level of openness from all actors 
involved. This is in line with the post-migration paradigm, which points to societal 
negotiation processes that acknowledge the (irreversible) realities of immigration 
countries with high levels of diversity and the concomitant necessity to adapt regu-
latory structures, institutions and political cultures to those new realities (Foroutan 
2015). However, the post-migration paradigm is more radical in challenging the 
conventional understanding of migration and in problematizing racist practices. In 
relation to educational issues, the turn towards open-ended modes of incorporation 
would involve a change of perspectives: Rather than asking how students need to 
adapt to an educational system, we would have to explore the adaptation of schools 
to respond to the individuality and resources of their students. This perspective 
brings the notion of “inclusion” to the fore—an educational approach that aims to 
acknowledge differing but equal ways of life on the basis of formal regulations and 
structural adaptations (Georgi 2015: 26). The notion of inclusion thus also implies 
the acknowledgement of diversity.
9.3  The Positioning of Foreign and Asylum-Seeking Students 
in the German Educational System
9.3.1  Development of “Foreigner Education” in Germany
The German educational system is traditionally constituted as a monolingual school 
system and is associated with a homogeneous and monolingual nation-state concept 
(Gogolin 2010: 303).1 Questions of migration, social plurality and multilingualism 
were considered rather late in educational planning and politics. It was not until 
1 In Germany, the governance of education is organized on the level of the 16 states, which results 
in a considerable variation regarding educational trajectories and school types. A good overview 
can be found at https://www.schulsystem.info/bildungssystem.html
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1964 that the compulsory education regulation was extended to foreign children, 
even though many children of the so-called “guest workers” already lived in West 
Germany, and it took many more years until the specifics of educating children with 
foreign backgrounds and non-native German speakers were seriously considered in 
the educational planning process (Herwartz-Emden 2007: 12). At the end of the 
1960s, preparatory classes for foreigners were established in West Germany, fol-
lowed by curricular developments for German as a second language, but also for the 
support of the children’s native language, which was mainly constituted as a prepa-
ration for the anticipated return of guest workers and their families to their country 
of origin (Baur et al. 2004: 162). During the 1980s and 1990s, as a reaction to the 
numerous arrivals of ethnic German repatriates (“Spätaussiedler”) and their off-
spring, differentiated curricula were developed for German as a second language. 
These curricula also established measures for labour market orientation and prepa-
ration, as well as issues of general social integration (Kühn and Gawlick 1994). In 
what was then the German Democratic Republic (GDR), however, specific integra-
tion programmes for migrant children were not provided. After the re-unification, 
most East German states adopted the West German system of stepwise integration 
and installed integration classes for migrant children. In the 2000s, all federal states 
harmonized educational planning processes in this regard and developed curricula 
for German as a second language, and corresponding training programmes for 
teachers. However, the development of an educational infrastructure for foreign 
minors and adults varied due to the differing shares of foreigners and changing 
migration processes. This is especially true for the East German states, which have 
a significantly lower share of population with a migration background than West 
German states (6.8 vs. 26.5% in 2017) (StBA 2018). While in the 1990s a consider-
able infrastructure was established for the education of ethnic Germans and other 
migrants, this infrastructure was dismantled during the 2000s due to reduced arrival 
numbers of “Spätaussiedler” and asylum seekers (see Glorius 2008: 87f).
9.3.2  Organizational Aspects of the German School System 
and the Placement of Migrant Children
In general, the German school system provides 9–10  years (depending on state 
laws) of compulsory full-time education, followed by compulsory vocational edu-
cation, which terminates when 12 years of schooling have been reached or when the 
student turns 18. Above the age of 18, students have the right to continue schooling 
in order to complete their secondary education, either in a “Gymnasium” which 
terminates with the university entrance exam, or in a vocational school, which offers 
general and specialized education, usually accompanied by a vocational traineeship 
(Fig. 9.1).
Migrant children have the same rights and obligations as non-migrant children. 
They receive special support to develop German language skills, mostly via prepa-
ratory classes. From there, children can gradually switch to the regular classes as 
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soon as their language competencies are sufficient (Mercator-Institut 2015: 44ff). 
The success of this integration path is – among other factors – dependent on the 
educational age of migrant children. While children who arrive at elementary school 
age (6–9) have good opportunities to catch up, the situation of children who start at 
a later educational age is more difficult, as the German school system in most states 
starts with differentiated educational tracks at the age of 10 (see Fig. 9.1). Thus, 
most immigrant children at secondary school age are allocated to a secondary 
Fig. 9.1 Structure of the German educational system. (Source: HowtoGermany, at https://www.
howtogermany.com/pages/germanschools.html)
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school that prepares for a minor educational exam (age 15 or 16 – after 9 or 10 years 
of schooling) rather than being enrolled at secondary schools preparing for the uni-
versity entrance exam (age 18, after 12–13 years of schooling). As a consequence, 
children who arrive at the ages of 15 or 16 – especially those with interrupted edu-
cational biographies – are unlikely to learn German and integrate into the regular 
classes until tenth grade, and thus often leave secondary school without a secondary 
certificate.
Preparatory classes at vocational schools focus on 16- to 18-year-old students, 
who are perceived to be too old to integrate in regular secondary school classes. The 
1-year preparatory programmes at vocational schools serve two goals: (1) they pro-
vide full-time education so that minors can fulfil their compulsory school education; 
and (2) they not only offer intensive German lessons but also a first orientation in 
the German labour market system, for example vocational education programmes. 
A vocational apprenticeship provides training on the job on the basis of a work 
contract with a specific employer. Parallel to this, trainees receive part-time educa-
tion in a vocational school in order to prepare for the Chamber of Commerce exams 
after the termination of their 2–3 year apprenticeship.
9.3.3  Education for Refugee Students – Quantitative 
Development and Qualitative Results
Regarding asylum-seeking children, federal education laws follow the EU Reception 
Directive 2013/33/EU (in particular Article 14 (2)), which determines that access to 
the educational system must be granted no later than 3 months after an application 
for international protection has been made. Also, minors must be offered prepara-
tory and language courses. The implementation of this directive is handled differ-
ently in the German states. For pragmatic reasons, allocation to a school only starts 
after a minor has left the first reception centre and has been allocated to a municipal-
ity, where they live during the asylum application process (Mercator Institut 
2015: 37).
After years of rather moderate immigration to Germany and declining numbers 
of immigrant children requiring preparatory education, immigration numbers started 
to increase in 2007, due to increasing inner-European mobility and the arrival of 
refugees. And then, in 2015, Germany had 2.14 million arrivals, among them around 
890,000 asylum seekers. Regarded by age groups, children and young adults under 
25 were the highest share: 42.9% of all immigrants, and 55.9% of all asylum seekers 
(those who submitted an asylum application) (BAMF 2016: 21f). This high increase 
of young immigrants resulted in a rapid expansion of preparatory classes. In the state 
of Saxony where our case study is located, the number of students in preparatory 
classes more than doubled from 3751 to 7531 during the winter term 2015–2016, 
and the number of preparatory classes increased from 290 at the beginning of the 
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school year to 469 in March 2016, of which 189 classes were located in elementary 
schools, 151 in secondary schools and 122 in vocational schools (Kelch 2016).
Between 2014 and 2018, a large amount of instantaneous research was carried 
out, delivering a first overview of major problems and issues at stake regarding the 
educational integration of asylum seeking students of higher age. A number of stud-
ies criticise the curricula for adolescent refugee students in vocational schools, 
which are mainly oriented towards language acquisition rather than general educa-
tional content, and thus leave the students ill prepared for vocational training or 
labour market integration (Gag and Schroeder 2014, Heinrichs et al. 2016, Paulsen 
et al. 2016, Vogel and Stock 2017). This is also reflected by labour market actors 
such as the Bavarian Industry Association, who assert that current preparatory train-
ing in vocational schools for refugee students is inadequate (vbw 2016: 242). A 
study from Hamburg shows how vocational schools struggle with unsuitable curri-
cula for the vocational schooling of refugees and plea for educational approaches 
that are better connected to the social environment of the students (Gag and 
Schroeder 2014: 30).
One reason for those narrowed curricula is found in the organisation of foreigner 
education as such, which views preparatory language classes as a starting point, fol-
lowed by stepwise integration into ordinary classes. However, as adolescent refu-
gees can only be enrolled in schools for a limited time, due to age restrictions, they 
rarely reach the point of integration into ordinary classes with a regular curriculum. 
“While student interviews show that they appreciate the welcoming atmosphere and 
individualised attention in preparatory German classes, they also indicate that they 
miss ‘real’ school where they can learn subjects” (Vogel and Stock 2017: 24). Bauer 
and Schreyer (2016) therefore suggest a prolongation of educational opportunities 
above compulsory school age.
Several studies stress the significance of social contact among age peers with and 
without refugee backgrounds for integration success and overall well-being (Gurski 
and Rother 2018, Metzner et  al. 2018). A study among refugee students in North 
Rhine-Westphalia showed that those students who were able to establish contacts with 
Germans outside the classroom had fewer difficulties integrating in class than those 
without contacts (Gurski and Rother 2018: 179). A study from a vocational school in 
Lower Saxony revealed that students who had continuous contact with German peers 
of the same age group and who were able to establish social bonds within their neigh-
bourhood showed much higher life satisfaction (Behrensen 2007: 53).
Organisational issues are also touched upon in the recent studies, due to the mul-
titude of actors in the field of asylum and education. Among other issues, long com-
muting distances from refugee accommodation facilities to schools (especially in 
rural regions), forced secondary mobility of refugee students resulting in 
 re- allocation to other schools, as well as general uncertainties regarding residency 
and work permits for refugees, are mentioned as obstacles towards long-term inte-
gration. However, there is a great interest in integrating refugees in vocational pro-
grammes, notably in regions which are lacking a qualified labour force (Speer and 
Klaus 2015, Braun and Simons 2016, Scheiermann and Walther 2016). Furthermore, 
Heinrichs et al. (2016: 235) found problems with different cultural ideas as well as 
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racism and rejection, and stressed the important role of headteachers in paving the 
way towards systemic integration of refugee classes in the vocational schools.
Wrapping up this section, we can say that in Germany’s educational integration 
there has been a traditional focus on language proficiency, based on a perception of 
a linguistically homogeneous nation state. Regarding the layout of the educational 
system, there is a large and sometimes confusing variety of school types, educa-
tional programmes and regulations, which are due to the federal organisation of the 
state. It is obvious that the rapid increase of refugees of educational age, notably 
those near adolescence, challenged the existing approaches of system integration, 
which only proved partly ready to cope with the number and the needs of the 
migrants.
While this overview of existing studies has highlighted general problems, our 
case study will give deeper insight into the complexity of approaches, practices, and 
perceptions of integration.
9.4  Case Study Background and Research Methodology
9.4.1  Case Study Background
Our case study was carried out in two vocational schools in the county of 
Erzgebirgskreis, a peripheral, mountainous area on the border with the Czech 
Republic. Due to its rural and mountainous features, the region is sparsely popu-
lated: 347,665 inhabitants live in an area of 1827.9 km2. There are 61 municipali-
ties, the largest being the county capital Annaberg-Buchholz with 20,426 inhabitants. 
There are six other towns with populations of between 11,000 and 18,000 inhabit-
ants; the other municipalities are rather small, scattered settlements with poor pub-
lic infrastructure, especially in terms of public transport. Like many other peripheral 
regions, the county of Erzgebirgskreis has suffered from population losses for 
decades. Especially younger adults leave the region in order to attend university or 
to settle in larger agglomerations, which are perceived as more attractive. However, 
the region is economically quite strong: it has a historic tradition of mining which 
laid the foundation for many other industrial sectors, such as manufacturing. In 
2013, the county had 5000 small and medium-sized companies and 108,625 
employees; unemployment is low, and in June 2016 there were more than 2600 
open job positions. Regarding further demographic development of the county, 
there are serious concerns about the availability of a skilled labour force in the near 
future (Wirtschaftsförderung Erzgebirge 2014: 35). Accordingly, the recruitment of 
skilled workers, in particular in the context of vocational training, has a great sig-
nificance for the future development of the region.
Due to population decline in the county and general restructuring processes fol-
lowing German re-unification, the structure of the public administration and the 
educational infrastructure has been reorganized several times. The county of 
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“Erzgebirgskreis” was formed in 2008 by the fusion of four former (and smaller) 
counties. Also the system of state schools was reorganized several times, as a reac-
tion to declining student numbers, but also due to changes in the economic structure 
which translated into students’ vocational choices. At the time of writing (2018), 
there are three vocational schools, which are each scattered over several locations 
(as they served as independent schools in former times). Our two case study schools 
operate at five locations at a distance of between 20 and 45 km from each other, 
which constitutes a significant burden for the daily organization of lessons.
While the migration balance of the German population in Erzgebirgskreis has 
been negative for years, the number of foreigners has shown net gains since 2013. 
Foreigners also contribute positively to the age balance: in 2015, 37% of the dis-
trict’s foreign population was younger than 25, and only 4% were 60 years or older. 
From 2014 to 2015, the number of foreign children under 15 years old and adoles-
cents between 15 and 25 years old doubled, mainly due to the arrival of asylum 
seekers in the county.
The extraordinary dynamics of international immigration are also reflected in 
changes in the duration of residency: While in 2013, 16% of foreigners had resided 
less than 1 year in Erzgebirgskreis and 22% between 1 and 4 years, in 2015 these 
shares increased to 40.5% and 24.6%, respectively. Those dynamics already shed 
light on the major challenges regarding the organizational aspects of education. 
Furthermore, as data from February 2015 suggests, asylum seekers were widely 
distributed across the county and resided in 39 of the 61 municipalities. For refugees 
who attended classes at the vocational schools, this meant sometimes extraordi-
narily long and strenuous commutes on public buses.
9.4.2  Research Methodology
Our study took place throughout 2016 and mainly reflects the school year 
2015–2016, which was strongly influenced by the large numbers of arrivals during 
the summer of 2015 and concomitant reactions. During our research, new prepara-
tory classes were formed, new teachers were engaged, new problems emerged and 
a number of sometimes contradictory regulations came into force. Our study was 
commissioned by the State Ministry of Culture and aimed to evaluate the educa-
tional practices in the preparatory classes focusing on the process of teaching and 
studying German. As the former curricula for preparatory classes aimed at children 
and younger students, our evaluation was meant to bring about suggestions of how 
to adapt the curriculum to the needs of more adolescent students.
Our research sites were suggested by our contractors. Both vocational schools 
had large and scattered campuses and offered a large variety of educational and 
vocational degrees,2 most of them as part-time classes. One school had 954 stu-
2 For example in bakery, gastronomy, metal construction, automotive electronics or sanitary 
installation.
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dents, among them 53 asylum-seeking students in preparatory classes; the other had 
1717, among them 73 asylum-seeking students, mainly from Afghanistan, Eritrea, 
Syria and Kosovo. During the year of our research, the number of asylum seeking 
students increased to 72 and 108, respectively, and there was a relatively high fluc-
tuation among the students, due to changing statuses in the asylum application pro-
cess, opening and closing of group accommodation facilities, or changing regulations 
that excluded students older than 18 from the lessons. One of the school campuses 
operated a boarding house for unaccompanied minor asylum seekers who attended 
the preparatory class on campus.
We started our research in February 2016 with field visits to both campuses and 
informal talks with the staff. Between February and June 2016 we carried out 11 
expert interviews with the headteacher and teachers on both campuses, as well as 
six interviews with representatives of the school authority and other relevant 
stakeholders. For the expert interviews, we used an interview guideline that 
addressed the status quo of integration practices, success factors and difficulties, 
and left room for specific aspects that were of relevance for the interviewees. 
Furthermore, we attended lessons of the preparatory classes and a social event on 
campus and carried out participant observation, three group discussions and three 
guided interviews (in English and German) with the refugee students. Group dis-
cussions with the refugee students followed a participatory approach and were 
supported by visualizing tools in order to bridge language difficulties (see Fig. 9.2). 
During the sessions, the students were asked to evaluate their school programme 
with respect to structures, content, interaction with teachers and social aspects. 
Furthermore, we motivated them to thematise their future career aspirations, tak-
ing into account relevant framing factors such as status determination and second-
ary mobility for the purpose of family reunification. All interviews were taped and 
transcribed, and the informal talks and participant observations were documented 
in a research diary.
Our analysis followed the documentary method by Karl Mannheim, which has 
its foundations in the sociology of knowledge and praxeological approaches 
(Przyborski and Wohlrab-Sahr 2014). It aims to reconstruct collective orientations 
and the “modus operandi” of a specific field of action, which can be extracted dur-
ing the interpretation process (Bohnsack et al. 2010). First, the topical sequences of 
each transcript were documented. In a second step, relevant passages for interpreta-
tion were selected. Those passages were reformulated in order to reveal the inherent 
meaning of what had been said. The next step entailed reflective interpretation, 
which aimed to uncover the action orientation embedded in the narration. In par-
ticular, this involved the explanation of the frameworks of orientations and habitus 
formations. One strategy of interpretation was to search for the limits and 
 opportunities for action and to assess the potential for action from the perspective of 
the interviewees. By contrasting those action orientations and action potentials, col-
lective orientations as well as diverging orientations and practices and their substan-
tiation came to the fore.
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9.5  Results
From the perspectives of the interviewed groups of actors, we can differentiate three 
perspectives on integration: headteachers and school authorities focus on organiza-
tional aspects, teachers concentrate on language and classroom situations, while the 
students highlight aspects of social integration on and off campus.
Fig. 9.2 Visualization tool for in-class evaluation. (Source: author’s photo)
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9.5.1  Integration as an Organizational Challenge
From an organizational point of view, the integration of asylum-seeking students in 
2015 was a new coordination task for the respective schools and was, at the time of 
our study, still under development. From the perspective of the school authorities, 
the formation of those preparatory classes and their integration into the structure of 
the school was the main integration task
because, integration, in my understanding, not only means participation of individual stu-
dents at the regular lessons, but it means integrating a class within the school system. 
(Representative of Regional School Authority, interviewed 12/02/2016, lines 13–18)
The headteachers of the vocational schools mainly focused on material issues in the 
preparation of those new classes, such as buying school books and dictionaries, as 
well as special equipment for the practical lessons, for example safety goggles for 
the welding shop. Possible consequences for the existing staff and students, such as 
xenophobic reactions or conflicts about scarce resources, were barely considered. 
Thus, the preparations did not include the school as a whole. It was not considered 
to unite the staff for the task of refugee integration, and likewise the German stu-
dents were not prepared for integrating their new peers.
Hence, the class teachers of preparatory classes reported being left alone with all 
integration issues that needed cooperation with the “regular” teachers. This con-
cerned for example the stepwise integration of refugee students in the practical les-
sons of “regular” classes (which was often refused by the instructors due to scarce 
capacities and the priority for trainees who were preparing for exams), the participa-
tion of refugees in internships (which required some extra engagement in terms of 
work permits or insurance, due to varying statuses), or practical questions regarding 
physical education (gender issues or lack of sports clothes). As a consequence, 
while the organization of systems integration was perceived as the duty of the head-
teacher, the social integration of the refugee students relied on the individual 
engagement of the preparatory classes’ teachers. They usually reached out to other 
individual teachers who they knew were responsive to their requests, whereas some 
other teachers refused to teach “foreigners” at all.
Then I take the path of least resistance and approach those colleagues who I know will 
make the effort to integrate them [the refugee students], because that’s not always easy. 
(preparatory class teacher, interviewed 08/02/2016, lines 613–615)
Some interviewees gave the impression that the preparatory classes’ teachers and 
their work was perceived as marginal and not the subject of joint efforts.
With the end of the school year approaching, the question of future steps became 
more pressing for both school representatives and refugee students. While the stu-
dents sometimes expressed very high educational goals and asked us researchers 
about possible pathways into university, teachers and representatives of the school 
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authority were less optimistic about their future perspectives. They anticipated that, 
due to a lack of German language proficiency and general knowledge and skills, 
students would need further educational support to achieve a vocational degree. A 
number of problems were caused by the regulations for labour market access: for 
most apprenticeships, a secondary school certificate and a German language certifi-
cate are obligatory, neither of which were offered in the preparatory classes. This 
was also criticized by one teacher, who anticipated
that we are producing stockpiles, so to say: they have learned German, but then they cannot 
make anything out of it. (preparatory class teacher, interviewed 08/02/2016, lines 
1251–1252)
Also regulations concerning the access to secondary education constituted a bar-
rier for the continuation of refugee education: a number of orientation and prepara-
tory programmes which were designed for teenagers without a secondary certificate 
are linked to the compulsory school age, which means that students above the age 
of 18 are not eligible for them. This also affects the preparatory classes. During our 
research, due to increasing refugee numbers and capacities lagging behind, this 
regulation was enforced and students turning 18 were sometimes not allowed to 
complete the one-year programme. Instead, they were recommended to enrol in a 
language course as part of other integration measures offered by various actors such 
as the labour agency or the Federal Agency for Migration and Refugees. Again, this 
regulation—which was enforced at the beginning of the second term of 2015–2016—
was heavily criticized by the teachers in charge of the refugee students, as they saw 
their integration efforts as being in vain:
There were students who just started in February, and they all had to leave…. They were 
told to look for regular integration classes. But they are only eligible for those classes when 
their asylum application is accepted. Those who are in the asylum procedure, or who only 
have a toleration status, are not eligible for those classes. (preparatory class teacher, inter-
viewed 08/02/2016, lines 94–102)
Those asylum seekers who had sufficient knowledge of German after completing 
the preparatory class could look for an apprenticeship. At this point considerations 
of integration and the specifics of the region came to the fore. All interlocutors 
regarded the question of labour force development as essential for the further devel-
opment of the regional economy. In this respect, the young asylum seekers can be 
regarded as a resource. At the same time, the integration of young migrants in edu-
cation and the labour market is a central goal of the integration efforts. However, as 
the interviewees pointed out, this goal will only be achieved with great joint efforts 
from all relevant actors.
An actual example in this respect is the effort to introduce young people from the 
preparatory classes to the field of metalwork, since there is a strong demand for 
skilled workers in this area and accordingly a high motivation of the relevant actors 
to support the transition of the young asylum seekers into a dual education.
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We would like to attract them into metalwork, so that maybe one or two will later say they 
could imagine working in this field. Because that’s what is needed in Erzgebirge: they are 
all very eager and are looking for apprentices in metal techniques–there is a very high 
demand. (headteacher, interviewed 04/02/2016, lines 593–597)
A problem could arise if educational certificates that are necessary to start an 
apprenticeship are missing, but this problem was perceived as solvable if chambers 
of commerce and employers cooperate (e.g. by easing the formal entry require-
ments into a dual education). From the point of view of our interlocutors, direct 
contacts between young people and employers are crucial, and the development of 
those contacts should be supported by mediating actors.
Employer and apprentice have to find each other to make this work out. (representative of 
regional school authority, interviewed 12/02/2016, lines 214–217)
Theoretically, both vocational schools have broad networks in this respect, as 
they have contacts with most of the small and medium-sized firms in the region that 
take apprentices. However, our research revealed that neither the headteachers nor 
the teachers felt responsible for or perceived to have capacity to do this kind of 
mediating work, and there were no additional staff at the schools (such as social 
workers) who could take over this task.
9.5.2  Language Acquisition as a Basis for Social Integration
As elaborated above, language plays a key role in the integration process, not only 
to reach educational goals, but also as a means for everyday communication, par-
ticipation and recognition. Thus, for refugee students and teachers, learning the 
German language is the most important goal, and sometimes the only one. The skill 
level of the students was described as heterogeneous, and this not only refers to 
German language skills, but also general skills and competences, which ranged 
between near university entrance certificate and illiteracy. This was a big challenge 
for the teachers, who needed to flexibly switch between the various skill levels, but 
it also imposed a burden on those students who were more advanced.
You cannot speed up learning a new language. And they know it, they always say ‘Step by 
step, slowly, slowly’. But some are learning quickly, and others more slowly. And those 
who learn easy, they are losing patience to listen to the others, who strive and want to speak, 
and they want to speak because they are faster. That’s really challenging. (preparatory class 
teacher, interviewed 07/04/2016, lines 243–261)
A further problem is the fluctuation of participants in the preparatory classes, as 
students are continuously allocated to the classes throughout the year, and some 
have to withdraw from class during the year, due to changing asylum statuses or the 
changing allocation of refugee housing. In the teachers’ perceptions, the goal to 
acquire enough German to start an apprenticeship after the end of the preparatory 
class will be rather difficult to achieve under these conditions.
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The teachers also anticipated a lack of opportunities to meet and enter into social 
interaction with German peers or Germans in general.
But how are they gonna do it? You don’t go out in the street and ask: ‘Do you want to have 
contact with me?’ ‘Contact’ is the favourite word of some students. But this only works in 
natural everyday situations. That’s why it’s so important to get them into an apprenticeship, 
to get them into a job, because that’s the only way it really works. Everything else is fake. 
(preparatory class teacher, interviewed 08/02/2016, lines 1212–1220)
However, the possibility to create opportunities for social interaction on campus 
were not used, and in some cases even restricted: The refugee students were edu-
cated separately to the German students, and also on campus there was a segregated 
situation, which culminated in different schedules for the breaks between lessons 
“to avoid conflicts”, as one of the headteachers stated.
9.5.3  Challenges of Social Integration – The Students’ 
Perspective
What is the view of the students on their language class? We addressed this question 
during group discussion, supported by a visualization tool (Fig. 9.2).
All students assessed their language understanding during lessons as very good, 
and all said they enjoyed the lessons. However, there was a shared desire to learn 
more than just German. The students would have also liked to take further subjects 
such as mathematics, biology or history in order to complete their education. They 
were interested in history, geography and the political system of Germany and 
regretted that these were not subjects in their lessons. Considering their language 
competences outside the classroom, many were dissatisfied. One student stated that 
he would not dare to approach German age peers due to his poor language profi-
ciency. Ninety percent of the refugee students stated they never had any contact with 
German students, mainly due to the fact that they did not meet during classes. Many 
reported a feeling of isolation:
One problem is that we are all from Afghanistan or other countries. We want to study 
German with Germans, because this is good for our progress. That’s the only problem here, 
the rest is fine. (Student M., research diary of participant observation, 01/06/2016)
During our participant observation of a football match on campus, we asked the 
German students if they knew where the refugee team came from. No one identified 
them as fellow students from the same campus. This might be partly due to the spe-
cifics of a vocational school with mostly part-time students, so that there is no con-
tinuous presence of peers on campus. In any case, the segregated situation was not 
seen by the teachers or headteachers as a problem they should take care of.
As stated above, the possibility to conduct German conversations outside the 
classroom would strongly support language skills. Furthermore, everyday social 
contacts and participation opportunities for migrants are the basis for social integra-
tion and for them finding a place in their new surroundings. However, if we consider 
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the housing situation of the young students, it is clear that those opportunities are 
scarce. Some live with their families or in group accommodation in various munici-
palities of the county, while others live in the boarding house of the vocational 
school, directly on campus. Their daily life outside school is characterized by social 
isolation, reinforced by the fact that the public transport infrastructure is poor and 
there are no other means of transport for the students.
I have students from O. which is one full hour from the bus station. But they live on the 
outskirts, so that they have to take one more train or bus for half an hour. (…) We have a 
group accommodation for minors in L., that’s not that far from here, but the connection is 
really bad. From L. to P., then from P. to W., and so forth. They have to leave at 5.30 every 
morning. When I get up in the morning, I think ‘poor boys, they are already on the road.’ 
But still they arrive with a smile and are happy, that they can go to school. (preparatory class 
teacher, interviewed 08/02/2016, lines 339–359)
The distant accommodation not only makes the daily trip to school onerous, but 
generally impedes a self-determined life, in which the young people can orient 
themselves and interact with other young people. Also, the unresolved residence 
status and the sometimes unclear perspectives for long-term stay have a negative 
effect on social integration. Concerning the specific problems the asylum process 
imposes, there are no provisions in the rural area that are specific to this target group 
and their needs and interests. For example, there are neither lawyers working on 
asylum in the region, nor specialized counselling centres. In addition, the job centre 
is far away. Thus, many students plan to move to bigger towns or cities as soon as 
possible, as these offer more possibilities for employment, education and for social 
contacts with peers.
When I talked to A., he told us he was looking forward to moving to S-town tomorrow. He 
doesn’t like O-town, as he has no public transport ticket and is struck in the town. In S-town 
he will move in with a friend who is also from Syria. Here, in O-town, he is all alone. After 
moving to S-town, he will also be able to visit C-town more frequently, as it is much more 
accessible. He likes the town and he will get the opportunity to work in an Arabic restau-
rant. (research diary of participant observation, 01/06/2016)
A further obstacle to social integration in the region is xenophobia and racism, 
which affects the students directly. Students reported that people insulted them 
when riding on the public bus, and some even experienced physical attacks at their 
accommodation facilities. Some students perceive their classroom as a shelter, and 
they only go out in larger groups, because they fear being attacked. We were also 
told of rumours in the schools and of undifferentiated reports in the regional news-
papers, which address and partly also problematize the presence of refugees in the 
vocational school. However, the school staff did not actively oppose these xenopho-
bic activities. Those reactions and underlying attitudes of the local population were 
rather perceived as normal and unchangeable, as the following citation shows:
I also do field trips with larger groups even though we are being recognized on the bus and 
on the train and sometimes we annoy people. The students don’t do any harm, but if I am 
arriving with a group, and there are ten black students, who raise a lot of attention, then you 
experience just the normal life here, so sometimes you are harassed and shouted at. (prepa-
ratory class teacher, interviewed 08/02/2016, lines 930–935)
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9.6  Discussion and Conclusion
The main aim of the research presented in this chapter was to investigate the role of 
the local in the field of educational integration in vocational schools in Germany. 
The significance of this field of research is highlighted with regards to the age struc-
ture of refugees, who are mainly younger than 25 and often have not finalized their 
education in their home countries. In order to find a way into the German labour 
market, not only language knowledge, but also knowledge about the specifics of the 
labour market and the German education system are necessary. From the perspec-
tive of state actors, vocational schools are a preferable environment in this respect, 
as they focus on the acquisition of practical skills, and are more easily accessible 
than academic education, given refugees’ limited knowledge of German. With the 
choice of our case study, we also wanted to highlight the relevance of contextual 
factors, namely the geographical setting, the social and economic situation, and the 
history of the case study site, notably with respect to migration issues. Additionally, 
we wanted to highlight the connectivity of policies, practices and discourses in our 
field of research.
In our analysis, we were guided by research questions that focused on the very 
meaning and contextualization of the term “integration”, as we assumed that the 
individual and collective framing of this term strongly influences concrete practices 
of integration. From our own understanding, we followed the general outlines of the 
term “integration” from social theory, which differentiates between systems and 
social integration with its main aspects of culturation, placement and interaction, 
but we also integrated the perspectives of transnational and post-migration 
approaches, which stress the intercultural and anti-racist aspects of immigrant 
incorporation.
Considering the interpretation of “integration” in the understanding of the main 
stakeholders in the field like headteachers and school authorities, we clearly identi-
fied the priority of systems integration, meaning the implementation of preparatory 
classes, based on the guidelines and regulations of the authorities. The authorities’ 
engagement mainly entailed organizational tasks and showed a segmented under-
standing of integration as giving a formal frame in terms of physical settings (class-
rooms), devices (dictionaries etc.), personnel (teachers) and time (school schedule), 
rather than taking the perspective of the individual and his or her needs from a more 
holistic perspective. This interpretation and these practices can be comprehended 
from the professional role of the stakeholders as public servants in a segmented 
culture of planning, and corresponds to their general professional role. However, it 
hinders focussing on the long-term integration of the refugee students and possible 
integration paths, such as arranging internships or further pre-employment mea-
sures. The respondents did not feel responsible in this respect, but rather awaited 
necessary system adjustments. Such adjustments would come too late for the refu-
gee students from 2015–2016.
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The perspective of the teachers, on the other hand, is guided by their role as lan-
guage teachers and pedagogical professionals. While they predominant focus on the 
organization of everyday teaching, they are aware of mismatches between the for-
mal regulations and their application. They build up personal relationships with the 
students and thus also introduce the category of emotion to the topic of integration. 
However, they perceive their own agency as limited, which is due to their rather 
marginal position in the school boards on the one hand, and the specifics of the 
region on the other, as there are few experiences with foreigners in the area and parts 
of the population show strong signs of xenophobia.
The refugee students certainly have the most holistic view of integration, but the 
least amount of action autonomy, so they are barely able to stimulate change. For 
them, school is not just a place of learning, but constitutes the primary place of 
everyday integration through contact with their teachers and peers. At the same 
time, they cannot plan ahead in terms of time or space, as their future depends heav-
ily on their asylum procedure, and repatriation or onward migration is possible at 
any time. Thus their classrooms and their relations to their teachers and peers are 
islands of stability in an otherwise uncertain future. In class, they aim to acquire 
knowledge which can be helpful in their future life. However, they are confronted 
with a system that is rather inflexible with respect to their peculiar situation.
What do these results mean in generalized terms? Based on the geographical and 
structural specifics of our case study, we have shown how the issue of refugee recep-
tion and integration is embedded into broader lines of conflict in a specific region or 
policy field and that the effectiveness of reception and integration measures is 
dependent on political culture in general.
The practices and policies we have found show the contradictions between a 
monolingual, sedentary culture of education and the supposed temporality of the 
stay of adolescent refugees. On the one hand, the refugees’ provisional situation 
refers to their unclear asylum status (which was, at the time of our survey, subject to 
multiple re-regulations, which mostly meant aggravations for the asylum proce-
dure) and, on the other hand, to the assumption that they will not stay put, following 
the predominant experience of the region, which is outmigration. Against this back-
ground, it is rather unlikely that further efforts will be made to ensure a more sus-
tainable integration of the refugee students, even though the general conditions are 
rather favourable.
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Chapter 10
Municipal Housing Strategies for Refugees. 
Insights from Two Case Studies 
in Germany
Francesca Adam, Stefanie Föbker, Daniela Imani, Carmella Pfaffenbach, 
Günther Weiss, and Claus-C. Wiegandt
10.1  Introduction
Germany is the destination for many refugees from different parts of the world, 
where political or economic conflicts cause people to leave their home countries. 
More than one million refugees sought asylum in Germany in 2015 and 2016. Their 
integration is an essential political task, especially since further migration from con-
flict areas can be expected in the years to come.1
Regarding the accommodation of refugees, there are different regulations and 
competencies within the national administration during an asylum process. Arriving 
in Germany, the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees is responsible for 
granting asylum or another protection status. However, the states (Bundesländer) 
are in charge of the accommodation and the social assistance of asylum seekers. In 
practice, the states partially leave this task to the municipalities. After the recogni-
tion of refugee status, refugees are allowed to move from municipal accommoda-
1 The authors are grateful to the “Ministerium für Innovation, Wissenschaft und Forschung des 
Landes NRW” and the “Forschungsinstitut für gesellschaftliche Weiterentwicklung” for funding 
our study (1605fg019a).
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tion into a private apartment (§ 53 Abs. 2 AsylG; see also Robert Bosch Stiftung 
2016). However, due to the domicile requirement that aims at regulating the distri-
bution of refugees within the federal territory and the federal states, refugees in 
North  Rhine- Westphalia are not authorised to move from the municipality where 
they were registered to another municipality during the first three years after refu-
gee status has been granted.2
In this chapter, we will analyse the conditions of accommodating refugees upon 
arrival and their transition from municipal accommodation to the housing market. 
In addition, we will explore how local policies shape the process of housing and 
consequently influence the opportunities for the integration of refugees. Furthermore, 
we will clarify how different spatial contexts affect the housing situation of refu-
gees, assuming that there are different underlying conditions in larger cities com-
pared to small and medium-sized towns. Whereas housing markets in thriving cities 
are subject to continued pressure, and refugees face tough competition from other 
low-income households, the underlying conditions are supposed to be more favour-
able in smaller towns.
In the following Sect. 10.2 we will highlight housing as a dimension of the inte-
gration process of refugees and integration policies that have been developed in the 
last years in Germany. Our methodological approach will then be described in Sect. 
10.3. In Sect. 10.4, we will depict to what extent the municipalities had already dealt 
with the topic (accommodation of refugees) before immigration strongly increased. 
Furthermore, we will illustrate the experiences of municipal actors concerning 
accommodation upon arrival and refugees’ transition to the housing market. In the 
conclusion (Sect. 10.5) we will elaborate and explain apparent differences and simi-
larities in integration policies in the case study areas. Furthermore, we will depict 
some consequences of apparent policy gaps on the integration process of refugees 
at a local level.
10.2  Housing of Refugees as a Central Precondition 
for Integration
The housing situation is a central aspect in the integration process of migrants. In 
the following section, we will first reflect on the role of housing within concepts of 
integration as well as the role of the state in integration processes. Afterwards we 
will outline the housing policy in Germany. Focusing on refugees, we will refer to 
international studies on their housing situation and depict the conditions for their 
accommodation in Germany. We will then argue that housing strongly affects refu-
gees’ integration and that the preconditions for their integration differ significantly, 
depending on where they live.
2 This requirement does not apply to refugees who received their status before 6th August 2016, 
who are employed and earn a specified minimum income, who study or who pursue vocational 
training.
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10.2.1  Integration: Concept and Policy
Integration is a contested concept that encompasses widely different meanings. 
However, structural integration, in terms of social positions within the housing and 
the labour market, plays a major role in classical as well as in more recent concepts 
of integration (Gestring 2014). The significance of structural integration is also 
reflected in political programmes in Germany (e.g. the National Integration Action 
Plan, Nationaler Aktionsplan Integration), which define the participation of migrants 
in society as one main objective (Die Beauftragte der Bundesregierung für Migration, 
Flüchtlinge und Integration 2011). Accordingly, Gestring (2014) suggests an inte-
gration concept that focuses on migrants’ access to the core areas of the host society, 
such as housing, work, education and health. He points out that integration is a 
process that involves migrants as well as society and the state.
States pursue integration policy e.g. through laws and the funding of programmes 
and provisions (Favell 2001: 351). However, policy does not easily translate into 
outcomes. Czaika and de Haas (2013) identify three policy gaps with regard to 
migration policy. Their notion of policy gaps can also be applied to integration 
policy. Firstly, they describe a gap (‘discursive gap’) between public policy dis-
courses and actual policies on paper (e.g. laws, regulations and measures). Secondly, 
they identify a gap between policy documents and their implementation. This 
‘implementation gap’ can be caused by constraints such as budgetary constraints. 
Moreover, it is particularly significant when policy implementation is based on sub-
jective assessments (e.g. in the asylum process) that give leeway to the decision- 
makers. Thirdly, there is a gap between implementation and outcomes, i.e. whether 
and to what extent implemented policy documents have the intended effects. 
Structural factors, and policies not related to migration and integration, play a major 
role in this ‘efficacy gap’ (Czaika and de Haas 2013).
Integration policy shapes the living conditions of migrants at different adminis-
trative levels. In Germany, with its federal system of government, the federal level, 
state level and municipal level each have different responsibilities in regard to inte-
gration, according to their political competencies (Bommes 2009). The federal level 
has the power of legislation and can therefore regulate matters of immigration and 
integration. The state level is responsible, inter alia, for education. The municipali-
ties implement integration policies that have been enacted at the federal or state 
level (e.g. accommodation of refugees). However, they can also develop local inte-
gration policies, such as integration guidelines (Filsinger 2009).
In this chapter, housing is considered as a central aspect in the integration pro-
cess of refugees because it is a basic need that has to be addressed first when refu-
gees arrive. In a long-term perspective, other aspects become crucial as well, such 
as language skills or networks. The importance of language skills for the integration 
process of migrants has been investigated in publications focussing on other groups 
of international migrants (e.g. Föbker and Imani 2017; Imani et al. 2014). In this 
book, the meaning of language skills will be discussed in Chap. 9 by Birgit Glorius 
and Anne-Christin Schondelmayer with regard to refugees.
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10.2.2  Housing Structure and Policy in Germany
Germany’s housing market is characterized by different submarkets. Condominiums 
are to be distinguished from rental apartments. In 2017, approximately 46% of 
households lived in owner-occupied buildings (Deutscher Bundestag 2017). 
Compared to other European countries this is rather low. Regional differences in the 
rate of residential property can be seen between urban and rural areas. In urban 
areas the share is only around 30%.
In 2011, of the approx. 40 million apartments in Germany, 22 million were rental 
apartments (Deutscher Bundestag 2017). In contrast to most other European countries, 
Germany’s housing stock is characterized by a high percentage of private owners. 65% 
of the rentals are owned by private landlords. Only a small percentage of the rental 
housing stock (around 10%) is owned by municipalities. Another almost 10% are orga-
nized as cooperatives, while private companies offer 13% of all rental apartments.
Germany’s housing policy has been characterized by the privatization of the munic-
ipal housing stock, the transfer of social housing from the federal government to the 
states as well as an emphasis on subsidizing low-income households instead of social 
housing in the past years (Pätzold 2017). Low-income households receive housing 
subsidies or are reimbursed for costs of housing. Investments in the fixed- price rental 
apartment stock have been rather low. Especially in Germany’s major cities an increased 
demand in the housing market faces an unbalanced supply of apartments in the lower 
to mid-price segment. Social housing has become scarce due to the expiration of rent 
and occupancy control (Mietpreis- und Belegungsbindung). The reduction of such 
controlled apartments as well as the increase in prices for private housing has caused 
shortages in low-income households in growing major cities (Held and Waltersbacher 
2015). To limit the rise in rent of re-letting in certain cities with shortages, the tool of a 
cap on rent increases (Mietpreisbremse) has been used for several years.
The current shortages in public subsidized housing elevate the risk of homeless-
ness. Government statistics on this phenomenon throughout the whole of Germany 
do not exist. For 2016, the National German Association on the Assistance for 
Homeless People estimates that 860,000 people in Germany lack housing and that 
this number rose by about 150% since the increasing immigration of refugees. 
Homeless people are those who are permanently without housing and who live on 
the streets or in shelters, where their stay is limited. The number of people living on 
Germany’s streets is estimated at 52,000 (Bundesarbeitsgemeinschaft 
Wohnungslosenhilfe 2017).
All this shows that refugees put additional pressure on the demand in a very 
limited housing market segment.
10.2.3  Housing of Refugees
The housing situation of refugees differs significantly between countries as well as 
within groups of refugees, and is highly determined by their legal status (Murdie 
2008). Studies from Europe, North America and Australia document that most 
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refugees start in transitional housing. There are great variations in the kind of provi-
sional accommodation provided, as well as in the period of time that refugees are 
allowed or obliged to stay there. In a second step, refugees move to the rental market 
(e.g. Flatau et al. 2015; Fozdar and Hardley 2014; Francis and Hiebert 2014; Borevi 
and Bengtsson 2015; Murdie 2008). This transition proves difficult. Thus, friends, 
family and people of the same ethnic background as well as volunteers and staff in 
transitional housing play an important role as a source of information and support 
(Francis and Hiebert 2014; Murdie 2008).
A major problem in the search process is the low income of most households in 
a context of housing markets that offer only a limited amount of affordable rental 
housing. Further barriers arise when the locally available housing stock does not fit 
refugees’ household structure that is comprised of large numbers of single refugees. 
In addition, large families often face difficulties in finding appropriate accommoda-
tion. The search and application process is further complicated by language prob-
lems and limited experience in the local rental market (BBSR 2017; Foroutan et al. 
2017; Johansson 2016; Flatau et al. 2015; Fozdar and Hardley 2014; Francis and 
Hiebert 2014; Murdie 2008). In search of better accommodation, many refugee 
households move several times before they finally find appropriate housing (Ager 
and Strang 2008).
In Germany, with its federal system of government, newly arrived refugees are 
first allocated to the states (Länder) and then further allocated to municipalities 
(Aumüller 2018). In the state of North Rhine-Westphalia (NRW), where our study 
is based, the municipalities are obliged to accommodate asylum seekers 
(Flüchtlingsaufnahmegesetz NRW § 1). However, accommodation differs signifi-
cantly between municipalities. The federal asylum law (Asylgesetz §53, 1) states 
that foreigners who have applied for asylum should be housed in group accommo-
dation. This ‘should’ rule at the federal level gives leeway to the other administra-
tive levels. Therefore, the type of accommodation provided very much depends on 
political opinion and structural constraints within the municipalities (Schammann 
and Kühn 2016). The debate on the pros and cons of group accommodation as com-
pared to private apartments mainly refers to its size, location and quality (e.g. 
Aumüller 2018; BBSR 2017; Schammann and Kühn 2016).
After refugee status3 is granted it is possible to move to a private dwelling (§ 53 
Abs. 2 AsylG; see also Robert-Bosch-Stiftung 2016). Refugees are eligible for 
 welfare benefits paid by the ‘Jobcenter’, which covers rental costs as long as they do 
not significantly exceed the local rents (Schammann and Kühn 2016). A representa-
tive survey, conducted in 2016, shows that 67% of refugees who had been granted 
3 German law distinguishes different forms of protection (BAMF 2017): entitlement to asylum, 
refugee protection and subsidiary protection. The weakest form of protection, a national ban on 
deportation, does not allow a person to move out of group accommodation. Regulations vary 
between the Länder with some states defining statutory periods of stay in group accommodation. 
In any case, people with this form of protection first need to obtain an official approval from the 
municipal authority before they are allowed to move to a private dwelling (Schammann and Kühn 
2016). Hence, the majority (55%) of this group is living in group accommodations (Baier and 
Siegert 2018).
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protection status were living in private dwellings, whereas the majority (62%) of 
refugees still in the asylum process was living in group accommodation (Baier and 
Siegert 2018).
As in NRW the place of residence is, for the first three years, restricted to the 
municipality a refugee has been allocated to (cf. Sect. 10.1; Wiegandt 2017), the 
local housing market situation is a crucial factor in refugees’ opportunities to rent a 
private apartment. As mentioned before, the social housing stock in Germany has 
been decreasing over the last decade (Prognos 2017). Consequently, in municipali-
ties with tight housing markets, refugees might not be able to leave group accom-
modation even after refugee status is granted (Foroutan et al. 2017).
10.2.4  Housing as a Precondition for Integration
A successful move from municipal accommodation into the rental market can be 
interpreted as an indicator of progress in a refugee’s integration process. Housing in 
turn affects refugees’ access to other core areas of the host society. For example, 
living in group accommodation makes learning difficult (Aumüller et al. 2015), and 
being housed in remote accommodation centres without public transport compli-
cates daily life and labour market access (Söhn et al. 2017, Baier and Siegert 2018). 
Moreover, the type and size of dwelling affects society’s perception of refugees. For 
example, large group accommodation fosters negative attitudes towards refugees 
among local inhabitants (Aumüller et al. 2015). Establishing group accommodation 
in residential neighbourhoods often results in conflicts between the local adminis-
tration and local inhabitants (Doomernik and Glorius 2016).
The living environment is the subject of a controversial debate around the effects 
of segregation on refugees’ (and, more generally, migrants’) integration. Two lines 
of argument can be distinguished—both of which refer to the social capital (Putnam 
2000) that is created in everyday interaction in the living environment (Borevi and 
Bengtsson 2015). One is based on the meaning of social bonds with family and co- 
ethnic groups that supply (newly arrived) migrants with information and support. 
Proximity to family and people of the same ethnic background in a segregated area 
is viewed as promoting integration. The other line of argument refers to bridging 
social capital that connects migrants with the host society. It suggests that segrega-
tion obstructs contact between migrants and the host society and thus undermines 
integration (Häußermann and Siebel 2001). This argument is particularly strong in 
the political debate. However, empirical evidence to support this latter hypothesis, 
that spatial segregation has negative effects on migrants’ integration, is scarce, at 
least in Germany (Dangschat and Alisch 2014).
As described above, there are major differences in municipal accommodation 
policies and practices. Furthermore, refugees’ opportunities to rent their own apart-
ment vary greatly between local housing markets. In contrast to many other studies 
investigating the national situation in general, our analysis considers the local con-
text, which has been recognised as a crucial factor for the integration processes of 
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migrants (Aumüller and Bretl 2008; Glick Schiller and Çağlar 2011). The number of 
inhabitants, the local population structure (especially the size and number of ethnic 
communities), the structure of the local labour and housing market as well as the local 
policies around the admission of refugees are considered as highly relevant for inte-
gration (Aumüller et al. 2015). Given the dispersal system for refugees in Germany, 
we argue that refugees are confronted with significantly different initial conditions 
for their integration. In our paper we focus on local policies and practices regarding 
the housing of refugees and analyse how local integration policy is implemented 
against the backdrop of different local opportunities and constraints. Furthermore, we 
discuss to what extent the implemented policies have the desired effects.
10.3  Methods: A Comparative Analysis of Two Case Study 
Areas
Regarding this gap in research on a local level, we have chosen two different spatial 
contexts in North Rhine-Westphalia: a large city on the one hand, and small and 
medium-sized towns in one district on the other. The selection of two contrasting 
contexts aims to identify similarities and differences in integration politics as well 
as specific local opportunities and constraints for the integration of refugees (Tilly 
1984; Pickvance 2005). Each of the local contexts is represented by a case study: 
the context of a large city by Cologne, and the context of small and medium-sized 
towns by the district of Heinsberg, which is located between the city of Düsseldorf 
and the city of Aachen, next to the border with the Netherlands.
With a population of 1.08 million as of 31/12/2016, Cologne is NRW’s largest 
and Germany’s fourth largest city. Cologne has positive net migration, with foreign-
ers and people aged 18–20 years accounting for the largest share of immigrants. 
19.3% of Cologne’s population have a foreign nationality, and 18.5% are Germans 
with a migrant background (Stadt Köln 2017). Turkish passport holders make up the 
majority (22.5%) of all foreigners. People with Syrian, Iranian or Iraqi nationality 
account for 6.9% of all foreigners (Stadt Köln 2017). Cologne has an international 
character in many respects. There are a variety of migrant infrastructures that could 
facilitate the integration of refugees. As early as 2004, the council of the city of 
Cologne passed guidelines on the accommodation and support of refugees, which 
became a leading example for German municipalities (Stadt Köln 2004). In 2011, 
some “Guidelines to strengthen the Integrated Urban Society” (Stadt Köln 2011) 
were developed (cf. Sect. 10.4). At the beginning, the city’s residents gave a warm 
welcome to the arriving refugees. However, the atmosphere changed not least 
because of sexual assaults committed mainly by migrants from North African coun-
tries on New Year’s Eve 2015.
The district of Heinsberg, with a total of 260,000 inhabitants, encompasses 10 
municipalities counting between 9000 and 44,000 inhabitants. Five of the munici-
palities are medium-sized towns with more than 20,000 inhabitants, whereas five 
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municipalities are small towns of less than 20,000 inhabitants. In total, the district 
of Heinsberg has a positive net migration that considerably rose in 2015. 14.7% of 
the population have a foreign nationality. The numbers vary between different 
municipalities, from 8.4% up to 38.8%. People from the nearby Netherlands and 
from Turkey dominate (IT.NRW 2017). In 2017, the district of Heinsberg hosted 
3600 refugees dispersed almost proportionally among the ten municipalities. Due to 
the former recruitment of labour migrants in the mining sector, the local communi-
ties have many years of experience in the integration of foreigners from Muslim 
countries. In contrast to the city of Cologne, a guideline of integration was only 
introduced in 2014 (cf. Sect. 10.4). Although in most communities the atmosphere 
was welcoming, more reserved and rejecting reactions of the administration were 
reported in the media as well. Out of the ten cities and towns, we selected five for 
the fieldwork: the capital of the district, two towns that were mentioned as best 
practice examples in the media and two towns where issues between the municipal-
ity, residents and refugees were reported.4 Therefore, when analysing the perspec-
tive of the district of Heinsberg we have to distinguish between the perspective of 
the district administration on the one hand, and the perspectives of the different 
municipal administrations on the other.
The aim of this paper – to understand the meaning of the local context and of 
local policies for the integration of refugees on the housing market – is reflected in 
our methodological approach. We have chosen a comparative case study in order to 
identify commonalities across the two cases despite the different contexts (Baxter 
2010). The short characterisations of our case study areas given above already 
reveal the differences as well as the complexity of the cases that we will examine. 
We designed a multidimensional qualitative approach to consider documents as 
well as perspectives of local governmental and non-governmental organisations that 
are concerned with the situation of refugees. Therefore, we analysed existing guide-
lines and integration plans in order to highlight the extent to which refugees and 
their accommodation was already taken into consideration prior to the arrival of 
more than one million refugees in Germany. Moreover, in 2017, we conducted 
expert interviews with representatives from local governmental as well as non- 
governmental organisations that are more closely involved in the neighbourhood, 
like welfare or voluntary aid organisations. The representatives were chosen due to 
their responsibility for the accommodation and care of refugees (Table 10.1).
In these guided interviews, we explored the experts’ daily work experience with 
regard to the integration of refugees, discussing their successes and failures in work-
ing with refugees as well as the most important needs of refugees. In our analysis, 
we will draw upon the interviews with institutions that are particularly engaged with 
the housing situation of refugees.
4 For reasons of data protection, the names of the towns are not mentioned in this paper, but entitled 
A-town, B-town, C-town, D-town and E-town. The names of urban neighbourhoods in the case 
study area of the city of Cologne are anonymised as well, as A-neighbourhood and B-neighbourhood.
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In addition to document analysis and expert interviews, we organised two work-
shops during the research process to discuss our findings with the previously inter-
viewed experts. Asking for feedback from the interviewees aimed at validating our 
results, broadening our understanding and updating our knowledge on crucial issues 
in the case study areas.
10.4  Housing and Integration from the Perspective of Local 
Experts
In 2015 and 2016, when approximately 1.2 million refugees applied for asylum in 
Germany, cities and districts such as Cologne and Heinsberg had to manage their 
accommodation (BAMF 2017). In some areas, it was an enormous challenge to 
meet the needs; in other areas, it did not cause major problems. In the following 
sections, the accommodation situation upon arrival and the transition from group 
accommodation into private apartments will be described and explained.
Table 10.1 List of governmental and non-governmental interview partners
Institution City of Cologne District of Heinsberg
Governmental Municipal Integration Centre Integration Centre of the district of 
Heinsberg
Refugees‘ Coordination Centre Municipal Integration Centre of A-towna
Department of Housinga Municipal Administration of B-towna
Municipal Integration Council Municipal Administration of C-towna
Integration Point Municipal Administration of D-towna
Chamber of Crafts Integration Point of the district of 
Heinsberg
Municipal Housing Companya Job centre of the district of Heinsberg
Relocation Coordination Centrea
Adult Education Centre Adult Education Centre of the district of 
Heinsberg




Caritas (Christian welfare work) Caritas of the district of Heinsberg 
(Christian welfare work)a
In Via (Christian welfare work) Diocese (Christian welfare work)
Cologne Council of Refugees
Citizens‘ Initiative in the 
B-neighbourhood
Citizens’ Initiative in D-towna
Education Association in the 
B-neighbourhood
Citizens’ Initiative in E-towna
Tenants’ Union of North Rhine-Westphaliaa
aInstitutions concerned with the housing situation of refugees
10 Municipal Housing Strategies for Refugees. Insights from Two Case Studies…
210
10.4.1  Accommodation upon Arrival
Regarding the guidelines on housing of refugees, the case study areas started with 
different bases. In 2003, the “Round Table for Refugee Matters” in Cologne devel-
oped a concept for the accommodation and support of refugees. The Council passed 
this concept as “Guidelines for the Accommodation and Support of Refugees” in 
2004 (Stadt Köln 2004). The aim of the concept is to increase the public acceptance 
for refugees as well as to encourage a peaceful togetherness of all population groups 
in the urban society. As stated by the guidelines, assigned refugees should be accom-
modated in accordance with a three-stage model. New residents should initially live 
in a municipal reception centre. A residence time of maximum three months should 
give the municipality the opportunity to gain an overview of the situation and allo-
cate people to group accommodation as soon as possible. According to the guide-
lines, group accommodation is characterised by self-contained dwellings and a limit 
of 80 people per building. However, in the political and societal integration dis-
course, group accommodation is viewed critically, due to the psychological stress 
for the residents, limited contact possibilities with the host society and rejection by 
the local population (Baier and Siegert 2018). Hence, after a maximum of three 
years, refugees should be placed in private rental apartments. Families should obtain 
an apartment in the same neighbourhood as the former group accommodation to 
avoid a change of daycare facility or school (Stadt Köln 2004).
Although the Municipality of Cologne was prepared, the Department of Housing 
in Cologne was overtaxed by the high amount of refugees coming into the city, 
especially between September 2015 and March 2016 when the number of refugees 
increased from 8003 to 12,431 (Stadt Köln 2018a). The capacity limit was reached 
rapidly and it is hardly surprising that the municipality could not abide by the guide-
lines. Avoiding homelessness was the priority, thus refugees were placed in sports 
halls, hotels, containers and lightweight-structure buildings during peak times. A 
representative of the city of Cologne admitted in their interview that although it had 
a strategy available, in practice, the administration was not prepared to accommo-
date the high number of refugees. This evidence indicates that an ‘implementation 
gap’ (Czaika and de Haas 2013) existed in the city, caused by the extraordinarily 
high influx of refugees that significantly exceeded the existing accommodation 
resources.
In response, the municipality devised a four-phase model for the placement of 
refugees in 2015. Above all this provided for the expansion of temporary accom-
modation. In order to return the sports halls to their original purpose, the municipal-
ity would build lightweight building constructions for up to 400 people (80 people 
per building). As accommodation intended to be temporary, albeit with more pri-
vacy, residential containers would be set up. Even though these containers were 
planned for a transition period, they are now considered as a lasting solution. 
Temporary accommodation also included hotels, in which rooms are usually occu-
pied by several people. As permanent buildings, group accommodation would be 
extended with quick-build housing units. In order to achieve greater flexibility in 
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capacity utilisation, the accommodation would be rented out to students as long as 
it was not needed for refugees. Finally, the construction of regular apartments 
formed the last phase of this model.
Despite this model, the last of the 27 sports halls used for the accommodation of 
asylum seekers could only be cleared in June 2017, and in March 2018, 3872 out of 
9674 asylum seekers were living in emergency shelters, lightweight-structure build-
ings and hotels (representative of the Department of Housing, city of Cologne). The 
figures clearly show that a residence time in emergency accommodation of maxi-
mum three months, which is set out in the guidelines, could not be met (Ottersbach 
and Wiedemann 2017).
In 2016, the Municipality of Cologne devised minimum standards for the accom-
modation and support of refugees, including structural and social conditions (Stadt 
Köln 2016a, b). Especially people with a particular vulnerability (e.g. refugees with 
disabilities, pregnant women, unaccompanied minors) should be placed in alterna-
tive accommodation. However, according to an employee of Caritas Cologne, the 
agreed-upon minimum standards were not met. During peak times, the needs of 
refugees with special vulnerabilities were not taken into consideration when placing 
them in sports halls or other group accommodation without proper psychological 
care. Hence, the emergency placement was described as “chaotic” and “lacking 
occupancy management” (interview with a representative of the Cologne Council 
of Refugees). This points to another implementation gap.
Referring to the aforementioned guidelines, it can be concluded that they were 
helpful in the beginning since group accommodation already existed (although not 
sufficient). However, the guidelines have subsequently served little purpose since 
the housing market situation has hampered the aim of accommodating the extraor-
dinarily high numbers of refugees in apartments. Nonetheless the guidelines reflect 
a consensus of the local actors on the preferable accommodation of refugees.
In contrast to Cologne, the integration guideline of the district of Heinsberg, 
which was passed in 2015, does not deal with the issue of accommodating refu-
gees, although the accommodation of refugees is a municipal obligation 
(Flüchtlingsaufnahmegesetz NRW §1; Stadt Köln 2011; Kreis Heinsberg 2014). 
This is due to the fact that the communities in the district of Heinsberg had only 
been affected to a minor extent by the influx of refugees before. Accordingly, the 
issue of their accommodation was not a matter of urgency for years and the strong 
increase in immigration in 2015 and 2016 was not foreseeable for local actors. This 
indicates that an implementation gap also existed in the district of Heinsberg. In 
the district, 3600 refugees were living in apartments and group accommodation in 
2017. Since the guideline does not deal with the issue of accommodation, each 
municipality pursued its own strategy to house the refugees. Our interviewees 
mainly emphasized their efforts to accommodate the refugees as decentralized as 
possible in order to avoid conflicts and obstacles to their integration. This refers to 
the social and political discourses regarding the negative consequences of segre-
gated housing on integration processes. According to Aumüller (2018), munici-
palities can draw on different, flexible scopes regarding the provision of housing. 
If municipalities possess land and apartments or cooperate with public housing 
10 Municipal Housing Strategies for Refugees. Insights from Two Case Studies…
212
companies, their opportunities for action increase and the dependence on private 
providers falls. Smaller municipalities usually have better opportunities for decen-
tralised housing of asylum seekers than large cities (Aumüller 2018). The different 
strategies of the municipalities in the district of Heinsberg encompass a broad 
spectrum. Only one municipality needed to set up emergency shelters (sports hall, 
commercial hall); the others were able to use group accommodation, containers, or 
even individual apartments. The number of refugees in group accommodation and 
apartments varies from municipality to municipality (Table  10.2). Whereas in 
E-town nearly 90% of the refugees are accommodated in group accommodation, 
only 6.4% of the refugees in A-town live in such accommodation. In the munici-
palities of A-town and B-town a sufficient amount of municipal as well as private 
apartments were vacant in winter 2016–2017. This shows the different possibilities 
of emergency accommodation within one district. Some municipalities needed to 
arrange group accommodation while others were able to use residential vacancies. 
An expert from B-town stresses the possibility of renting apartments to refugees: 
“In the meantime, we have rented up to 80 apartments; I was surprised that it was 
even possible to rent so many, but it was possible.” However, another expert from 
the district of Heinsberg admits that many of these apartments were of a low qual-
ity and were overoccupied. In contrast to Cologne, the mediation of private apart-
ments seems to have a greater significance in the district of Heinsberg.
In 2016, the Refugee Council of the district, founded by charitable organisations 
and the Municipal Integration Centre, agreed to take greater account of the housing 
needs of particularly vulnerable women and children. In contrast to Cologne, the 
municipalities of the district mostly arranged accommodation for people with spe-
cial vulnerabilities or special groups (e.g. families in apartments, single mothers 
with children in their own corridor, single men in their own group accommodation). 
Nevertheless, there were also cases of single women being placed next to single 
men, again showing an existing gap between planning and implementation.
When setting up group accommodation its location is a major issue for a munic-
ipality, neighbours and the refugees themselves. An expert from D-town refers to 
phone calls from residents “who are not delighted about the accommodation, espe-
cially about the size of accommodation”. He also relates to some incidents when 
young male asylum seekers have followed young women from the neighbourhood. 
In Cologne, neighbours express concern regarding the construction of group 









A-town (Jan 2018) 821 53 768
B-town (Dec 2016) 684 n.s. n.s.
C-town (Nov 2017) 614 173 441
D-town (Dec 2016) 379 n.s. n.s.
E-town (Mar 2018) 123 110 13
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accommodation, since they fear the devaluation of their properties and a growing 
competition for childcare facilities (Stoldt 2014).
Regarding group accommodation locations in small towns, some experts of the 
district of Heinsberg emphasise the difficulties of access to public transport and 
other infrastructure, such as language and integration courses or supermarkets. A 
former barrack, a group accommodation in E-town, is located at the edge of the 
town within a forest. There is no direct bus connection so the refugees need to walk 
20–30 min to the next shopping facility and bus stop. Such isolated dwellings that 
cause a spatial segregation of refugees were not found in Cologne.
Other issues, in both case study areas, are a noisy environment, small space and 
a lack of privacy in certain emergency and group accommodation facilities, which 
has negative effects on social atmosphere and well-being. Moreover, refugees 
attending a language class or school find it difficult to concentrate on their home-
work. People of diverse backgrounds are forced to live together in a confined space. 
Different religions and nationalities may lead to social tensions and conflicts (Christ 
et al. 2017). According to Aumüller et al. (2015), the consequences of this prevalent 
confined space and lack of privacy may be psychosocial disorders. Regarding emer-
gency accommodation, an expert from Caritas Cologne stresses that there are 
“women who cannot take off their headscarf, since there is no private room.” 
According to Christ et al. (2017), not only women and children but also men do not 
feel safe in group accommodation. This is also related to shared showers, which do 
not offer sufficient protection, since they are not lockable.
In summary, there are considerable differences regarding the accommodation 
situation upon arrival between and within our two case study areas. While many 
refugees arriving in Cologne in 2015–2016 had to be placed in emergency shelters 
or temporary accommodation, many refugees arriving in Heinsberg, especially fam-
ilies, were housed in private or municipal apartments from the beginning. In the 
following section, we will focus on the transition from municipal accommodation 
to the rental market.
10.4.2  Transition to the Housing Market
The Cologne guidelines for accommodation of refugees and the expert interviews in 
Cologne and Heinsberg have shown that in both case study areas the public policy 
discourse considers living in a private home as the long-term goal of housing policy 
for recognised refugees. After refugee status is granted, it is possible to move to a 
private dwelling (see Sect. 10.2.3).
Since some municipalities in the district of Heinsberg received many offers from 
private landlords, they could rent these apartments and use them for the accommo-
dation of refugees. Some municipalities in Heinsberg are now transferring the rental 
agreements from the municipality to the refugees themselves, if the landlords agree. 
Thus, at least some families in the district of Heinsberg can stay in their first dwell-
ing and do not need to move to another apartment after receiving their status. For the 
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refugees this solution allows a very smooth transition to the rental market (BBSR 
2017). For the municipalities this solution is attractive since they can reduce addi-
tional expenses like incidental and clean-up costs.
10.4.2.1  Search for New Housing
Despite the fact that the public policy discourse in both case study areas aims at 
refugees’ accommodation in rented apartments, our interviewees in both case study 
areas mostly describe the implementation of this policy as very difficult to almost 
impossible. They name several factors as decisive:
Landlords’ Reservations Experts in the city of Cologne and in the district of 
Heinsberg state that landlords’ reservations about refugees (due to legal status, 
source of income, country of origin, religion) are a severe barrier to transition in the 
housing market (see also Flatau et al. 2015; Murdie 2008). In both case study areas, 
the willingness especially of private landlords to accept refugees as tenants has 
decreased. Some experts assume that this development is strongly influenced by the 
media discourse about the sexual assaults in Cologne on New Year’s Eve 2015.
Shortage of Affordable Housing/Supply Does Not Meet Demand In both case 
study areas the above-average demand for affordable housing is not matched by a 
corresponding supply. Rents of vacant accommodation often exceed the limits set 
by the Jobcenter (see also BBSR 2017). The housing market in Cologne has been 
tight for many years, and the increased immigration of refugees has reinforced this 
situation. There is a strong demand for affordable housing, not only from refugees 
but also from students and households with lower incomes. The lowest rents are 
demanded for apartments in high-rise buildings and older, unrenovated apartment 
buildings, partly on the outskirts (KSK Immobilien 2018). This results in neigh-
bourhoods with a strong influx of refugees. Often these are areas that already had a 
higher proportion of foreigners (see Stadt Köln 2018b).
In contrast, the housing market in the district of Heinsberg was rather relaxed at 
the beginning of the increased immigration of refugees. In some municipalities, suf-
ficient municipal as well as private apartments were vacant. However, these reserves 
have now been widely used up by the municipalities that rented them for the accom-
modation of newly arriving refugees. Hence, there are hardly any apartments left for 
refugees to move into after leaving group accommodation. Additionally, the apart-
ment sizes often do not meet the demand. While in Cologne, especially families 
with several children looking for dwellings with more than three rooms face prob-
lems in finding new accommodation, in the district of Heinsberg, this mostly applies 
to young male refugees looking for single-person apartments. In the interviews, the 
experts point out that moving to a shared flat could be a solution for these young 
men. However, after living for several months in group accommodation, many refu-
gees desperately want to live on their own and have privacy again. In addition, some 
landlords have even more reservations about letting their apartments as shared flats.
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Language Barriers/Lacking Information About Search Techniques Some refu-
gees do not (yet) have sufficient language skills and information about the best way 
to search for an apartment (see also Foroutan et al. 2017; Fozdar and Hardley 2014; 
Francis and Hiebert 2014; Baier and Siegert 2018).
Territorial Restrictions Due to the introduction of the domicile requirement in 
NRW, refugees facing problems in finding an affordable apartment in their munici-
pality are not allowed to move to municipalities with less pressure on their housing 
markets. Some interviewees in the district of Heinsberg evaluate this critically. They 
point out that refugees living in the small municipalities are restricted in their search, 
as housing offers, integration offers (e.g. integration courses) as well as job oppor-
tunities are limited there. Experts in the city of Cologne refer to the fact that the 
domicile requirement prevents families with several children from searching out-
side the city limits, where large apartments are more affordable.
It becomes clear that the difficulty of actually achieving and implementing the 
desired goals (e.g. refugees‘ transition to the housing market) is due to an interac-
tion of various factors, including refugees’ limited economic and cultural resources, 
the limited number of locally available apartments, and the conflicting interests of 
potential landlords. Accordingly, solutions must also be found at various levels, e.g. 
housing construction, financial resources for the municipalities, and campaigns 
against discrimination. Furthermore, the example of the domicile requirement 
shows that the implementation of measures can have ambivalent consequences. For 
example, the domicile requirement enables cities and municipalities to better plan 
the integration infrastructures they need. At the same time it represents a severe bar-
rier to the housing market integration of many refugees, as their search radius is 
significantly reduced.
10.4.2.2  Strategies to Face Housing Shortage
Our findings show two different ways of how governmental and non-governmental 
organisations in the city of Cologne and in the district of Heinsberg try to face the 
housing shortage.
Mediation of Vacant Apartments In both case study areas, refugees receive sup-
port in their search for accommodation from different actors. Often there is a 
need for basic information about housing as well as support in finding a suitable 
apartment, contacting the landlord and signing the lease. Hence, in some com-
munities voluntary initiatives, welfare organisations, housing companies as well 
as municipal administration staff are involved and are ideally in close contact. 
This is the ‘municipal leeway’ in implementing compulsory tasks (e.g. accom-
modation of refugees, see Sect. 10.2.1; Schammann and Kühn 2016) when some 
municipalities initiate the establishment of voluntary tasks (e.g. support in find-
ing housing). However, if the refugees’ integration into the housing market is not 
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important to municipal politicians, this may also have an impact on the commit-
ment of the administrative staff, as an expert in the district of Heinsberg stated:
If the man at the top does not want to [support refugees’ integration], it has an effect further 
down. There are social welfare office managers or employees in social welfare offices who 
euphorically helped me one year ago, (…) today they shrug their shoulders.
An important institution in the city of Cologne is the Relocation Coordination 
Centre, developed by the Municipality of Cologne, the Cologne Council of 
Refugees, the German Red Cross and Caritas in 2011 (Ottersbach and Wiedemann 
2017). This Centre aims to help refugees in their search for apartments in order to 
enable a move out of municipal group accommodation. Social workers from the 
Department of Housing provide access to the project. They use criteria such as spe-
cial vulnerability, asylum status and ‘positive social prognosis’ to select those refu-
gees who will be supported. However, these criteria are in some cases 
incomprehensible for affected persons (BBSR 2017). According to the Relocation 
Centre, 842 people (237 families) were mediated into private living space in 2016. 
However, there is a waiting list of up to 3600 parties. This clearly shows that against 
the background of tight housing markets in large cities, municipal support measures 
to find housing for refugees (or other needy/vulnerable groups) are only of limited 
effectiveness (efficacy gap; Czaika and de Haas 2013).
Since 2015, the Relocation Coordination Centre has cooperated with the 
Municipal Housing Company, which has committed to providing 150 apartments 
per year for refugee accommodation (BBSR 2017). However, since this housing 
company mainly has apartments with two or three rooms in its stock, the demand 
from families with several children as well as single-person households can hardly 
be satisfied. Additionally, the refugees are only one group of several (vulnerable) 
groups seeking affordable housing. A representative of a municipal housing com-
pany observed increasing competition:
The refugee organisations are always only one part of the demand and we must take care of 
as many interests as possible. And, of course, there are one or two organisations for home-
less people that say, after the refugees have arrived, the homeless are left out.
New Constructions The second way to tackle the housing shortage is by new con-
structions. Since new conditions for financing subsidised housing were introduced 
at the state level in 2015, construction activity is increasing. This refers to the fact 
that not only traditional integration policies influence local integration processes but 
also policies not usually seen as integration policies, like housing policy (Czaika 
and de Haas 2013).
In the district of Heinsberg, representatives of different municipalities point out 
that there is far too little public housing. However, at the time of our interviews only 
one municipality had decided to invest in the construction of new housing for refu-
gee families. By settling refugees with children in declining villages, a representa-
tive of B-town hoped to prevent the closure of primary schools:
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We have deliberately chosen these locations. In [village name] it is not possible to maintain 
a two-track primary school and in [village name] even the closure of the primary school will 
be imminent if we cannot place more children. Of course, this works relatively well with the 
accommodation for refugees.
This project is a good example of the efforts made by declining localities to miti-
gate some negative consequences of decline through the permanent integration of 
refugees.
In Cologne, as in some other places, the Municipal Housing Agency is investing 
in the construction of new housing. In 2017, they aimed to build 350 housing units. 
According to the Department of Housing, approx. 1000 publicly subsidized residen-
tial units are constructed annually. However, although the conditions for the financ-
ing of subsidised housing have been optimised, private investors are still more likely 
to focus their construction on single−/multi-family homes as well as condominiums 
in the upscale price segment, so predominantly expensive residential property is 
emerging. The municipality has tried to prevent this via new guidelines for develop-
ers. In 2013, a building land model (Kooperatives Baulandmodell) was passed, 
which obliges investors to develop at least 30% of a housing project as subsidised 
apartments. Additionally, the municipality does not sell municipal real estate to the 
highest bidder any more, but rather rates on the basis of an evaluation matrix (Stadt 
Köln 2016c). The new guideline identifies the “best concept” according to factors 
such as the planned number of subsidised apartments (Hendorf 2017). Hence the 
winning bidder is not necessarily the one with the highest bid, but rather the one that 
best fulfils and implements the requirements of the municipality (Attenberger 
2016). These measures are examples of how the public and political discourse on 
the importance of affordable housing for social integration, which has intensified in 
recent years, is reflected in municipal housing policy approaches.
10.5  Conclusion: “Integration Only Starts When People Live 
in an Apartment”
To conclude, we will elaborate and explain apparent similarities and differences 
concerning the accommodation and integration of refugees into the regular housing 
market of our case study areas.
The legal framework conditions were the same in both case study areas because 
of national laws and laws at the federal state level that aim at regulating the distribu-
tion and reception of refugees. In principle, these laws standardise structural condi-
tions of the integration of refugees to a high degree (e.g. the obligation to 
accommodate refugees, the amount of welfare benefits given to refugees). 
Nevertheless, we could identify differences among local strategies and policies and 
the underlying contextual conditions.
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Firstly, this concerns the very different relevance of the topic before 2015 in the 
two case study areas, not least because of the different experiences with the immigra-
tion and integration of refugees. Many years before the long summer of migration, 
there was a political and social discussion in Cologne about the accommodation and 
integration of refugees. Hence, the city was prepared in a more comprehensive way, 
since it had developed policy documents and implemented measures for the accom-
modation and integration of refugees. However, the fast increase of refugees greatly 
exceeded existing possibilities to accommodate them according to the guidelines. 
With regard to the policy gaps (Czaika and de Haas 2013) that were emphasised in 
Sect. 10.2.1, in the city of Cologne we found evidence of an existing implementation 
gap and an efficacy gap. In response to the fact that the previously developed guide-
lines could not be implemented, new policy papers were developed which were 
adapted to the changed realities. However, the general policy discourse, namely the 
goal of decentralised accommodation in apartments, was not questioned.
In contrast to the city of Cologne, the accommodation and integration of refugees 
in the district of Heinsberg before 2015 was not a relevant political or social topic. 
Hence, the district lacked any kind of guideline with regard to refugee immigration. 
We consider this situation as an implementation gap, since the municipalities were 
not sufficiently prepared to fulfil their obligations. Against this background, the 
communities within the district had to develop different accommodation strategies 
spontaneously, sometimes under great time pressure. Although policy papers on 
“good accommodation practices for refugees” did not exist in the district, measures 
were often influenced by superordinated policy discourses concerning negative 
effects of mass accommodation and targeted at decentralised housing of refugees.
When comparing housing strategies for refugees within the district of Heinsberg, 
the municipalities show a big variation. Some of the investigated municipalities had 
large facilities at their disposal where they could easily accommodate a high num-
ber of refugees. In contrast, municipalities that could not draw on apparently “sim-
ple solutions” had to develop other strategies.
This points to a second aspect of the very different starting positions in the two 
case study areas, namely the situation on the housing market. While the housing 
market in Cologne was already tense before 2015 and the first accommodation of 
the refugees took place in sport halls, hotels and containers, the situation in most 
municipalities in the district of Heinsberg was initially calm. Accordingly, refugees 
were often placed in rented apartments upon arrival, and accommodation in large 
group accommodation was mainly avoided. However, the offer of vacant apart-
ments in the district of Heinsberg was in most cases exhausted after accommodating 
the refugees upon arrival. Meanwhile, demand in the low-price segment exceeds 
supply not only in the city of Cologne but also in the district of Heinsberg. 
Accordingly, the transition into the housing market is now proving difficult in both 
case study areas. In fact, this is the case not only in our case study areas, but nation-
wide. The demand for affordable housing has increased further due to the number 
of refugees searching on local housing markets (Bundesarbeitsgemeinschaft 
Wohnungslosenhilfe 2017).
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With regard to the subject of integration, one representative of a welfare organ-
isation stated: “Integration only starts when people live in an apartment“. Our 
study has shown that the central actors in both case study areas share this view and 
are trying to achieve long-term housing for refugees. However, our study has also 
shown that the transition into the housing market has become problematic in both 
case study areas. Hence, in many cases integration processes have not yet started 
although refugees arrived years ago because many of them are still living in group 
accommodation, which affects not only the well-being but also the ability to learn 
the new language. Especially the large-scale facilities that are located in the local 
periphery turned out to be a constraint for the integration of refugees. A few munici-
palities created an isolated and spatially segregated situation for the refugees. In 
these isolated and segregated large-scale facilities refugees suffer disadvantages in 
reaching everyday life infrastructure, language courses and workplaces. Furthermore, 
these locations neither allow the development of bridging ties to the host society nor 
the development of bonding ties to possibly existing local ethnic communities.
In terms of the generalisation and transferability of the results of the two case 
study areas, it must be emphasized that our findings cannot be applied to all large 
German cities and small towns. In particular, the political situation, the housing 
market situation, the migrant history as well as the social acceptance in former West 
and East Germany (Glorius and Schondelmayer 2017) differ greatly, so that the 
transferability of our results is limited to former West German communities.
However, we can state that a similar situation as in Cologne can be transferred to 
other prosperous west German cities, since these too are characterised by a tight 
housing market and can look back on decades of immigration (also of refugees). 
Accordingly, the pressure to act is comparable and similar difficulties are to be 
expected for the transition into the housing market (Friedrichs et al. 2017), although 
the concrete strategies for dealing with the exceptionally high immigration of the 
years 2015–2016 may have differed (e.g. with regard to the type of accommoda-
tion). The results from the district of Heinsberg also show that different strategies 
have been developed in small and medium-sized towns and that large differences 
may even exist in neighbouring communities within one district. The transition into 
the housing market may be easier in peripheral small and medium-sized towns, due 
to less competition on the market, and less dependence on measures to support the 
transition. At the same time, we expect that access to housing in these areas will also 
largely depend on local discourses and policies for integrating refugees.
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Chapter 11
Arenas of Volunteering: Experiences, 




Two key terms dominated media reports in Germany in the summer and early 
autumn of 2015: firstly, ‘refugee crisis’ (see for example Mattissek and Reuber 
2016; Fleischmann and Steinhilper 2017; Luft 2016)2 discrediting the huge number 
of incoming refugees, and secondly, the appreciative term ‘welcome culture’ 
(Mattissek and Reuber 2016; Sutter 2017).3 Some authors even speak of a ‘summer 
of welcome’ (e.g. Karakayali and Kleist 2016: 2) to describe people’s response to 
this ‘refugee crisis’ which manifested itself in a sudden increase in voluntary aid for 
refugees (Youkhana and Sutter 2017). Smaller and larger relief projects have 
emerged in many places in Germany and have occurred across a broad range of 
social classes, age and income groups, religious affiliations, and family statuses 
(Karakayali and Kleist 2016). A wide variety of aid services have been offered, 
communicated, and organised by individuals, loose, non-institutionalised groups 
and small or large associations, schools, churches, and municipalities (Karakayali 
and Kleist 2016). These have primarily been focused on providing practical and 
1 This chapter presents the first results of an ongoing study that is part of a doctoral thesis. I would 
like to thank the Hanns-Seidel Foundation for supporting this project.
2 For a comprehensive analysis of the media discourses between 2015 and 2016, see Mattissek and 
Reuber (2016).
3 Mutz and Wolff (2018: 12) explain this term as follows: ‘During the increasing migration of refu-
gees and a more intensive examination of the subject of flight and migration, “welcome culture” is 
[…] now being taken up particularly in the media public and in so-called mood studies, to describe 
a positive attitude towards foreigners.’
A. Hoppe-Seyler (*) 




direct care for the refugees themselves: language teaching, translation activities, 
practical assistance, and the delivery of donations have been the main practices of 
volunteers (Karakayali and Kleist 2016; Sutter 2017). This focus on the needs and 
difficulties of affected migrants is reflected in the numerous academic publications 
that address this topic. These deal with questions such as ‘What refugees need’ 
(Bendel 2016) or ‘What is really important: Insights into the life situation of refu-
gees’ (Schiefer 2017). Research has focused on refugees and asks for their inten-
tions and regionally specific attitudes to stay in certain places (Brücker et al. 2016; 
ongoing project from Haug et al.).
In contrast, research on the volunteers, who are often some of the first people to 
develop close contact with the refugees, is increasing only slowly, even though in a 
statistical survey by the Social Science Institute of the Protestant Church in Germany 
of more than 1000 respondents, conducted at the end of August 2016, over 75% said 
they could imagine a personal involvement in refugee relief (Ahrens 2017). 
Moreover, a recent study conducted by the Federal Ministry for Family Affairs con-
cludes that 19% of the German population are still providing active refugee assis-
tance or helping in some other way (BMFSFJ 2017). Studies that have focused on 
volunteers and the practice of voluntary aid for refugees have mostly delivered a 
view ‘from the outside’ and have dealt with the challenges and possibilities of 
organising volunteer work and the interaction between voluntary and full-time posi-
tions (Karakayali and Kleist 2015, 2016; Hamann et  al. 2016; Liebenberg et  al. 
2016; Speth and Becker 2016; Ahrens 2015, 2017; BMFSFJ 2017). A lack of 
research into the local practices of refugee accommodation and the relevant pro-
cesses and dynamics of negotiation can be identified. In particular, geographical and 
ethnographic approaches to such practices, and the perspective of volunteers, are 
still very rarely found (exceptions include Sutter 2017; Fleischmann and Steinhilper 
2017; Karakayali 2017). It is therefore important to focus more closely on practices 
of volunteering at a local level. In this context, the experience of volunteers must be 
considered, which, according to the theoretical assumption of this paper, arise and 
are imparted in and through the execution of practices. In order to display the inter-
nal dynamics and tensions in the field of volunteering it is necessary to regard the 
emerging (or ‘breaking’) practices of voluntary refugee relief. Furthermore, the 
associated, socially framed, and locally developed horizons of experience must be 
combined with an examination of the significance of local and communal contexts 
for these practices. What is of particular interest is how specific practices develop in 
this fluid field of voluntary refugee relief and how subjects4 become significant in 
this context. I argue that emotions play an important role in voluntary refugee relief 
and that therefore a conceptual approach that can grasp emotionality is necessary 
(Karakayali 2017; Youkhana and Sutter 2017; Fleischmann and Steinhilper 2017). 
Moreover, the spatial characteristics of voluntary refugee relief must also be taken 
into account, as these play an essential role in local configurations.
4 In line with the pragmatist perspective discussed in more detail later, the present work assumes 
that subjects are not constituted as fixed, coherent units but are to be thought of as constantly evolv-




Therefore, the paper is structured as follows. First, it compiles and analyses con-
temporary research concerning voluntary refugee relief in Germany. It then gives 
insights into the local field of research and provides some relevant context of volun-
teering in the Bavarian city studied. After statements concerning methodology, 
empirical examples show the relevance of a theoretically underpinned consideration 
of experience, especially in its emotional and spatial dimensions. With the help of 
the pragmatist concept of experience, both the development of practices and the 
emergence of conflicts and ruptures within voluntary work can be explained. 
Especially regarding conflicts with the administrative and bureaucratic asylum sys-
tem, the emergence of the voluntary subject—whether political or decidedly unpo-
litical—becomes relevant.
11.2  Contemporary Research Concerning Voluntary Work 
in Germany
Even though research projects focusing on voluntary refugee relief increased in 
2016 and 2017, the number of such projects is still relatively modest (Mutz and 
Wolff 2018). A number of large-scale studies (Karakayali and Kleist 2015, 2016; 
Hamann et al. 2016; Liebenberg et al. 2016; Speth and Becker 2016; Ahrens 2015, 
2017; BMFSFJ 2017) have come to the following concordant conclusions on volun-
teers, their activities, and their forms of organisation: Since 2015, 55% of Germany’s 
population has provided refugee assistance in one way or another, and 19% are cur-
rently still active (BMFSFJ 2017). Most of the volunteers are female, but there is a 
more equal distribution in terms of age and working status (Karakayali and Kleist 
2016). Membership of a religious organisation is also roughly the same as the 
national average, whereas there is a slight overproportion of volunteers who are 
migrants. Involvement is seen more in very large cities, although an increase in 
voluntary work in rural areas and small towns and cities can be observed. The 
engagement was characterised in its beginning by spontaneity, a proactive character, 
and a high degree of initiative (ibd.). However, many of the initiatives underwent 
increasing professionalisation and formalisation after an informal start-up phase 
(Hamann et al. 2016). On average, refugee helpers currently spend around five-and- 
a-half hours per week on their activities (BMFSFJ 2017), and nearly a quarter stated 
that they were active for more than ten hours per week (Karakayali and Kleist 2016). 
Especially in coordination, a high number of hours of volunteer work is invested 
(Hamann et al. 2016). Nevertheless, despite these high workloads, over three quar-
ters of participants were satisfied with their activities (Karakayali and Kleist 2016). 
The areas of activity focus on counselling, accompaniment, German language les-
sons, leisure activities, collection and distribution of donations, and coordination of 
activities (Hamann et al. 2016; BMFSFJ 2017). Most of the studies stressed that it 
was especially the first phase, the admission of refugees, that would not have been 
possible without the help of actively engaged people, and that the various assistance 
groups have meanwhile become an ‘indispensable part of a liberal and helpful 
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society’ (Speth and Becker 2016: 6). On a smaller scale, Liebenberg et al. (2016) 
present a local example of voluntary refugee relief and illustrate that, apart from 
general structural recommendations, each region and city offers its own approaches 
and challenges. In analogy to Hamann et al. (2016), Liebenberg et al. draw attention 
to the effects of voluntary refugee relief that go beyond direct aid: they recognize in 
it an important stabilising factor of municipal democracy and a building block 
against right-wing agitation (Liebenberg et al. 2016).
Regarding the motives of volunteers, the BMFSFJ study (2017: 26) gives the top 
three reasons as ‘because I basically want to help others’, ‘because I enjoy it’, and 
‘because I am convinced that it’s important for Germany that the refugees are well 
integrated’. These statements show that emotional and political aspects play an 
important role in becoming a volunteer. Karakayali and Kleist (2016) see high polit-
ical awareness amongst those involved in voluntary work since 2015 as they stated 
that they want to help shape society, at least on a small scale, through their activities. 
A research team from the University of Applied Sciences in Munich found volun-
teers being motivated by a socially oriented humanism and not for religious reasons 
(Mutz et al. 2015; Mutz and Wolff 2018). In addition to the desire to make up for 
social deficits and to make it easier for refugees to integrate, they also identify self- 
referential motives of the volunteers, such as the wish for recognition, being needed, 
and widening personal horizons; all statements indicate a great relevance of (posi-
tive) emotions for voluntary work.
Recently, a few works from sociologists and anthropologists have focused on the 
role of emotions in the context of voluntary refugee relief (Karakayali 2017; Sutter 
2017) and the political aspects of volunteer work (Fleischmann and Steinhilper 
2017). Sutter specifically speaks of emotional practices, which, according to his 
observations, play the central role in civil society engagement for refugees. 
Performative practices, media representations and the interaction with materialities 
enable an emotionalization of engagement and can explain how the surveyed volun-
teers use emotions to act politically. The close connection between voluntary refu-
gee relief and emotional experiences is also the central aspect of this paper.
In summary, it can be concluded that the socio-politically relevant connection 
between voluntary refugee relief, its emotional and spatial dimensions, and the way 
in which people become politically involved and committed is largely unexplored. 
Only very few studies have researched this area in great depth and a theoretical 
framework is almost completely missing. Accordingly, I will present a notion of 
how individuals become subjects (as volunteers) in local fields of practice, assum-
ing that these processes are grounded in experience. In the following section, I will 
present some of the contexts relevant for these experiences in order to provide a 
basis for introducing the empirical and theoretical considerations.
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11.3  The Local Context of Voluntary Refugee Relief
At the beginning of the research project in spring 2014, the decisive role that volun-
teers would play in the Bavarian city in the coming months and years could not yet 
be predicted. I was based in a local organisation for voluntary refugee relief, which 
was founded in 2002 and was well established in urban society. Through its long- 
lasting activities, members of the organisation had built up various connections with 
other actors relevant for the refugee work, and partly personal relations with repre-
sentatives of the city administration. Therefore, the association appeared as an ideal 
door-opener to gain insight into the local conditions of voluntary refugee relief. 
Figure 11.1 illustrates the rapid increase in membership in the following years.
Since the membership lists were not consistently maintained until the end of 
2014, the previous years are estimates based on participation in irregular exchange 
meetings (with the exception of 2002, where an exact figure is available). It becomes 
apparent that especially between the surveys in autumn 2014 and spring 2015, and 
between October 2015 and April 2016, there was a strong increase in the number 
of  volunteer refugee helpers. The second increase reflects the development 
referred  to  as the “Summer of Welcome”5 which in autumn 2015, following the 
temporary suspension of the Dublin Regulation by German Chancellor Angela 
5 Karakayali and Kleist (2015, 2016).
Fig. 11.1 Development of membership numbers. (Source: Membership administration of the 
organisation: own compilation)
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Merkel,6 led to great attention to refugee relief in many places. The significantly 
increased number of members already in April 2015 can be traced back to a special 
incidence in the investigated city that occurred at the beginning of September 2014. 
Back then, the government of Middle Franconia gave the city administration two 
days to create an emergency admission facility for up to 300 refugees. This was 
achieved by the immediate closure of a local open-air swimming pool, on whose 
parking lot an infrastructure (sanitary facilities and sleeping accommodation, which 
was primarily tents) was set up, drawing on the capacities of the civil protection and 
social services. The following months were stressful and a burden on everyone 
involved, especially the refugees (who at times threatened to go on hunger strike 
because they no longer wanted to wait for their registration at the responsible initial 
reception facility), but also the municipal and charity workers and the many volun-
teers. Most of the volunteers were very spontaneously involved and mainly helped 
with the direct care and support of the refugees. The joint coping with this situation 
by volunteers and staff members resulted in a first wave of entries into the organisa-
tion and for many, even several years later, constitutes a positive experience.
There are no official figures regarding the further development of the refugees 
accommodated in the city area. A personal inquiry to the city revealed a rather 
vague picture of steadily growing numbers of refugees. According to this, the num-
ber of people with a refugee background more than quadrupled from approx. 500 at 
the end of 2014 to approx. 2300 in 2018. At the same time, the local organisation 
also grew as shown in Fig. 11.1. For the organisation, which had previously grown 
rather unplanned, this rapid increase of members initially meant a significant rise in 
workload in terms of organisation. At the same time, little political-administrative 
support was wanted and possible. For in addition to the generally accepted picture 
of relatively regulation-free voluntary work, which may and should exist indepen-
dently of state institutions and controls, municipal and state authorities were over-
strained by the very rapid increase in the number of asylum seekers in 2015.
The heavy workload took months but hardly ever led to volunteers terminating 
their involvement. Instead, various restructuring processes took place within the 
organisation, so that the tasks could be distributed more evenly. Those volunteers 
who were very dissatisfied with providing 40 to 60 hours of direct support and assis-
tance a week reduced their activities rather than giving up their commitment com-
pletely. Many volunteers reported that they suffered exhaustion and overwork. On 
the sidelines of an event on the subject of “Protection from Burnout“, a volunteer 
told me analogously: ‘I already had that [occupational burnout]. […] I lost ten kilo. 
But I’m alright now’ and then turned to an asylum seeker with whom she had agreed 
to practice German. Similar stories have been told often, especially since the notice-
able reduction of reallocations to the city. Moreover, they explain why the decline 
6 The statements of Chancellor Angela Merkel that “Asylum knows no upper limit” and “We can 
do it” led to a temporarily suspension of the Dublin Regulation on 31 August 2015 and thus 
enabled hundreds of thousands of asylum seekers who had not yet applied for asylum in their 
respective EU entry country to do so in Germany (Mushaben 2018: 14; Luft 2016: 68).
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in the number of members of the organisation is relatively moderate compared to 
the previous increase. In particular, the latest drop in numbers is due to the fact that 
at certain intervals the list of members is cleaned up to remove those who no longer 
respond to member queries. However, it cannot be ruled out that these persons may 
nevertheless continue to help individual refugees or families outside the structure of 
the association, as I have been told several times in personal conversations. Such 
observations show that voluntary refugee aid, despite its often spontaneous charac-
ter and with few or no institutionalised practices, tends towards a certain regularity 
and continuity of commitment.
This persistence of voluntary practices despite the sometimes burdensome con-
texts can be theoretically framed and made understandable with the pragmatist con-
cept of experience. Experiences are conceived as embedded in social conditions and 
lead to a complex interplay of practical action, emotional experience, and intellec-
tual reflection. This theoretical framework can grasp the emotional and strongly 
practice-oriented research field of ‘refugee care’ as arenas of volunteering. It points 
out how subjects emerge, are challenged and reconfigured in regard to various prac-
tical, emotional, and physical experiences. In Sects. 11.5 and 11.6 I provide a more 
detailed conceptualisation of the relevant concepts of ‘experience’, ‘arenas of vol-
unteering’, and ‘becoming a subject’ based on empirical insights. However, some 
methodological considerations will be explained first.
11.4  Methodological Considerations
How do you explore experiences that, by their very nature, not only concern intel-
lectual knowledge but have both practical and emotional components? The perspec-
tive of this paper assumes that situationally made experiences can either be observed 
in practical realisation, in other words while they are actually taking place, or can be 
interrogated in conversations as they can be intellectually reflected. The emotional 
dimension of experiences becomes visible with both methods: it can be observed in 
its bodily ‘suffering’ and becomes intersubjectively intelligible through communi-
cation.7 To capture practical doings and intellectual reflections of volunteers as well 
as those of the researcher, this work is based on the grounded theory methodology 
(Geiselhart et al. 2012; Wagenseil 2014; Strauss and Corbin 1996), which corre-
sponds to Dewey’s understanding of research as a reciprocal process (Volbers 2015). 
This process is guided by ‘the basic principles of openness and the method of per-
manent comparison’ (Geiselhart et al. 2012: 85). Thus, the aims and guidelines of 
the research only emerge during the empirical process and need to be constantly 
reflected upon; moreover, the theory developed from this process can and must refer 
7 This translation of bodily experience into conventionalized language always leaves an untranslat-
able remnant which contains a certain amount of uncertainty and the possibility of failure. Due to 
limited space this cannot be expanded upon here, but several authors have discussed this to a larger 
extent (e.g. Berwing 2012; Hetzel 2008).
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to the data and be measured against it. This close connection between theory and 
empiricism in the sense of grounded theory is also reflected in the structure of the 
paper.
The methods used in this study are mainly qualitative, open interviews and eth-
nographic studies through participatory observation in the form of action research8 
(Chatterton et al. 2010; Brambilla 2012). Since the author of the article is herself 
active in several helper groups as well as at the organizational level of the investi-
gated association, a deep and quite comprehensive insight into the structures, proce-
dures, and negotiation processes was possible. Much of the data collected so far has 
been generated from observing various meetings and communication processes 
between volunteers and other people involved in the field of refugee relief. These 
include volunteer group meetings and working group meetings of the organisation 
for refugee relief, meetings with representatives of various interest groups (e.g. 
workers’ welfare organisations, the city administration, or school representatives), 
public speeches, and panel discussions on the topic of refugees, round tables, and 
board meetings, but also everyday email correspondence, play groups with refugee 
children or joint leisure activities. In several interview phases between 2014 and 
2017, more than 40 qualitative interviews were conducted with volunteers, full-time 
workers, refugees and city authorities. These came about through personal contacts 
and the snowball principle. The data pool also includes transcripts of various meet-
ings and discussion forums, flyers, legislative texts, images, and audio recordings of 
the observations, as well as personal reflections on my own position in the research 
process, in the form of field diary entries. In the following sections, extracts of the 
empirical data are combined with theoretical considerations in order to gain a deeper 
understanding of the observed situations. Since the presented project is currently 
still being implemented and its methodology is designed for a cyclical research 
process with increasing ‘saturation’, only preliminary results can be presented here.
11.5  Experiences, Emotions and Emerging Practices
The following interview extract is a typical example of how a volunteer got engaged 
in refugee relief:
Then these containers came into my residential area and then, then somehow, yes, it was, 
not because I wanted to become a member of the association, or something like that, but I 
went by there several times a day and then I just, uh… in the bike basket I had street crayons 
and Frisbees and a jump rope and I was just there and we painted. […] I’m kind of like that, 
I was in the neighbourhood, I drove by and I volunteered at the trade union and did youth 
work there, in my Frankfurt time, so I know that I have a connection to it … and, yeah, and 
the kids, of course, the kids used to see my dog, and then they wanted to pet the dog and that 
was kinda, yeah, sweet (Volunteer, Interview 06, translated by author).
8 For further examples regarding the implementation of participatory research, see Chaps. 9 and 12.
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The dog plays an important role and was often mentioned in the further course of 
the interview. The practical doings of playing with the kids and letting them pet the 
dog is inseparably connected with accompanying emotions of kindness and joy. The 
statement: ‘and that was kinda, yeah, sweet’ clearly displays such positive feelings. 
The spatial proximity intertwined with previous experiences with volunteer work 
initially led to sporadic interactions. These moments are reported being full of emo-
tions, whereby private interests mix with public concerns, so that the volunteer 
develops further commitment. This calls for an approach that can take the emotional 
dimension of experiences into account. I therefore adopt the pragmatist philosophy 
of practice developed by John Dewey.9
11.5.1  The Pragmatist Concept of Experience
Dewey’s focus was on the events of here and now. His goal was to redirect the phi-
losophy of his time to practice and human experience. He saw experience as an 
emotionally charged, experimental, and creative process of exploring and acquiring 
the world (Cutchin 2008; Morgan 2014). Experiences are not only constitutional 
conditions of the social, material, geographical, political and historical contexts (i.e. 
the respective situation) but are also individually possessed as they are processed by 
human organisms. By means of conjoint dealings and associations, experiences 
intertwine individuals with their communities (McCormack 2010). ‘Associated or 
joint activity is a condition of the creation of a community. But association itself is 
physical and organic, while communal life is moral, that is emotionally, intellectu-
ally, consciously sustained’ (Dewey 1995: 151). Therefore, experiences are never to 
be understood as something purely individual (as mere one-experience making), but 
also as a social experience, only possible in the community and with the surround-
ing world.
Three aspects play a role in the process of making an experience and becoming 
experienced: experiences are (a) made ‘practically and physically’, (b) emotionally 
lived through, and (c) intellectually reflected upon and classified with reference to 
existing knowledge (McCormack 2010; Cutchin 2008). This perspective focuses on 
the intervening of emotions, practices, and knowledge of the research field and 
make it accessible for analysis. Thus, the approach chosen here can connect with 
debates on affects and emotions (Davidson et al. 2007; Smith et al. 2009, 2010; 
Schurr and Strüver 2016) and can add practical examples of socially relevant 
 empirical research. Following the process perspective of many affective theories, 
which understand affects as relational and emerging phenomena, Dewey’s view 
of  experience- based emotionalities can be added. In his terms, affects and emo-
tions must be understood as processed (and above all communicated) by individu-
9 For a first overview of Dewey’s life and work, see http://dewey.pragmatism.org/
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als, but they are not inherent in them as intrinsic properties (Dewey 1995).10 Instead, 
the concept of experience sees emotionalities as inherent in social practice. Emotions 
are ‘supra-individual’ but Dewey’s particular contribution is that he does not only 
see the interpersonal dimension but also points out how emotions are lived through 
by individuals and how they contribute to societal development. Therefore, when 
they are researched and analysed, they cannot be detached from the singular situa-
tions, but rather must be viewed in context, with all accompanying social, material, 
and historical dimensions.
In the context of refugee relief, the consideration of the lived experiences shows 
that the motivation to engage in voluntary work and to continue with it is mainly 
based on emotions rather than intellectual reasons. Often, and with pleasure, volun-
teers report about small success experiences. A volunteer was uncertain ‘whether 
we could check on the BAMF11 in any way concerning the progress of the asylum 
application’. Nevertheless, she familiarized herself with the administrative proce-
dures and submitted a corresponding request. She was not just a little surprised 
when ‘only three weeks after this letter he [the asylum applicant] had his recogni-
tion. For THREE years. [Pause] And of course everyone was like ‘WHAAAT, you 
can do that?!?” (Volunteer, Interview 07, translated by author). The pleasant sur-
prise of success and the appreciation of refugees and other volunteers made her 
visibly proud. With the same pride, another volunteer spoke about a flat she found 
after a long search for a family of five. Another volunteer explained the relief he felt 
as a church asylum, usually combined with an extremely high expenditure of time, 
finally led to a positive result for the person being hosted and cared for. Often, vol-
unteers discuss pleasant experiences: nice afternoons in an accommodation facility, 
kind and tasty dinner invitations, or playful encounters with the refugees’ children. 
Such reports are widely shared and the emotional character of different situations is 
often highlighted.
News easily spread through the network structure of the organisation. Rumours 
about troubles circulate fast between different helper circles, coordinators and board 
members due to regular meetings and intensive and fast email traffic. Problems are 
discussed quickly and supporters are found, so that in most cases rapid solutions are 
possible. Accordingly, positive experiences take place frequently. And even in frus-
trating or hopeless cases, in which for example anger arises about refugees, other 
volunteers, the operators of the accommodation facility, the government or the 
bureaucratic system, support from other volunteers or full-time staff often mitigates 
negative feelings. This confirms, especially in retrospect, the corresponding prac-
10 On this issue, Dewey (1995) asserts that feelings are indeed experienced by complex and active 
living beings, but they are not their own in an incorporated, physical sense. He writes: ‘The quali-
ties [feelings] were never in the organism; they were always qualities of interactions involving both 
non-organic things and organisms.’ (249). It is only through language/communication that these 
qualities of interactions, i.e. the feelings, can become signs of objective differences, give meaning, 
report, and prophesy. ‘With language they [sensitivities, feelings, qualities] are clearly differenti-
ated and identified. They are then >>objectified<<; [...]’ (249).




tices and leads to continuous commitment. A detailed observation of existing volun-
tary practices must therefore take place with special attention to the emotional 
components in order to be able to understand how these emerged and why they have 
been consolidated.
The next section will link such emotionalities to spatial settings, collective mem-
ories and personal biographical experiences.
11.5.2  Material and Spatial Conditions of Volunteering
‘I went by there several times a day; I was in the neighbourhood’. This quotation 
indicates the connection that experience creates between an individual and its envi-
ronment. According to Dewey, the individual transacts with the socio-material 
arrangements of space and thus becomes a socially and spatially situated subject. 
This central concept of ‘transactions’ needs some further clarification: ‘Transaction 
is distinct from interaction which implies communication between two fully formed 
organisms. In transactions, the environment and organism are co-constituted’ 
(Bridge 2008: 1580). According to Dewey the concept of transactions describes 
how, in everyday life situations, there are no fixed, fully developed subjects and 
objects that interact with each other; instead, all organisms realise just one of the 
possibilities of themselves in a specific situation as they establish relationships with 
one another (Geiselhart 2019). At the same time, the environment also becomes 
fixed in a way that facilitates the actual situation. Situations are always direct, 
immediate, new and different on every single occasion. Therefore, with transactions 
the organisms undergo different states of relatedness and thus different subjectivi-
ties (Bridge 2008). Accordingly, individuals only become a subject in situations.
Dewey names ‘situations’ as those moments and spatial localizations in which an 
over-individualized experiencing takes place (McCormack 2010; Morgan 2014). In 
order to emphasize the singularity of these situations and their transactional co- 
constituting character, the term ‘arenas of volunteering’ will be used below. One can 
conceptualize these processes of negotiation in the arenas of volunteering as based 
on overlapping, experience-based, and path-dependent worldviews that must be 
explored, negotiated, and conveyed at the local level (Bridge 2008; Cutchin 2008; 
Steiner 2014). The singular arenas of volunteering can therefore be thought of as 
situated and temporarily fixed negotiation spaces in which the participants are estab-
lished as voluntary subjects and in which different experiences can be made, lived, 
and communicated (see also Massey 1994; Cutchin 2008; Jupp 2008; Conradson 
2003). Spaces are conceived as intersections of heterogeneous lines of experience: 
on the one hand, they are only produced as significant in the social process of expe-
riencing; and on the other hand, they make experiences understandable and compre-
hensible in the first place, whereby experiences are always also spatialized and 
materialized through them (Cutchin 2008; Bridge 2008). In the arenas of voluntary 
work, people meet each other with differing experience-based ideas about voluntary 
refugee relief in general, as well as about its actual practices and implementations.
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The general material conditions of arenas of volunteering are characterised by a 
particularly high degree of fluidity and instability. This is largely due to the structure 
of voluntary relief for refugees. At least in its local organisational form, the 
 investigated association does not have facilities of its own. Instead, external proper-
ties are used for the various meetings such as assistance or board meetings, informa-
tion evenings or further training, consulting hours, German courses, and meetings 
with refugees, municipal employees or representatives of other organisations. These 
facilities include, for example, rooms in community centres, neighbourhood houses, 
schools, church parish halls, or the city hall, rooms in shared accommodation (for 
refugees) or of private individuals; even outdoor public places or theatres and cine-
mas are sometimes used. While not exhaustive, this list illustrates the diversity of 
the possible places in which volunteer refugee helpers meet. Some examples can 
serve to highlight the relation between different facilities and voluntary refugee 
relief practices.
A positive connotation with any ‘arena of volunteering’ due to its physical loca-
tion in a familiar neighbourhood seems to clearly promote commitment and willing-
ness to become a volunteer (see also Jupp 2008). For example, one volunteer told 
me:
The containers, which are now used as shared accommodation facilities for refugees, were 
formerly used as temporary rooms for my daughter’s kindergarten. Therefore, I knew the 
place and never felt uncomfortable when I walked by or in it. So, I thought I could help 
there, as I already knew a lot about the rooms (Volunteer, Interview 23, translated by 
author).
The interviewee felt familiar with the premises, she knew how it felt to go inside, to 
move things around in that place, to show people around, and to deliver collected 
donations to the accommodation facilities. She felt secure, the material objects were 
familiar, and thus she felt confident that she could support the refugees appropri-
ately. Positive emotions create self-efficacy.
However, many of the structures used for refugee relief were originally intended 
for the local population. Refugee accommodation can be found in schools or gym-
nasiums which are then temporarily unusable for their original purpose. This fact is 
often exploited by the media and can be heard from administrators in charge:
So, for example the one in Wilhelm Street now with us in the city or the one in Main 
Street,12 it’s a good thing that there is no one in there anymore, because these are not good 
places for living, and I told the government I would leave them on standby, because … 
because what happens when the numbers start to rise again, then we’re back to gymnasiums 
and that’s the worst thing, um […] in these other accommodation facilities we’ll at least 
have, uh, partitioned compartments, yes, they’re not rooms because there’s no ceiling over 
them, but at least compartments (Mayor, Interview 11, translated by author).
These examples also illustrate the path dependency of arenas based on previous 
experiences. While in the first example, positively connoted experiences led to the 
containers being perceived as a safe, comfortable place, statements in the latter 
quote refer to a very tense and negative context. This took place in the late summer 
12 Both large collective accommodation facilities, locations anonymized.
A. Hoppe-Seyler
237
of 2015, when the Bavarian town was forced to accommodate a surplus of 100 refu-
gees per week. The accommodation in various school gymnasiums provided a very 
tense atmosphere for the city’s staff, refugees, volunteers, and the local population. 
The clearly negative evaluation of this period is reflected in the words ‘that’s the 
worst thing’.
The collective coping with this situation (as well as with the provisional tent 
camp in a swimming pool parking lot mentioned above) is recalled and emphasized 
repeatedly even several years later, for example on public occasions (such as a 
reception for volunteers, or the honouring of individual representatives of voluntary 
organisations), or at volunteer events (annual meetings, helper meetings) and in 
personal conversations. The evaluation of these experiences is thus quite ambivalent 
and straining, as recalling past feelings of stress and fear of an escalatory situation 
at that time mix with relief and pride in coping. This influences contemporary prac-
tices of dealing with current shared accommodation facilities and the way in which 
people interact, perceive, and argue in the various negotiating situations (e.g. city 
leaders and the state government, municipal employees and volunteers, or volun-
teers and refugees in the accommodation facilities concerned).
11.5.3  The Contribution of Idiosyncratic Biographies
In addition, experiences that at first sight have no direct relation (either spatially or 
temporally) to current situations can influence the practices and emotional experi-
ences of voluntary subjects. This is illustrated in the following example:
I was abroad, did some voluntary work in an African country. When I first arrived, I felt very 
lonely and insecure. I was helpless cos I didn’t understand the language and didn’t know the 
country. But I was welcomed warmly and everyone was so kind. I was very grateful. So, 
when I was back in Germany, I thought: like it was for me back there, it’s the same now for 
all the refugees who come to this country (Volunteer, Interview 22, translated by author).
The fact that the interviewed woman thought about her experiences abroad and 
transferred her experience in anticipation of the refugees’ perspective—assuming 
they must feel the same or even worse than she did—created empathy and a readi-
ness to engage in personal relationships with refugees. So, this led to her voluntary 
action for refugees in the current time and place and influenced her present experi-
ences. Similarly, many people have experiences that they feel allow them to relate 
to the refugees’ situations. In the statement above, the volunteer told me about going 
on a trip, arriving in a different place, meeting new people, fighting tooth and nail to 
communicate, doing voluntary work, taking pictures, etc. All these practical doings 
were accompanied by emotions: being nervous, excited, and curious; feeling inse-
cure and lonely, then welcomed and happy. This generates the wish to recreate her 
altogether positive experiences for refugees. Similar motives are expressed by sev-
eral volunteers and show that the consideration of current volunteer practices must 
always take into account their interdependence with past experiences and arenas.
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11.6  Conflicts, Ruptures and the Examination of Political 
Voluntary Subjects
While the concept of experience with its emphasis on the emotional dimension can 
explain the emergence of practices, on the one hand, it can simultaneously help to 
understand their ruptures on the other. The previous examples have shown that indi-
viduals who become ‘refugee helpers’ come with different experiences and then 
transact accordingly. In Dewey’s approach, the individual is not to be understood as 
an autonomous actor, but as the ‘place’ where all the different and complex infor-
mation of a situation is brought together. Based on individual dispositions and hab-
its, this information is processed in order to develop subjectivity as an attitude 
within the given situation. This is a permanent process whereby the subject is always 
in the process of becoming (Geiselhart 2019). In its constant development and 
change, the voluntary subject also has to deal with unpleasant, challenging and even 
conflicting situations.
Several interviewees mentioned experiences that were particularly frustrating 
and hard. Some were annoyed with other volunteers or refugees who had not acted 
according to their expectations. For example, one volunteer reported disappointedly 
that a family she had cared for had not invited her since she found an apartment for 
them, though they had had very intensive contact before. She told me:
So that was a friendship for me, which I then brought back to the voluntary level. [Because] 
they have since moved out, I thought to myself, well, they will certainly invite me for cof-
fee, but they have already lived there for two months and I have not heard a thing. So I think, 
ok, it was just, so, this was in any case not a long-term friendship (Volunteer, Interview 07, 
translated by author).
Much more frequently, frustration is derived from conflicts with the bureaucratic 
levels of the asylum procedure and the corresponding administrative offices. Once 
a woman spontaneously said to me ‘I wouldn’t do it again!’— ‘it’ meaning her 
voluntary help for refugees. This happened in a completely private situation where 
her frustration about the immigration authorities who refused to allow a young man 
from Azerbaijan to work boiled over. ‘I just don’t get it; it’s like they want us volun-
teers to give up’, she concluded, enraged.
Conflicts among volunteers are especially burdensome as they directly affect the 
working atmosphere. For example, one volunteer felt unfairly treated and not suf-
ficiently supported by the board in forwarding her requests for help, and so com-
plained to other volunteers, as well as to full-time and municipal employees. Another 
was annoyed that the notes she hung up in the accommodation facility were always 
disappearing. She was sure that another volunteer was responsible even though she 
couldn’t prove it. Such conflicts are often staged in digital spaces where no physical 
confrontation is necessary. In these cases, the conflicts can be carried out with 
changed transaction partners, and do not necessarily have to be resolved. Such con-
flicts often circle around opinions of how best to assist refugees or what alternative 
methods of action and self-initiatives are suitable.
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However, conflicts in voluntary refugee work rarely cause volunteers to quit. 
Much more frequently, a change in practices can be observed, for example through 
a reduction in working hours, a move to another field of activity or a new composi-
tion of certain boards. When volunteers terminate their commitment entirely it is 
often due to changes and ruptures in other realms of their life. Some find new jobs, 
others move to another town, or their family situation changes. However, a major 
issue discussed in conflicting situations is the question of to what extent voluntary 
refugee work is political or even activism.
Fleischmann and Steinhilper (2017) argue that volunteering for refugees should 
not be understood as unpolitical, as often claimed by media or volunteers them-
selves. Even if they correctly discuss the forms of political subjectivation that take 
place and draw attention to the transformative potentials that result from it, they 
neglect the individual experiences and reflections of volunteers. Most volunteers are 
well aware of the politicization of ‘their’ field of activity and address and reflect on 
it in different ways.
It can be confirmed that many volunteers clearly reject politicization, as the fol-
lowing quote shows:
[audible inhalation] From my experience, it’s possible to be totally non-political, um … 
yes, because I don’t really care […]. You can stay out of it. That’s possible. […] That 
doesn’t mean for me that I agree, but I do not want to get involved in politics; that was my 
premise from the beginning (Volunteer, Interview 07, translated by author).
Others regard themselves as unpolitical but recognize the political attributions 
within the arenas of volunteering and address them through reflection:
I would still describe myself as not being politically active, but … yes, it’s just that it’s a 
little bit political when you just say I don’t agree with what everyone says—we can’t [help] 
everybody and there are too many and so on (Volunteer, Interview 02, translated by author).
And finally, a comparatively small number of respondents see themselves as being 
politically active in their practices, even though the transition to politically institu-
tionalized arenas is usually absent. Since 2015 the researched association has had its 
own working group on politics. This working group addresses issues of local and 
national migration and integration policy. However, from currently more than 300 
registered members, only five are in this group. Communal and integration politics 
have an ambivalent aftertaste, as one volunteer stated: ‘Actually, I see it as some-
thing political; definitely […] it’s a political statement to get involved on a voluntary 
basis.’ The volunteer then reported that she once joined a meeting of activists against 
right-wing radicalism. ‘That was actually too political for me […] [laughs] that was 
too much for me … politically negative in the sense that politics often … it’s unfor-
tunately often just talk’ (Volunteer, Interview 05, translated by author). The volun-
teer differentiated between politics in terms of negotiating on a theoretical basis and 
being political in one’s practical doings and commitments. She also explained that 
she did not feel comfortable amongst the professional politicians who joined those 
activities.
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Many volunteers insisted that they are not politically motivated or politically 
active, at least at the programmatic level, and they sometimes even clearly 
 distinguished themselves from ‘integration politics’. The field of voluntary refugee 
relief involves very different political concepts and understandings. This creates 
numerous tensions against the background of the strong processes of politicization 
in the fields of refugee care, integration, and migration. Conflicts arise around the 
question of the ‘right’ or ‘necessary’ degree of political activity of volunteer refugee 
helpers. Volunteers, who are unpolitical in their self-perception, therefore move and 
act in a highly politicized field. These tensions have decisive influences on the 
dynamics of voluntary organisations as they often provoke internal conflicts. In 
meetings or informal discussions, political programmatic questions are frequently 
raised and discussed.
11.7  Conclusion
This chapter has dealt with an established relief organisation for refugee help in a 
mid-sized Bavarian city and offers insights from the perspective of the pragmatist 
philosophy of praxis. The empirical data is interpreted with the help of the concept 
of experience, understood as a situational and supra-individual form of practical 
doings, emotional live-through, and intellectual reflection.
A close look at the spatial and material conditions, collective memories, idiosyn-
cratic biographies and major lines of conflict revealed how volunteers emerge dif-
ferently as subjects. It became clear that ‘being a volunteer’ becomes effective in 
particular through the personal relationships people establish through transactions 
amongst each other and with refugees. Furthermore, the path dependency and situ-
ational dependence of volunteers’ experiences in and through their practices was 
illustrated. The emotionally pleasant and sometimes ambivalent moments were the 
ones that bound the volunteers to their work and the organisation. The negotiating 
spaces of voluntary refugee relief can be described as fluid and unstable and have 
great impact on the experiences of volunteers.
It was possible to show the contestation of volunteers induced by the increasing 
politicization of ‘their’ field of activity and to provide valuable new insights into the 
‘conflicting nature of volunteering’ due to this politicization. As Kurt Lewin argues, 
“the so-called minority problems are in reality problems of the majority” (Lewin 
1953: 295), meaning that experiences at the grassroots level of voluntary refugee 
relief reflect and concern processes of refugee integration as a whole. It is essential 
to see that for many volunteers, their work only becomes meaningful through expe-
riences of togetherness and through the lived relationships. However, these are often 
prevented or hindered by the administrative side. Moreover, volunteers increasingly 
feel they are being used as service providers for the aim of maintaining the current 
asylum system, which pursues political interests they cannot share. Political author-
ities have made volunteer activities much more time-consuming and frustrating due 
to stricter laws. Simultaneously the current culture of appreciation only honours 
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volunteers for their activities but not for their personal commitment and emotional 
engagement. Yet the willingness to help and integrate refugees relies on the latter, 
not on formalities or duties, or on praise from management or full-time staff. The 
commitment of volunteers should be supported wisely by promoting existing rela-
tionships. Furthermore, cooperation between volunteers and administrative bodies 
should be experienced as a common interest in a shared goal.
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Chapter 12
Local Innovation in the Reception 
of Asylum Seekers in the Netherlands: 
Plan Einstein as an Example of Multi-level 
and Multi-sector Collaboration
Karin Geuijen, Caroline Oliver, and Rianne Dekker
12.1  Introduction: Asylum Reception as a Multi-level 
Governance Issue
Asylum seeker reception in Europe has proven a ‘wicked issue’ (Rittel and Webber 
1973), whereby policy actors identify the problem in different ways and existing 
policy solutions have so far failed to resolve the challenges. This became particu-
larly clear during the 2015–2016 European ‘refugee crisis’ when various political 
and administrative problems with asylum reception were apparent. Agreement 
about the nature of the problem and desirability of solutions was difficult to reach at 
European and national levels of government, while achieving consensus and con-
structing partnership-based modes of multilevel governance between different tiers 
proved difficult.
In the Dutch context, as well as other European countries, there is considerable 
debate about the number of asylum seekers that should be admitted, as well as how 
the reception of such asylum seekers should take shape. This issue has been the 
basis of discussion for at least 30 years, while the most important arguments have 
not changed fundamentally (Geuijen 2004). On the one hand, there is a view that the 
human rights of refugees must be protected; that refugees have the right to protec-
tion from persecution and that they have civil, political and economic rights, such as 
the right to freedom of expression, the right to housing, to work and to health care. 
On the other hand, there is the view that national interests must be protected. This 
relates firstly to the field of economy and social security (costs of welfare, education 
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etc.); secondly in relation to the socio-cultural field (especially around potential 
threats to national identity); and thirdly in the area of security (both related to gen-
eral crime and more recently to terrorism). The contrasting arguments can be found 
in many variants in discussions on asylum that have taken place in the past three 
decades.
Second, in terms of content and governance, there is an impasse on the national 
level. The asylum problem is blamed repeatedly on the European Union, on migrant 
smugglers, as well as on asylum seekers themselves, some of whom are perceived 
as ‘abusing’ the asylum system. Politicians seem compelled to express the feelings 
of ‘the regular (angry) Dutch citizen’ and to leave the burden of receiving asylum 
seekers to those countries in Europe where asylum seekers first arrive: mostly in 
Italy and Greece. Within the Netherlands, we also see that asylum policies at the 
national level have increasingly been stripped down to a depoliticized, managerial 
approach to asylum reception. The Central Agency for the Reception of Asylum 
Seekers (COA) organizes asylum seekers’ centers, the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service (IND) organizes the asylum procedure, while the Repatriation 
and Departure Service (DT & V) organizes return and expulsions. At the same time, 
the asylum debate at the national level is at an impasse: there are polarized political 
debates in the House of Representatives and responsibilities are shifted to the 
European level, but on this level of governance, actors are even further away from 
reaching consensus.
Within this governance context, problems related to asylum reception are 
thereby, by default arriving at the local level. The poor socio-economic integration 
of refugees implies, among other things, pressure on municipalities: of having to 
pay for benefits, as well as solve shortages within the local social housing rental 
market. Problems in achieving returns lead to undocumented people living on the 
streets in municipalities, who then face obligations to provide ‘bed-bath-bread’ pro-
visions for them. Dissatisfaction and protest in neighbourhoods where these prob-
lems manifest are also directed against the administration of municipalities, who 
must address local tensions. Yet in many ways, their hands are tied because of the 
‘scale mismatch’ (Castells 2008) between the arenas in which the concrete prob-
lems are felt (the local level) and the place where these problems are discussed and 
managed (the national level).
The ‘refugee crisis’ of 2015–2016 exacerbated some of these problems related to 
asylum reception on the local level. However, as we explain in this chapter, this 
moment also opened up a window of opportunity (Kingdon 1984) for experiment-
ing with new forms of asylum reception. At the national level, large policy frame-
works for asylum reception are still being developed, but this created possibilities 
for discretion in the implementation of integration and asylum policies, which had 
been increasingly left to local authorities. Already before the refugee crisis, local 
governments had sought to take the initiative in shaping processes of asylum seeker 
reception and integration in their own ways, in what is termed as the ‘local turn’ in 
integration policies (Bak Jørgensen 2012; Scholten 2013). Across Europe, cities 
have been assuming a pioneering role, and some of these locally developed policy 
initiatives are subsequently transferred to the national level (Dekker et al. 2015). In 
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this way, during the refugee crisis, the development of local solutions was not only 
a necessity, but also an opportunity that was taken by cities in various European 
countries.
This chapter discusses a specific policy initiative that was developed within such 
contexts in the Dutch city of Utrecht: the Utrecht Refugee Launchpad. This asylum 
centre is known colloquially as Plan Einstein, in reference to both the inspirational 
spirit of its namesake and its location along the Einsteindreef, a busy road in the 
neighborhood of Overvecht in the North of the city. Applying the concepts of mul-
tilevel governance and experimental governance, this chapter analyzes how it was 
possible that this initiative was able to be realized at this location and at this time. 
Besides the political-administrative vacuum at the European and national level of 
governance, and the urgency of the refugee crisis as a window of opportunity, the 
analysis also addresses how this local solution came about through manoeuvring by 
key actors of the initiative within its multilevel context.1
12.2  Methodology
The chapter provides a case study of Plan Einstein as an exemplar of the type of 
local experiments with asylum reception which have started at several locations in 
the Netherlands – just as elsewhere in Europe and beyond – around the time of the 
European refugee crisis. In the deprived district of Overvecht in Utrecht, in late 
2016, an office building was converted into an asylum seeker centre. At this loca-
tion, 400 asylum seekers were expected to live together with 38 local youths. 
Various social activities and learning opportunities were provided to connect asy-
lum seekers/refugees and local residents socially and professionally at the centre, as 
well as to help them generate new business ideas. The project sought to develop 
participants’ ‘futureproof’ skills that would be of benefit to them irrespective of 
whether their future was in the Netherlands or elsewhere. Challenging the national 
approach to reception, characterised by the motto to provide ‘austere but humane’ 
reception (Adviescommissie Vreemdelingenzaken 2013), this initiative aimed to 
diminish the common experience of reception as a time of limbo, boredom and pas-
sivity, to foster more self-determination among participants, and to repair asylum 
seekers’ ‘broken narratives’.2 Through living and learning close to each other, all 
participants were expected to build relationships, gain skills, and ultimately benefit 
from better prospects and wellbeing, with the programme acting as a ‘launchpad’ to 
further success.
1 This chapter is an extended and refined version of an earlier version that was published in Dutch 
(Geuijen et al. 2017). It also draws upon the project interim report (Oliver et al. 2018).
2 Repairing ‘broken narratives’ refers to the ways in which individuals, through telling their stories 
of traumatic events (including illness or injury) are able to engage in ‘narrative reconstruction’. 
These concepts are used in narrative research especially in the fields of sociology of health and 
illness (Hydén and Brockmere 2008).
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This case study is based on two types of data: first, an analysis of documents that 
was undertaken during the second half of 2017, including several versions of the 
plans and the subsidy application that formed the basis for Plan Einstein. Second, in 
the autumn of 2017 interviews were held with the involved partners of Plan Einstein 
and meetings, presentations and other activities were observed. This strand of the 
research is part of a larger research and evaluation of Plan Einstein led by 
Roehampton3 University, London and the University of Oxford (Oliver et al. 2018). 
Other components include monitoring of participation in courses and activities, 
observations of these courses and activities, interviews with asylum seekers, local 
residents, stakeholders and with young people living with Plan Einstein and a sur-
vey among local residents and young people living in the centre. While the analysis 
presented in this chapter has been member-checked by several involved partners, we 
cannot make definitive evaluative claims about this project before it finishes in late 
2018 and the final evaluation is completed.
12.3  Plan Einstein: A Local Experiment
Plan Einstein advanced a new concept: an experimental form of asylum shelter that 
aimed to support asylum seekers in their preparations for the future, wherever they 
may be. That future might be in the Netherlands after being granted a residence 
permit, but might also in the country of origin, after rejection of the asylum applica-
tion, or in a third country, after migrating on. The concept is framed around two 
pillars: firstly, ‘co-learning’ and secondly, ‘co-living’ of asylum seekers with local 
residents of Overvecht.
The co-learning pillar was filled with a variety of activities: The teaching of 
English language in classes, as well as instruction in entrepreneurship via courses 
and coaching. These occurred in a so-called ‘incubator’: a space where people who 
want to start a business could work on the design thereof, and where peer-to-peer 
coaching was available by more experienced entrepreneurs. All courses and coach-
ing were conducted in English, on the basis that the English language can be used 
anywhere in the world. In the project proposal the courses and activities were called 
‘future proof’, referring to how they prepared people for a future anywhere within 
or outside of the Netherlands. All activities were designed to be accessible to all 
asylum seekers from their first day in the asylum seekers reception center (asiel-
zoekerscentrum AZC), supporting an aim that they could use their waiting time 
during the asylum procedure more meaningfully. The development activities would 
also provide a valuable addition to their curriculum vitae, so that they could be both 
better prepared for integration in the Netherlands following the granting of a 
3 From 2019, replaced in the partnership with University College London, following the Principal 
Investigator’s move to a different institution.
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 residence permit, or would be better prepared for onward migration or return to their 
country of origin if their asylum request was rejected.
The courses were not only accessible to the 400 asylum seekers living in the 
reception center, but were also open to local residents to encourage mutual contact 
and co-learning. In addition, housing for local youngsters was created in one wing 
of the asylum seekers’ center, where studios were provided for rental by 38 young 
people. Youngsters were recruited to live there and had to demonstrate how they had 
in some way or another, a relationship with the neighbourhood of Overvecht. In set-
ting this criteria, the project set out to pacify the often expressed objection from 
local residents that asylum seekers receive all sorts of facilities while local residents 
do not. By offering both courses and housing opportunities to asylum seekers and 
local residents, it would also mean that they could come into contact with each other 
more easily, with an expectation is that this would lead to more mutual 
understanding.
12.4  Responding to Local Problems of Asylum Reception 
in the Netherlands
The concept of Plan Einstein was developed to provide an answer to the most 
important problems that traditional asylum reception in the Netherlands was con-
fronting. As with other places in the world, the arrival of large numbers of refugees 
through (forced) migration poses both immediate and longer-term problems in the 
Netherlands. In particular, the integration of many refugees into the labor market 
and housing market has proved difficult. Research into refugees who received a 
residence permit in the Netherlands in the 1990s shows that 20 years later only one 
third of them between the ages of 15 and 64 have a paid job (Engbersen et al. 2015). 
The prospect has not improved for recent groups: one and a half years after receiv-
ing a residence permit, 90% of the 18–64 year old Syrian and Eritrean refugees 
receive social benefits (CBS 2016). Moving on from the reception center (AZC) to 
housing on the regular housing market is also difficult for some groups, so many 
refugees with a residence permit stay unnecessarily long in asylum seekers’ centers, 
compounding the problems of the phase of asylum determination.
In addition, there are problems with deporting rejected asylum seekers to their 
country of origin. Many asylum seekers take up all possible opportunities for legal 
procedures, in order to challenge rejected applications and avoid expulsion. Some 
of the asylum seekers who have been rejected disappear from the asylum reception 
location without giving notice of where they are going; in policy terms: they leave 
‘with unknown destination’. In 2017 there were more than 9000 of these individu-
als, in 2016 about 8000 (Dienst Terugkeer and Vertrek 2018). Many subsequently 
reside without documents in the Netherlands or in another European country 
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(Leerkes et al. 2014). Other rejected asylum seekers on the other hand end up in 
detention for foreigners or in family reception locations with a view to deportation; 
in these cases however, it may be still very is difficult to deport people when they 
refuse to cooperate in obtaining the correct identity and travel documents through 
their national embassies.
A third problematic consequence of asylum migration for the Netherlands con-
cerns the physical location where asylum reception take concrete shape. It is com-
mon that when neighbourhoods are given notice that a (large) asylum seeker center 
will be established, residents react negatively and protests have occurred. Such 
responses happened in several places in the Netherlands, including in the neigh-
bourhood of Overvecht in Utrecht. National media reported on some of the com-
munity meetings held to provide information about the soon to be established AZCs 
(NOS 2016). Research shows that 90% of the Dutch would object to the arrival of a 
large AZC with 500 asylum seekers in the district or municipality and 50% of the 
Dutch object even to the a smaller AZC with 50 asylum seekers (Lubbers et  al. 
2006). In such contexts, we find that even individual housing cannot proceed in 
some instances, because safety can be jeopardized as a result of threats or worse.
A fourth and final problem with asylum reception in the Netherlands concerns 
the length and nature of time asylum seekers have to spend in the AZCs. Asylum 
seekers often stay in reception places for a long period of time, where they can only 
do limited types of activities. For example, they cannot formally learn Dutch and 
only work under specific conditions. Stress and uncertainty characterize their lives, 
which consists mainly of waiting for the outcome of the asylum procedure, followed 
by procedures for achieving family reunification and getting housing (often, as in 
the case of Utrecht, in a saturated local market). Their accommodation involves 
sharing a room with four or five others, and a kitchen and sanitation with more 
people provoking mutual tensions, quarrels and sometimes even violent incidents. 
Asylum seekers mostly have only few contacts outside of the reception center and 
loneliness is common (Engbersen et  al. 2015; Adviescommissie voor 
Vreemdelingenzaken 2013).
The intention of the Plan Einstein experiment was that asylum seekers would 
integrate better into the Netherlands after admission and that there would therefore 
be fewer problems with labour market participation, in turn diminishing pressure on 
the municipal social benefits system. It was also the expected that rejected asylum 
seekers who would have gained better skills through the programme would object 
less to returning to their country of origin since they would feel somewhat facili-
tated to build a new life there. In principle, they might feel less inclined to cling to 
legal procedures in which they would have little chance of receiving a staying per-
mit anyway. Plan Einstein was also intended as a response to strained relations 
between asylum seekers’ centers and the neighborhood, namely by linking direct 
benefits to the neighborhood to the asylum reception centre, both in the form of 
training opportunities and living opportunities. And finally, Plan Einstein was 
intended to make the life of asylum seekers less difficult during the reception phase 
by making it possible to spend their time in a meaningful way while developing a 
future perspective. This would be through facilitating contacts both with young 
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people living in one wing of the center and with people outside the center, helping 
to reduce isolation and loneliness.
12.5  Shifts in the Plan
Plan Einstein is one of several local experiments to address local problems concern-
ing asylum reception and to give substance to the national (and European) policy 
vacuum. However, being an experiment meant that Plan Einstein also had to adjust 
to changes in the context. Since the moment in early 2016 when Plan Einstein was 
designed as an emergency centre, the picture of increased asylum applications 
across Europe during the so-called ‘refugee crisis’ has changed dramatically. 
Particularly following the EU-Turkey ‘refugee deal’ in March 2016, the numbers of 
asylum applications in the Netherlands fell significantly. Indeed just as Plan Einstein 
was being developed in late 2016 and throughout 2017, the COA was closing down 
some emergency and reception centres and reducing occupancy in some other exist-
ing newly opened centres (Swai 2018).
From the outset of the project therefore, the U-RLP project team had to adapt to 
changing circumstances, including an ongoing delay and uncertainty around the 
arrival of asylum seekers to the centre. Early on in the project, from February 2017, 
rather than operating to full capacity, 40 young, male asylum seekers were placed at 
the centre. Following multiple delays, 350 asylum seekers arrived in August 2017. 
The delays created some challenges for partners in the early days of the project, who 
were seeking to fill classes and fulfil their obligations to the project plan. Plan 
Einstein also had to adapt its initial conception as an emergency centre which antici-
pated that asylum seekers would go there immediately after arriving in the 
Netherlands and access courses and activities ‘from day one’. The initial plan 
included short-term courses of 8 weeks as it was assumed that asylum seekers would 
be living in Plan Einstein only for relatively short time-periods. In reality, rather 
than starting at Plan Einstein on day one, those arriving at the centre were more 
diverse, including individuals and families who were at different stages of the asy-
lum procedure, and therefore had already lived in multiple other centres. As a result, 
some individuals were moving quickly through the centre into resettlement, only 
remaining for a matter of days rather than staying for any longer period as expected, 
while others were staying much longer. Data from COA (through a private data 
request from the research team in October 2018) indicate that more than half of the 
people living in the residence center in fact had already obtained some type of resi-
dence permit when living at the centre, be it asylum related or through family reuni-
fication. These people already knew they would stay in the Netherlands so their 
aspirations were oriented to integration, including learning to speak Dutch, getting 
to know Dutch society and norms, as well as building a network.
The ‘futureproof’ approach of Plan Einstein (with activities in English) therefore 
needed some consideration as a result of the changes. The programme showed 
adaptability by allowing participants to follow courses at different levels, thus 
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allowing participants to progress over longer periods of time, and by offering differ-
ent elements of the business incubator program offered by a local social enterprise 
(Social Impact Factory SIF) as a follow up. The programme was also able to meet 
diverging needs of participants by situating the U-RLP offer within the broader, 
complementary integration facilities already operating within the city, for example 
offering the Dutch Taalcafé (Language café) organized by Welkom in Utrecht in the 
centre’s incubator space. The courses were adapted practically too to accommodate 
some difference in languages, with one class for mixed participants in English, one 
class with English-Arabic translation attended by asylum seekers only and some 
further translations brought in. There was also more emphasis on developing highly 
individualized matching and coaching activities (by SIF) to connect refugees to 
appropriate Dutch employers. Learning from the project suggests that flexibility and 
agility in response is vital, where providing different programs for different groups 
might be necessary to offer a truly futureproof programme.
An emerging challenge at the time of writing is that the project was committed 
to close at the pre-set date of November 2018, but suddenly faced the closure of the 
AZC prematurely in September 2018, due to operational reasons by COA. In the 
months preceding the closure, the outlook of certain stakeholders was – understand-
ably  – also changing. For example, the youngsters living at the premises were 
already looking for other housing options, and some project partners also shifted 
their focus towards transferability of the program to the other AZC in the city. 
During this time, there were inevitably some tensions around how to manage with-
drawing an intervention that a range of beneficiaries have committed to and profited 
from (including the asylum seekers, youngsters and the neighbourhood).
12.6  The Realization of Plan Einstein
Plan Einstein was conceived initially by local civil servants in Utrecht, who had 
been working on this theme for 15 years in the city and elsewhere in the Netherlands. 
In doing so, they had been collaborating for some time with NGOs on these issues, 
including the Dutch Council for Refugees, the largest representative of asylum 
seekers and refugees in the Netherlands. The officials had also exchanged ideas and 
interesting examples with colleagues in other cities nationally and internationally 
for some time and were looking for opportunities to come to a ‘solution’ for the 
various problems in asylum reception.
In a way therefore, the ‘refugee crisis’ was perceived at the time by the Utrecht 
civil servants as a window of opportunity (Kingdon 1984) in which Winston 
Churchill’s well known adage applied: ‘Never let a good crisis go to waste.’ The 
preceding years had enabled them already to develop ideas about innovation in asy-
lum reception and enter into partnerships with NGOs. They also saw, in responses 
to the crisis, that there was growing public support for asylum seekers, and this 
might be harnessed within an innovation. Indeed, while in some quarters, the public 
in the Netherlands and in Utrecht were hostile to asylum seekers in this period, 
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locally there were also signs of an emerging welcoming culture. This is evident in 
spontaneous initiatives such as Welcome in Utrecht,4 the Catching Cultures 
Orchestra,5 and restaurant Syr.6 During this moment, the Dutch Council for Refugees 
received more applications from new volunteers than were employable.
The local civil servants worked closely together with the highest ranking civil 
servant within local government. He gave them a personal assignment at the begin-
ning of the ‘refugee crisis’ to develop an innovative approach through which Utrecht 
could take its part in asylum reception. Given this mandate, the local civil servants 
built partnerships with a range of NGOs, SMEs and Universities to develop a new 
approach, experimenting and trialling different solutions through collaborative 
innovation, as well as involving multiple stakeholders in learning and 
development.
The partnership included:
• The City of Utrecht;
• the Dutch Refugee Council (VluchtelingenWerk West en Midden-Nederland, 
VWWMN7) an NGO tasked with asylum-seeker support and brokering;
• Socius Wonen, a housing company with a track record in creating and facilitating 
community living;
• Utrecht University’s Centre for Entrepreneurship: a research institute to teach 
entrepreneurship;
• The People’s University (VolksUniversiteit): an education institute, to provide 
English courses from basic level up to Cambridge Advanced English.
• Social Impact Factory, a foundation stimulating social entrepreneurship, to coach 
participants in developing business ideas.
• Roehampton and Oxford Universities, UK higher education institutions, to con-
duct an independent evaluation and share learning through international knowl-
edge exchange.
In this way, a multisector alliance was created that jointly developed a concrete 
plan and sought broader support and funding for the action. Following a competitive 
process, the plan was co-financed through the Urban Innovative Actions (UIA) pro-
gramme, a funding scheme designed to provide urban areas throughout the European 
Union with resources to experiment and test new and unproven solutions to solve 
urban challenges. This fund was created to contribute to the European urban agenda, 
an agenda which had already received a strong impetus under the Dutch presidency. 
It offered a different way of working, since the usual format for funding regional or 
local initiatives by the European Regional Development Fund was through dividing 
the budgets among the different EU countries, for decisions to be made at the 




7 The regional arm of the Dutch Refugee Council, although from this point in the report the national 
abbreviation of VWN is used as this is how it is referred to colloquially.
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 submitted to national departments. Local officials had been lobbying for years to 
change this method of distribution, since they preferred for regional and local par-
ties themselves to be able to apply for this type of EU subsidy instead of having to 
go through the national departments. Under the UIA funding arrangements, this 
now had become possible while the timing gave the Utrecht alliance the opportunity 
to apply directly for an EU budget without the Ministry of Justice and Security act-
ing as gatekeeper. According to a number of stakeholders, this has made it possible 
for an experimental project such as Plan Einstein to receive a large EU subsidy.
Obtaining the UIA subsidy was also decisive for ameliorating financial objec-
tions from the city council. With available co-financing, different partners and 
stakeholders could find different strengths in the plan. The mayor, the aldermen and 
the City council  – with a majority of D66 (liberals) and GroenLinks (green- 
liberals) – were sensitive to the argument that the problems in the Overvecht district 
could also be reduced by this initiative. The neighbourhood has high rates of unem-
ployment and in comparison to other neighbourhoods, more residents cope with 
personal and social problems including in relation to health, nuisance, crime and 
poverty.8 Plan Einstein could become a vibrant center that could benefit the neigh-
borhood, while yet for these local politicians, it also offered a more humane 
approach to the reception of asylum seekers.
Support was also harnessed at the highest levels in local politics. The alderman 
politically responsible for the project (GroenLinks – green liberals) in particular 
felt strongly involved because the project was aimed at marginalized people: both 
asylum seekers and people from Overvecht. He took pride in the projection of 
Utrecht as a human rights city and ‘inclusive city’ and conveyed this in presenta-
tions that he regularly gave on the project, both in Utrecht and in the rest of the 
Netherlands and abroad. The Mayor (VVD – conservatives) was, by contrast, more 
interested in the entrepreneurial side of Plan Einstein, yet equally his enthusiasm 
also contributed to the acceptance of this type of project within his own party at 
local and national level.
In a similar way, the project was able to appeal to the multiple partners, who had 
different interests and values, because the local officials emphasized different 
aspects of Plan Einstein for them. For the Overvecht district – and especially neigh-
borhood organizations – it was important that Plan Einstein offered opportunities 
for courses and accommodation for young people. This would be expected to help 
reduce the existing tensions between different groups in the neighborhood. As noted 
earlier, following the announcement that there would be an asylum seekers’ center 
in Overvecht, there had been heated meetings in the district where residents 
expressed strong negative reactions to the plan. They felt that there were more than 
enough problems in Overvecht: high unemployment, low education, a prostitution 
zone, people from many different cultural backgrounds, with different languages 
and/or different living rhythms, who have little contact with each other, but who had 
to live in close proximity to each other in cramped high-rise flats. The neighborhood 
organizations, such as the district office, were initially negative about the plans to 
8 https://utrecht.buurtmonitor.nl/
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establish an AZC in Overvecht. This was particularly because Overvecht had for 
10  years been under the so-called ‘power district’ approach, which meant extra 
investments were made in the neighbourhood. Just when it was expected that things 
would start improving in the neighbourhood, this was potentially to be endangered 
by the establishment of an asylum seekers reception center. In response, a ‘neigh-
bourhood sounding board group’ was set up immediately after the announcement of 
the establishment of the asylum seekers reception center. People from the district 
were able to express their opinions regularly and were in turn informed of develop-
ments surrounding the AZC. A so-called ‘neighbourhood safety group’ was also 
created, in which the municipality, police and COA listened weekly to possible 
safety and nuisance complaints from the neighborhood.
On the other hand, the interests of NGOs such as the Dutch Council for Refugees 
were very different. They had been lobbying for a long time to facilitate more mean-
ingful ways for asylum seekers to spend the waiting time during an asylum proce-
dure. In their opinion this was important in itself, but it was also relevant to help 
prepare for better integration afterwards. For them Plan Einstein was an opportunity 
to contribute to these goals and they therefore immediately enthusiastically joined 
the preparation team from the start. Also Welcome in Utrecht – an NGO that was 
founded during the ‘refugee crisis’ of 2015–2016 – saw in Plan Einstein a hub from 
which it was possible to make the lives of asylum seekers less difficult and to bring 
about more social interaction.
For other groups, again the project meant different things. The local social busi-
ness community Plan Einstein provided opportunities to guide new businesses and 
establish links between (social) entrepreneurs and refugees through peer-to-peer 
coaching by Utrecht entrepreneurs. At the same time it might strengthen their 
‘movement’ and represented an opportunity to diversify their local business net-
work. For the knowledge institutes involved, Plan Einstein represented an opportu-
nity to valorise their knowledge, which has recently become an increasingly 
important objective for universities. The Volksuniversiteit saw an opportunity to 
spread its knowledge and skills to a new target group: asylum seekers with different 
levels of English. The Universities of Oxford and Roehampton were interested in 
finding out how such an initiative might have positive effects, and were therefore 
motivated to evaluate this project for a number of years.
12.7  Manoeuvring Multi-level and Multi-sector 
Collaboration
As we have outlined above, the ‘refugee crisis’ of 2015–2016 opened a window of 
opportunity for the realization of the local initiative Plan Einstein. In summary, 
already before the crisis, as we have explained, there were various problems con-
cerning asylum reception that were felt mainly at local level. In addition, a policy 
vacuum arose at national (and European) level. Due to the ‘refugee crisis’, the 
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theme of asylum reception suddenly also attracted the attention of new parties, such 
as social entrepreneurs and knowledge institutes that wanted to use their knowledge, 
skills and network for this theme. Asylum seekers became in some ways ‘the talk of 
the day’ and because the national government and also the local government were 
confronted with enormous (time) pressure to host asylum seekers, this theme was 
high on the agenda, first in the form of emergency relief, but later also in the form 
of more structural care. This was the case too in Utrecht, where the topic received 
attention from the green-liberal majority in the city council. And finally, as asylum 
seekers suddenly became much more important for the ‘urban agenda’, it became 
possible to apply for a subsidy from a recently established EU fund. In this way the 
crisis offered opportunities and the moment and opportunity was seized by local 
officials, in collaboration with the network they had built up.
That the crisis actually offered these opportunities was not accidental. The Plan 
Einstein alliance was able to acquire support and legitimacy as a result of two devel-
opments in the context of broader public governance trends: the increase of multi-
level and multisector collaboration (Sorensen and Torfing 2011) and a trend of 
experimentalist governance (Sabel and Zeitlin 2011). These were the waves on 
which the initiators could sail and which they could use to credibly embed their 
arguments and perspectives.
First, with reference to the broad development of multilevel (vertical) coopera-
tion and multisector (horizontal, public-private) networks, the political scientist 
Benjamin Barber writes in his book ‘If Mayors Ruled the World: Dysfunctional 
Nations, Rising Cities’ (2013) that such partnerships are becoming increasingly 
important, because national states alone cannot solve the major transnational prob-
lems they face today. According to him, they are too ideologically driven and 
focused on protecting national interests. This is not a problem when dealing with 
national policy issues such as housing or education, but the stance is unhelpful in 
solving transnational challenges such as climate change (see also Bulkeley and 
Betsill 2005) or refugee issues. Barber states that city governments are better placed 
to engage with these topics, because they are more pragmatic and inclined to coop-
erate with other cities and with many different partners, including private parties 
and international and supranational organizations (such as the EU). In order to make 
this possible, co-production and co-creation with citizens are becoming more and 
more generally accepted ways to develop meaningful plans and practices.
In line with these trends, various policy domains have been decentralized to cit-
ies in recent years, with cities taking and receiving opportunities for their own inter-
pretations of what to do. In integration policy, cities sometimes choose an 
interpretation that deviates to a greater or lesser extent from the national policy, and 
is sometimes in conflict with it (Dekker et al. 2015). This is called ‘decoupling’ of 
national and local policy, or also the ‘local turn’ in integration policies (Bak 
Jørgensen 2012; Scholten 2013). Plan Einstein can be interpreted as an example of 
this broader development, because it is an ‘urban’ project that deviates from the 
national policy on asylum reception. Plan Einstein was conceived and implemented 
in a dominantly restrictive national context, which it chose manoeuvre within, not 
to confront directly, in order to achieve most success. The initiators chose this 
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 strategy as the most effective way of making this experiment acceptable. If it would 
be too confrontational, it might become vetoed. By manoeuvring cautiously the 
developers created space for the experiment, as we explain below.
The first aspect the initiators manoeuvred was around the national political 
choice to maintain and strictly manage large scale asylum seekers reception centers. 
Plan Einstein was created as an ‘add on’ to a regular large scale reception centre in 
which about 400 asylum seekers were living under the ‘normal’ living conditions in 
AZCs. The COA agency decided who was able live in the reception centre, for how 
long and when they would have to move on again. Asylum seekers had to live in 
similar circumstances as in all other AZCs, which were known to impact their lives 
negatively: sharing rooms and facilities, having to report weekly, experiencing little 
privacy, having physical barriers around the premises and security guards at the 
entrance of the building and having to abide to strict internal regulations etc. So 
while Plan Einstein intended to enhance the wellbeing of asylum seekers and 
improve neighbourhood relations by providing opportunities for co-learning and 
co-living, it had to accept that these goals would be influenced by the conditions 
asylum seekers had to live in.
The second aspect of the national context Plan Einstein had to manoeuvre were 
national political sensitivities around the integration of asylum seekers. Aspects that 
directly fed into integration, such as Dutch language classes are prohibited, in order 
to more easily facilitate the deportation of asylum seekers after the rejection of their 
asylum claim. For this reason Plan Einstein developed the ‘future proof’ approach 
in its education: for example by teaching all course in English. In reality, it trans-
pired that many asylum seekers who lived in the AZC complex of Plan Einstein 
would receive a residence permit after having gone through the asylum application 
process, because many of the came from Syria and Eritrea: countries to which 
hardly anybody would be deported. In this case, asylum seekers might have benefit-
ted too from learning Dutch and preparing for jobs in the Netherlands, as most of 
them expressed a desire to do.
The third aspect in which Plan Einstein manoeuvered its political context was by 
designing and implementing a project that would benefit the neighbourhood as well 
as the asylum seekers. As public opinion was partly welcoming and partly negative 
towards asylum seekers the initiators of Plan Einstein decided that providing tan-
gible benefits to the neighbourhood (housing for youngsters, free education) might 
positively impact politics and public opinion on refugees by showing that good rela-
tions between asylum seekers and the neighbourhood ‘can be done’.
In this sense, we see Plan Einstein as an example of the local turn, but not to the 
extent of complete decoupling: the initiators of the project worked within the 
national political and administrative context instead of against it.
The European funding of the project also helped to bypass local and national 
objections to the Plan, since with financing available, there was not too much risk 
involved. As a result, the Ministry of Justice and Security did not stop the urban 
experiment of Plan Einstein, and in the most recent coalition agreement (2017: 55), 
the government explicitly created ‘municipal experimental space’ concerning the 
integration of refugees. Urban experiments provide positive opportunities for  testing 
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things out, but they circumvent the danger that the policy must be adopted whole-
sale immediately. This also helps explain why the implementation agency COA 
took advantage of this opportunity by enabling collaboration with this experiment, 
wherein the local AZC organization was closely involved with Plan Einstein, but not 
one of the partners. The partners of Plan Einstein could therefore exploit the trend 
of multilevel and multisector collaboration, and were able to present Plan Einstein 
as an example of this kind of widely supported cooperation processes.
The development of Plan Einstein can also be understood from another perspec-
tive, being the trend of experimental governance (Sabel and Zeitlin 2011). In experi-
mentalist governance, it is recognized that top-down blueprint thinking in policy no 
longer fits in a time when problems have become extremely complex and contexts 
are highly variable. In the case of unruly policy controversies, such as the climate 
crisis and the asylum issue, adaptiveness, flexibility and innovation are required 
(Scholten 2013; Sengers et al. 2016). This is increasingly being organized through 
multilevel and multi-sector collaboration, so-called collaborative innovation 
(Sørensen and Torfing 2011) with an ‘innovation orientation’ penetrating through-
out the public sector. Plan Einstein is also based on this experimental approach: 
initially a plan was developed, including the key aspect that, during the course of its 
implementation, it was expected that choices were adjusted or reconsidered if there 
was reason to do so. In this sense, it was experiment as learning by doing.
12.8  Conclusions
Plan Einstein was intended as a way to tackle the problems that had arisen in the 
existing asylum reception in the Netherlands. The plan tried to find a balance 
between protecting refugees on the one hand and protecting national economic, 
socio-cultural and security interests on the other. This concept was developed in the 
context of a scale mismatch, where management and the debate of the issue was 
taking place traditionally at national level, but the problems were felt at the local 
level. There was, as a result something of an impasse. These contexts help explain 
why the Plan Einstein initiators opted for an urban experiment, which might ulti-
mately also then work to influence national policy. In this experiment, partners from 
public, private and social sectors worked together (multisector) and they did this 
simultaneously on multiple levels of government (multilevel).
Above we have explained why it is precisely at this time and in this place that 
policy entrepreneurs (Kingdon 1984) succeeded in bringing about such an experi-
ment. A number of aspects proved to be crucial in the process. Firstly, it was linking 
already well-developed alternatives to suddenly emerging problems: local officials 
had worked together with others for years on developing their ideas about alterna-
tive forms of asylum reception. Due to the ‘refugee crisis’, chaos had arisen and in 
the short term, local emergency relief had to be arranged. Parties were open to all 
good suggestions in this context and therefore were open also to this proposal. A 
second crucial aspect was the establishment of public-private partnerships that were 
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an extension of, and built on, existing alliances between the municipal partners and 
NGOs. This enabled the creation of a partnership in which some of the partners 
already knew each other, trusted each other and were able to build on earlier meth-
ods. At the same time, new partners were brought in who could introduce innova-
tion: new ideas, perspectives, knowledge and skills. The broad objectives of the 
project made it possible for various partners to emphasize and prioritize different 
parts of the experiment. Thirdly, the availability of European funding for the project 
was an important driver and helped to refute financial concerns.
On a theoretical level, we can interpret the creation of local experiments in the 
recalcitrant policy controversy regarding asylum reception on the basis of concepts 
of experimental governance and multilevel governance. Urban experiments are part 
of these larger developments in policy: it is widely accepted that innovation takes 
place through experiments and that cities and local alliances have a greater role now 
that it appears that national states are not capable of answering these kinds of issues 
on their own. However we need to nuance conclusions which would indicate that 
this is an example of ‘decoupling’ between different levels of integration gover-
nance. Constraints in the national context proved to be crucial factors, influencing 
what the experiment was able to establish. These constraints result in local policy 
entrepreneurs creating space by manoeuvring within the national context, nibbling 
at structural constraints: neither openly fighting national government and its agen-
cies, nor ignoring them.
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13.1  The View
The first section of the book highlights the effects of a fundamental mismatch 
between the logics underlying the mobility of refugees and those determining the 
ambition and capabilities of states to govern such mobility. This tension arises on 
several levels of governance; the European, the national as well as the sub-national. 
As the Italian example (Semprebon and Pelacani, Chap. 2) demonstrates, asylum 
seeking migrants desire certain destinations over others. Preferences may for 
instance result from the presence of relatives in a particular place or the reputation 
of a country as being generous or having well-organized reception structures. As a 
result, it is not surprising that there is considerable transit migration in the countries 
along the European Union’s external borders, such as the Italian case shows. This 
transit-migration is by policy makers commonly referred to as “secondary move-
ment” for reasons of a different logic, one that follows from the structure of the 
Common European Asylum System: the first country of arrival is responsible for an 
asylum request and the reception of the applicant. Until recently (i.e. in the after-
math of the ‘refugee crisis’) this principle tended to be loosely applied by the 
Southern member states allowing for considerable onward migration. Not fully 
applying the rules served the national interest while reducing burdens to the asylum 
system. Obviously fuller effectuation of the principle serves the interests of the 
majority of member states while reducing their “burden” but inevitably reduces the 
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possibilities for refugees to cross into another member state. On a lower scale, this 
creates stresses as well: the numbers of refugees that require reception grows and 
the nature of the reception changes too. People in transit turn into people who 
remain, albeit unwillingly. Certain localities in border regions thus unexpectedly 
face the need to integrate refugees into their housing and labor markets. Like 
between states, they maybe tempted to shift the presumed or actual burden onto 
neighboring localities or regions. These processes in turn may considerably impact 
local civic support and find translation in politics on all levels. In other words, deci-
sions and actions on any given level resonate between the other levels of governance.
Whereas in Southern Europe refugee reception tends to be loosely organized, 
further north the traditional welfare states tend to take more control. Their desire to 
make and keep populations “legible” (Scott 1998) in order to (among other goals) 
both care for and control them (see Agier 2011 for examples from Africa), together 
with the expected benefits of the economies of scale this leads to the establishment 
of large asylum seeker accommodations. Kreichauf (Chap. 3) and Göler (Chap. 4) 
extensively demonstrate how this results in holding facilities for hundreds of asylum 
seekers who are in the process of status determination. Oftentimes, these facilities 
(or camps, as both Göler and Kreichauf refer to them) are at geographically isolated 
locations thus reducing interaction with wider society. And even when their location 
is not isolated by their distance (literally or practically by lack of transportation) 
they are so by the presence of obvious demarcations such as fences, walls and gates, 
as well as the presence of security staff. Since such facility needs not to be inte-
grated in its environment and the location thus does not matter, Göler, while refer-
ring to the work of Auge (1995), conceptualizes them as “non-places”. Unavoidably 
then, this leads to a sense of alienation among those who are meant to reside there. 
Likewise, the geographical distance and the demarcations of the camp render the 
residents as aliens and effectively underline their otherness in the eyes of the resi-
dent population. This effect is possibly more consequential than the alienation of the 
asylum seekers per se. Normally the duration of their residency is brief and will be 
followed by further integration or (attempts at) deportation. The physical structure 
of the “camp” is likely to be more permanent and so are its signifying and hence 
political consequences. Kreichauf (Chap. 3) finds this to be an explicit goal of recent 
Danish politics and refers to the process as one of “campization”.
Kreichauf (ibd.) furthermore describes how the Danish government introduced 
conditionality in refugee protection, a trend seen elsewhere in Europe as well. 
Whereas earlier on recognition of a refugee status meant full acceptance and fast- 
track integration, nowadays society’s membership can be made conditional on the 
fulfillment of integration requirements, oftentimes based on the refugee’s accep-
tance or better still embracement of society’s core values. Duyvendak and Tonkens 
(2016) refer to this as the “culturalization of citizenship”. Failing to pass exams that 
test the adaptation to the national “culture”, virtues and skills may result in less 
favorable treatment by the state. It could and probably should be argued that this 
trend towards ‘conditionality’ is at odds with the spirit of Chap. 4 of the Geneva 
Convention, which stipulates that refugees should be granted the most favourable 
treatment allotted to other non-citizens.
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Once asylum seekers have been identified by the authorities as eligible for pro-
tection, which either results in a refugee status, subsidiary protection (usually 
because returning the asylum seeker would expose them to severe risks) or some 
other residence status, their housing, integration into the labour market or into edu-
cation becomes the next concern. As several contributions to this volume show, it 
matters where one ends up. It also matters whether the sequence just mentioned 
(arrival, temporary accommodation and asylum adjudication, acceptance and (only 
then) steps towards further integration) are strictly adhered to or not, and how much 
time lapses before it is complete.
The precise location in which asylum seeking migrants who received a residence 
status start their integration process is of considerable consequence even though the 
wider, i.e. national, setting, in terms of resources, regulations and political climate, 
is of considerable significance as well. Obviously, it is at the local level that per-
sonal interactions take place and experiences are made, where refugees find work or 
not, go to school and receive training. And, as Ponzo and Pogliano (Chap. 6) show, 
the framing of refugee integration as a policy and political issue is also very much 
done locally. In line with the finding of Geuijen et al. (Chap. 12) and Doomernik 
and Ardon (2018), local policy makers tend to the view that integrating refugees 
(and other migrants) functions best when dealt with in a pragmatic, i.e. non- 
ideological, manner. Pogliano and Ponzo (Chap. 6) provide two local case studies 
that demonstrate how local policy communities are most effective in achieving their 
aim, if this is clearly defined in practical, pragmatic terms and not fraught by ideo-
logical differences of opinion. This then allows for the definition of a clear policy 
frame, which is easily and consistently conveyed to local media who subsequently 
reproduce, and by doing so, strengthen support for the policy frame. And conversely, 
policy communities not united around pragmatism fail to convey a strong and clear 
frame and thus generate less support through the local media. Not in all countries 
local media are equally prominent, but the gist of their argument could well be 
generalizable.
In spite of local governments’ usual benevolent intentions towards refugees, for-
mal rules do not always allow equal support to all of them. Ravn et al. (Chap. 7) 
make this concrete by the example of young refugees who turn 18. Once they for-
mally have become adults, a different support regime applies to them and they lose 
access to facilities that are typically geared towards minors. The support gap this 
results in is being bridged by a coalition of local actors (civil society as well as 
municipal) who then are faced with the need to differentiate between those who are 
most likely to benefit from extra resources (translated into access to housing and 
training) and those who are less so. In the Antwerp case, on which Ravn et al. base 
their discussion, this discretion results in striking a balance between more or less 
deservingness. A paradoxical outcome is that those who are socially or psychologi-
cally most disadvantaged are least likely to receive support.
Geuijen et al. (Chap. 12) present the case of the Einstein-plan in the Dutch city 
of Utrecht. It is the story of a local government, with a notable role for activist civil 
servants, which viewed the “asylum crisis” as an opportunity for increasing its role 
in refugee integration and offering an innovative approach. Dutch asylum policies 
13 Conclusion
264
are highly centralized which leaves little agency for the local level. The authors, 
referring to the work of Castells (2008), show how this easily leads to “scales mis-
match” while problems manifest themselves in other locations and to other actors 
than those placed at the (higher) scale where these are the subjects of policy making. 
This observation is surely valid beyond the city of Utrecht and the Netherlands.
Asylum seekers tend to be moved between reception centers throughout the 
country before they are finally resettled in a municipality according to a distribution 
procedure. Depending on the availability of housing, which is usually scarce, this 
can take much longer than the actual adjudication process. Only once this resettle-
ment has been realized can integration actually commence. In Utrecht (and else-
where) this was viewed as inefficient. Rather the integration process should be 
allowed to start from the moment of arrival; i.e. already before the outcome of the 
asylum request is known. Moreover, the Utrecht approach aims to keep these asy-
lum seekers as permanent residents (unless their request is rejected). Even though 
looking for employment is illegal for anyone without a residence permit, at least 
social integration is made easier by this approach, which accommodates asylum 
seekers, refugees and young locals in a single venue. This latter element appeared 
to be essential: when Dutch public discourse is negative about receiving (more) 
asylum seekers this tends to be about scarce resources, notably social housing, that 
are unequally handed out to refugees. The Einstein project found its public support 
by explicitly including local interests. Moreover, funding necessary for the project 
was found by going beyond the national level, i.e. by a subsidy from the European 
Regional Development’s Fund (Urban Innovative Action). The mismatch between 
scales thus appears to have resulted in creative innovations which would fit under 
the broad heading of “experimentalist governance”, modes of policy development 
through channels other than those of traditional hierarchical architectures and their 
bureaucratic inhabitants when these are no longer adequate to cope with present day 
issues, notably those that are related to or result from European policy harmonisa-
tion and integration.
Reflecting on Simonovit’s piece on Hungary (Chap. 8), it would appear in few 
European countries refugee protection is as emotionally charged, and in a negative 
manner, as it is in Hungary. As is hard to ignore, the country’s government is very 
outspoken on the matter and refuses to implement the EU’s Common European 
Asylum System in as far as this would result in the acceptance and integration of 
refugees. As Simonovits (ibd.) notices, this refusal finds significant support in the 
Hungarian population. She also finds, this support seems to a considerable extent 
based on irrational fears for migrants in general. Causality in the relationship 
between public opinion and political rhetoric may be a difficult issue, but the 
Hungarian government appears to be quite willing to heighten and exploit such 
fears instead of offering reasoned arguments for political action. Aside from chal-
lenges this creates for the future of joint European asylum and refugee policies, the 
other burning question is how state level positions play out on the local level. Can 
cities still be pragmatic forces for integration in spite of those? And are local gov-
ernments willing to be more receptive in the first place?
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Many of the chapters in this volume show or at least are suggestive of a local turn 
in asylum policies and notably in authority over refugee reception, to bring these in 
line with local political concerns and lessen scale mismatches. This would be fitting 
in a trend towards a gradual federalization of asylum and refugee policies in a 
Common European Asylum System, which would allow local governments to ask 
for resources from the European level instead of, or in addition to, the national one. 
From a multi-level governance perspective one could suggest this then to become a 
new vertical division of labour and competences. The Austrian case study by Müller 
and Rosenberger (Chap. 5), however, seems to suggest something else: the division 
of tasks and authority can also oscillate with the tide of political expediency and 
need for stress relief. Under the pressure of high arrival rates, national government 
may have no alternative but to enlist municipal support. Municipalities recognize 
this as an opportunity to increase their authority and act accordingly (see also 
Geuijen et al. in Chap. 12). Once stress on the system receded and Austrian national 
elections brought to power a government with a right-wing migration agenda, the 
governance of asylum is being retrenched to the national level and replaced by a 
‘campization’ model (cf. Kreichauf in Chap. 3). A dynamic process along scales of 
governance may well offer an alternative perspective on the evolution of national 
and European responses to unexpectedly large numbers of asylum seekers.
Adam et al. (Chap. 10) go into the importance of housing as a prerequisite for 
integration. As we already discussed in relation to refugee camps, social and geo-
graphical distance are severe and obvious impediments to integration. In these 
cases, this may be the intended consequence. However, once asylum seekers have 
been accepted, this would be counterproductive. Yet, peripheral housing is often 
easiest available, whereas at desirable locations prices are likely to be high, social 
rental sectors to be small, and competition therefore severe. This is definitely the 
case in the Western part of Germany, where the authors did two case studies. They 
find that even when a city (here Cologne) has well-developed housing policies for 
refugees, scarcity in times of high inflows is unavoidable if this city is also a gener-
ally desired location for people to move to. Given the overall urbanization trend this 
is likely to result in social-economic segregation in general and that of newly arrived 
refugees in particular. Indeed Adam et  al. find that refugees thus live in group 
accommodations for a prolonged period of time, which keeps them from developing 
the bonding and bridging ties that are vital to the integration process.
Studying the integration of young adult refugees who ended up in Germany’s 
sparsely populated eastern periphery, Glorius and Schondelmayer (Chap. 9) found 
that stakeholders tend to have varying ideas about what should be achieved in order 
for integration to have been accomplished. School administrators, for instance, tend 
to understand integration as formal inclusion into the (educational) system without 
showing much interest in the general well-being of their pupils. This results in mis-
matches between what the system offers and requires of students and the needs of 
those students themselves. Teachers, who actually interact with these students try to 
close the resulting gaps. Here the local setting is of crucial importance as it to vary-
ing extents limits and determines the scope of their interventions. The case study 
area is a remote rural area with long commuting times, little educational 
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 opportunities, lack of diversity and a skeptical or downright hostile social environ-
ment. Moreover, the resulting general trend of out-migration was projected by 
stakeholders on the refugees’ futures too. In other words: this regional case again 
underscores the importance of the understanding of a complicated interplay of local 
effects on the integration process, be they positive or negative.
Going through the collection of chapters, more or less explicitly the vital role of 
civil society actors becomes apparent. Its role is complementary to those of govern-
mental institutions, it functions to build bridges and to fill policy gaps. In a Bavarian- 
based case study, Hoppe-Seyler (Chap. 11) focuses on volunteers, whose 
involvement, notably when the “asylum crisis” was at its peak, has been widely 
noted. Interestingly, these volunteers appear not so much driven by ideological 
motives but by the desire to engage in new social relations with each other and refu-
gees, and helping in pragmatic ways. It appears many want to stay clear of the wider 
politics of asylum and integration and are simply motivated to do what seems neces-
sary on an interpersonal level. At the same time they cannot escape the fact that 
those issues have become politically highly charged. Here Germany offers a very 
explicit example of a more general trend: it moved from the almost euphoric moment 
of Chancellor Merkel’s open-door approach and Germans greeting asylum seekers 
with flowers and gifts when arriving by train in 2015 to the general elections of 
2017 which showed meanwhile considerable support for the right-wing “Alternative 
for Germany”/“Alternative für Deutschland” (AfD) with its anti-refugee agenda had 
developed, as well as the overall much more critical appreciation in the media of 
what actually had happened since 2015. Here on the local level, individuals are 
touched by the failed implementation of the Common European Asylum System, 
which otherwise would have put much less pressure on Germany’s integration 
capacities and thus might have resulted in smaller electoral support for the AfD.
13.2  Further Research
This volume merely offers a flavour of what the local consequences were of the 
2015 ‘refugee crisis’ and its aftermath. It is a story with many protagonists, each 
with its own narrative and plot development, leading to as yet unknown endings (if 
we assume there exists such a thing in real life world). In order to better understand 
the storylines, explain their dynamics and chart their likely futures, the highlights of 
the present collection of studies suggests the following obvious lines of inquiry:
It has been amply demonstrated that refugee integration happens and is governed 
first and foremost at the local level, by local actors. These local actors act in the 
wider settings and are constrained and/or supported by higher levels of governance. 
They also organize horizontally with likeminded partners and as such engage in 
vertical relationships. The latter processes deserve more study, in terms of quantity 
and in a more systematic study of local governance of refugee integration.
As a method, it seems to pay to adopt a perspective that puts the local experience 
central: “looking up from below” should help better understand how gaps between 
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politics, policies, laws, mandates, on all governance levels, as well as scale mis-
matches translate into local realities.
We would suggest there is considerable skepticism in certain member states 
about the fundamental need to protect refugees, about the feasibility of refugee 
integration, and about the social, cultural and economic benefits to be gained from 
accepting refugees. The Hungarian case is a clear one in point but more overall as 
well national governments appear less inclined towards a positive take on these 
issues, as is exemplified by the “campization” trend we observed. We already sug-
gested this could have considerable direct impact on the refugee integration process 
but also have a signifying effect on local communities and society at large. These 
effects merit more attention.
Housing is a crucial element of refugee integration. This is so for the obvious 
reason that decent housing is a pre-condition for integration in all other societal 
areas. Additionally, the location of housing has consequences for the outcome of 
this wider integration process: e.g. distance to work has an effect on employment 
and income, which in turn has effects on educational outcomes, and the social set-
ting may deeply effect people’s well-being. Since housing is such a basic need, its 
availability or rather lack thereof also deeply affects resident populations. Further 
study of local housing markets and social housing schemes are thus highly relevant 
for a proper appreciation of refugee integration in its widest meaning.
We assume national skepticism to result in local political responses and grass- 
root opposition. In terms of multi-level governance this may result in decoupling 
(Scholten and Penninx 2016) and independent policy making efforts, implicitly or 
explicitly opposing national policies. All through Europe cities become vocally in 
favor of refugee reception, not least in those states where the national take on offer-
ing asylum is skeptical or downright negative, in line with the sanctuary city move-
ment in the United States. Interesting and innovative findings on political 
mobilization and their effectiveness in multi-level settings could be expected from 
systematic trans-Atlantic comparisons.
Whereas the concept of multi-level governance offers a suitable frame for a 
transatlantic comparison of federal arrangements, for the EU as such the question 
would rather be how within the formal framework, and by making use of its strengths 
and resources, “experimentalist governance” offers durable remedies for the fail-
ings of the current Common European Asylum System. Experimentalist governance 
may offer flexibility and establish new relationships between actors when pre- 
conceived policy methods do not deliver what local actors (and possibly also the 
member states) require in order to reach their policy goals (Sabel and Zeitlin 2012). 
In effect, Europeanization may well fundamentally reconfigure the role of the local, 
and notably the city, in the asylum policy domain.
Lastly, because refugee admission normally is a national affair and a lengthy 
process, refugee integration from a policy perspective is conceptualized as a process 
taking place outside, or next to, wider social dynamics. We saw that local policy 
makers and civil society actors tend to oppose such a separation and favor a main-
streaming approach. More case studies could help identify the conditions under 
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